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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the contribution of management and leadership 
development (MLD) for middle managers. Its central hypothesis is that MLD plays 
an important role in enabling strategic change through middle managers, but that 
greater contextualisation is required to understand the precise nature of its effects 
and its limitations. The thesis builds on organisational contingency theory (Mintzberg 
1979) to develop and test a model of changes to middle management roles and 
associated outcomes of MLD.  
 
The thesis differentiates between the MLD options of management development, 
leader development and leadership development (Day 2001) and hypothesises a 
range of MLD outcomes across organisational types. For its empirical base, the 
thesis focuses on public service organisations (PSOs), in which substantial 
investments in MLD have been made at all levels of management in recent years. 
Three case studies show how, as PSOs seek greater flexibility, the devolution of a 
broader range of responsibilities to middle managers creates various development 
needs according to different directions of organisational change.  
 
The thesis finds that: i) when the machine bureaucracy divisionalises, investment in 
line management training makes a significant contribution to organisational stability, 
while leader development is most effective in the customer-facing divisions of the 
business; ii) when the safety bureaucracy professionalises, investment in 
competence-based management development and leader development can 
successfully promote more participatory forms of management, but that the potential 
for political obstacles to MLD is accentuated; and iii) when the professional 
bureaucracy adhocratises, investment in MLD makes a significant contribution to 
balancing ongoing organisational effectiveness with the building of adaptive capacity 
for the future.  
 
The thesis adds to academic knowledge of MLD options and their expected 
outcomes. The thesis also develops the academic literature by contextualising 
changes to middle management roles and explaining the contingent role of MLD in 
organisational change.  
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Chapter 1. Middle management roles and skills 
 
It would…be very nice if someone would do a bit more research on the basic 
question of what sort of differences management can make, and when. (Pollitt 2003: 
171 - emphasis in original) 
 
 
This thesis investigates management and leadership development (MLD) for middle 
managers. Its central hypothesis is that MLD for middle managers makes an 
important contribution to strategic organisational change, but that greater 
contextualisation is required to understand the precise nature of its effects and its 
limitations.  
 
Middle managers represent an important group in organisations, performing a 
critical function between strategic and front-line management (Floyd and Wooldridge 
1992,  1994,  1997, Currie and Procter 2001, Huy 2002, Balogun 2003). As 
organisations seek greater flexibility, they tend to devolve broader sets of 
responsibilities down to middle and front-line managers (Dopson and Stewart 1990, 
Cunningham and Hyman 1999, Hales 2006/7). Learning and development priorities 
arise from such devolution (Currie and Procter 2005, Hales 2006/7), leading 
organisations to make investments in MLD activities, particularly for those managers 
below the senior management level (Storey 2004b: 6-7).  
 
MLD is not a simple instrument of organisational change. It exhibits a variety of aims 
and methods (Day 2001, Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008), and its effectiveness is 
influenced by a range of contextual factors (Mole 2000, Thomson et al. 2001). 
Although the importance of a conducive organisational climate for achieving 
effectiveness in MLD is well understood (Kirkpatrick 1994, Van Velsor and 
McCauley 2004), there has been little research into the effect of organisational type. 
This is surprising in view of the supposed relationship between MLD and the pursuit 
of strategic organisational goals. The question of the extent to which MLD’s 
contribution is influenced by organisational contingencies represents a key gap in 
the literature.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to identify the precise role of MLD for middle managers in 
enabling strategic changes across key organisational types. It develops a theoretical 
model with four main elements: i) middle management roles and skill-sets according 
to different types of organisation, namely the machine bureaucracy (and its variant, 
the safety bureaucracy), the divisionalised form, the professional bureaucracy and 
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the adhocracy (Mintzberg 1979); ii) expected changes to these middle management 
roles, as organisations seek greater flexibility through strategies of divisionalisation, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation (c.f. Hales 2001: 128-59); iii) the MLD 
options associated with these organisational change strategies, including 
management development, leader development and leadership development (Day 
2001); and iv) the expected multi-levelled outcomes (Kirkpatrick 1958, 1994, 
Martineau 2004, Tyler 2004) of the different combinations of MLD intervention.  
 
The model is tested through three organisational case studies of MLD for middle 
managers. The empirical focus is the public services, where substantial investments 
in MLD have been made at all levels of management in recent years, and in which 
different types of bureaucratic work organisations and their directions of change are 
clearly identifiable. The case organisations – a train operating company, a fire 
brigade, and a social services department - are selected to represent 
divisionalisation in the machine bureaucracy, professionalisation in the safety 
bureaucracy, and adhocratisation in the professional bureaucracy respectively.  
 
The case studies show that: i) when the machine bureaucracy divisionalises, 
investment in line management training makes a significant contribution to 
organisational stability, while leader development is at its most effective in the 
customer-facing divisions of the business; ii) when the safety bureaucracy 
professionalises, investment in competence-based management development and 
leader development can successfully promote more participatory forms of 
management, but that political obstacles to MLD are accentuated in this type of 
organisational change; and iii) when the professional bureaucracy adhocratises, 
investment in the full range of MLD options makes a significant contribution to 
balancing ongoing organisational effectiveness with the building of adaptive capacity 
for the future.  
 
This first chapter sets out the initial theoretical conditions underpinning the enquiry 
into the contribution of MLD for middle managers. In its first section, the current 
state of knowledge of middle management is reviewed, and it is argued that the 
tendency in the academic literature to build a universal model of the middle 
management function should be inverted, instead taking a theory of organisational 
differences as the point of departure. To this end, the second section analyses the 
‘middle line’ within Mintzberg’s organisational typology and discusses the value of 
his contingency theory for understanding changes to middle management. The third 
section then develops its own typology of contingent middle management roles and 
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skill-sets. The fourth section analyses the expected effects of organisational change 
on middle management roles and skill requirements. Organisational change is 
understood in terms of movement between the Mintzbergian organisational types 
through strategies of divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation. The 
accompanying changes to middle management roles and skills are then modelled 
according to these three directions of organisational change. The final section 
explains the remaining structure of the thesis and how its key arguments are 
constructed.  
  
 
1.1 Middle management and the limits of a universal model 
 
Who are the middle managers? What do they do, and how has this changed? Such 
questions, in the search for a universal model, have characterised most academic 
enquiry into the middle management function. However, as Grugulis observes, 
managerial work is “remarkably wide-ranging and resistant to definition” (2007:133) 
and when seeking to develop managers it is perhaps more fruitful to “focus on the 
differences between managers rather than seeking to emphasise what they share” 
(p.154). In a similar vein, Hales (2006/7: 36-37) argues that, as organisations 
change and alter their management roles, it is pertinent not only to ask ‘what is 
happening to middle and front-line managers’ jobs’, but also ‘what they are for’. This 
section reviews the academic literature, which is shown to provide important insights 
into how middle managers link the strategic and operational activities of 
organisations, but which is also shown to be limited by a lack of context-specific 
models.  
 
Middle managers are worthy of study as a group. Since the emergence of large 
industrial and service organisations with several hierarchical tiers, they have 
continued to be significant in a quantitative sense, despite the enthusiasm for the 
‘delayering’ of organisational hierarchies in the 1980s and early 1990s (Livian 1997, 
Vouzas et al. 1997). However, precise measurement of the number of managers in 
this specific group is difficult to achieve. In the UK, the 2004 Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey reports the Standard Occupational Classification of ‘Managers and 
senior officials’ as accounting for 11 per cent of the workforce in the 90 per cent of 
organisations that employed managers (Kersley et al. 2006: 24). But international 
statistical comparisons of managers are problematic (Bournois and Livian 1997, 
Elias and McKnight 2001).  For example, the 2002 European Labour Force Survey 
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reported only 3.5 per cent of German workers describing themselves as managers 
or officials (TUC 2005).  
 
The difficulty in measuring the number of middle managers is underlined by deeper 
definitional problems. The most logical way of defining middle managers is to 
identify the group between senior and front-line managers in the organisational 
hierarchy. In this sense, middle managers are necessarily managers of other, more 
junior managers. However, as Livian (1997) points out, ‘middleness’ can have 
several dimensions: 
 
middle of a command hierarchy; middle in terms of time-scale and scope of decision 
between strategic and routine supervision; middle in terms of organizational impact, 
between fundamental and inconsequential. (Livian 1997: 4)  
 
 
Within this wider perspective, middle managers can include two broad groups of 
personnel: i) those with some responsibility for the work of others and some 
hierarchical authority in the ‘middle stretch’ of organisational hierarchies; and ii) 
professionals who exercise a degree of control over their own work, and therefore 
indirect control over the work of others (Livian 1997: 5). The middle management 
group is broadened considerably by the inclusion of professionals, such as 
accountants and engineers (c.f. Grugulis 2007: 136), who in the UK comprise a 
further 12 per cent of organisations’ workforces, with 46 per cent of professionals 
holding responsibility for supervising other staff (Kersley et al. 2006: 24).  
 
Greater definitional precision can be achieved by identifying what middle managers 
are conventionally responsible for in organisations, and what they actually do. A 
comprehensive outline is provided by Hales (2006/7), who points out that, while 
there are both different levels and types of middle managers (p.32), their defining 
characteristic is their responsibility for “either the operational effectiveness of a 
meso-level unit and/or its performance as a cost/profit centre” (p.33). The tasks 
associated with this responsibility are:  
 
 Direction, co-ordination and control of the operation of the unit. 
 Deployment of resources within the unit. 
 External relations with others inside the organisation and external parties. 
 Reporting and accounting for smoothness of operations and/or level of business 
performance that ensued. 
(Hales 2006/7: 33) 
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These lead to the following activities:  
 
 Linking strategy and operations by transmitting and implementing policy and 
regulations, planning and co-ordinating a number of units, briefing and directing 
subordinate managers, allocating work and reporting on operational, financial and/or 
market performance. 
 Deploying human, financial and physical resources through recruitment and 
selection, training and development, appraisal and motivation of managers reporting 
to them; negotiating and managing budgets and controlling expenditure; and 
managing inbound and outbound logistics. 
 Liaising with other units within the organisation, to maintain workflow, co-ordinate 
activities, trade and provide services and information and liaising with external 
parties such as suppliers, distributors/agents and customers/clients. 
(ibid.) 
 
 
This outline is helpful in demonstrating the variety of activities involved in managing 
in the middle of the organisational hierarchy, including both specialist and generalist 
tasks, upward and downward communication and internal and external liaison. It 
illustrates why middle managers have traditionally been seen as the organisational 
‘linking pins’ (Likert 1961), a view which is echoed in more recent research on 
managerial work by Mintzberg (2009: 138), who finds that middle management is 
the place in which the organisation best integrates its activities.   
 
In the late-twentieth century, however, the contribution of middle management 
became closely scrutinised, with middle managers becoming popular targets for 
redundancy in the 1980s and early 1990s  (Currie and Procter 2005: 1328). The 
delayering of organisations through the removal of middle managers was an 
important element of the search to find more flexible alternatives to tall, centralised 
bureaucratic structures in response to perceived changes in the business 
environment. The specific concerns were – and still are - that: i) increasingly well-
educated employees demand less supervision and more autonomy at work; ii) more 
turbulent and uncertain operating environments require greater organisational agility 
and responsiveness; iii) reductions in managerial overheads are enabled by ever 
more sophisticated information technology; and iv) such reductions are required in 
the face of continually increasing international competitive pressures (Livian 1997, 
Hales 2001: 151).  
 
The underlying criticism of middle managers, especially in the popular management 
literature, has been that they represent a blockage between the organisation’s 
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strategy and operations, rather an efficient linking function. Scarbrough and Burrell 
(1996) caricature this negative perception of middle managers as follows:  
 
[Middle managers] are costly, resistant to change, a block to communication both 
upwards and downwards. They consistently underperform; they spend their time 
openly politicking rather than in constructive problem solving. They are reactionary, 
under-trained and regularly fail to act as entrepreneurs (1996, cited in Balogun 2003: 
70). 
 
Yet, as Fenton O’Creevy (2001) has pointed out, it would be unsurprising if middle 
managers did not resist organisational change at times, as they may find 
themselves both the target and the agent of change (cited by Balogun 2003: 70). 
Moreover, the apparent durability of the middle management group, despite the 
pressures of the late-twentieth and early-twenty first century business environment, 
suggests that they continue to play an important role in organisations and exercise 
significant influence.  
 
Performing the key linking role of middle management is plainly not a 
straightforward functional matter. It is a complex process of negotiation and 
exchange (Watson 1994), in which the different hierarchical groups of managers 
have bounded cognitive capacity. As Boxall and Purcell (2008) explain line 
managers’ sometimes less than enthusiastic adoption of new human resource 
management (HRM) policies:  
 
Line managers are not necessarily trying to be perverse. They are often trying to 
make the organisation function effectively….[A]t times, line managers help to keep a 
sinking ship afloat. At other times, they may be letting a policy die that they think is 
unworkable or against their interests (Boxall and Purcell 2008: 219). 
 
Clearly, there are a number of roles that middle managers have to play according to 
changing circumstances. The question is which middle managerial roles are the 
most important, and whether these have altered in recent years.  
 
The main academic debate centres on middle managers’ contribution to strategic 
change (Currie and Procter 2001,  2005). Some accounts have concentrated on 
middle managers’ role in initiating change and innovation, emphasising their crucial 
mid-way position for the effective processing of new information and ideas (c.f. 
Kanter 1985, Nonaka 1988). Other, more recent research has shed light on how 
middle managers contribute simultaneously to organisational stability and change. 
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Huy (2002) demonstrated through a three-year qualitative study how middle 
managers in a large deregulated information technology company played an 
important ‘emotional balancing’ role in their teams. The middle managers’ pursuit of 
change-projects at the same time as attending to the emotions of their team 
members enabled them to make an important contribution to organisational 
adaptation (2002: 31). Balogun (2003), using a similar methodology in a deregulated 
utilities company, reached comparable conclusions, identifying middle managers as 
‘change intermediaries’. In this study, middle managers played the dual role of 
interpreting and ‘making sense’ of organisational change, both for themselves and 
their teams, and balancing the pressures of managing continuity of service with the 
implementation of change.  
 
As well as highlighting the balancing role played by middle managers in 
organisational stability and strategic change, the accounts of Huy and Balogun are 
notable for their description of how middle managers navigate between the use of 
formal managerial control and informal influencing strategies. The authors do not 
make it explicit, but there is a strong resonance here with theories of leadership, and 
how this differs from management (Kotter 1990, Zaleznik 1992). Fundamentally, 
leadership is “the process in which an individual influences other group members 
towards the attainment of group or organizational goals” (Shackleton 1995: 2). This 
is to be distinguished from coordination activities that rely upon formalised control 
processes, which have more to do with management (or ‘transactional leadership’ 
(Bass 1985)). The leadership literature has become huge and complex (Storey 
2004a), but Shackleton’s basic and widely-cited version of leadership as an 
influencing process serves as a useful working definition for the purposes of 
modelling middle management roles. It does this by differentiating, on the one hand, 
the people-focussed, motivational and change-orientated dimensions of managing 
through informal influencing, from, on the other hand, the task-focussed, 
compliance- and continuity-orientated dimensions of managing through formal 
control.  
 
The balance that managers have to strike between management and leadership is 
seen by many to have shifted towards the latter in recent decades. This shift is 
associated with the rise of flatter, decentralised and ‘post-bureaucratic’ 
organisational forms, designed to be more flexible and responsive to ensure survival 
in the new, more competitive business environment  (Drucker 1988, Kanter 1989, 
Handy 1990). As these organisational forms utilise fewer hierarchical tiers and 
standardised processes, there is less demand for “day-to-day management, in the 
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form of the direction, control and monitoring of work performance”, and more 
demand for “leadership, in the form of consultative coordination, support, advice, 
coaching, development and inspiration” (Hales 2002: 55). 
 
The evidence that centralised, rule-bound bureaucracies have been replaced to a 
significant extent by decentralised and less formalised organisations has, however, 
been called into question (Heckscher 1994, Hales 2002, Mintzberg 2009: 50). 
Nonetheless it is reasonable to conclude that any model of middle management 
should comprise of a balance between formal management activities concerned with 
coordination and control, and informal leadership activities concerned with 
influencing. These combine to serve the simultaneous pursuit of organisational 
stability and change. The balance that middle managers strike between 
management and leadership can then be expected to vary according to 
organisational circumstances.  
 
With regard to middle managers’ contribution to strategic change, a widely-cited 
model is that of Floyd and Wooldridge (1992, see also Currie and Procter 2001, 
2005). Taking Mintzberg and Waters’ (1985) view of strategy as a set of deliberate 
and emergent processes, the authors identify four middle management roles across 
two dimensions, as Figure 1.1 illustrates.  
 
 
 Upward Downward 
Divergent Championing 
alternatives 
Facilitating 
adaptability 
Integrative Synthesising 
information 
Implementing deliberate 
strategy   
Figure 1.1 Typology of middle manager influence  
(Floyd and Wooldridge 1992) 
 
 
 
The model summarises how middle managers exercise downward influence by 
‘implementing deliberate strategy’ through the translation of objectives from senior 
management into effective operational plans, as well as by ‘facilitating adaptability’, 
in which they stimulate local changes that fall outside of the planned strategy. The 
model also shows how middle managers exercise upward influence by ‘synthesising 
information’ for senior management, thus filtering important strategic feedback 
upwards, as well as by ‘championing alternatives’ to the organisation’s planned 
strategy. Middle managers are therefore seen as undertakers of both ‘integrative’ 
and ‘divergent’ activities, by supporting the deliberate processes of planned strategic 
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change on the one hand, and by engaging in the more ad hoc processes of 
emergent strategic change on the other.  
 
Despite their bias towards the idea that middle managers contribute significantly to 
strategic change, Floyd and Wooldridge highlight a necessary degree of continuity 
and uniformity amongst middle managers in the ‘implementing deliberate strategy’ 
role. This role is crucial for achieving consistency and performance across the 
organisation, without which “coordination breaks down among the various elements 
of strategic change...[which] is likely... to hamper the overall realization of strategy” 
(Floyd and Wooldridge 1997: 472, cited in Currie and Procter 2005: 1327-28). In 
effect, therefore, the roles performed by middle managers, as conceptualised by 
Floyd and Wooldridge, may be understood as serving both organisational stability 
and change.  
 
The above model provides a useful basis for exploring how middle managers 
balance their key roles, and the circumstances under which this balance might 
change. In their 1994 study, Floyd and Wooldridge observe that implementing 
deliberate strategy was the most prevalent of the four roles, but they identify two key 
conditions under which middle managers can exert greater influence over strategic 
change. Firstly, middle managers have to ‘span boundaries’, in the sense of acting 
outside their normal functional delineations, and secondly, middle managers have to 
be given a degree of freedom by senior management to experiment and adapt 
strategic plans (Floyd and Wooldridge 1994, cited in Currie and Procter 2001: 57). 
The authors recognise that these conditions necessarily vary according to 
environmental and market context, and they argue that future research should 
concentrate on this area (ibid.).  
 
In acknowledging the likely effects of contingencies on the balance of roles played 
by middle managers, Floyd and Wooldridge highlight the limits of a universal model. 
Concerns about over-generalisation have also led others, notably Dopson and 
Stewart (1990), to call for more contextualised research:  
 
There is no attempt to differentiate between the future of middle management in 
different contexts. It may well be that the work and situation of the middle manager 
in the public sector is very different from that of the middle manager working in a 
traditional industry or a fast-growing computer company. These differences are 
important, and if researched, may will [sic] provide a less homogenous picture… 
(Dopson and Stewart 1990: 9) 
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Despite such calls, there have been few attempts to examine the influence of 
context on middle managers’ roles. A rare exception is Currie and Procter (2005).  
Recognising that most of the evidence of middle managers’ strategic contributions 
derives from technology-intensive and highly decentralised organisational 
environments, Currie and Procter build on Floyd and Wooldridge’s model to 
investigate middle managers’ contributions within the more centralised and 
regulated organisational setting of the ‘professional bureaucracy’, as conceptualised 
by Mintzberg (1979). Through case studies they explore the effects of a number of 
contingencies, including the two conditions of ‘boundary-spanning’ and managerial 
discretion. Among other findings, they demonstrate how organisational structures 
and professional norms limit middle managers’ strategic contributions and how 
these effects may vary between organisations.  
 
The research by Currie and Procter opens up an important line of enquiry into the 
influence of organisational type over middle management roles. To pursue this line 
of enquiry more fully, and thus to advance academic understanding of the middle 
management function, it is necessary to return to basic theories of organisation. 
Rather than attempt to build inductively a universal theory of middle management, 
even one that is sensitive to context, it is more meaningful to invert the question, 
and deduce a variety of middle management roles from a theory of organisational 
differences.  
 
1.2 Contingent middle management  
 
The most comprehensive treatment of organisational differences and their influence 
on management roles is to be found in Mintzberg (1979). The author also pays 
considerable attention to theorising the function of the ‘middle line’ in an 
organisation’s hierarchy. This provides a useful starting point from which to 
conceptualise differences between various middle management roles. Mintzberg’s 
model of the middle line across various organisational types may be usefully 
incorporated with more recent theory on leadership to develop a concept of 
contingent middle management.  
 
Mintzberg’s middle line refers to those mid-hierarchy managers with direct 
responsibility for the work of front-line managers and teams. It is one of five 
organisational parts. The other four are: the strategic apex (senior management and 
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directors); the operating core; the technostructure (technical specialists who 
standardise work systems, such as engineers and programmers); and the support 
staff (responsible for providing services such as administration, catering and 
maintenance for the operating core). Middle managers may therefore include both 
the members of middle line and mid-hierarchy staff managers. In addition, different 
types of middle line occur across four main organisational types: the ‘machine 
bureaucracy’ (an important variant of which in the public services is the ‘safety 
bureaucracy’ (1979: 332)); the ‘professional bureaucracy’; the ‘divisionalised form’; 
and the ‘adhocracy’1.  
 
Mintzberg’s central proposition is that organisations have a strong, natural tendency 
to be structured in keeping with their internal and external environments through 
their search for efficiency-maximisation. The organisational structure that results is 
shaped by the key coordination mechanism, namely the way in which the 
organisation’s main work tasks are allocated and organised. As organisations grow, 
or as the operating environment becomes more complex, the key coordination 
mechanism necessarily changes, so responsibility for decision-making becomes 
decentralised away from senior management. Mintzberg makes an important 
distinction between vertical and horizontal decentralisation, in which the former 
relates to the devolution of management responsibilities down the hierarchy to less 
senior staff, and the latter relates to the hiving off of responsibility for decisions over 
work to non-managers.  Figure 1.2 summarises the main dimensions of the four 
main types of organisation, and how the function of the middle line varies across 
them.  
  
                                               
1
 Mintzberg’s fifth organisational type, the ‘simple structure’ (1979) or ‘entrepreneurial organisation’ 
(2009) has no significant middle management function, and is not considered in this thesis. It is also 
notable that, in his later work (2007,  2009), Mintzberg abandons the terminology of the machine 
bureaucracy and the professional bureaucracy in favour of ‘the machine organisation’ and ‘the 
professional organisation’. This suggests that the author may have come to observe de-
bureaucratisation as an important feature of the recent business environment. However, this thesis 
retains the terminology of bureaucracy for three reasons: i) the thesis has an empirical focus on the 
public services, in which the concept and practice of bureaucracy remains strongly relevant (c.f. also 
Mintzberg 1996);  ii) the conceptualisation of machine and professional organisations remains 
fundamentally unaltered in Mintzberg’s later work, thus providing no specific theoretical reason for 
adopting the new terminology; and iii) the ‘safety bureaucracy’ is employed as a theoretical construct in 
this thesis alongside two other types of bureaucracy, and has no equivalent in Mintzberg’s revised 
terminology.  As an addendum to this last point, Mintzberg uses the term ‘contingency bureaucracy’ 
interchangeably with ‘safety bureaucracy’ to describe emergency services organisations such as fire 
departments (1979: 332). However, the ‘contingency bureaucracy’ has, for this thesis at least, 
unhelpful connotations with ‘contingency’ theories of HRM, which are taken up later in the discussion 
and which are therefore usefully differentiated from specific conceptual models of organisation.  
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 Machine 
bureaucracy 
Professional 
bureaucracy 
Divisionalised 
form 
Adhocracy 
Key coordination 
mechanism 
Standardisation of 
work processes 
Standardisation of 
skills 
Standardisation 
of outputs 
Mutual 
adjustment 
Key part of 
organisation 
Technostructure  Operating core Middle line Support staff 
Type of 
decentralisation 
Limited horizontal 
decentralisation 
Horizontal and 
vertical 
decentralisation 
Limited vertical 
decentralisation 
Selective 
decentralisation 
Function of the 
‘middle line’ 
Elaborated and 
differentiated; 
conflict resolution; 
staff liaison; 
vertical 
communications 
Controlled by 
professionals; much 
mutual adjustment 
Formulation of 
local strategy; 
operations 
management 
Extensive but 
blurred with staff 
function; project 
work 
Figure 1.2 Dimensions of organisational structures 
(Adapted from Mintzberg 1979: 466-67) 
 
 
Mintzberg argues that a machine bureaucracy arises in large and mature 
organisations in which there are predominantly routine and predictable work tasks. 
Work is therefore most efficiently coordinated through the formal standardisation of 
work processes.  A large technostructure is the key part of the organisation, as it 
has a strong influence in designing the work processes of the operating core to 
achieve machine-like efficiency. This means that the machine bureaucracy is 
vertically centralised through its chain of command, though with some horizontal 
decentralisation as the organisation devolves much responsibility to the 
technostructure. While middle managers in such an organisation may work in the 
technical and support parts of the organisation, the managers in the middle line 
above the operating core are chiefly responsible for overseeing routine workflow and 
‘disturbance-handling’ when the organisational ‘machine’ fails to function properly. 
Additional middle management functions include conflict resolution and 
communications between the operating core and senior management. The role for 
middle managers is therefore relatively limited, as the actual planning and co-
ordination of their teams’ work is largely determined by the technostructure.   
 
The machine bureaucracy has a number of variants (as do Mintzberg’s other 
organisational types, see 1979: 470-71). Due to the focus of this thesis on the public 
services, it is pertinent to dwell briefly on Mintzberg’s ‘public machine bureaucracies’ 
(p.331), which arise in organisations that are subject to strong external control and 
regulation by governments. As the author puts it, “the more an organization is 
controlled externally, the more its structure is centralized and formalized, [which are] 
the two prime design parameters of the Machine Bureaucracy” (Mintzberg 1979: 
331).  Thus public machine bureaucracies arise in government agencies, such as 
licensing or tax collection departments, in which workflow processes and personnel 
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procedures have to be regulated by government for the purposes of accountability, 
transparency and fairness. The first main variant of this is the ‘control bureaucracy’, 
seen in organisations such as custodial prisons and police forces, in which discipline 
and hierarchical control are necessary conditions of operation. The second main 
variant is the ‘safety bureaucracy’ in which organisations such as airlines and fire 
departments develop highly formalised and practised procedures in order to 
minimise risk and to respond efficiently in non-routine and emergency situations. As 
Mintzberg illustrates:  
 
[A] fire crew cannot arrive at a burning house and then turn to the chief for orders or 
decide among its members who will connect the hose and who will go up the ladder. 
The environments of these organizations may seem dynamic, but in fact most their 
contingencies are predictable – they have seen them many times before – and so 
procedures for handling them have been formalized. (Mintzberg 1979: 332)  
 
 
In control and safety bureaucracies, due to the relatively uniform nature of their core 
operations, the middle line can be expected to be less elaborated and differentiated 
than in a classic machine bureaucracy, such as in a factory with multiple production 
lines. This means that conflict resolution, staff liaison and vertical communication 
activities are likely to take on greater relative significance than disturbance-handling 
in the control and safety bureaucracies. In the specific case of the safety 
bureaucracy, the practising of emergency routines, and the introduction of new 
routines as additional contingencies are anticipated, become the main workflow of 
the organisation.  
 
The professional bureaucracy arises when the organisation’s primary work tasks are 
sufficiently unpredictable to require professional discretion and cannot be easily 
standardised by technical experts. Therefore, in order to achieve consistency and 
efficiency, work is primarily coordinated through the standardisation of skills. This is 
accomplished through ‘training and indoctrination’, or the qualification and 
socialisation of the operating core workers into a professional group. The operating 
core is therefore the key part of the professional bureaucracy, and authority to make 
decisions on work tasks is horizontally decentralised to a large extent. 
Departmentalisation of different types of work also ensures a degree of vertical 
decentralisation. Middle line managers in the professional bureaucracy are usually 
of the professional group themselves, or are at least controlled closely by them, due 
to the professional discretion required in making decisions about the work of the 
operating core. They have little formal influence or power to standardise work and 
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therefore have to rely on ‘mutual adjustment’, namely informal communication, 
collaboration and negotiation to achieve their goals and the changes required by the 
strategic apex.  
 
The divisionalised form arises when the work of the organisation becomes 
sufficiently diversified, for example as it begins to service several different markets. 
It then has to decentralise authority to a number of different business units, or 
divisions. In order to retain control over this diverse range of work processes, 
however, vertical centralisation remains at the strategic apex and the top of the 
middle line, where the outputs of the different business divisions are standardised. 
Within each business division, authority may be highly centralised, but across 
divisions there may also be considerable decentralisation of work processes. Middle 
managers therefore have a high degree of influence in the divisionalised form of 
organisation. They are typically responsible for entire business units and thus for 
strategies for the medium-term future, and how work is planned and organised at 
unit level. However, the centralised performance control system is the main 
regulating and coordinating force in the organisation, and middle managers have to 
work within its constraints.  
 
Mintzberg’s final organisational type is the adhocracy. This is more common in fast-
changing and complex markets. The adhocracy or ‘project organisation’ (Mintzberg 
2007,  2009) is strongly associated with the flat, post-bureaucratic form both 
observed and advocated by those who consider the new business environment to 
require a high degree of organisational flexibility. Work tasks in the adhocracy are 
concerned with innovation and chiefly organised through time-limited projects. 
Because it is less predictable and able to be standardised, either by process, skills 
or outputs, work has to be coordinated through mutual adjustment between the 
different parts of the organisation. The support function is therefore the most 
important part of the adhocracy, as decisions around the management of projects 
and administration are integral to the core operation. This is a ‘selectively 
decentralised’ structure, in which professionals, managers and support staff 
intermesh through project teams and informal networks, in addition to their 
functional groupings.  
 
Mintzberg develops two variants of the adhocracy, the operating adhocracy and the 
administrative adhocracy. The former is the main type described above. In the latter, 
the operating core, rather than intermeshing with the support function, is truncated 
or even contracted out, so that middle management and support staff form the core 
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of the organisation. Management and staff experts join together to oversee projects 
and the administration of the work of the operating core, which can be organised in 
a separate bureaucratic structure. Middle managers in the adhocracy are therefore a 
diverse group, not readily identified, as the distinction between staff and line is 
blurred and project matrix structures throw up multiple management positions that 
change with time.  
 
Mintzberg’s typology has been influential but not uncontested. The main challenge 
has come from Doty et al (1993, cited in Pollitt 2005: 384) who reject both 
Mintzberg’s typology and his underlying contingency theory. They perform an 
empirical test of Mintzberg’s two central assertions that: i) organisations conform to 
a limited number of ideal structural configurations; and that ii) organisations are 
more effective when they approximate one of the ideal types and thus achieve a 
high degree of ‘fit’ between their structure and environment. The researchers 
surveyed more than one hundred US organisations over a period of approximately 
one year to measure both their conformity to Mintzberg’s ideal organisational types 
and their effectiveness in relation to their conformity to these types. Their data 
provide little empirical support for either Mintzberg’s typology or his theory.  The 
authors nevertheless concede that:  
 
Mintzberg's theory may be valid in some sectors of the economy and not in others, 
or only among mature organizations, or only among truly autonomous firms rather 
than among semiautonomous strategic business units.... research [in this area] 
might show that Mintzberg's theory is a powerful predictor of organizational 
effectiveness when it is interpreted as a middle range theory ... rather than a grand 
theory. (Doty et al. 1993: 1242) 
 
It is the middle-range theoretical ground in which Mintzberg’s organisational types 
are employed in this thesis. The intention here is not to make a grand test of 
Mintzberg. Rather his organisational typology provides a useful basis on which to 
conceptualise the diversity of middle management roles that may occur across 
mature, bureaucratic work organisations. A similar approach is used by Pichault and 
Nizet (2000) and Pichault and Schoenaers (2003) in their typology of human 
resource (HR) models, which are based on Mintzberg’s organisational 
configurations, and by Boxall and Purcell (2008) in their typology of HR systems 
across different types of organisation, including ‘classical’, ‘participatory’ and 
‘flexible’ bureaucracies (pp. 211-12).  
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The other advantage of using Mintzberg’s typology is that it provides a basis for 
conceptualising changes to managerial roles. This is enabled by the flexibility of the 
typology and the possibility for partial or full-scale structural transitions between 
organisational types. As Mintzberg argues, “some real structures fall into position 
close to …one of the pure structures…while others fall between two or more, as 
hybrids, perhaps in transition from one pure from to another” (1979: 469). A 
continuum of structural organisational change, with progressively greater flexibility, 
may therefore be conceptualised to include: i) piecemeal movements from one 
organisational type in the direction of another, for example when a machine 
bureaucracy adopts elements of the divisionalised form; ii) partial transitions 
resulting in hybrids, for example between the professional bureaucracy and the 
adhocracy; and iii) full transitions from one organisational type to another, for 
example from the machine bureaucracy to a professional bureaucracy (see pp.470-
71). This continuum creates an organisational map, on which a diversity of 
managerial roles can be located, and on which changes to managerial roles may be 
traced. (Structural transitions between organisational types and their implications for 
changing middle management roles are returned to in the next section).  
 
The main limitation of Mintzberg’s typology is its age. More recent theories have 
conceptualised new forms of project-, network- and knowledge-based organisation, 
particularly the Japanese ‘J-form’ (Lam 2000) and variants of the adhocracy (c.f. 
Hales 2001, Grugulis 2007: 175). However, Mintzberg’s adhocracy continues to 
offer a basic working model that captures the key characteristic of project- and 
network-based approaches to coordination and how this affects managerial roles. 
Moreover, the professional bureaucracy has provided a durable theoretical construct 
which researchers continue to use (c.f. Broadbent and Laughlin 2002: 95, Currie 
and Procter 2005). Finally, organisational environments with standardised and 
relatively low-skill work tasks, that resemble the machine bureaucracy, continue to 
be of interest to researchers (c.f. Boxall et al. 2011).  Mintzberg’s typology therefore 
enables the full range of organisational environments to be encompassed within a 
single, coherent theoretical framework. Crucially, it includes the most detailed 
consideration of differences in managerial roles across organisations, especially 
evident in its treatment of the middle line.  
 
Beyond specific criticisms of Mintzberg’s theory, general challenges to contingency 
theory also need to be considered. As Hales points out (2001: 152), the ability of 
some organisations to shape their own environments, rather than be shaped by 
them, suggests a less deterministic, one-way relationship between the organisation 
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and its environment than is implied in contingency theory, asserting that new 
management practices could be driven by forces other than competitive pressures.   
 
A challenge to contingency theory that is particularly relevant to the study of PSOs 
comes from neo-institutional theory, which questions the assertion that an 
organisation’s design is motivated by efficiency-seeking. Instead of the fit between 
the organisation’s structure and its environment, neo-institutionalists emphasise 
‘isomorphism’, namely the adoption of ‘best practices’ and organisational designs 
that follow prevailing political and professional norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 
Abrahamson 1991, Paauwe and Boselie 2005, Ashworth et al. 2009, cited in 
Entwistle 2011). Because PSOs face less competitive pressure to be efficiency-
seeking than private sector organisations, the preferences of contemporaneous 
professional and policy-making circles are likely to be influential in shaping 
organisational structures and the adoption of new management practices (c.f. Pollitt 
2005: 390-91, 393). PSOs may also be expected to imitate changes introduced by 
other PSOs that are perceived by elites to be high-performing and demonstrative of 
best practice (Entwistle 2011).  
 
In short, neo-institutionalist theory suggests that structural changes in PSOs may 
follow the ‘logic of appropriateness’ rather than the contingency ‘logic of 
consequences’ (March and Olsen 1996, cited in Ashworth and Entwistle 2011). Yet 
a number of commentators suggest that the logic of appropriateness and the logic of 
consequences should cohabit and be reconciled, rather than be seen as mutually 
exclusive (Entwistle 2011: 665). For example, Entwistle investigated radical 
organisational change in fifteen English local authorities and found that:  
 
Although largely insulated from the disciplining effect of competitive markets... the 
change decisions ... were to a very significant degree still determined by the logic of 
consequences. While there was evidence that senior and middle managers sought 
to adopt fashionable or appropriate reform ideas, they were constrained by the many 
veto points within their organizations from doing so without good consequential 
reasons (Entwistle 2011: 676). 
 
 
Entwistle further finds that, despite the lack of competitive threats to local authorities’ 
long-term survival, concerns about organisational performance differences 
motivated just over half of the changes observed. As he puts it, “Just because an 
organization adopts an idea for reasons of legitimacy does not mean that it is a bad 
idea in terms of efficiency and effectiveness” (2011: 678).  
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This evidence suggests that, when investigating changes to management in PSOs 
through the lens of structural organisational change, isomorphic pressures should 
be understood as integral with a search for greater efficiency. One way of 
understanding the interrelationship between isomorphic and efficiency pressures is 
offered by Sherer and Leblebici (2001). In seeking to explain variety and change in 
strategic HRM, the authors distinguish between strong and weak institutional forces 
on one continuum and strong and weak competitive forces on the other. They use 
combinations of these forces to predict the degree of isomorphism across four main 
groups of organisations, as illustrated in Figure 1.3.  
 
 
  Institutional  
forces 
  Weak Strong 
 
 
 
 
Competitive 
forces 
 
 
Weak 
Cell 1 
 
Random and idiosyncratic 
variation in HRM practices 
Cell 2 
 
Selection of stable best 
practices in HRM 
 
 
 
Strong 
Cell 3 
 
Competitive variation 
through selection 
 
Cell 4 
 
Variation through 
collective adaptation 
  
 
Figure 1.3 Variety and change in HRM practices  
(Sherer and Leblebici 2001: 217) 
 
 
 
In Sherer and Leblebici’s Cell 1 are organisations that are subject to both weak 
institutional and competitive forces, which lead to ‘random and idiosyncratic variation 
in HRM practices’; such conditions are seen as rare. In Cell 2 are organisations that 
are subject to strong institutional forces but weak competitive forces, which lead to a 
high degree of isomorphism through the adoption of ‘stable best practices in HRM’. 
In Cell 3 are organisations that are subject to weak institutional but strong 
competitive forces, which lead to ‘competitive variation through selection’ in which 
some organisations survive and others fail. In Cell 4 are organisations that are 
subject to both strong institutional and competitive forces, which lead to variation in 
HRM practices as part of a process of ‘collective adaptation’, in which groups of 
organisations gradually abandon dominant best practices, start to experiment with 
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new HRM practices and then with time adopt them as the new best practices 
(Sherer and Leblebici 2001: 216-220).  
 
With reference to Sherer and Leblebici’s model, it can be argued that the 
international trends of privatisation and market-type reforms to public services in 
recent decades (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) have shifted the environmental 
conditions for PSOs from Cell 2 towards Cell 4 (more on this in Chapter 3). While 
institutional pressures remain strong, competitive pressures have also strengthened. 
As the authors describe Cell 4:  
 
Such a scenario typically indicates that the competitive environment has changed 
dramatically and/or that there has been a dramatic shift in the views or ideology of 
key actors in an industry or organizational field (Sherer and Leblebici 2001: 220).  
 
Recent changes in management practices in PSOs may be usefully examined in 
terms of this theoretical shift, from the isomorphic adoption of stable best practices 
in the sector towards a process of adaptation to find a more effective fit with the 
changing environment. The main question is how strong the competitive forces 
actually are: whether they are sufficiently strong to induce structural change and 
variety in management practice in PSOs; or whether they simply produce some 
limited diversity that is naturally found in groups of isomorphic organisations, as a 
by-product of the process of diffusion of stable best practices (c.f. Sherer and 
Leblebici 2001: 218).  
 
This thesis will proceed on theoretical basis that large, mature, bureaucratic work 
organisations can be broadly categorised according to Mintzberg’s four main types, 
and that changes to organisational structure and management are primarily 
efficiency-seeking in their motivation. Within this approach, it is recognised that 
Mintzberg’s four main structural configurations are ideal types, so the typology is 
used as a theoretical device to provide rough locations and directions of change on 
a conceptual organisation map. It is also recognised that PSOs are subject to strong 
institutional forces, so organisational change is understood as part of a process of 
collective adaptation to the changing operating environment.  
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1.3 Four middle management roles and skill-sets 
 
Returning to the original Mintzbergian typology and the middle line, four contingent 
middle management roles may now be conceptualised, including a differentiation of 
the skills that are required in each role. The four key middle management roles may 
be termed: ‘machine middle line management’ (Role A); ‘business division 
management’ (Role B); iii) ‘professional middle line management’ (Role C); and iv) 
‘middle leadership’ (Role D).  
 
Before outlining the four roles, it is first necessary to clarify the use of the term ‘skill’. 
Skill is used in this thesis as a generic term for what one is required to know and be 
able to do in order to perform one’s role in an organisation. It therefore 
encompasses a range of required knowledge, abilities and behaviours, sometimes 
termed ‘competences’ (or 'competencies' in the US, c.f. Boyatzis 1982, Burgoyne et 
al. 2004: 14). Such a generic definition of skill is pragmatic shorthand and not 
unproblematic. Grugulis (2007: 16) shows how the concept of skill is actually part of 
a ‘complex social system’ and itself socially constructed. The author draws on 
Cockburn’s (1983) definition, in which the term skill can be simultaneously used to 
describe: i) individuals’ knowledge, experience and ‘human capital’; ii) the expertise 
and discretion required by specific jobs in organisations; and iii) the social status of 
particular positions of responsibility. In line with the organisational orientation of this 
research, it is Cockburn’s second element – skill in the job as part of organisational 
requirements – that is selected here as a working definition, whilst appreciating the 
complexities of examining skills-development in practice.  
 
It is necessary to distinguish between different types of managerial skills. Of the 
many available categorisations of managerial skills and competences (which are 
ultimately quite similar (Hill 2003: 239)), particularly influential has been that of Katz 
(1974), who proposes that all managers require a mixture of three basic sets of 
skills: technical; human; and conceptual. Technical skills refer to the possession of 
specialist knowledge and the abilities to analyse problems within one’s specialism 
and to use its tools and techniques. Human skills, increasingly rebranded as ‘soft 
skills’ in contrast to ‘harder’ specialist skills (c.f. Grugulis 2007: 76-79), refer to the 
ability to communicate, to work effectively in teams, and to lead teams. This also 
involves an awareness of how one perceives others and is perceived by others in 
the workplace. Conceptual skills refer to the ability to comprehend the relationships 
between different organisational functions and processes. This may include an 
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appreciation of the interrelationships between the different parts of the organisation, 
the individual and the external environment (Hill 2003: 376). Using Katz’s threefold 
categorisation of management skills, the four key middle management roles A-D are 
summarised in Figure 1.4.   
 
Role A. Machine middle line management  
Key roles: ensuring workflow, conflict management, liaison and communications 
Technical skills: relevant business and technical knowledge. 
Human skills: soft skills for communication and interaction.  
Conceptual skills: ability to implement organisational policies e.g. people management, 
health and safety.  
 
Role B. Business division management 
Key roles: strategic and operations management.  
Technical skills: tools and techniques of resource management and performance 
monitoring. 
Human skills: soft skills for communication and interaction.  
Conceptual skills: understanding of systems of output-standardisation and business 
strategy. 
 
Role C. Professional middle line management 
Key roles: professional-managerial collaboration, mutual adjustment.  
Technical skills: specialist professional knowledge and credibility. 
Human skills: leader skills for mutual adjustment. 
Conceptual skills: understanding of systems of skills-standardisation and the changing 
regulatory environment.  
 
Role D. Middle leadership 
Key roles: project management, mutual adjustment. 
Technical skills: project management. 
Human skills: leader skills for mutual adjustment. 
Conceptual skills: understanding of processes of innovation and strategic change. 
Figure 1.4 Four roles of middle management  
 
 
 
Role A middle managers occupy the middle line of machine bureaucracies and have 
a limited but crucial role. While the design, planning and coordination of work tasks 
are the responsibility of the technostructure in a machine bureaucracy, changing 
technical standards and arrangements require translation to the operating core. The 
basis for this ability is a sufficient grasp, if not an expert understanding, of the 
relevant business and technical knowledge in order to ensure workflow in the form 
of the smooth-running of the organisational machine. In addition, and in an apparent 
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paradox for a ‘hard’ mechanical environment, machine middle line management 
requires the ‘soft’ human skills of communication and people management.  
 
The human skills required by machine middle line managers can be identified as 
having three purposes. These are: i) for conflict resolution to bridge gaps between 
the technostructure and the front line; ii) to receive and convey information 
effectively from above and beyond the departmental boundaries and between the 
front line, other parts of the middle line and other parts of the organisation; and iii) to 
help defuse conflicts and maintain a harmonious working atmosphere on the line, in 
view of the difficult human conditions that tend to exist in machine bureaucracies 
(Mintzberg 1979: 316, 334-40).  
 
Overall, the role of machine middle line managers is closest to Floyd and 
Wooldridge’s implementing deliberate strategy role. Machine middle line managers 
may also exist in other organisational structures than the machine bureaucracy, as 
mini-machine bureaucracies arise as substructures, for example, to organise the 
catering or cleaning staff within a professional bureaucracy. In the previous section, 
the safety bureaucracy variant of the machine bureaucracy was also emphasised, in 
which the middle line had an augmented staff liaison and vertical communications 
role. This suggests a variant of machine middle line management, which may be 
termed ‘emergency middle line management’. (This variant is elaborated in Chapter 
5).  
 
Role B middle managers are best viewed as ‘mini-general managers’, running 
independent divisional operations (Mintzberg 1979: 384). Despite their importance, 
however, Mintzberg devotes remarkably little space to the roles of middle line 
managers in divisionalised forms and has little to say about their required skills. The 
significant point to make about these middle managers, here called ‘business 
division managers’, is that their divisions have a natural tendency to be organised as 
mini machine bureaucracies. This is due to the standardising influence of 
headquarters, which exerts its influence and retains control by standardising the 
outputs of the divisions and by specifying measures of the required quantity and 
quality (Mintzberg 1979: 385, c.f. also Mintzberg 1989:155-72, 2009:107). Due to 
the strong emphasis on upward reporting, business division management is most 
closely approximate to Floyd and Wooldridge’s ‘synthesising information’ role.  
 
Business division managers require various technical skills in resource 
management, planning, budgeting, coordination, information and change 
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management to ensure organisational efficiency and continuity. They require the 
conceptual skills for output standardisation within the often complicated framework 
provided by the organisation’s performance management system. Included here are 
also strategic management skills, including knowledge of all the organisational 
functions of operations, human resources, marketing and finance, in order to 
manage the development of their business divisions in the medium- to long-term 
and to respond to changes in their particular market environments. Finally, due to 
the tendency to run mini-machine bureaucracies and liaise with headquarters, they 
require similar human skills to their machine middle line manager counterparts. The 
breadth of skills required by business division managers means that, of all the four 
types of middle management, Role B management represents the closest 
approximation to Fayol’s (1949) classic full range of management activities 
(planning, organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting and budgeting) and 
Hales’ (2006/7) outline of the classic middle management function in Section 1.1.  
 
Role C middle managers constitute the middle line in professional bureaucracies. 
Due to the power of the professional operating core to standardise and control its 
own work, professionals seek also to exert influence over the middle line, which has 
to make decisions about how colleagues are hired, fired and promoted, how 
resources are distributed and which new projects the organisation should choose to 
embark upon. Mintzberg argues that professionals exert control over the middle line 
in two ways: either by doing the work of the middle line themselves; or, to enable 
them to concentrate on their professional work, by collaborating closely with 
professional administrators in formulating policy and making decisions (1979: 358-
363).  
 
Professional middle line management therefore requires a complex set of skills. This 
is particularly the case if a professional turns completely to administration, while 
having to keep up-to-date and in-touch with ongoing developments in the 
profession. First, in order to have credibility in the professional community of the 
organisation, the professional middle line manager has to have the recognised 
technical skills. This means being a qualified member of that profession, or as 
Mintzberg puts it, appropriately ‘trained and indoctrinated’ (1979: 95). Second, in 
order to manage the complexities of resource-allocation and other managerial tasks, 
the professional middle line manager needs to possess the requisite conceptual 
skills for skills-standardisation. Similarly to Role B managers, required here are 
abilities in planning, budgeting, coordination, information and change management, 
but with the more specific purpose of understanding changes in the regulatory 
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environment so that ongoing changes to organisational systems and procedures are 
managed in ways that protect and develop professional standards.  
 
The third skill area required by professional middle line managers, in order to work 
in collaboration with professionals, concerns the advanced human skills for mutual 
adjustment. As Mintzberg describes it:  
 
Seldom…can a senior administrator impose a solution on the professionals or units 
involved in a dispute. Rather the unit managers … must sit down together and 
negotiate a solution on behalf of their constituencies. Coordination problems also 
arise frequently…, and it often falls to the professional administrator to resolve them 
(Mintzberg 1979: 362 - emphasis in original).  
 
 
The advanced human skills required for mutual adjustment – those of negotiation 
and collaboration without the exercise of formal authority – are re-interpreted in this 
thesis as ‘leader skills’. These are to be distinguished from the more basic human 
skills required by machine middle line management and business division 
management, which are not to be under-estimated, yet which are ultimately 
concerned with communication and effective interaction with others in order to 
secure agreement with instructions. In contrast, leader skills are concerned with 
influencing and motivating others to commit to organisational objectives and 
changes, without having to issue instructions or ‘pull rank’ by drawing on one’s 
formal authority. This area of activity also involves initiating change upwards, and is 
therefore most approximate to Floyd and Wooldridge’s ‘championing alternatives’ 
role for middle managers.  
 
Role D management, termed here as middle leadership, is required in adhocracies. 
The distinction between ‘leader’ and ‘leadership’ is made here in order to emphasise 
the difference between the individual-level, motivational dimension of relating to 
others and the organisational-level, shared activity of contributing to strategic 
change and innovation.  By virtue of their operating environment, middle managers 
in adhocracies deal with greater uncertainty than in the other middle management 
roles. Work has to be coordinated through project teams that span across 
conventional functional boundaries in the organisation, and change is achieved 
through mutual adjustment rather than centralised command-and-control. This 
means that middle leadership is characterised by the ongoing responsibility to work 
collectively with other managers to innovate and find solutions to organisational 
problems. This is akin to Floyd and Wooldridge’s ‘facilitating adaptation’ role.  
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With regard to the Role D skills-set, the leader skills required for mutual adjustment 
on an individual level have to be supplemented with the technical skill of project 
management in order to work collectively with other managers and technical 
specialists in an unpredictable operating environment. Project management includes 
abilities in planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation, as well as the softer skills 
of communication and teamwork. Middle leadership also requires a relatively high 
level of conceptual skill in order to understand and appreciate the interrelationships 
involved in project work and how the projects relate to the dynamic environment and 
changing strategy of the organisation. Middle leadership has therefore much in 
common with professional middle line management, but without the requirement to 
be qualified and socialised into the relevant professional community.  
 
Middle leadership is most prominent in the adhocracy, but it may also appear within 
any of the other three organisational types as the management of the 
technostructure or support staff. This will depend on the existence of high-skill or 
professional technical and support functions in the organisation. The alternative is 
for the support function – and in certain cases, the technostructure - to be run as a 
set of mini machine bureaucracies. This is possible if the work tasks are routine, 
such as catering and cleaning on the support side, or timetabling and scheduling on 
the technical side. Across the four organisational types, therefore, middle line 
management should range from Roles A-D, whereas staff management should 
mainly exhibit either Role A or Role D.  
 
The different roles of middle management across the four main structural 
configurations are summarised in Figure 1.5 in a way that distinguishes between 
line- and staff- management.  
 
 
 Middle line 
management 
Staff management 
Bureaucratic Adhocratic 
Machine Bureaucracy Role A Role A Role D 
Divisionalised Form Role B Role A Role D 
Professional Bureaucracy Role C Role A Role D 
Adhocracy Role D 
 
Role A = machine middle line management; Role B= business division management; 
Role C = professional middle line management; Role D = middle leadership 
 
Figure 1.5 Middle management roles according to line- and staff management 
functions  
(developed from Mintzberg 1979) 
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The A-D role typology, including an appreciation of the line-staff distinction, helps to 
differentiate more sharply than the existing literature has allowed between the 
various roles of middle managers. It enables a clearer understanding of what this 
important group in organisations is required to know and be able to do in different 
contexts.  
 
 
1.4 Transitions between organisational types and changes to middle 
management  
 
The four contingent middle management roles and skill-sets outlined in the previous 
section were each based on the influence of one organisational type - the machine 
bureaucracy, divisionalised form, professional bureaucracy or the adhocracy. This 
section sets out the three main processes of change - divisionalisation, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation - that involve transitions between the 
organisational types and produce changes to middle management roles and skill 
requirements.  
 
The specific way in which organisational change is interpreted in this thesis is as 
transition between Mintzbergian structural types. As Mintzberg argues, when an 
organisation searches for greater control over its changing environment, it 
experiences new ‘pulls’ on its structural configuration to make complete or partial 
transitions towards another of the ideal organisational types (1979: 477-79). This 
kind of organisational change results “from a growing misalignment between an 
inertial deep structure and perceived environmental demands” (Weick and Quinn 
1999: 365, cited in Entwistle 2011: 667). Such change necessarily alters the basic 
coordination mechanism and is therefore radical rather than incremental in nature.  
 
The difference between radical and incremental organisational change can be 
further clarified by reference to Dunphy and Stace’s (1992) four-stage scale of 
organisational change. Their scale ranges from: i) fine-tuning; to ii) incremental 
adjustment; iii) modular transformation; and iv) corporate transformation. Dunphy 
and Stace’s first two types represent smaller-scale, ongoing adjustments to 
operations that may be reasonably viewed as a normal part of organisational 
continuity rather than organisational change. The last two types are akin to 
Mintzberg’s structural transitions in that they are concerned with the transformation 
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of parts of the organisation (modular transformation) or the whole organisation 
(corporate transformation). Modular transformation may be said to represent partial 
structural transition, or the creation of a structural hybrid, whereas corporate 
transformation represents a full structural transition from one organisational type to 
another.  
 
Mintzberg’s treatment of structural transitions and hybrids is somewhat 
underdeveloped, but it is helpful as a starting point for analysing changes to middle 
management roles. It would be to stretch the theoretical framework too far to match 
specific middle management roles against an exhaustive typology of structural 
transitions and corresponding hybrids. Rather, it is more sensible to recognise that 
organisations, in search of greater flexibility, make strategic attempts to practice 
more decentralised forms of management (Hales 2001: 128-159). On a continuum 
of decentralisation, three key strategic attempts can be conceptualised as 
divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation.  
During divisionalisation, the machine bureaucracy moves towards the divisionalised 
form. Hales (2001) argues that divisionalisation tends to be market-driven, in which 
“Greater market uncertainty... cannot be handled through programmed and 
standardized operations” and in which “management functions are devolved to 
make unit operations more sensitive and responsive to local market conditions” 
(p.140). The divisionalisation process involves the breaking down of the organisation 
into sub-units according to product lines or geographical markets. The main 
implication of divisionalisation for middle managers is that greater responsibility for 
operational management is devolved down to business units from senior managers. 
Middle managers therefore become divisional heads, autonomous to a degree, but 
subject to central performance controls and use of central specialist services such 
as HR, marketing and procurement (ibid). The retention of centralised controls 
means that divisionalisation represents a partial rather than full structural transition 
away from the machine bureaucracy. 
 
In effect, divisionalisation is vertical decentralisation, or decentralisation ‘within’ 
management. It is a less radical alternative to horizontal decentralisation, or 
decentralisation ‘beyond’ management to technical specialists (ibid). This latter type 
of decentralisation includes the other two types of organisational change, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation. These two types of change are knowledge-
driven rather than market-driven, as “responsibility for and control over work 
operations resides with professionals or technical experts in order to reap the 
benefits of their expertise” (ibid).  
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The specific way in which professionalisation is conceived in this thesis is as a 
knowledge-driven change in organisational management. This is in contrast to the 
more frequently-used political sense in which professionalisation is understood as 
an occupational strategy of groups of skilled employees to maintain their autonomy 
from management control (Hales 2001: 144). Professionalisation as it relates to 
organisational change is:  
 
a way of circumventing some of the deficiencies of bureaucracy in the face of 
increasingly complex work processes and turbulent environments.... [This involves] 
balancing the demands of professional autonomy with the need for managerial 
control ... [or] devolving management functions to those whose specialist work 
requires that they are given some freedom to manage themselves and whose 
training equips them to do so. (ibid) 
 
 
Professionalisation involves a shift in the machine bureaucracy or the divisionalised 
organisation towards the professional bureaucracy. During professionalisation 
middle managers assume greater responsibility for achieving business outcomes 
through collaboration with managers in other parts of the organisation such as the 
technostructure and support staff. They also assume more responsibility for the 
recruitment and development of staff to uphold the accepted professional standards, 
rather than for the implementation of bureaucratic processes that determine how 
work is completed. Depending on how far managers assume this full range of new 
responsibilities, the organisation makes either a partial or full structural transition to 
the professional bureaucracy.  
 
Adhocratisation entails moving beyond the machine bureaucracy, divisionalised 
organisation or professional bureaucracy towards a highly decentralised form. This 
involves “creating a loose federation of temporary work units, or project teams, in 
which technical expertise and creativity are given free rein” (Hales 2001: 147). As 
Hales remarks:  
 
adhocracy is defined as much by absences, what is not present, as by what is and 
may be seen as a kind of anti-structure (or deliberate dis-organization) where the 
usual paraphernalia of organization charts, rule books/manuals, operating 
procedures and job descriptions are missing. (ibid) 
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The main implication for middle managers, as organisations move in this direction, is 
that they become less concerned with line-responsibility and increasingly 
responsible for collaboration with specialists from across the organisation and 
beyond. The middle line and staff managers increasingly intermesh through matrix 
structures, acting as coordinators of project teams, “offering guidance or advice, 
rather than exercising managerial control” (Hales 2001: 148). In reality, however, full 
transitions towards this type of coordination tend to be limited to very specialised 
knowledge-intensive work environments and are therefore rare (pp.150-51). Due to 
ongoing pressures to organise work activities efficiently and the psychological 
reluctance of managers to decentralise decision-making powers completely (Hales 
p.156), it is more common to build a ‘parallel organisation’ of project teams 
alongside the existing hierarchy, thus hybridising the bureaucracy and the 
adhocracy (p.152).  
 
The three transition processes of divisionalisation, professionalisation and 
adhocratisation are illustrated in Figure 1.6 in relation to Mintzberg’s four main 
organisational types.  
 
 
Organisational type Transition   
Machine bureaucracy    
Divisionalisation   
Divisionalised Form 
Professionalisation  
Professional 
bureaucracy 
Adhocratisation   
Adhocracy 
 
   
Figure 1.6 Transitions between organisational types 
 
 
 
The concentric rectangles on the right of Figure 1.6 imply that the three processes of 
decentralisation may occur across any of the four organisational types. In fact, in 
Mintzberg’s original text, there are multiple, two-way directions of travel to represent 
an even greater variety of structural transitions (1979: 470-71). However, following 
Hales’ continuum of decentralisation, the transitions have to be understood as a set 
of unidirectional downward shifts (as depicted by the arrow in Figure 1.6). Although 
it may be possible, for example, for the machine bureaucracy to undertake a radical, 
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three-stage shift towards adhocracy, the most likely organisational transition is one 
or two shifts downwards, towards the divisionalised form, or towards the 
professional bureaucracy.  
 
The above location of the three transition processes against Mintzberg’s 
organisational types can be developed to model changes to the middle line. Figure 
1.7 builds on Figure 1.6 to represent the four middle management roles A-D and the 
expected changes to the middle line.  
 
 
Organisational type Middle line Transition Changes to 
middle line roles 
Machine bureaucracy Role A  
(machine middle line 
management) 
  
 
Divisionalisation 
 
A → B 
 Divisionalised Form Role B  
(business division 
management)  
Professionalisation 
 
B → C 
(poss. A→C) Professional 
bureaucracy 
Role C  
(professional middle 
line management)  
Adhocratisation 
 
C → D 
(poss. A or B → D) Adhocracy 
 
 
Role D  
(middle leadership)  
  
Figure 1.7 Changes to the middle line during organisational transitions 
 
 
 
 
As transition attempts are most likely to involve shifts of only one stage down the 
continuum, it follows that the most likely changes to the middle line are those 
highlighted in bold in the far-right column of Figure 1.7. It is recognised, however, 
that pressures for changes to the middle line may extend further down the 
continuum. (The pressure to change middle management roles from Role A to Role 
C, for example, is of particular interest in safety bureaucracies, as is discussed in 
Chapter 3).  
 
Any shift between the middle management roles implies the need for new skills. For 
example, middle line managers in machine bureaucracies during divisionalisation 
can be expected to possess or have to develop not only the skills associated with 
machine middle line management, but also some or all of those associated with 
business division management (see A → B).  Similarly, middle line managers in 
professional bureaucracies during adhocratisation can be expected to possess or 
have to develop not only the skills associated with professional middle line 
 40 
management, but also some or all of those skills associated with middle leadership 
(see C → D), and so on.  
 
It is argued in the next chapter that MLD represents a strategic instrument through 
which organisations try to achieve the necessary changes in the skills of middle 
managers to support divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation. The 
discussion in this chapter has served to set out the initial conditions within which 
MLD plays this role. The three initial conditions may be summarised as follows:   
 
Initial condition 1. Skill-fit to organisational structure.  
The main tasks and key skills required of middle managers vary according to four 
main roles, which correspond to Mintzberg’s four main organisational types. 
 
Initial condition 2. Line-staff division across the four roles. 
The various middle management roles found within an organisation are determined 
by the responsibility for either a line or staff function. 
 
Initial condition 3. Skill needs for structural transition.  
The skill needs of middle managers are driven by one of the four main middle 
management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational 
flexibility. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
 
The rest of the thesis is set out as follows. Following the argument that structural 
organisational change produces a demand for new management skills, Chapter 2 
reviews MLD as an instrument of organisational change and develops a model of 
MLD in three steps. The first step is to differentiate MLD options – management 
development, leader development and leadership development - according to their 
underlying strategic aims. The second step is to model the outcomes of the different 
MLD options at individual, group and organisational levels. The third step is to model 
the use of MLD to achieve strategic changes to middle management by linking the 
hypothetical MLD options and outcomes with the A-D role typology and the 
structural transitions of divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation. 
This produces a full model of contingent MLD for middle management, which leads 
to four hypotheses which drive the empirical enquiry.  
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Chapter 3 sets out the methodology of the thesis. It justifies the use of a 
comparative case study strategy for the testing of the three initial conditions and the 
four hypotheses, and introduces three PSOs as case studies. The three case 
organisations are selected to investigate the role of MLD for middle managers in 
divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation respectively. The data 
collection strategy and processes in the case studies are explained and discussed.  
 
Chapters 4-6 each present one of the case studies. Chapter 4 investigates the 
contribution of MLD in a train operating company from 2003-6, a machine 
bureaucracy which divisionalised, including changes to its middle line of depot and 
station managers. Chapter 5 investigates the contribution of MLD in a fire brigade, a 
safety bureaucracy which entered into a process of professionalisation in 2002-5, 
including changes to its middle line of fire station managers. Chapter 6 investigates 
the contribution of MLD in a local authority social services department, a 
professional bureaucracy which introduced a degree of adhocratisation in 2005-07, 
including changes to its middle line of adult social care managers.   
 
Chapter 7 synthesises the lessons from the three case studies and demonstrates 
how the hypotheses are broadly supported by the evidence. The case studies, while 
limited in number, each provide a rich insight into the actual experience of middle 
management and its development in organisations. Together they demonstrate 
sufficient variation in organisational type and direction of change to suggest the 
importance of organisational structure as a primary influence in shaping MLD 
options and outcomes. Chapter 8 sets out the theoretical implications of the findings 
of the thesis, while also considering its limitations and suggested directions for 
future research.  
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Chapter 2. Management and leadership development: options and 
expected outcomes 
 
 
[E]mployer approaches to developing their managers are a good deal more 
contingent and cogent than they used to be. Partly this has been forced upon them. 
(Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 230) 
 
 
The previous chapter argued that middle management roles and skill requirements 
are contingent on the organisational type and direction of structural transition. This 
chapter hypothesises that contingent combinations of MLD methods are required to 
achieve specific strategic organisational changes by adapting the skills of middle 
managers.  
 
As organisations try to effect strategic change, they rely upon managers having the 
motivation and capability to perform new roles. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, when organisations seek greater flexibility, broader sets of responsibilities 
for coordination and change tend to be devolved to middle managers. This 
devolution of responsibility progressively requires skills of leadership relative to skills 
of managerial control. To ensure that middle managers fulfil their new 
responsibilities effectively, organisations employ a number of strategies, including 
restructuring, performance-management and the altering of the reward system, with 
varying degrees of success (McGovern et al. 1997, Hales 1999, Balogun 2007, 
Morris and Farrell 2007). One of the least researched strategies is the use of MLD 
as a means of adapting the skills of managers.  
 
MLD is investigated in this thesis for its contribution to organisational change. It is 
therefore understood as an organisational investment in managers’ learning in order 
to meet strategic goals (c.f. Mole 2000). These goals necessarily involve the 
simultaneous pursuit of both organisational stability and change (Leana and Barry 
2000, Boxall and Purcell 2008: 20). Amongst the variety of aims and methods, three 
broad MLD options can be distinguished (Day 2001). The first is management 
development, which uses training-orientated methods to develop the competence of 
managers to ensure organisational stability and continuity. The second is leader 
development, which uses individualised methods to enable managers to influence 
and motivate others towards strategic change goals. The third is leadership 
development, a collective and less prescriptive type of intervention, during which 
managers learn to facilitate organisational adaptation (c.f. also Gold et al. 2003).  
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The key argument is that: i) different types of management development contribute 
to various forms of organisational stability; and ii) different combinations of 
management development, leader development and leadership development are 
required to enable specific directions of organisational change, namely 
divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation. This twofold argument is 
constructed in more detail through the development of a theoretical model over the 
next three sections of the chapter.  
 
The first section of the chapter explains the interpretation of MLD as an 
organisational investment in managers’ learning; it also elaborates the three main 
MLD options in terms of their methods, and deduces their underlying strategic aims. 
The second section identifies the main contextual variables that influence the MLD 
process and deduces the expected outcomes of the different MLD options at 
multiple levels within a single organisation. The third section applies the hypothetical 
outcomes to the middle management roles A-D and maps them across the 
processes of divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation. Thus a full 
model of contingent MLD outcomes is constructed, culminating in four hypotheses, 
which rest on the three initial conditions set out at the end of Section 1.4. The final 
section of the chapter reviews the main argument of the thesis, including a 
consideration of potential challenges to the theoretical model. 
 
 
2.1 MLD options 
 
 
In conceptualising MLD as a means of achieving organisational change, this thesis 
is adopting a broadly functionalist perspective, in which MLD is seen as “the process 
by which individuals improve their capabilities and learn to perform effectively in 
managerial roles” (Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 33). There are, however, a number 
of competing interpretations of what MLD is and what it is for. Mabey and Finch-
Lees (2008) show how MLD has been theorised in three main alternative ways: i) as 
a means of satisfying multiple objectives and the different interests of various 
individuals and groups; ii) as an effort by elites to enforce control and subordination; 
and iii) as a process of identity-construction (see also Mole 2000, Chapter 9, Storey 
and Tate 2000: 196-99, 2008: 23, and Stewart 2009 for similar accounts of MLD's 
various aims).  
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These alternative conceptualisations of MLD would identify different types of 
empirical outcomes than those predicted by the approach adopted here. This thesis 
is ultimately concerned with factors relating to organisational efficiency, whereas the 
logic of the three main alternative interpretations is that MLD should be primarily 
concerned with political compromise, compliance and domination, and changes in 
managers’ self-images respectively.  
 
Out of the three main alternative conceptualisations, MLD as an expression of 
political compromise has the greatest potential to co-exist alongside expected 
efficiency-related MLD outcomes. As Pichault and Schoenaers (2003) argue, 
political tensions between stakeholders are integral to organisational change, during 
which new strategies, structures and HRM models may be adopted. Given the 
plurality of stakeholders involved in MLD - including individual learners, their line 
managers and colleagues, the HR function, management trainers, senior managers 
and possibly external certificate-awarding bodies – there is considerable scope for 
the balancing of different interests through MLD intervention.  Nevertheless, if MLD 
is a chiefly a strategic investment by organisations in managers’ learning, then MLD 
activities should be found to aim to achieve changes in management behaviour that 
enable long-term efficiency goals to be met. While this may involve other outcomes 
such as political compromise, the most salient outcomes should be those relating to 
long-term organisational efficiency. As Mabey (2002: 1141) puts it, “providing 
important differences are aired and the opportunities for compromise and synergy 
between different interest groups are not lost, the [MLD] arena can be managed 
despite its pluralist nature” (citing Burgoyne and Reynolds 1997: 61 - emphasis in 
original).  
 
The assertion that MLD is fundamentally motivated by strategic organisational 
concerns is ripe for further investigation. Research to date on the influence of 
business strategy on management development has produced mixed conclusions. 
While some have argued that human resource development (HRD) is a function of 
long-term business priorities and/or structural configurations (Fombrun et al. 1984, 
Schuler and Jackson 1987), a view which has received some empirical support from 
Gratton (1997), others (Storey et al. 1997) have observed a lack of strategic 
integration of management development activities in organisations, at least in the 
UK (Mabey 2002: 1141-42). Mabey’s (2002) survey findings (reported also in 
Thomson et al. 1997, Thomson et al. 2001) support the conclusion that the 
relationship between business strategy and MLD in organisations is weak. However, 
in a later review of the evidence, Mabey and Finch-Lees note that MLD in 
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organisations is becoming more “contingent and cogent” (2008: 230, see also the 
opening quote to this chapter). This observation raises the possibility that the 
relationship between organisational-level strategy and MLD may have strengthened 
in recent years, indicating that a reappraisal of MLD’s strategic role and fit is timely.  
 
A sharper conceptualisation of the relationship between organisational strategy and 
MLD is also overdue. In his 2002 study, representing the most detailed recent 
attempt to measure the relationship, Mabey identifies a key limitation in the 
measurement of the ‘structural context’ surrounding MLD using the variables of 
organisational size and degree of centralisation.  He suggests that future research 
on MLD could benefit from a “construct which captures the prevailing business 
strategy of the organization” (p.1156). This thesis offers the Mintzbergian constructs 
of organisational configurations and structural transitions as the most suitable 
response. ‘Purer’ models of business strategy, such as those of Miles and Snow 
(1978) and Porter (1980), do not capture the relationship between strategy, structure 
and management roles with the same comprehensiveness provided by the 
Mintzbergian map of divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation. 
Particularly due to its focus on management roles, the Mintzbergian map has 
greater potential to illuminate the role of MLD in altering managers’ skills and 
behaviour for strategic purposes.  
 
Regardless of organisational type, however, if MLD is an instrument of HRM, then it 
can be assumed to be related to an organisation’s HR strategy. Indeed, Mabey 
(2002: 1152-54) found the ‘HRM context’ (measured by presence of ‘planned career 
structures’, ‘fast track programmes’ and ‘succession planning’) to be a strong 
influence over the ‘design’ and ‘amount’ of MLD in an organisation, particularly when 
MLD was articulated as part of the organisation’s HR strategy.   
 
But MLD is not a straightforward instrument of HRM strategy. It does not always 
equate to formally-organised, internal provision, so the HR function does not always 
fully ‘own’ the responsibility for MLD. As Mabey (2002) points out, the most effective 
MLD may happen “when the individual manager takes, or at least shares, 
responsibility for diagnosing needs and choosing the goals for their own self-
development” (pp.1143-44). Much learning may be informal or externally-sourced, 
and the individual learner is clearly the most important actor in the MLD process. 
Nevertheless, for MLD to be effective in organisational terms, “the role of HR 
specialists and line managers in managing development is obviously crucial” 
(Mabey 2002: 1144). Whether or not the HR function entirely initiates, designs and 
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delivers the learning activities, it still has responsibility for the effectiveness of the 
MLD process and for the committed organisational resources. In this sense, MLD 
practice may be seen as strongly and necessarily linked to HR strategy.  
 
The different ways in which HR strategy is linked to the design and delivery of 
different MLD interventions have not been fully theorised in the literature. The 
various approaches to training and developing managers that are employed in 
organisations are abundantly described (c.f. Burgoyne and Reynolds 1997, Mumford 
1997, Mole 2000: 21-26, Storey and Tate 2000, Mumford and Gold 2004, Guest and 
King 2005, Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008). But there is considerable “conceptual 
confusion” (Day 2001: 581), which has limited the development of theory on the 
specific strategic aims of MLD. The confusion is cleared up to a large extent by Day 
(2001), who provides a typology of MLD from which the various strategic aims of 
different types of interventions can then be deduced.  
 
Day distinguishes between management development, leader development and 
leadership development. Management development, according to Day, has “an 
emphasis on acquiring specific types of knowledge, skills and abilities to enhance 
task performance in management roles” (2001: 582). He maintains that 
management development has “mainly a training orientation” and characterises it as 
“the application of proven solutions to known problems” (ibid). For example, 
managers at various levels in the organisation need to be competent in the 
management of people so that HR policies on absence and discipline are adhered 
to and basic performance standards are maintained. Similarly, they need to be 
competent in the management of financial resources to ensure that departmental 
budgets are not over-spent. For such reasons, organisations frequently invest in 
standard management development programmes, with well-defined objectives and 
expected learning outcomes, typically delivered in a classroom setting in order to 
ensure that managers are equipped with the knowledge and skills to maintain 
organisational performance and implement business plans.  
 
In contrast, leader development is described by Day as developing the individual 
manager “to think and act in new ways” (2001: 584). This is more concerned with 
the psychological and emotional aspects of work in organisations, and is not 
necessarily related to a specific managerial position. It is about understanding one’s 
own character and personality, how one fits into the broader strategic organisational 
picture, and how one’s behaviour is perceived and impacts on others. For example, 
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a manager might discover that colleagues perceive him or her to be sympathetic but 
overly submissive in his or her interactions with others. Alternatively it may be learnt 
that he or she is perceived as decisive but overly dominant. Leader development is 
designed to address such issues and work with the individual to become more 
effective in social interactions. It tends to have less prescribed learning outcomes 
than management development and uses individualised methods such as 360-
degree feedback, coaching, mentoring and personal development plans. 
 
The question of the quality of relationships between employees and their line 
managers has attracted much attention in recent years as part of attempts to 
understand how  employee motivation and discretionary effort might be increased 
(c.f. Purcell et al. 2003: 7, Boxall and Purcell 2008: 219). This goes a long way to 
explaining why, in addition to investing in management development to ensure an 
adequate stock and flow of competent managers, organisations also invest in leader 
development. Leader development activities are often included as the self-
development or self-management element of standard management development 
programmes, to encourage managers to learn about how they can improve their 
relationships with others and influence their teams more effectively to commit to 
strategic goals. There is, in short, a strong incentive to promote the development of 
their managers’ human skills so that they might ‘lead’ staff more effectively.  
 
In a more general effort to promote innovation and the organisation’s ability to 
manage the uncertainties of the future, HR practitioners tend to turn to leadership 
development. Leadership development is described by Day as a collective process 
for “building capacity in anticipation of unforeseen challenges” (2001: 582). It 
involves networking, action learning and special project assignments, which include 
both planned and ad hoc group activities, designed to guide and draw upon 
interactions between managers so that solutions to organisational problems may 
emerge.  
 
Due to its emphasis on collective learning and relationship-building between 
managers, leadership development is concerned with the creation of ‘social capital’. 
This is to be distinguished from ‘human capital’, which is rather the concern of 
leader development (Day 2001: 583-84). The development of social capital involves 
efforts to increase mutual understanding, trust, commitment and obligation between 
managers to “enhance cooperation and resource exchange in creating 
organizational value” (Day 2001: 585; see also Nahapiet and Goshal 1998). Such 
activities have a strong association with ‘organisational capacity-building’ (O'Connor 
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and Quinn 2004, Tyler 2004), communities of practice (Brown and Duguid 1991, 
Lave and Wenger 1991) and organisational learning (Argyris and Schön 1978).  
 
Survey evidence suggests that the majority of MLD activity in the UK constitutes 
standardised management development programmes, or elements of them. The 
remainder of MLD activity is mostly in the form of leader development (Gold et al. 
2003, Burgoyne et al. 2004: 22). Gold et al (2003: 9-10) claim that leadership 
development activities, in the form described above, are in fact rare. It is clear that, 
in practice, there are overlaps between the different types of MLD activity within 
organisations (Day 2001: 584, Gold et al. 2003: 7). But to separate out and 
distinguish between them provides analytical clarity and forms the basis for enquiry 
into the contribution of different types of MLD interventions under varying conditions. 
Indeed, empirical evidence of ‘what works and when’ is notably lacking in this area 
(Burgoyne et al. 2004: 1, 82).  
 
Day’s typology provides much-needed conceptual clarity, but stops short of linking 
MLD activities to specific strategic concerns. Day suggests that there may be 
different orientations in organisations, towards either the building of human capital 
(leader development) or towards the building of social capital (leadership 
development) (p.605). But his overall conclusions are general, arguing that “Either 
approach is incomplete by itself” (ibid) and that the keys to effectiveness are 
“consistent and intentional implementation” and “linking initiatives across 
organizational levels and in terms of an overall developmental purpose within the 
context of a strategic business challenge” (p.606).  
 
For MLD to be effective, it may indeed be necessary in any organisational context to 
have a balance of human and social capital development activities, managed by a 
competent and strategically-orientated HRD function. As Boxall and Purcell (2008: 
20) have pointed out, organisations typically pursue a range of strategic HRM goals 
simultaneously;  operational efficiency is typically sought at the same time as 
seeking to maintain the trust and confidence of the workforce, and securing flexibility 
and capacity for the future. Thus organisations may be expected to invest a range of 
MLD activities to support their various HRM goals. Yet it is also logical to expect that 
organisations will seek to strike different balances of human and social capital 
development according to their changing strategic priorities, and therefore to pursue 
different blends of MLD practices (as the above-mentioned empirical evidence from 
Gold et al also suggests).  So Day’s typology requires further development in order 
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to identify how specific HRM goals might be reflected in an organisation’s MLD 
choices.  
 
If the three main MLD options are taken to be instruments of HR strategy, and HR 
strategy is understood as a subset of organisational strategy (Boxall and Purcell 
2008), then more specific underlying goals of the MLD options may be deduced, as 
can the broader organisational goals to which they are intended to contribute. The 
goals driving management development, leader development and leadership 
development can therefore be respectively derived as: i) efficient and effective 
management; ii) effective leading of staff; and iii) adaptive capacity. The 
organisational outcomes to which the three MLD options are intended to contribute 
may also be respectively derived as: i) organisational stability; ii) planned strategic 
change; and iii) emergent strategic change. 
 
These theoretical linkages will now be elaborated in more detail, taking each MLD 
option in turn. Firstly, management development is driven by the requirement for 
efficient and effective management and thus is intended to support organisational 
stability in terms of the viable, ongoing provision of the organisation’s services to 
customers and the smooth implementation of the organisation’s business plans. 
Secondly, leader development is driven by the concern to ensure the effective 
leading of staff; it aims to do this through activities that enhance individual 
managers’ abilities to take the initiative and to influence others to commit to longer 
term, strategic goals. In this sense, leader development is intended to support the 
overall organisational goal of deliberate and planned strategic change (c.f. 
Mintzberg and Waters 1985). Thirdly, leadership development is driven by the 
concern to build greater adaptive capacity in the organisation; it aims to do this 
through activities that foster relationships and help generate shared knowledge 
amongst managers in pursuit of the overall goal of improving the organisation’s 
future flexibility. In this sense, at organisational level, leadership development is 
intended to contribute to emergent strategic change (c.f. ibid.).  
 
This differentiation of the three main MLD options according to three broad 
organisational goals necessarily underplays the overlaps that are likely to exist 
between MLD interventions in practice. For example, management development 
interventions may contribute to planned strategic changes as well as to continuity of 
service to customers. The value of this novel framework, however, is to clarify the 
linkages between various strategic HRM goals, associated MLD interventions and 
intended organisational outcomes. The linkages are illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1 MLD goals, options and intended organisational outcomes 
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outcomes as they relate directly to managers and their colleagues (column 4). This 
is the subject of the next section of the chapter.  
 
 
2.2 MLD outcomes  
 
Effective MLD interventions may be expected to produce outcomes at three main 
levels, that of: i) the individual manager; ii) the group with whom he or she works; 
and iii) his or her organisational unit (c.f. Martineau 2004, Tyler 2004). However, the 
processes by which learning outcomes are produced are complex and subject to a 
variety of influences (Thomson et al. 2001, Mabey 2002, Mabey and Finch-Lees 
2008). The extent to which the intended learning outcomes of MLD interventions are 
achieved will partly depend on the quality of the management of the learning 
process by HRD practitioners. Also, what managers learn, and how they apply their 
learning, takes place amid wider contextual factors outside of the formal 
development process, some of which the HRD function may be able to influence, yet 
some of which are beyond its control.  
 
The first half of this section reviews the literature to set out the main principles of 
conventional best practice in MLD and to identify the two main contextual factors 
that may either enable or constrain the processes by which managers’ learning is 
transferred into the workplace. These factors are identified as: i) HRD competence 
(which is broken down into operational and strategic HRD competence); and ii) 
political obstacles. This lays the theoretical ground upon which, in the second half of 
the section, a model of multi-levelled MLD outcomes is constructed for the single 
organisation.  
 
The management of MLD by HRD practitioners is concerned with ensuring an 
effective learning transfer process that contributes to strategic organisational goals 
(c.f. Mole 2000: 2-4). But, as the voluminous organisational behaviour and 
psychology literature has demonstrated, the processes by which managers learn 
and apply their learning in organisations are highly complex (c.f. Argyris and Schön 
1978, Kolb 1984, Dotlich and Noel 1998, Antonacopoulou 2006). The problems 
facing the HRD function in achieving intended MLD outcomes are also well 
documented. In practice, MLD interventions are often misconceived, ill-matched to 
both individual and business needs, poorly implemented and ineffectively followed-
up (c.f. Hansen et al. 1999, Mole 2000, Conger and Toegel 2003).  
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Research by the Center for Creative Leadership in California (also drawn upon by 
Day (2001)), suggests that effective MLD depends upon three key elements: 
assessment, challenge and support (Van Velsor and McCauley 2004). Under 
‘assessment’ are the various types of diagnostic activities used in organisations to 
identify learning needs, such as training needs analysis, multi-source feedback and 
psychometric testing. Under ‘challenge’, are various MLD activities which are 
matched to the learning preferences of individuals and designed to ‘stretch’ them in 
ways that will result in memorable learning experiences. Under ‘support’, is the 
range of formal and informal mechanisms for follow-up, feedback, reward and 
evaluation.  
 
The assessment-challenge-support model is influential amongst practitioners and its 
application may be said to constitute conventional ‘best practice’ in MLD. To apply 
the model fully requires considerable resource and expertise within the 
organisation’s HRD function. With regard to the ‘assessment’ and ‘challenge’ 
elements, as Guthrie and King (2004) demonstrate, specialist training and 
development expertise is required to select and administer the appropriate 
diagnostic tools, and to design and facilitate relevant, stretching learning activities. 
Similarly, Mole (2000: 29-30) points out how HRD functions rarely deliver all MLD 
activities in-house and therefore require the competence to commission appropriate 
specialist MLD services. With regard to the ‘support’ element, as Martineau (2004) 
illustrates, to engage managers and their colleagues over several months in follow-
up and evaluation activities requires the HRD function to yield significant influence 
amongst the organisation’s key stakeholders.  
 
A particular problem of MLD-management, one that relates mainly to the ‘support’ 
element of the model, lies in negotiating the overlap between formal intervention and 
informal learning. Informal learning is concerned with naturally-occurring, incidental 
experiences. The extent and power of such experiences and the general importance 
to managers of informal development methods, such as learning through experience 
and reflection, are well established through research (Woodall and Winstanley 1998, 
Thomson et al. 2001, Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 230-31). The main issue for 
HRD practitioners is that the boundaries between formal and informal learning are 
especially blurred in the case of MLD. The term ‘intervention’ might imply prescribed 
learning objectives and planned learning activities. But particularly in the cases of 
leader development, individual reflective activity is central and there is considerable 
scope for drawing upon incidental learning experiences for developmental purposes 
(Guthrie and King 2004, Van Velsor and McCauley 2004).  
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With regard to the formal-informal learning overlap, the challenge for HRD 
practitioners, Guest and King (2005) suggest, is to maximise the contribution of 
incidental learning so that managers’ experiences are converted into “planned yet 
informal learning” (p.250). This relies upon the HRD function being able to ensure 
that MLD interventions are sufficiently personalised to integrate individual managers’ 
informal learning experiences. Key to this is the facilitation of regular reflection 
activities for managers, including the ongoing involvement of colleagues upon whom 
they rely for ‘developmental relationships’, namely as mentors, coaches and line 
managers (McCauley and Douglas 2004). 
  
The capacity of the HRD function to implement conventional best MLD practice, by 
applying the assessment-challenge-support model effectively, can be understood as 
a contextual variable in the MLD process outlined in Figure 2.1. This contextual 
variable may be termed ‘operational HRD competence’, which an organisation may 
possess to varying degrees: when high, it serves to enable the effectiveness of MLD 
intervention; when low, it serves to constrain them. The other type of HRD 
competence, ‘strategic HRD competence’, relates to the broader organisational 
environment within which the MLD intervention takes place.  
 
The effects of different types of organisational environment on learning transfer are 
well researched. The most notable and influential models include Kirkpatrick’s 
(1994) five organisational learning climates (‘preventing’, ‘discouraging’, ‘neutral’, 
‘encouraging’ and ‘requiring’), and Burke and Hutchins’ (2007) forty-eight 
organisational factors that either stimulate or inhibit learning transfer (cited in 
Broucker 2009: 4). With respect to the crucial relationship between MLD and 
business strategy, however, the most fruitful area of research relates to ‘internal 
strategic fit’. 
 
Purcell et al’s (2003) treatment of internal strategic fit suggests that, in order to meet 
their intended aims, MLD interventions have to be designed as part of a ‘bundle’ of 
complementary HR policies and practices. MLD activities are unlikely to be effective 
if learning aims are undermined by contradictory HRM practices or fail to be 
reinforced, namely through complementary recruitment, performance management 
and reward practices. Furthermore, due to the time-lags between MLD interventions 
and their eventual intended effects on individual and team behaviour, often lasting 
several months (Martineau 2004: 243-45), the achieving of internal strategic fit relies 
on consistency in the overall HR strategy, at least in the medium term. The classic 
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contradiction arises where managers are encouraged to follow long-term 
development plans, while at the same time having to deal with the threat of 
redundancy or the pressure of short-term performance targets (c.f. McGovern et al. 
1997).  
 
The capacity of the organisation to achieve internal strategic fit in MLD has been 
otherwise described as ‘strategic maturity’ (c.f.  Thomson et al. 2001, Mumford and 
Gold 2004: 30-33, Stewart 2009: 425). The most strategically mature organisations, 
those that achieve an effective alignment between MLD strategy, HR strategy and 
long-term business strategy, have been observed to be mainly large, established 
employers in relatively stable environments, such as PSOs (ibid.). While 
acknowledging the considerable difficulties involved in achieving internal strategic fit, 
Mabey and Finch-Lees point to evidence of a ‘virtuous cycle’ in MLD (2008: 70-71). 
In such a cycle, there is an initially strong link at strategic level between HR and 
business strategy, which is likely to produce a consistent and sustained emphasis 
on developing effective management throughout the organisation. This conveys the 
message to line managers that senior management take MLD seriously, which in 
turn gives greater grass-roots credibility to MLD (and employee development 
generally). The ultimate effect of this greater credibility is to focus attention on the 
quality of relationships between line managers and their staff and on the quality of 
the organisation’s product or services. Thus, the virtuous MLD cycle is perpetuated 
and a long-term process of internal strategic fit is enabled. The ability of an 
organisation to achieve internal strategic fit through strategic maturity, and to set the 
virtual MLD cycle in motion, may be said to constitute strategic HRD competence.  
 
The second main contextual variable that may influence the effectiveness of MLD is 
the strength of political obstacles. As argued in Section 3.1, while primarily driven by 
the search for greater organisational efficiency, MLD intervention necessarily 
involves political tensions that arise from competing stakeholder interests and 
priorities. It follows that the HRD function, in seeking to discharge its responsibility 
for designing and implementing MLD interventions in line with strategic goals, may 
encounter varying degrees of resistance from managers in respect of MLD activities 
that are perceived to be unimportant or against their interests. With respect to 
middle managers, such resistance would derive from their loyalty to constituencies 
other than senior management, such as front-line staff or a professional association 
or trade union.    
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Clearly, a high degree of conflict between managers and the HRD function over 
organisational priorities is likely to cause even the best designed and implemented 
MLD interventions to fail. Typically, however, managerial resistance to strategic 
HRM intervention is unlikely to be so overt. As Truss (2001) has shown, managerial 
resistance exists in subtle ways even in those organisations reputed for their 
‘excellence’ in HRM, as managers’ informally selected priorities may often 
supersede or subvert the formally espoused ones.  
 
The political complexity of managerial learning is notably illustrated by 
Antonacopoulou (2006). Drawing on case studies from the banking sector, she 
shows how success in aligning individual managers’ learning with organisational 
goals is likely to vary according to the quality of informal negotiation between 
managers and the organisation’s strategic HRD function. The author concludes that, 
for managers to learn new skills that advance the organisation’s strategic goals, this 
requires an organisational environment that is genuinely encouraging of personal 
development and the promotion of individuals’ wider employability. If organisations 
fall short of such a negotiated, reciprocal approach to learning, MLD then becomes 
a “means of manipulating individuals to achieve the organization’s priorities” (p.465). 
As Antonacopoulou shows, the learning outcomes of this latter approach can be 
expected to be very limited; managers are unlikely to commit to MLD intervention 
under these circumstances, instead opting to ‘play the political game’ (ibid.), giving 
the impression of learning new skills and maintaining the status quo, rather than 
actively promoting the new approaches to management being encouraged through 
MLD.  
 
The negotiation of meaningful learning plans with individual managers is, to an 
extent, part of ‘best MLD practice’ as described above, in which the HRD function 
seeks to integrate informal and formal learning. Also, the organisational aims that 
drive MLD intervention – ‘efficient and effective management’, ‘effective leading of 
staff’ and ‘adaptive capacity ’ (see Figure 2.1) – are themselves relatively broad and 
subjective concepts, so are open to some interpretation and negotiation with regard 
to aligning individual and organisational learning goals. However, as 
Antonacopoulou points out, “individual learning is as much a reflection of individuals’ 
personal interests and histories as it is a reflection of their social identity and the 
regulating impact of the professional culture, which they embody” (p.468). 
Reluctance amongst managers to commit to MLD activities may therefore be an 
expression of a collective managerial resistance to MLD, reflecting the interests of 
informal or professional groups of managers that diverge from formal strategic 
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goals. From the point of view of the HRD function, this represents a political obstacle 
to MLD, which it may seek to overcome through negotiation with groups of 
managers rather than with individuals.     
 
There appear to be no specific prescriptions in the literature for how a HRD function 
might overcome collective managerial resistance to MLD. Nevertheless, a broad 
approach may be inferred from Antonacopoulou’s analysis, namely one of 
recognising differences and seeking to work in partnership with managers. This 
negotiated partnership approach is resonant of Brown and Duguid’s (1991) slightly 
more detailed recommendations in respect of ‘communities of practice’. Groups of 
managers with similar roles and specialisms, like other groups of staff, may be 
expected to form communities of practice through the development of influential, 
informal networks, based upon shared interests and experiences. Brown and 
Duguid demonstrate how formal HR interventions can be either undermined or 
enhanced by communities of practice within organisations, depending on the extent 
to which the organisation legitimises communities’ social norms and learning 
activities. To secure commitment to strategic HRM interventions such as MLD, the 
organisation should then ‘detect and support’ the relevant communities of practice 
and ‘foster learning’ within them (p.49). In terms of MLD, this can be imagined as the 
HRD function making available its resources for use by informal managerial groups 
and networks and encouraging the sharing of learning experiences (c.f. p.54).  
 
The task of ‘detecting and supporting’ informal managerial groups is complicated by 
the extension of managerial networks beyond the organisation itself, due to inter-
organisational partnership arrangements and managers’ membership of 
professional organisations (c.f. Brown and Duguid 1991: 49). While this presents the 
opportunity to draw upon additional resources to support managers’ learning 
activities, it may also become more difficult for the HRD function to align MLD to 
strategic organisational priorities, as the actual application of learning may be 
disproportionately influenced by the competing priorities of external managerial 
networks (c.f. pp.53-54).  
 
The overall conclusion to be drawn from this discussion of communities of practice 
is that although a degree of incongruence between the formal and informal priorities 
of groups of managers is to be expected, this does not necessarily lead to collective 
managerial resistance to MLD. There are negotiation strategies that the HRD 
function may employ to overcome the political obstacles. Nevertheless, there are 
likely to be limits to the HRD function’s influence, both in terms of securing the 
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necessary and consistent support for its negotiated activities from the organisation’s 
senior management, and in terms of its relative power vis-à-vis external 
stakeholders such as professional management groups and institutions.  
 
To summarise this section of the chapter so far, the two key factors that either 
enable or constrain the MLD process have been identified as: i) HRD competence, 
involving operational HRD competence to apply the assessment-challenge-support 
model in line with conventional best practices, and strategic HRD competence to 
achieve internal strategic fit; and ii) political obstacles, deriving from managerial 
resistance, over which the HRD function may have less influence. If the two 
assumptions are made, that the organisation possesses a high degree of HRD 
competence and that political obstacles are easily surmountable, then expected 
MLD outcomes may be modelled at individual, group and organisational levels for 
each of the three main MLD options.  
 
To treat learning as multi-levelled has become commonplace since Kirkpatrick’s 
seminal text (1958) on training evaluation, from which most contemporary evaluation 
frameworks are still derived (Tamkin et al. 2002a, Tamkin et al. 2002b, Martineau 
2004, see also Boaden 2006, Kirwan and Birchall 2006 for specific and recent MLD-
related examples, see also Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 60-61). Kirkpatrick’s model 
identifies four stages of evaluation: ‘reaction’, ‘learning’, ‘behaviour’ and ‘results’. 
The first three of these levels are essentially concerned with the individual learner: 
how he or she reacts to the intervention; what he or she learns; and then how his or 
her behaviour changes. The fourth level, results, is concerned with the wider impact 
on the business of the learner’s changed behaviour.  
 
Given its focus on MLD outcomes, the theoretical model constructed in this thesis is 
mainly orientated towards Kirkpatrick’s third and fourth levels: behaviour and results. 
The effective management of the learning process, considered in Kirkpatrick’s first 
two levels - reaction and learning - is already assumed in the organisation’s 
possession of HRD competence. The model constructed here substitutes 
Kirkpatrick’s third and fourth levels with three levels of outcomes: individual, group 
and organisational outcomes. This follows the Center for Creative Leadership’s 
leadership development framework (Martineau 2004: 241), but adds to it by 
differentiating the multi-levelled outcomes according to the three main MLD options. 
The new model, building on Figure 2.1, is illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Intended MLD outcomes 
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The intended individual and group outcomes of the three MLD options depicted in 
Figure 2.2 are deduced from various theoretical literature. (Organisational outcomes 
were conceptualised above in Section 2.1). The individual outcomes of leader and 
leadership development, ‘intrapersonal competence’ and ‘interpersonal competence’ 
respectively, are derived directly from Day (2001). To remain consistent with the 
theme of competence, the individual outcome of management development is 
conceptualised as ‘managerial competence’. This is shorthand for the possession of 
Katz’s technical, human and cognitive skills (see Section 1.3), but also informed by 
models of competence-based management (Burgoyne 1993, Horton 2002). The 
group-level outcomes of management development and leader development, ‘staff 
compliance’ and ‘staff commitment’ respectively, are derived from the theoretical 
distinction between management and leadership (see Section 1.1) and from 
Walton’s (1985) distinction between control and commitment. The group-level 
outcome of leadership development, ‘innovation’, is derived from theory on 
collaborative networks (Hudson et al. 1999, Huxham 2003, cited in Osborne and 
Brown 2005: 176), and follows Day’s (2001) conceptualisation of “leadership 
development as a type of organizational development strategy” (p.586).  The 
intended individual and group outcomes will now be explained in more detail in order 
of the three different MLD options: management development, leader development 
and leadership development.  
 
The intended individual outcome of management development (see fourth column of 
the third row of Figure 2.2), managerial competence2, commonly refers to sets of 
normative statements that describe what managers ‘should know’ and ‘be able to 
do’ at various levels of the organisational hierarchy. This approach to modelling 
managerial work became widespread during the 1980s, spawning an international 
‘competence movement’ (Burgoyne 1993, Horton 2002). Competence statements 
have since become well embedded in HRM practice (Guest and King 2005: 242) 
and continue to form the basis of recruitment, appraisal and reward systems in 
many large organisations, as well as frameworks of nationally-recognised 
management qualifications (see MSC 2008 for the UK government-sponsored 
model of management and leadership competences). 
 
                                               
2 The term ‘competency’ was originally used by Boyatzis (1982) as part of the McBer 
consultancy work in the US in the 1980s to describe ‘individual attributes for superior 
performance’. Over time, however, the term has come to be used more or less 
interchangeably with ‘competence’, especially in the UK, to mean the knowledge, skills and 
behaviours necessary to be able do a particular job satisfactorily (Burgoyne et al. 2004: 14, 
Guest and King 2005: 243).  
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What constitutes a ‘competent manager’ is, however, not an objective question. It 
depends on who defines competence and on the prevailing perceptions of important 
managerial knowledge and skills in a given set of circumstances (Grugulis 1997, 
Salaman 2004). As discussed in Section 1.1, and as Rosemary Stewart has long 
demonstrated, in reality managerial work varies considerably according to individual 
choices and contingencies rather than conform to a universal set of tasks or 
behaviours (Stewart 1963,  1967,  1976,  1982). For such reasons, the competence-
based approach has therefore been justifiably criticised for reductionism and over-
simplification (Bolden and Gosling 2004: 3-4).  
 
Yet despite criticisms from both academics and employers, the competence-based 
approach has remained remarkably durable in organisational practice (see 
Burgoyne, Hirsh et al. 2004: 14-16). Also, despite the wide range of competence 
frameworks in use, and their differentiation for different types of sectors and levels of 
management, there is a high degree of consistency in content across frameworks 
(see ibid; Guest and King 2005: 242). Invariably the different categories of 
competence cover the full range of Katz’s technical, human and cognitive skills (see 
Section 1.3). The categories emphasising human skills (such as effective 
communication, teamwork etc.) tend to predominate, but as Burgoyne, Hirst et al 
(2004) point out, knowledge, “especially knowledge gained through career 
experience of functions, industries, recurring situations etc.” continues to be valued 
in organisations (p.16). The more technically- and conceptually-orientated skills are 
therefore still seen as important, and there is a related ‘canon’ of theory in  
marketing, finance, operations, HRM and strategy, selections from which managers 
may be taught, alongside more skills-based models, tools and practical ‘textbook’ 
techniques (see Pedler et al. 1994, Cole 2003 for popular UK-based examples).  
 
In line with the modelling of middle management skills in Section 1.3, the term 
managerial competence is defined in this thesis as the possession of the requisite 
blend of technical, human and conceptual skills for managerial control in a particular 
organisational context. This definition occupies a midway position between, at one 
extreme, the critical argument that competent or effective management cannot be 
objectively defined, and, at the other, a normative model of management based on 
sets of universally applicable statements. As argued in Section 1.3, in order to 
perform their organisational roles, managers require different blends of technical, 
human and conceptual skills. These blends of skills can be expected to vary 
according to job and organisational context, and in the ways in which they are 
applied by individuals. But in order to exercise managerial control, that is to 
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coordinate efficiently the activities and resources associated with their job roles, and 
to work effectively with the teams of staff for which they are responsible, there are 
sets of conventional models, tools and techniques to which groups of managers with 
similar roles may be introduced through management development. Managerial 
competence therefore serves as a general description of the intended individual 
outcome of management development.  
 
Turning to the intended group-level outcomes of management development (see 
fifth column of third row of Figure 2.2), it is important to remind of Day’s conception 
of management development as “the application of proven solutions to known 
problems” (2001: 582). This is to be contrasted with the less predictable sorts of 
organisational problems that are addressed through leader and leadership 
development. At group level, management development is concerned with 
achievement of formally planned operational efficiencies and effectiveness through 
staff. The related intended group outcome of management development is therefore 
staff compliance, in which managers coordinate the work of staff so that work tasks 
are controlled to meet business objectives. 
 
Staff compliance is to be distinguished from staff commitment, which will be 
associated as the intended group outcome of leader development. Securing the 
agreement of staff to work towards the business’ objectives is a necessary goal of 
management and requires human skills of the part of the manager. However, this is 
essentially a question of ensuring that staff comply with the system of managerial 
monitoring and control. Staff commitment, on the other hand, in the sense that is 
used by Walton (1985), is more concerned with mutual adjustment and the 
generation of shared values and goals. As argued in Chapter 1, this is the goal of 
leadership, rather than management, and requires more advanced human skills, 
which may be addressed through leader development.  
 
The fourth row of Figure 2.2 models the intended outcomes of leader development. 
As explained in the previous section, leader development activities often form part of 
management development programmes, but they may also be found as discrete 
interventions for individuals or groups of managers in organisations. What 
distinguishes leader development from management development is the more 
intangible and personal nature of the learning and what it is designed to achieve. 
Leader development seeks a deeper and more reflective personal experience of 
change than the application of standard management tools and techniques. Day 
conceives this is intrapersonal competence, as illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
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Leader development 
intervention 
Intended outcomes  
360-degree feedback 
 
 
Self-knowledge 
Behavioural change 
 
 
 
Intrapersonal  
competence 
 
Coaching Self-knowledge 
Behavioural change 
Career development 
Mentoring  Broader understanding 
Catalyst for promotion 
Insights into lessons learnt and how 
to avoid future mistakes 
Figure 2.3 Individual outcomes of leader development  
(adapted from Day 2001: 588) 
 
 
Day breaks down intrapersonal competence into three components: self-awareness 
(e.g. emotional awareness and self-confidence); self-regulation (e.g. self-control, 
trustworthiness and adaptability); and self-motivation (e.g. commitment, initiative, 
optimism). The three main leader development activities – 360-degree feedback, 
coaching and mentoring - are then said to result in slightly different sets of individual 
outcomes to develop overall intrapersonal competence.  
 
The personal nature of the intended outcomes means that the effectiveness of 
leader development intervention is particularly dependent on the individual’s ability 
to reflect on the learning activities and on his or her motivation to change their 
behaviour (c.f. Van Velsor and McCauley 2004). By comparison, management 
development, which tends relate to the acquisition of more abstract knowledge and 
skills, is less likely to face psychological obstacles to the learning process. 
Management development outcomes are also relatively easy to measure, in contrast 
to the elements of intrapersonal competence such as self-knowledge. When 
measuring the individual outcomes of leader development, the main criterion is that 
the manager is observed to have increased his or her self-awareness, -regulation 
and –motivation. Ideally, this requires the use of a well-validated psychological 
research instrument (see especially Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe 2001, Avolio 
and Bass 2004).   
 
The intended group outcome of leader development, as indicated above, may be 
described as increased staff commitment within the manager’s team to the 
organisation’s strategic objectives (see fifth column of fourth row Figure 2.2). In 
Chapter 1, it was argued that leadership is less concerned with the control of staff to 
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meet specific business objectives, and more with a manager’s ability to motivate 
staff to increase discretionary effort in pursuit of shared organisational goals. In 
particular, Bowen and Ostroff (2004, cited in Boxall and Purcell 2008: 220) present 
evidence that, as individual managers develop relationships with staff through 
exchanges based on mutual trust and respect, this contributes over time to a strong 
and positive social climate in the organisation, which is then conducive to the 
achievement of organisational goals. Learning how to build and sustain such 
relationships with staff may be seen as the key process by which leader 
development is intended to contribute to increasing staff commitment to planned 
strategic change.  
 
The fifth row of Figure 2.2 illustrates the intended outcomes of leadership 
development. The intended individual outcome, ‘interpersonal competence’, goes 
beyond the conventional understanding of interpersonal skills as being able to ‘work 
well with people’. In Day’s conception, interpersonal competence is related to the 
advanced human skills required to initiate and work within organisational networks. 
He breaks down interpersonal competence into two main components: social 
awareness (e.g. empathy, service orientation and developing others); and social 
skills (e.g. collaboration and cooperation, building bonds, and conflict management). 
Day then outlines the intended individual outcomes of the three main types of 
leadership development – networking, special project assignments and action 
learning - as illustrated in Figure 2.4.  
 
 
Leadership development 
intervention 
Intended outcomes  
Networks 
 
Better problem-solving 
Learning who to consult for project help 
Socialisation  
 
 
 
Interpersonal  
competence 
 
Special project assignments Skills development 
Broader understanding of the business 
Action learning Socialisation 
Teamwork 
Implementation of strategy 
Figure 2.4 Individual outcomes of leadership development  
(adapted from Day 2001: 588) 
 
 
As with leader development, the intended outcomes of leadership development (see 
for example ‘socialisation’ in Figure 2.4) are less prescribed than management 
development outcomes and more difficult to quantify. At group level, the intended 
outcomes of leadership development are also difficult to measure, but nevertheless 
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tangible. Leadership development can be expected to lead to the building of 
collaborative networks, through which managers seek to develop new ways of 
achieving organisational goals (c.f. Osborne and Brown 2005: 176). While the 
process of building such networks is largely intangible (Tsai and Goshal 1998, cited 
in Day 2001: 585), the eventual outcomes of the group interaction can be expected 
to take the tangible form of changes to products/services and/or processes in ways 
or directions that were unforeseen before the intervention.  
 
For example, an action learning set, based around understanding and meeting the 
needs of disabled customers, might result in the building of a collaborative network 
of managers from different parts of the business, possibly extending beyond the 
boundaries of the organisation to strategic partners such as charities for people with 
disabilities. The network then generates new shared knowledge and insights, from 
which opportunities are identified for the development of new services, or the 
redesign of existing services for new customers.  
 
Such types of unforeseen changes to products/services and/or processes represent 
the intended group-level outcome of leadership development and may be usefully 
summarised as ‘innovation’ (see fifth column of fifth row of Figure 2.2). Although the 
term innovation may be defined in various ways, the conceptualisation of Osborne 
and Brown (2005) is adopted here, in which innovation is understood as involving 
“the implementation and/or adaptation of new knowledge” (p.115). This differentiates 
innovation from the narrower concept of ‘invention’, which may be understood as the 
actual generation of new knowledge (p.120). According to Osborne and Brown, 
innovations in organisations may include changes to processes as well as products 
and services, and may be either incremental or radical in nature. The key 
characteristic is that innovation should constitute a ‘paradigmatic shift’ and be 
“discontinuous from what has gone on before” (p.121). Strictly, this should exclude 
incremental processual changes from being defined as innovation, as these provide 
continuity with the past and therefore belong more to organisational development 
than to “true innovation” (p.123). Nevertheless, as Osborne and Brown 
acknowledge, the basic approach to conceptualising innovation as either a product 
or process ‘outcome’ has the “benefit of simplicity” and has been widely adopted 
(ibid).  
 
At organisational level, leadership development can be said to contribute mainly to 
emergent, rather than planned strategic change (see sixth column of fifth row of 
Figure 2.2). As the group-level changes that may be expected to result from 
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leadership development are necessarily unforeseen, this means that the 
organisation’s strategic goals, or the ways in which they are pursued, are 
themselves developed through this MLD activity. The potential for leadership 
development to contribute to organisational development distinguishes it from the 
other two MLD options, which essentially serve to develop individual managers 
rather than a collective contribution to organisational change.  
 
In summary, the model in Figure 2.2, similarly to Mabey’s (2002) ‘map of 
management development practice’ (see p.1153 for diagram), seeks to represent 
the full range of key relationships that may be expected to shape the provision and 
outcomes of MLD in a single organisation. Unlike Mabey, however, the relationships 
that are mapped out in Figure 2.2 do not comprise a predictive model for measuring 
MLD’s contribution to organisational performance.  Rather, an explanatory model of 
multi-levelled MLD outcomes has been constructed by deducing the connections 
between the main MLD options, their underlying aims and associated methods (see 
also McGurk 2009,  2010). 
 
The contextual variables at the bottom of Figure 2.2 serve as a reminder that actual 
MLD outcomes may differ from intended MLD outcomes (c.f. Boxall and Purcell 
2008: 216). Not only may actual outcomes be shaped by the degree of HRD 
competence and political obstacles that are specific to the organisation, they may 
also be shaped by the specific structural organisational context. The next section 
addresses this issue by revisiting the varying organisational contexts set out in 
Chapter 1 and their implications for MLD.  
 
 
2.3 Contingent MLD outcomes for middle management 
 
In Chapter 1, it was argued that middle management groups in organisations could 
be expected to play one of four main roles (A-D), corresponding to one of the four 
Mintzbergian structural types: the machine bureaucracy, the divisionalised form, the 
professional bureaucracy and the adhocracy. Roles A and B, corresponding with the 
first two types of organisation, were argued to require skills especially of managerial 
control; in contrast, Roles C and D, corresponding with the last two types of 
organisation, were argued rather to require skills of leadership. This second chapter 
has thus far established how MLD options may be differentiated to develop the skills 
of managerial control and/or leadership.  
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Assuming organisations invest in development, rather than ‘buying-in’ the requisite 
skills through external recruitment, it follows that the four middle management roles 
can be expected to demand different combinations of MLD, according to their 
demand for the skills of managerial control vis-à-vis the skills of leadership. It is 
therefore argued in this section that: i) the four middle management roles A-D all 
demand management development, but of different types in line with the differing 
approaches to managerial coordination and control; ii) role C also demands leader 
development, due to the requirement for advanced human skills needed for mutual 
adjustment; and iii) role D not only demands management development and leader 
development, it also demands leadership development, due to the ongoing 
requirement to innovate and manage flux in the adhocratic operating environment.  
 
The other main argument of Chapter 1 was that, as organisations seek greater 
flexibility through divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation, middle 
managers have to adapt to new roles that require additional skills. It also therefore 
follows that, as organisations undergo the structural transitions of divisionalisation, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation, they can be expected to demand new 
combinations of MLD options for their middle managers. So, it is further argued in 
this section that: iv) middle managers under structural transition require not only the 
MLD combination that corresponds to their ongoing role, but also that associated 
with a new role within a more flexible organisational structure; v) a pattern of 
contingent MLD options can be expected to lead to a pattern of contingent MLD 
outcomes; and vi) the extent of structural transition can be expected to determine 
the pattern of contingent options and outcomes. In short, this section takes the 
single-organisational model of MLD outcomes depicted in Figure 2.2 and develops it 
into a model of contingent MLD outcomes for middle managers.  
 
To the first step of the argument: that the four middle management roles A-D all 
require management development, but of different types. In Section 2.2, it was 
argued that management development is driven by a broad strategic concern to 
ensure that the organisation has a stock of effective and efficient managers in order 
to achieve managerial coordination and control. Earlier, in Section 1.2, it was shown 
how coordination mechanisms should vary between different types of organisations. 
In the machine bureaucracy and the divisionalised form, the standardisation of 
processes and outputs respectively required for coordination were seen to demand 
an emphasis on managerial control, with middle managers playing important roles. It 
is therefore to be expected that management development interventions, rather than 
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leader or leadership development interventions, should be directed towards Role A 
and B managers.  
 
In the professional bureaucracy and the adhocracy, the standardisation of skills and 
the mutual adjustment respectively required for coordination were seen to produce a 
stronger demand for leadership, again with middle managers playing important 
roles. It is therefore to be expected that leader and leadership development 
interventions should be directed towards Role C and D managers. Nonetheless, in 
these latter two cases middle managers still have to exercise control over work 
tasks on a day-to-day basis: to uphold professional standards in the professional 
bureaucracy; and to meet project deadlines and quality expectations in the 
adhocracy. The point is not, therefore, that only Role A and B managers require 
management development, while Role C and D managers require only leader and 
leadership development. Rather, the four middle management roles require different 
kinds of management development.  
 
It is proposed here that four different types of management development should be 
expected to be observed in organisations: operational management development 
(OMD) for Role A managers in machine bureaucracies; strategic management 
development (SMD) for Role B business division managers; professional 
management development (PMD) for Role C managers in professional 
bureaucracies; and project management development (PJMD) for Role D middle 
leaders in adhocracies.  
 
This is a novel categorisation of management development. It has some similarity 
with conventional competence-based frameworks, such as that of the UK’s 
Chartered Management Institute, which differentiates between first-line, middle and 
strategic management, and matches these with corresponding learning programmes 
(see for example the Scottish Certificate, Diploma and Executive Diploma in 
Management respectively - Chartered Management Institute 2010). However, such 
competence-based programmes are designed according to “informed opinion” 
(Burgoyne, Hirst et al 2004: 16) rather than scientific evidence of differences in 
managerial roles. In contrast to this, the categories of OMD, SMD, PMD and PJMD 
are deduced from a theory of organisational differences.  
 
OMD, SMD, PMD and PJMD may be expected to differ in their content and 
methods. In this regard it is instructive to introduce Mintzberg’s (2004b: 198) 
distinction between management ‘education’, ‘training’, and ‘development’ to 
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describe three main orientations within management development (see also Guest 
and King 2005: 239). Mintzberg observes that management learning activities tend 
to break down into: i) management education, focussed on instruction in 
management theories and concepts and the advancement of general academic 
skills such as critical analysis and evaluation; ii) management training, focussed on 
the development of specific skills and competencies in order to perform a  
managerial job role in the workplace; and iii) management development, which he 
uses in a more specific way to describe those activities focussed on enabling 
managers in more personalised and experiential ways to confer competitive 
advantage on the organisation. (According to Mintzberg, this third set of activities 
also includes leader development and leadership development, although Day (2001) 
differentiates them from management development, as discussed in Section 2.1).   
 
The relative emphases that may be placed on management education, training or 
development have been the subject of much debate. Mintzberg (2004) attacks what 
he sees as an unhealthy tendency to concentrate on management education, 
especially in the form of MBAs (Masters in Business Administration), to the 
detriment of more experience-based and contextualised forms of management 
development (c.f. also Hill 2003: 249-52, Gosling and Mintzberg 2006). In response, 
Watson (2006) questions the empirical basis for this attack, arguing that the 
development of “general intellectual skills produced by a good liberal higher 
education” (p.430) can make an important contribution to effective management in 
organisations. Taking a more general stance, Guest and King (2005) argue that all 
three groups of management development activities – education, training and 
development - are necessary, and that “the key lies in finding the right balance 
between them” (p.239). This thesis advances the contingency argument: that the 
OMD, SMD, PMD and PJMD categorisation captures all three orientations of 
management education, training and development, but in different concentrations 
according to the type of managerial role to which the MLD is directed.  
 
Figure 2.5 illustrates the different emphases on education, training and development 
in OMD, SMD, PMD and PJMD that may be expected across the four middle 
management roles A-D (see bullet points in second column). It also introduces the 
second and third steps of the argument by mapping leader development against 
Roles C and D, and leadership development against Role D. The more detailed 
MLD requirements of the four middle management roles will now be considered in 
turn, from Role A to Role D.   
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Middle management role MLD requirements 
Role A. Machine middle line management  
Key roles: ensuring workflow, conflict 
management, liaison and communications.  
Technical skills: relevant business and 
technical knowledge. 
Human skills: soft skills for communication and 
interaction.  
Conceptual skills: ability to implement 
organisational policies e.g. people 
management, health and safety. 
Operational management development 
(OMD) 
 Technical training and development of 
operational knowledge 
 Development of communication and 
team leadership skills 
 Training in implementation of 
organisational policies 
Role B. Business division management 
Key roles: strategic and operations 
management.  
Technical skills: tools and techniques of 
resource management and performance 
monitoring. 
Human skills: soft skills for communication and 
interaction.  
Conceptual skills: understanding of systems of 
output-standardisation and business 
strategy. 
Strategic management development 
(SMD) 
 Education and development in strategic 
and operations management  
 Development of communication and 
team leadership skills 
Role C. Professional middle line 
management 
Key roles: professional-managerial 
collaboration, mutual adjustment.  
Technical skills: specialist professional 
knowledge and credibility. 
Human skills: leader skills for mutual 
adjustment. 
Conceptual skills: understanding of systems of 
skills-standardisation and the changing 
regulatory environment.  
Professionalised management 
development (PMD) 
 Training and education in professional 
standards and regulations 
 Education and development in use of 
applied business management tools and 
techniques 
 
Leader development (LD)  
 360-feedback, coaching, mentoring, 
personal development planning 
Role D. Middle leadership 
Key roles: project management, mutual 
adjustment. 
Technical skills: project management. 
Human skills: leader skills for mutual 
adjustment. 
Conceptual skills: understanding of processes 
of innovation and strategic change. 
Project management development (PJMD) 
 Training and development in use of 
project management tools and 
techniques 
Leader development (LD)  
 360-feedback, coaching, mentoring, 
personal development planning 
Leadership Development (LSD) 
 Networking, special assignments, action 
learning sets  
Figure 2.5 MLD requirements for middle managers by role 
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Role A: It is argued here that the skills associated with machine middle line 
management require an operationally-orientated form of management development 
(OMD). Machine middle line managers can learn to perform their key tasks of 
disturbance-handling, conflict management and liaison mainly through conventional 
training activities. These include instruction in the essential technical requirements 
of the organisation, such as basic product or equipment knowledge, and how to 
implement the main organisational policies within the team. OMD also includes 
development in the use of ‘textbook’ techniques of communication and team 
leadership skills and how to manage oneself and one’s time. Of all the types of 
management development, OMD has the most predictable learning outcomes. 
 
Not to be underestimated in machine middle line management, however, is the 
importance of tacit operational knowledge. In order to handle disturbances to 
workflow and conflict on the line, it is necessary for machine middle line managers 
to have practical experience and understanding of the jobs undertaken by the 
operating core, combined with a general understanding of the social norms of the 
working environment. Such practical experience and understanding cannot be 
successfully taught through a management training programme. It is developed over 
time, and communities of practice may play a significant role. As Mintzberg (2009) 
argues, managing is a ‘craft’, rather than an art or a science.  
 
Role B: It is argued that business division managers may also require OMD, 
including similar training in communication and team leadership skills, as such 
managers tend to be responsible for divisions that function as mini-machine 
bureaucracies within a wider organisational group. In addition, however, business 
division managers require understanding of a broader set of management models, 
tools and techniques. As ‘mini general managers’, it is necessary to be able to apply 
strategic management models and work with potentially complex management and 
performance information. This may require a more extensive, strategically-orientated 
type of management development (SMD), including education in strategy and 
operations management and ongoing development in the use of strategic models 
(such as ‘PEST’ and ‘SWOT’ analysis, see for example Cole 2003). However, it 
follows that SMD, as a more advanced type of management development, builds 
upon OMD and cannot be effective in isolation from it.  
 
Role C: Professional middle line managers, rather than dealing with standardisation 
of work processes or outputs, are concerned with the standardisation of skills. This 
necessitates a slightly different type of management development (PMD). To an 
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extent, PMD resembles SMD due to the requirement for professional middle line 
managers to possess strategic awareness. Like business division managers, 
professional middle line managers have to assess and respond to changes in the 
environment and their impact on the profession. However, as Mintzberg (1979: 371-
76) describes it, the processes involved in the coordination of skilled work, the 
management of differences in professional competence and discretion, and the 
management of innovation in professional bureaucracies are highly political and 
complex. Therefore, professional middle line managers not only require a thorough 
education and training in the professional aspects of their work in order to secure 
credibility in the professional community, they also require development in the 
cognitive skills of problem-solving, administration and political skills to manage the 
ambiguities and uncertainties that professional standards and conventions cannot 
automatically accommodate.  
 
PMD is therefore concerned with the study of one’s professional standards and 
regulatory environment as well as development in the use of applied management 
tools and techniques for problem-solving and administration, in order to help resolve 
ongoing coordination, standardisation and innovation problems. To a degree, PMD 
has predictable learning outcomes as many of the standards, regulations and 
management activities are likely to be common across the profession. To a greater 
extent, however, competence and confidence in applying the necessary problem-
solving and coordination skills can only come from engagement with, and the 
support of the professional community of practice. This necessitates a more 
workplace-based type of learning, such as competence-based development, in 
which specific experiences are reflected upon with one’s line managers and 
professional colleagues as part of a gradual process of development.  
 
Closely related to PMD is leader development, which is also ideally required by 
professional middle line managers and which should entail activities such as 360-
degree feedback, coaching, mentoring and personal development plans. Leader 
development should enable professional middle line managers to develop the 
advanced human skills (leader skills) for mutual adjustment. Required here is the 
intrapersonal competence to collaborate and negotiate effectively with other parts of 
the organisation, principally the strategic apex and support staff, but also with 
stakeholders outside the organisation such as governmental agencies, and with 
one’s professional colleagues. As Mintzberg maintains:  
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Change in the Professional Bureaucracy does not sweep in from new administrators 
taking office to announce major reforms, nor from government technostructures 
intent on bringing the professionals under control. Rather, change seeps in, by the 
slow process of changing the professionals – changing who can enter the 
profession, what they learn in its professional schools (ideals as well as skills and 
knowledge), and thereafter how willing they are to upgrade their skills (Mintzberg 
1979: 379). 
 
A combination of PMD and leader development interventions may therefore be 
required to develop the professional middle line manager fully.  
 
Role D: Middle leaders, due to the less programmable nature of work in 
adhocracies, are likely to have less need for standardised management 
development interventions. However, there is one relatively standardised area of 
learning that is relevant for such managers, namely project management (requiring 
PJMD). The effective organisation of work in the adhocracy through continuously 
changing sets of projects is well served by a defined body of knowledge and skills 
that can be taught through the use of conventional training techniques, and which is 
increasingly practised through use of computer software. Yet, by definition, project 
work is not predictable or programmable, so ongoing, reflective development 
activities are required beyond the initial training in order to achieve fuller 
competence in this aspect of the middle leadership role.  
 
Beyond PJMD, middle leaders require skills to work in their specific technical fields. 
It is difficult to generalise about the work of adhocracies, except to comment that 
they are most commonly found in high-tech and knowledge-based sectors. This 
means that, in addition to PJMD, it is possible, depending on the sector or field, that 
the knowledge and skills associated with PMD or even SMD are prerequisites to 
work effectively within a particular adhocracy.  As argued above, middle leaders also 
require the advanced human skills for mutual adjustment and middle leadership 
skills for innovation and organisational adaptation. These should be served by 
leader development, as described above in relation to the professional middle line 
manager, and by leadership development, which should make use of activities such 
as networking, special assignments and action learning sets.  
 
The above exposition of the expected MLD requirements of the four middle 
management roles presents the first three steps of the argument in this section, that: 
i) all four roles all require management development, but of different types; ii) role C 
also requires leader development; and iii) role D not only requires management 
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development and leader development, it also requires leadership development. 
Thus far, MLD has been presented as a means to ensure that middle managers 
possess the skills required for their current rather than future roles. It has therefore 
been treated as an instrument of organisational stability rather than change. As 
argued in Section 1.4, however, pressures for structural transition can be expected 
to produce changes to middle management roles. This may be expected then to 
produce a demand for additional MLD intervention.  
 
A consideration of the skills required to support organisational change introduces 
the fourth step of the argument: that middle managers under divisionalisation, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation require not only the MLD combination that 
corresponds to their ongoing role, but also that associated with a role within a more 
flexible organisational structure. (Again this assumes that organisations invest in the 
development of existing middle managers rather than recruit new ones). Figure 2.6 
develops Figure 2.5 to illustrate the expected MLD requirements of the middle line 
under divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation.  
 
 
Middle line MLD for stability MLD for structural transition 
Role A  
Machine middle line 
management 
Operational management 
development (OMD) 
   
Divisionalisation 
 
OMD + SMD 
  
Role B  
Business division 
management 
Strategic management 
development (SMD) 
Professionalisation 
 
OMD/SMD+ PMD + LD 
 
Role C  
Professional middle 
line management 
Professional management 
development (PMD) 
Leader development (LD)  Adhocratisation 
 
OMD/SMD/PMD + PJMD 
+ LD + LSD 
  
Role D  
Middle leadership 
Project management 
development (PJMD) 
Leader development (LD)  
Leadership Development (LSD) 
   
 
Figure 2.6 MLD requirements for middle line management under structural 
transition 
 
(See Figure 2.5 for explanations of Roles A-D and the various MLD options) 
 
 
  
Figure 2.6 summarises how, under the divisionalisation of the machine bureaucracy, 
Role A managers can be expected to require not only OMD, but also SMD. Under 
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professionalisation, depending on the original organisational type (machine 
bureaucracy or divisionalised form), Role A or Role B managers can be expected to 
require not only OMD or SMD respectively, but also PMD and leader development 
(LD). Under adhocratisation, depending on the original organisational type (machine 
bureaucracy, divisionalised form or professional bureaucracy), Role A, B or C 
managers can be expected to require OMD, SMD or PMD respectively, as well as 
PJMD, leader development (LD) and leadership development (LSD).  
 
In practice, this pattern of contingent MLD options is unlikely to be quite so neat or 
straightforward. Similarly to the observation made earlier in Section 2.1, that 
management and leader development are likely to overlap in practice, it is 
recognised that there is also likely to be some commonality across the different 
types of management development (OMD, SMD, PMD and PJMD), particularly as 
organisations undergo transition and invest in multiple interventions. Also, it is 
probable that the various learning needs of individuals may lead to a diversity of 
MLD interventions among a group of managers who share similar mid-hierarchy 
positions in the same organisation. So MLD combinations may be driven in part by 
individual differences as well as by the requirements of organisational change.  
 
The above modelling of contingent MLD options enables the elaboration of the fifth 
step of the argument: that a pattern of contingent MLD outcomes should also be 
expected. To illustrate this fifth step of the argument, Figure 2.7 combines the model 
of multi-levelled MLD outcomes for the single organisation in Figure 2.2 with the 
model of contingent MLD options in Figure 2.5. In this combined model, MLD’s role 
is restricted to the enabling of organisational stability rather than change.  
 
At individual level (see third column of Figure 2.7), the intended outcomes of leader 
development and leadership development - intrapersonal competence and 
interpersonal competence respectively - may be read across directly from Figure 2.2 
(fourth column). These two outcomes are mapped against Roles C and D, rather 
than Roles A and B, in line with the previous argument that the former have a 
specific demand for the skills of leadership. In contrast, the individual outcome of 
management development, described in Section 2.2 as ‘managerial competence’, is 
not read directly across from Figure 2.2, but differentiated in Figure 2.7 across the 
Roles A-D to reflect the different managerial contexts. This requires some further 
explanation.  
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Middle 
management 
Expected MLD 
intervention 
Individual 
outcomes 
Group  
outcomes 
Contribution to 
organisational 
outcomes 
Role A 
 
Machine middle 
line management 
OMD OMC Compliance Organisational stability 
Role B 
 
Business division 
management 
OMD 
SMD 
 
OMC 
SMC 
Compliance Organisational stability 
Role C 
 
Professional 
middle line 
management 
PMD 
LD 
 
PMC 
Intrapersonal 
competence 
Compliance and  
commitment 
Organisational stability 
and planned strategic 
change 
Role D 
 
Middle leadership 
PJMD 
LD 
LSD 
PJMC 
Intrapersonal 
competence 
Interpersonal 
competence 
Commitment and 
innovation 
Emergent strategic 
change 
 
Role A = machine middle line management; Role B= business division management; Role C = 
professional middle line management; Role D = middle leadership; OMD = operational management 
development; SMD = strategic management development; PMD = professional management 
development; PJMD = project management development; LD = leader development; LSD = leadership 
development; OMC = operational managerial competence; SMC = strategic managerial competence; 
PMC = professional managerial competence; PJMC = project management competence 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Contingent outcomes of MLD for middle management  
 
 
 
Managerial competence was defined in Section 2.2 as the possession of the 
requisite blend of technical, human and conceptual skills for managerial control in a 
particular organisational context. In order to enable managers to develop the skills 
required for different types of managerial control, it was argued earlier in this section 
that roles A-D required four different types of management development (OMD, 
SMD, PMD and PJMD). It therefore follows that these different types of 
management development may be expected to lead to different types of managerial 
competence. These may be termed operational managerial competence (OMC), 
strategic managerial competence (SMC), professional managerial competence 
(PMC) and project management competence (PJMC).  
 
OMC represents the blend of technical, human and conceptual skills required by 
Role A machine middle line managers. Referring back to Figure 1.4, this is the 
competence to manage workflow in the machine bureaucracy, including 
disturbance-handling and the demands of conflict resolution through upward and 
downward communication. The term SMC represents the blend of technical, human 
and conceptual skills required by Role B business division managers. This is the 
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competence to coordinate the various functions within a business division in line 
with the corporate performance monitoring regime (see Figure 1.4). The term PMC 
represents the blend of technical, human and conceptual skills required by Role C 
professional middle managers. This is the competence to coordinate work in 
accordance with complex and changing professional regulations (see Figure 1.4). 
The term PJMC represents the blend of technical, human and conceptual skills 
required by Role D middle leaders. This is the competence to manage projects 
effectively (see Figure 1.4).  
 
At group level (see fourth column of Figure 2.7), the intended outcome of 
management development is staff compliance, as read across from Figure 2.2 (fifth 
column). This applies as a generic concept to all four types of management 
development except PJMD. As argued in Section 2.2, the common goal of 
management development is for individual managers to develop the competence to 
control work tasks through people in pursuit of business objectives. Although staff 
compliance is depicted as the outcome across the middle management roles A-C, 
the circumstances under which staff comply with the manager’s direction necessarily 
vary. For Role A managers in machine bureaucracies, the goal is to implement 
organisational policies to maintain staff discipline on the line. For Role B business 
division managers, the goal is to ensure staff adherence to the business plan and 
performance monitoring regime within the business unit. For Role C managers, the 
goal is to interpret and implement policies so that staff uphold the agreed standards 
in the professional bureaucracy. Despite these varying circumstances, all three 
examples are of the same generic outcome of staff compliance. The exception is 
PJMD, for which the concept of staff compliance is less applicable. This is because 
the coordination of work through projects does not rely on standardisation and 
conformity for its effectiveness. Instead, PJMD has a stronger association with staff 
commitment and innovation, which are seen as intermeshed, representing the 
cumulative intended group outcomes of MLD for Role D middle leaders (see below).  
 
Alongside staff compliance, staff commitment may be expected as a group-level 
outcome of MLD for Role C managers in the professional bureaucracy. This is due 
to the organisation’s expected use of leader development alongside management 
development. Whereas PMD is primarily orientated towards the ensuring of the 
compliance of colleagues with professional standards, leader development for Role 
C managers is orientated towards influencing and motivating staff to commit to new 
strategic directions. These new directions enable the profession to adapt to the 
 77 
changing external environment. Mintzberg (2007: 341-42) has more recently 
described this activity in professional organisations as ‘strategic venturing’.  
 
Staff commitment may also be expected as a group-level outcome of leader 
development for Role D middle leaders in the adhocracy, intermeshed with 
innovation, which is the expected outcome of leadership development. It is sensible 
to view the leader and leadership development group outcomes for Role D middle 
leaders as intermeshed due to the lack of hierarchical separation of the middle line 
from the operating core, and the necessary orientation amongst colleagues in the 
adhocracy towards collaboration and innovation. Rather than artificially 
conceptualise discrete group effects of leader development and leadership 
development, it is more sensible to expect a cumulative effect in the form of 
increased collective commitment to ongoing innovation in processes and services. 
Mintzberg (2007: 362-63) has described such activity in adhocracies as ‘strategic 
learning’. 
 
At organisational level (see fifth column of Figure 2.7), the intended outcomes of 
MLD for Roles A and B may be expected to be contributions to organisational 
stability, as read across from Figure 2.2. These are the logical outcomes of 
individual managerial effectiveness and staff-level compliance, to which 
management development is oriented in the machine bureaucracy and 
divisionalised organisation through OMD and SMD respectively. For Role C 
managers in the professional bureaucracy, MLD may be expected to contribute at 
organisational level both towards organisational stability, as managers learn to 
secure staff compliance to uphold professional standards, and planned strategic 
change, as managers learn to influence colleagues to commit to new strategic 
ventures. The logical outcome of MLD for Role D middle leaders in the adhocracy is 
emergent strategic change, as managers learn to coordinate projects and motivate 
others to participate in continual innovation.  
 
Figure 2.7 therefore summarises part of the fifth step of the argument in this section: 
that not only the MLD options, but also their outcomes can be expected to be 
contingent on the middle management roles with which they are associated. To 
complete the fifth step of the argument, however, the contingent pattern of MLD 
outcomes must be elaborated to include the effects of structural transition. This may 
be illustrated by developing Figure 2.7 to produce Figure 2.8, which depicts a full 
model of contingent MLD outcomes.  
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Role A = machine middle line management; Role B= business division management; Role C = professional middle line management; Role D = middle leadership; 
OMD = operational management development; SMD = strategic management development; PMD = professional management development; PJMD = project 
management development; LD = leader development; LSD = leadership development; OMC = operational managerial competence; SMC = strategic managerial 
competence; PMC = professional managerial competence; PJMC = project management competence 
 
Figure 2.8 Contingent MLD outcomes for middle management under structural transition 
Structural 
transition and 
changes to the 
middle line  
Expected  
MLD 
interventions 
Individual 
outcomes 
Group  
outcomes 
Organisational outcomes 
Divisionalisation 
  
 (Role A→B) 
OMD OMC  
Staff compliance 
 
Organisational stability 
SMD Some  
SMC 
 
Professionalisation 
 
 (Role B→C) 
(poss. A→C) 
SMD 
(poss. OMD) 
SMC 
(poss. OMC) 
 
 
Staff compliance and some staff commitment 
 
 
Organisational stability and some 
planned strategic change 
PMD Some PMC 
 
LD Some 
intrapersonal 
competence 
Adhocratisation 
  
(Role C→D) 
(poss. A or B → D) 
PMD  
(poss. OMD/2) 
PMC 
(poss. OMC/2) 
 
 
 
 
Staff compliance, staff commitment and some 
innovation 
 
PJMD Some PJMC 
 
 
 
Organisational stability, planned 
strategic change and some emergent 
strategic change  
LD Intrapersonal 
competence 
 
LSD Some 
interpersonal 
competence 
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The principal shifts in middle management roles during divisionalisation, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation, as argued in Section 1.4, are most likely to 
be from Role A towards Role B, from Role B towards Role C, and from Role C 
towards Role D respectively (as indicated in bold font in the first column of Figure 
2.8, as read across from Figure 1.7). In addition, earlier in this section it was argued 
that a specific pattern of MLD options could be expected to accompany these shifts 
(see column two of Figure 2.8, as read across from column three of Figure 2.6). 
Finally, it was argued that a specific pattern of MLD outcomes could be expected to 
correspond with the four middle management roles A-D (see Figure 2.7). Therefore, 
with regard to MLD outcomes for middle managers under structural transition, it may 
be argued that the expected combinations of MLD options across the different Roles 
A-D should lead to not only those multi-levelled outcomes associated with the 
original middle management role but also some of those associated with the newer 
role (see columns three, four and five of Figure 2.8).  
 
The reason that it is proposed that only ‘some’ of the MLD outcomes associated with 
new middle management roles should be expected to be achieved is due to the 
transitional rather than complete nature of divisionalisation, professionalisation and 
adhocratisation. As argued in Section 1.4, the structural transitions are best 
conceived as movements between organisational types on a Mintzbergian map, 
rather than necessarily full-scale transformations. In order to transfer their learning 
from MLD interventions into the workplace fully, managers require the opportunity to 
practice new approaches to management within their new roles (c.f. Boxall and 
Purcell 2008: 5). The source of such opportunity is the organisational environment, 
in which the wider ‘support’ element of the assessment-challenge-support model 
can be manifested. If MLD is used as a HRM instrument to accompany and support 
organisational change (c.f. Pichault 2007: 278) as well as for organisational stability, 
then it is logical that a full transition to a new organisational structure will not have 
been completed. This means that while organisations may invest in MLD options 
that are associated with a more flexible organisational form, it is unlikely that the 
associated MLD outcomes will be fully achieved.  
 
During divisionalisation, therefore, an organisation may be expected to invest in 
OMD and SMD for its middle managers, which should then be expected to produce 
outcomes of: i) OMC and ‘some’ SMC at individual level; ii) general compliance at 
group level; and iii) a contribution to general organisational stability. During 
professionalisation, an organisation may be expected to invest in SMD (or OMD, if 
originally a machine bureaucracy), PMD and leader development for its middle 
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managers, which should then be expected to produce outcomes of: i) OMC/SMC, 
some PMC and some intrapersonal competence at individual level; ii) staff 
compliance and some staff commitment at group level; and iii) a contribution to 
organisational stability and some planned strategic change. During adhocratisation, 
an organisation may be expected to invest in PMD (or OMD or SMD, if originally a 
machine bureaucracy or divisionalised organisation), PJMD, leader development 
and leadership development for its middle managers, which should then be 
expected to produce outcomes of: i) PMC/OMC/SMC, intrapersonal competence, 
some PJMC and some interpersonal competence at individual level; ii) staff 
compliance, commitment and some innovation at group level; and iii) a contribution 
to organisational stability, planned strategic change and some emergent strategic 
change.  
 
The question of the degree to which the MLD outcomes are met during 
divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation, when only partial 
outcomes are expected, brings this section to its sixth and final step of the 
argument. It is proposed that the extent of structural transition can be expected to 
determine the pattern of contingent options and outcomes. As argued earlier in this 
section, MLD is an HRM instrument to accompany and support organisational 
change. In Section 1.4, organisational change was conceived as a continuum of: i) 
movements in the direction of another structural type; ii) partial structural transition 
in the form of a hybrid; and iii) a full structural transition. The position on the 
continuum of structural transition may therefore be seen as setting the conditions for 
new management roles to be enacted.  
 
The logical conclusion of this is that the investment in MLD options, designed to 
enable middle managers to perform new roles, can be expected to produce 
outcomes that mirror the extent of the structural transition. The more advanced the 
structural transition, the stronger the MLD outcomes associated with the more 
flexible organisational form, and the stronger MLD’s contribution to organisational 
change. Conversely, the less advanced the structural transition, the weaker the MLD 
outcomes associated with the more flexible organisational form, and the greater the 
preponderance of MLD outcomes associated with the original organisational 
structure. In this latter scenario, MLD contributes more to organisational stability 
than to change.  
 
In summary, the three initial conditions of contingent middle management roles and 
skills deduced in Chapter 1 – skill-fit to organisational structure, line-staff division, 
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and skill needs for structural transition -, when applied to the three main MLD 
options and their expected associated outcomes, have enabled the construction of a 
full model of contingent MLD options and outcomes. The argument concerning 
MLD’s contribution in organisations may be expressed as four hypotheses.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1. Role of MLD. 
MLD interventions for middle managers are investments to enable them to contribute 
to organisational stability and/or strategic change.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Contingent MLD options. 
MLD options for middle managers are contingent on one of the four main middle 
management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational 
flexibility.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Contingent MLD outcomes. 
The outcomes of MLD for middle managers are contingent on one of the four main 
middle management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational 
flexibility.  
 
Hypothesis 4. Extent of structural transition and effect on MLD. 
The extent of structural transition determines the extent to which MLD serves 
organisational stability and/or change.  
 
 
2.4 Overall assessment of the theoretical model 
 
Now that the theoretical model of contingent MLD options and outcomes has been 
fully constructed, it is pertinent to review it in the light of rival theoretical approaches 
and to assess possible counterfactual patterns of MLD. This final section assesses 
the theoretical model in terms of the three main areas of MLD goals, options and 
outcomes.  
 
Firstly, with regard to MLD goals, the model is derived within a broadly functionalist 
perspective, in which organisations are expected to invest in MLD as a means of 
promoting efficiency. Noted at the beginning of the chapter, however, were three 
rival explanations for devoting organisational resources to MLD. These were: i) to 
balance the interests of different stakeholders; ii) to reinforce control and 
subordination in the workforce; and iii) to reproduce managerial identities. According 
to these three alternative explanations, the motivation for investment in MLD would 
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respectively be: i) to reconcile competing stakeholder interests, for example , 
between the HRD function and professional bodies who both seek greater 
investment in managers’ development but with different emphases; ii) to alter the 
balance of power between management and subordinates, or between different 
groups of staff, such as administrative and operational staff; or iii) to legitimise 
managerial positions in the organisation by altering the language and self-
perceptions of managers.  
 
The theoretical model here, though based on the premise that MLD is motivated by 
long-term efficiency-seeking, is nevertheless sufficiently flexible to account for the 
possibility that MLD may sometimes serve a range of purposes in the short term. In 
particular, it was noted in Section 2.1 how HRM goals may reflect shorter-term 
priorities or socio-political rather than economic goals (c.f. Boxall and Purcell 2008: 
20). Shorter-term and/or socio-political HRM goals could potentially influence MLD 
activities. Organisations may, for example, use MLD as a way of rewarding 
particular individuals, and being seen to invest in their careers, rather than directly 
for the purposes of organisational efficiency (Jansen et al. 2001, Mabey and Finch-
Lees 2008: 7). However, in the long-term, MLD interventions that do not primarily 
serve organisational efficiency needs may be expected to result in an eventual lack 
of support amongst the senior management. Other stakeholders may also withdraw 
their support, as individual learners or their line manager sponsors come to regard 
the MLD activities as unhelpful for improving individual or team performance.  
 
Secondly, with regard to MLD options, the model asserts that organisations will 
follow a predictable pattern of investment in MLD, differentiating between 
management development, leader development and leadership development. 
Should a divisionalising machine bureaucracy invest in leadership development, for 
example, or should an adhocratising professional bureaucracy fail to invest in 
leadership development, then this would be counterfactual to the theoretical model. 
It is important to remember, however, that the model of contingent MLD options is 
qualified by the condition that the organisation should possess HRD competence. 
Therefore, while organisations may make MLD investments that run counter to the 
model, this should be a reflection of a lack of HRD competence, rather than of the 
inability of the model to explain MLD investment choices.  
 
Thirdly, with regard to MLD outcomes, the model makes three main assertions. The 
first of these is that, assuming HRD competence in the organisation, MLD 
intervention leads to observable changes in individual and group behaviour that 
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positively advance the organisation’s goals. If, therefore, MLD were to result in ‘null’ 
or ‘negative’ outcomes, then this would be counterfactual to the model. Null 
outcomes can be said to arise when no discernible changes are observed, either at 
individual, group or organisational levels. Negative outcomes can be said to arise 
when MLD has the reverse intended effect, in which individual or organisational 
performance actually worsens.  
 
Certainly it is a common complaint that MLD activities lack relevance to managerial 
reality and produce cynicism rather than the intended outcomes of improved staff 
commitment or innovation (Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 4). Null or negative 
outcomes may however be explained through the model’s contextual variables. A 
lack of operational HRD competence or the presence of insurmountable political 
obstacles may be the cause of ineffective MLD, rather than the inherent inability of 
MLD to produce individual and group-level change in pursuit of the organisation’s 
goals.  
 
The second, more implicit assertion with regard to MLD outcomes is that observed 
changes in the behaviour of individual managers and groups may be actually 
attributed to MLD. At the beginning of the chapter, however, it was noted that 
organisations have a number of HRM instruments at their disposal which they may 
employ when attempting to alter the behaviour of managers and their effect on the 
behaviour of staff. Such instruments may involve changes to recruitment, 
performance management and reward (c.f. Boxall and Purcell 2008, Leopold and 
Harris 2009) or broader efforts to change organisational culture (c.f. Watson 1994, 
Grugulis 2007: 115-32).  
 
Given that organisations may employ a bundle of HRM instruments (Boxall and 
Purcell 2008), the MLD outcomes observed in organisations are likely to be 
intertwined with changes to management and employee behaviour that are 
attributable to interventions other than MLD. While the difficulty of isolating MLD 
effects is largely a methodological issue, one that will be discussed further in the 
next chapter, it is also a potential weakness of the model that the processes of MLD 
intervention are conceptualised somewhat in isolation from other HRM interventions. 
At best, the model assumes strategic HRD competence in the organisation, which in 
turn assumes alignment and complementarity between HRM policies and practices; 
but the finer details of specific HRM bundles, of which MLD may be a part, are not 
fully captured in the model.  
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The third and final assertion with regard to MLD outcomes is that particular patterns 
of changes in individual and group behaviour may be expected. For example, 
management development is expected to lead to individual managerial competence, 
group compliance and organisational stability, whereas leader development leads to 
individual intrapersonal competence, group commitment and planned organisational 
change, and so on. It would therefore be counterfactual to the model if, for example, 
a management development intervention resulted in intrapersonal competence and 
led to greater staff commitment, or if a leader development intervention resulted in 
managerial competence and led to greater staff compliance. It has, however, been 
recognised in the development of the model that there are overlaps between the 
three main approaches to MLD intervention, so some intermeshing of the expected 
outcomes may be expected. But, over time, and across the various groups of 
managers in the organisation, the broadly expected pattern should eventually be 
observed.  
 
To conclude, the model of contingent MLD options and outcomes represents a 
theory of ‘external strategic fit’ in MLD (c.f. Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 58). The 
model predicts clear and predictable relationships between different organisational 
strategies, structures, HRM goals, MLD options and MLD outcomes. The model has 
some built-in flexibility, through its recognition of the contextual variables of HRD 
competence and political obstacles, and of the possibility of influential short-term 
HRM goals and overlapping MLD interventions.   
 
If the model is wrong, however, then MLD investment will not be found to be 
motivated by long term efficiency concerns but by internal political concerns or HRM 
fashions. MLD activities will not be found to be matched or differentiated according 
to the categories of management development, leader development and leadership 
development, but will be randomly designed. MLD outcomes will not be found to 
produce changes at individual or group levels, or to make a contribution to 
organisational stability and change; rather, MLD intervention will have null or 
negative outcomes. Where changes in individual and group behaviour are observed, 
these will not be attributable to MLD intervention, nor will they conform to an 
expected pattern, in which managerial control leads to staff compliance and 
leadership leads to staff commitment and innovation; rather the observed changes 
will be attributable to other HRM interventions or other factors, and will not follow a 
consistent pattern across individuals or groups. 
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In order to ascertain the extent to which the model is right, the four hypotheses 
developed in this chapter have to be tested. The most appropriate way of testing the 
hypotheses is the central concern of the next chapter on methodology.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
 
[T]here is a need for more receiving-end research to get ‘beneath the skin’ of an 
organization and build our understanding of the purposes and meanings that people 
attach to management development experiences and activities with which they are 
involved (Thomson et al. 2001: 178) 
 
 
The first two chapters culminated in the central proposition of the thesis: that MLD 
for middle managers plays an important role in enabling organisational stability and 
change, but that MLD options and outcomes for middle managers are contingent on 
the organisational type and the direction of structural transition. A theoretical model 
of contingent MLD options and multi-levelled outcomes was constructed. The 
empirical task that follows is to test the model by observing actual MLD options and 
their outcomes at the levels of the individual middle manager, the group and the 
organisation across a variety of organisational contexts.  
 
The testing of the model requires firstly that the organisation is taken as the unit of 
analysis in order to examine the interrelationships between the organisation’s main 
middle management roles and its MLD options and outcomes. Secondly, the study 
of a number of organisations is required in order to observe the effect of varying 
organisational context. A balance therefore has to be struck between the necessary 
depth for the investigation into organisational processes, and sufficient breadth to 
observe a variety of organisational contexts. This methodological trade-off is best 
reconciled through the use of a comparative case study strategy.  
 
The first section of this chapter elaborates on the justification for a comparative case 
study research strategy. The second section explains the multiple case study design 
and the criteria for case selection to illustrate MLD’s contribution during 
divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation. In addition, this section 
introduces the three case organisations. The third section outlines the data 
collection strategy used in the case studies. Particular attention is paid to the use of 
the critical incident interview technique used with middle managers, to the 
triangulation of the interview data with other sources of evidence, and to 
interviewee-selection. The fourth section outlines the fieldwork protocol and the 
research process adopted across the case studies, including the strategy for data 
analysis. The fifth and final section presents an overall assessment of the validity 
and reliability of the research design.  
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3.1 Comparative case study strategy  
 
The testing of the theoretical model requires rich, qualitative data to be collected. At 
organisational level, the questions that need to be answered include:  
 how and why MLD intervention was made in the organisation, and its 
relationship to strategic goals;  
 the extent to which MLD activities were designed and implemented in line 
with conventional best practices;  
 the changes that MLD led to for individuals, groups and the organisation; and 
 how far contextual factors may have enabled or constrained the MLD 
process.  
Such ‘how and why’ questions, and the contextualised accounts of personal, group 
and organisational change, require detailed information to be obtained from multiple 
sources within an organisation. This is best approached using the case study 
research strategy (Yin 1994).  
 
Case studies tend to use qualitative methods, particularly interviews, to obtain the 
rich, contextualised data required (Cassell 2009, Fitzgerald and Dopson 2009). This 
is a relatively unusual empirical approach for the testing of hypotheses. As 
Easterby-Smith et al (2002: 27) point out, hypothesis-testing in management 
research is typically associated with quantitative methods and large surveys, 
underpinned by a positivist research philosophy. In contrast, qualitative research 
has a stronger association with a phenomenological philosophy. Yet, as Easterby-
Smith et al also point out, research design and the choice of quantitative or 
qualitative methods are ultimately questions of preference, not predetermined by 
philosophical tradition (p.31, see also Yin 1994: 14-15, Bryman and Buchanan 2009: 
713). It is the nature of the specific research problem that should determine, for 
example, a hypothesis-testing approach over a hypothesis-generating approach, 
and the choice of qualitative over quantitative methods.  
 
Research questions, which are underlined with an initial theoretical clarity about 
what needs to be investigated, are best suited to a hypothesis-testing approach 
(Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 36). As illustrated in the previous chapter, this is the 
case with the question of the effects of MLD across different management roles. 
Additionally, some hypotheses are best tested through qualitative methods. This 
tends to occur when the hypotheses are concerned with processes of change and 
their meaning for stakeholders, thus requiring detailed data that capture the various 
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interpretations of the key variables and their interrelationships (c.f. Easterby-Smith 
et al. 2002: 32, George and Bennett 2005: 19). As will be further argued below, to 
understand how different types of MLD contribute across different organisational 
contingencies requires insights that are best generated through qualitative rather 
than quantitative data.  
 
Previous researchers have responded similarly by developing hypotheses and using 
qualitative methods to test them. Notably Goldthorpe et al (1968) used mainly 
interview data to test the embourgeoisement thesis in their landmark study of 
attitudes and behaviours among affluent manual workers. More recent examples 
that are directly relevant to this thesis include Winterton and Winterton’s (1999) 
largely qualitative testing of their hypotheses about the contribution of competence-
based management development to organisational performance, and Pichault’s 
(2007) use of interview data to test hypotheses that predicted a variety of effects of 
HRM interventions across Mintzbergian types of organisation in the public services.  
 
The testing of hypotheses using qualitative methods has certain advantages and 
disadvantages. Basing fieldwork on a clear set of hypotheses or propositions has 
the advantage of providing a systematic framework for the collection and analysis of 
data (Yin 1994: 28). This also helps strengthen the replicability of the study for other 
researchers  (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 36). Furthermore, qualitative studies that 
are guided by a clear preliminary theory can benefit from the use of counterfactuals 
to strengthen the test of causality and to evaluate rival theories (c.f. Yin 1994: 27). 
This was illustrated in the Goldthorpe et al (1968) affluent worker study, in which the 
qualitative evidence countered the predictions of embourgeoisement theory about 
changes in working class behaviour and attitudes. On the other hand, qualitative 
research is necessarily less precise than quantitative research for the confirming or 
disconfirming of hypotheses about causal effects. Whereas qualitative research 
might enable the drawing of strong conclusions about whether or how a variable 
matters in producing effects, quantitative research is likely to enable more confident 
estimates of how much a variable matters in relation to other variables (c.f. George 
and Bennett 2005: 25).  
 
In summary, while the use of qualitative methods in a small number of in-depth 
cases is well suited to testing whether and how the use of MLD is shaped by job and 
organisational context, it cannot test precisely how much the job and/or 
organisational contexts matter, which would require a much larger sample of cases. 
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Such a trade-off of parsimony for richness is inherent within the case study research 
strategy (George and Bennett 2005: 31).  
 
Case studies have been widely used to investigate the actual experience of HRM 
amongst stakeholders and its contribution to broad, organisational outcomes (see 
for example Hartley 1994: 211, McGovern et al. 1997, Truss 2001). Although case 
study research strategies have been criticised for imprecision (Fitzgerald and 
Dopson 2009: 465), the study of carefully selected cases can make valid 
contributions to theory through a partially deductive approach and ‘analytical 
generalisation’, rather than statistical generalisation (Yin 1994). In other words, 
wider conclusions may be drawn from individual cases by locating them in a 
theoretical context.  
 
The use of qualitative methods, characteristic of case studies, is also timely, 
considering the current state of knowledge about MLD’s strategic contribution in 
organisations. The most extensive recent attempt to test the full range of 
relationships between business strategy, HR strategy, MLD options and outcomes 
was a quantitative study by Mabey (2002). Mabey analysed data from an interview 
survey of 501 HRD managers to demonstrate MLD’s positive impact on 
organisational performance and the pivotal role played by ‘the HRM context’ (akin to 
HRD competence). The key limitation of the study, however, was acknowledged as 
the use of HRD managers as single respondents from the sample organisations. 
Mabey concluded that, in future research, the views of other stakeholders, 
particularly those of line managers as the recipients of MLD, should be compared to 
those of HRD managers (p.1156).  As Mabey and others put it elsewhere, such 
research should examine the receiving-end experiences of managers to get 
“beneath the skin” of MLD’s strategic contribution (Thomson et al. 2001: 178, and 
the opening quote of this chapter). The case study research strategy, and the use of 
qualitative methods, is well suited to this task. By exploring the views and 
experiences of the various stakeholders in MLD, the detailed processes by which 
MLD contributes to organisational goals and the key influences on these processes 
may be identified.  
 
In addition to the in-depth investigation of key relationships at single-organisational 
level, the thesis requires an examination of the effects on MLD intervention of 
organisational type and structural transition. A comparative case study strategy is 
therefore required to enable observation of the interaction between interventions 
and their contexts (Ackroyd 2009: 535). The main dependent variable, the outcome 
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of MLD interventions for middle managers, has to be investigated in terms of the 
influence of the independent variable, namely organisational-structural transition. 
Due to the ‘small-n’ character of the comparative case study research strategy, it is 
important to select cases according to limited variation on the dependent variable 
and maximum variation on the independent variable in order to accentuate findings 
pertinent to the causal role of context. The goal of case selection here is to produce 
“contrasting results but for predictable reasons” (Yin 1994: 46).  
 
Limited variation on the dependent variable is achieved by selecting organisations 
that are known for their HRD competence, and thus for their implementation of 
conventional best practice in MLD. This reduces the likelihood that variations in MLD 
options and outcomes are to be explained by ineffectual or atypical HRD functions, 
or the lack of application of conventional learning-management principles within 
individual organisations. To achieve variation on the independent variable requires 
the selection of cases across the continuum of divisionalisation, professionalisation 
and adhocratisation.  
 
The main challenge in case selection here is to achieve sufficient variation on the 
independent variable, namely adequate representation of divisionalisation, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation. The best way to accomplish this would have 
been to replicate the representation of each type of structural transition by selecting 
multiple cases in each category. This approach was used by Whipp et al (2005), 
who investigated the impact of management changes in several social security 
departments grouped by different types of local authority, and by Winterton & 
Winterton (1999), who investigated the impact of competence-based management 
development by selecting several case organisations grouped by industrial sector. 
On a slightly smaller scale, Kessler et al (2000) and Truss (2008) used matched 
pairs of cases in each of their organisational categories when investigating changes 
to the management of public services.  
 
Unfortunately, due to resource limitations, this researcher could only conduct three 
case studies – one each of divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation 
- and was therefore unable to replicate or match cases in each category. This 
means that it is particularly important for a systematic approach to be taken to 
analysing the case study evidence so that valid theoretical generalisations may be 
made. This process is aided by a robust theoretical framework and a clear set of 
theoretical propositions, as developed in Chapters 1 and 2, to guide the analysis 
(Yin 1994: 103-4).  
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The main limitation of using a small number of cases is that the potential for 
interfering factors is increased. The two main contextual variables of HRD 
competence and political obstacles were discussed in the previous chapter. 
However, external influences such as professional regulation might also provide 
some explanation for the MLD options and outcomes observed in a case, even 
though these fall outside of the key theoretical relationships considered. The main 
strategy for overcoming this problem, as will be discussed further in Section 3.3, is 
the triangulation of evidence within each case and then the triangulation of findings 
across the three cases when drawing conclusions (Yin 1994: 91-92). 
 
In summary, the comparative case study strategy can be justified as the most 
suitable approach to testing the central proposition of the thesis, as it enables a 
detailed examination of MLD interventions across contrasting organisational 
contexts. The main limitations, deriving from the small number of cases, are the 
potentially distorting effects of interfering factors on MLD outcomes and the single-
organisational representations of structural transitions. These limitations are largely 
mitigated by careful case selection.  
 
 
3.2 Case selection 
 
The comparative case study strategy necessitates an “embedded multiple case 
design” (Yin 1994: 38). This means that each case study is treated separately, with 
each set of findings embedded in a single organisational context, rather than pooled 
across the case studies in order to make generalisations. As Yin argues, the 
selection of multiple case study organisations has to be in accordance with the logic 
of ‘theoretical replication’, rather than on the basis on representative sampling from 
a population (Yin 1994: 46-47). Therefore, the quality of theoretical replication rests 
upon appropriate case selection according to the independent and dependent 
variables. A rich source from which to select case organisations according to both 
variables is provided by PSOs.  
 
PSOs are an important group of organisations, employing approximately eighteen 
per cent of the UK workforce (Kersley et al. 2006: 18). To select the case study 
organisations from among PSOs has the advantage of gaining some consistency in 
the sample, while allowing for the necessary variation on the independent variable.  
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With regard to consistency, PSOs tend to be large, mature bureaucratic work 
organisations that are subject to relatively strong external regulation of their 
operations (Flynn 2007). In contrast, private organisations are likely to vary more 
widely in terms of their size, products and services, and their operations tend to be 
subject to less external regulation. To select case study organisations from the 
public services therefore helps to hold constant factors of size, age, sector and 
institutional regulation.  
 
It is important, however, not to overstate the distinction between public and private 
sector organisations and their management. Rainey and Han Chun’s (2005) review 
of the evidence concludes that, while “most public managers will face conditions 
much more strongly influenced by … governmental institutions and processes” 
(p.90), a clear distinction cannot be sustained between public and private sector 
operating environments, management goals, structures and processes, and 
organisational efficiencies.  In short, the differences between PSOs are more 
significant than their collective differences with private sector organisations. This 
means that, although case study organisations taken from among PSOs share some 
important similarities, their public sector nature does not significantly reduce their 
representativeness in terms of their management functions.  
 
The organisational diversity amongst PSOs is explained by Grout and Stevens 
(2003: 217-19). The authors present a fivefold categorisation of the increasing 
variety of ownership and contracting arrangements for the provision of public 
services, including: i) publicly-owned and -controlled organisations, such as most 
local authority schools; ii) privately-owned but publicly-rented and -managed 
organisations, such as some newly-built hospitals; iii) publicly-owned but privately-
rented and -managed organisations, such as ‘failing’ schools run by private 
education contractors; iv) privately-owned and-managed organisations whose 
services are contracted by the government, such as private hospitals providing 
state-funded surgical operations; and v) privately-owned and -managed 
organisations that sell regulated and often state-subsidised services directly to the 
public, such as privatised utility firms and transport providers.   
 
When selecting case study organisations from among PSOs, therefore, the 
researcher is faced with a potentially wide choice of types. However, some types are 
more prevalent than others. As Grout and Stevens point out (p.218), the first and 
fifth types – traditional public sector organisations and privatised providers – are the 
most common. The three case organisations in this thesis – a publicly owned and 
93 
 
controlled fire brigade, a local authority social services department, and a privatised 
train operator – reflect these more dominant types of PSOs.  
 
Another important feature of PSOs in recent years, related to the increased diversity 
of ownership and control arrangements, is governmental pressure on them to 
achieve greater organisational flexibility and responsiveness. As discussed in 
Section 1.4, such environmental pressures have important implications for 
management roles and skills. Public management reforms in recent decades have 
taken many forms and operate on a number of levels (Pollitt 2002, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004). At organisational level, however, the common theme has been 
greater decentralisation, motivated by attempts to speed up managerial decision-
making, adapt services more easily to local conditions, encourage innovation and 
increase staff motivation and identification  (Pollitt 2005: 378, 381).  
 
The three chosen case studies for this thesis - namely SWT, LFB and KASS - are 
exemplars of PSOs under these kinds of decentralisation pressures. In general 
terms, recent changes to the management of PSOs provide a good illustration of the 
theoretical range of different types of organisational decentralisation, both vertical 
and horizontal (Pollitt 2005: 384-85). In more specific terms, public management 
reforms at organisational level provide good illustrations of the most important points 
on the continuum of decentralisation: namely divisionalisation, professionalisation 
and adhocratisation. Thus, each of the three case study PSOs in this thesis helps 
achieve the required variation on the independent variable.  
 
With regard to variation on the independent variable, PSOs in recent years may be 
said to exemplify the divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation of 
mature bureaucratic work organisations. Firstly, PSOs are the “natural home of 
bureaucracy and the bureaucrat” (Hales 2002: 58) and span a wide spectrum of 
organisational types (Grout and Stevens 2003: 217-19, Flynn 2007: 210), including 
machine bureaucracies, professional bureaucracies and adhocracies (Pichault 
2007). Secondly, with regard to exemplifying divisionalisation, professionalisation 
and adhocratisation, PSOs have seen significant structural changes in their 
management in the past two and a half decades, particularly in the UK (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004).  
 
Divisionalisation has been widespread in the UK public services in the last three 
decades, producing a rich source of cases from which to select. At organisational 
level, the shift from ‘Old Public Administration’ to the ‘New Public Management’ 
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(NPM) in the 1980s and mid-1990s (Dunleavy and Hood 1994) has meant the 
breaking up of large, multi-purpose bureaucracies and their replacement by 
decentralised sets of smaller, more autonomous units (Pollitt 2002, Dunleavy et al. 
2006). The driving force behind such reforms has been the pursuit of efficiency-
maximisation, through a localised emphasis on the achievement of outputs, rather 
than the management of inputs and processes through centralised, hierarchical 
decision-making (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004).  
 
The breaking up of large centralised bureaucracies into smaller, more autonomous 
and commercialised units, described by Dunleavy et al (2006) as ‘disaggregation’, 
has been particularly pronounced in the civil service, which encompasses a range of 
professional and machine-like bureaucracies. In addition, and of most interest to this 
research, is the type of divisionalisation in which machine-like PSOs are ‘chunked 
up’ into deregulated or privatised services (c.f. Dunleavy et al.: 5). Examples of such 
PSOs may be primarily found in utilities, distribution and transport.  
 
Professionalisation and adhocratisation are more readily detected within the second 
wave of public service reform from the late-1990s to the late-2000s, which has been 
observed as a shift from NPM towards ‘modernisation’ (Newman 2002). This second 
wave is characterised, amongst other agendas, by a fresh concern with quality and 
innovation in services (Dunleavy et al. 2006, Bach and Kessler 2007, Bach 2010: 
157-58). Notwithstanding the continuation and strengthening of centralised 
performance controls, particularly in the form of audit (Power 1997), the key 
changes at the level of the PSO have been the accentuation of professional 
involvement in managing quality, greater technological sophistication, and the 
creation of partnerships between public, private and voluntary organisations to 
deliver ‘joined-up’ and innovative public services. Implicit here is the increasing 
importance of learning and mutual adjustment, processes that are common to 
professionalisation and, particularly in the case of partnership work, to 
adhocratisation.    
 
Cases of professionalisation in the UK are less easily observable than those of 
divisionalisation. Indeed, the opposite trend of deprofessionalisation has been more 
commonly observed, and there is good evidence of the weakening of professional 
control and the intensification of work in many areas of the public services, 
particularly in education and health (c.f. Ferlie and Geraghty 2005: 424). However, 
this trend has not been entirely even or unidirectional. Various patterns are in fact 
visible, including ‘professionalisation projects’ that seek professional status and 
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recognition for various groups of workers, such as in nursing (Abbott 1998, cited in 
Ferlie and Geraghty 2005: 425, 426).  
 
An important element of deprofessionalisation has been the increase in 
competence-based management in the public services (see Winterton and 
Winterton 1999, Horton 2002). As part of NPM-inspired measures to standardise 
quality of service, there have been widespread attempts by central government to 
establish new sets of competences for professionals and other skilled employees. 
This has resulted in the introduction of new professional standards in health and 
social care, education, local government and the emergency services.  
 
For the more established and socially powerful professions, such as teaching and 
medicine, the new professional standards therefore represent greater centralised 
control, rather than the devolution of control to autonomous professional bodies 
(Broadbent and Laughlin 2002). For less powerful groups in the public services, 
however, namely those skilled employees who might be termed ‘emergent-‘ or 
‘semi-professionals’, new vocational or professional standards can be interpreted as 
empowering, or can at least be adapted in an empowering way in practice (c.f. 
Ashworth and Entwistle 2011: 434-35). For such groups of workers, new standards 
generally signal an intended move away from predictable, routinised work that 
favours close supervision and command-and-control management, towards work 
tasks that deal with greater uncertainty and require the exercising of a broader set of 
skills and informed judgement.  
 
This second type of professional standard-setting reflects underlying attempts to 
shift the coordination of work away from standardisation of work processes towards 
standardisation by skills. Driven by pressures to become more responsive to public 
service users, the renegotiation of professional standards for such groups as 
nurses, unqualified social care workers, police officers and firefighters has often 
been contentious. Nevertheless, it represents an attempt to identify new sets of 
competences and to redefine the professional status of the work of these groups.  
 
It is these types of PSOs, that predominantly employ ‘emergent-‘ or ‘semi-
professional’ labour, which best illustrate professionalisation in the sense in which it 
is used in this thesis. In organisational-management terms, as explained in Section 
1.4, professionalisation represents a shift from machine-like bureaucracy towards 
professional bureaucracy, and in terms of the middle management role typology it 
represents a shift from Role A machine middle line management towards Role C 
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professional middle line management. While the shift from Role B (business division 
management) to Role C may be more consistent with the consecutive stages of the 
theoretical continuum (see Figure 1.7), the shift from Roles A to C better captures 
the typical practice of professionalisation.  
 
Adhocratisation in PSOs is commonly found in professional bureaucracies that are 
attempting to achieve greater flexibility in parts of their operations. Although 
Mintzberg recognises the theoretical possibility of transition from machine 
bureaucracy to adhocracy through a leap in the sophistication or automation of the 
technical system used to provide the product or service (1979: 471), there is scant 
evidence of this type of radical shift in the public services. There have been cases of 
fully automated public services using ‘zero-touch’ technology, such as London’s 
road congestion surveillance system, but large and routinised back-office functions 
that resemble machine bureaucracies are still required in most PSOs, even if parts 
of the organisation require no human intervention (c.f. Dunleavy et al. 2006: 20).  
 
The most common adhocratisation attempts are those arising from modernisation 
reforms that have tried to shift the delivery of services away from single providers 
towards partnerships and networks of providers (c.f. Newman 2002). The concept of 
partnership-working in the public services has been loosely defined in policy 
documentation to cover a wide range of quite different institutional arrangements 
(Entwistle  and Martin 2005: 235, cited in Bach and Givan 2008: 528). In general 
terms, however, partnership reforms have had a significant impact on professional 
bureaucracies, particularly in local government, leading to the rise of a new type of 
‘boundary-spanning’ public manager (Williams 2002, cited by Ashworth and 
Entwistle 2011: 437).  It is this type of change, which seeks to join up different PSOs 
to deliver services, in which adhocratisation attempts can be most widely observed. 
 
To summarise, PSOs provide a rich source from which to select case organisations 
that represent divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation, and 
therefore the required variation on the independent variable of structural 
organisational change. In turning to the question of case selection according to 
limited variation on the dependent variable – through the implementation of 
conventional best practice in MLD -, it is important to point out that PSOs have been 
the recipients of sustained investment in MLD in recent years. Indeed, the issue of 
raising the quality of management and leadership has been central to the public 
service reform debate. The individual manager in the PSO has been viewed 
particularly by NPM advocates as the key agent through whom the efficiency and 
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quality of services can be improved (Clarke and Newman 1997). This emphasis has 
also continued in the modernisation debate in the form of a preoccupation with 
individual ‘leaders’, who are expected at all levels in PSOs, to help ‘transform’ 
services (Lawler 2008: 22, O'Reilly and Reed 2010).  
 
Attempts to raise the quality of management and leadership in PSOs through 
investment in MLD have featured strongly in governmental policies to reform PSOs 
(see OECD 2001, DfES/DTI 2002: 1, Burgoyne et al. 2004: 69-70). In the UK, 
through the creation of various academies and national centres of excellence in 
areas of the public services such as the civil service, health, education and social 
care (Burgoyne et al. 2004: 69-70, Storey 2004b: 4-5, Guest and King 2005: 248-49, 
Lawler 2008: 22), MLD practice in PSOs has been well developed and supported by 
expert advice. ‘Best-practice-in-MLD organisations’ are therefore common amongst 
PSOs and can be identified through their accreditation by such external awards as 
‘Investors in People’, or through their reputations as acknowledged leaders in MLD 
practice in their sectors. While awards like Investors in People do not automatically 
indicate good practice in MLD (Hoque 2003), they nevertheless demonstrate a high 
degree of adherence to conventional best practice principles.   
 
The final set of considerations in case selection relates to the need to keep 
extraneous factors constant as far as practicable. There are three main factors. 
Firstly, the case organisations should be of a similar size. The decision to study 
PSOs is helpful in this respect, as such organisations tend to be large and therefore 
comparable in terms of workforce size and institutional maturity. Secondly, the case 
organisations should be of a similar geographical location. This reduces the 
potentially distorting effects of managers and their teams being recruited from labour 
markets with different norms or institutional conditions. Thirdly, the case studies 
should be taken from a similar time period. This reduces the potentially distorting 
effects of incomparable external environmental factors and regulatory conditions.  
 
3.2.1 Introduction to the three case study organisations 
 
The use of MLD during divisionalisation is well illustrated by South West Trains 
(SWT) in the years 2003-7. The basic coordination mechanism on the railways is 
machine-bureaucratic, involving the standardisation of work processes through 
centralised control and the regulation of services by national train timetables and 
through passenger safety routines.  However, privatisation of the rail network in 
1996 broke up the national coordinating structure into regions, and passenger 
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services such as SWT were sold as private franchises on a fixed term basis through 
a market-tendering process (Wolmar 2005). The winner of the South West 
franchise, Stagecoach plc, became responsible for operating (but not owning) the 
stations and trains on the regional network on a customer-satisfying and profit-
making basis.  
 
After privatisation, responsibility for operations was devolved to train operating 
companies, but monitored at national level by the government-controlled regulator 
through an extensive framework of performance indicators (Cole and Cooper 2005). 
Within SWT itself, accountability for the performance of trains, stations, depots and 
other business units was devolved to managers in a way that largely mirrored the 
national performance measurement regime. This created new managerial 
responsibilities, particularly at middle level. Alongside an ongoing process of 
restructuring, the company experienced significant employment relations problems 
from 1997-2003, but became renowned in the industry for overcoming these through 
HRM and MLD interventions from 2003-2007. This period of SWT’s history therefore 
represents an excellent opportunity to study the role played by MLD for middle 
managers during an apparently successful divisionalisation of a machine 
bureaucracy.  
 
The London Fire Brigade (LFB) during the period 2003-5 provides a good illustration 
of the use of MLD during professionalisation. As noted in Section 1.2, fire 
departments may be seen as a variant of the machine bureaucracy, namely the 
safety bureaucracy (Mintzberg 1979: 332-333). Coordination in safety bureaucracies 
is achieved through standard or routine work procedures that, although not used 
continuously, are highly formalised and extensively rehearsed to minimise risks to 
safety and to enable effective response to situations of an emergency but essentially 
predictable nature. In fire services, this approach to coordination is known as 
‘incident command’. The main operational responsibility for incident command lies 
with the mid-hierarchy managers in charge of fire stations, who may be said to 
practice a variant of machine middle line management, called here ‘emergency 
middle line management’.  
 
By the mid-1990s there was a consensus amongst stakeholders, including the 
government, fire service managers and the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) (Fitzgerald 
2005: 655-56), that the operating environment had changed. Knowledge and 
technology in fire safety and prevention had advanced and, although the number of 
fires on average was falling, there was a rise in less familiar emergency situations 
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such as dangerous hoax calls, floods and terrorist attacks. This changing landscape 
meant that the traditional range of firefighters’ work tasks had necessarily 
broadened and become subject to greater local variation. Local fire service 
management therefore assumed a wider range of functions beyond the coordination 
of incident command, notably in the promotion of fire prevention and community fire 
safety.  
 
During a lengthy and acrimonious industrial dispute with the FBU in 2002-4, the UK 
government seized the opportunity to reform what it saw as outdated and overly 
centralised bureaucratic operating procedures in the fire service and sought to 
abolish “strongly entrenched working practices” (Fitzgerald 2005: 649, see also 
Seifert and Sibley 2011). In 2004, radical modernisation measures were introduced 
in an effort to make the fire service more flexible and professionalised. The 
measures included the restructuring of brigades, the introduction of localised 
community fire safety plans, new terms and conditions for firefighters, targets for 
greater gender and cultural diversity in the workforce, and a new competence-based 
development system for all uniformed managers and staff (ODPM 2003).  
 
A key component of the modernisation reforms was a move away from the 
traditional rank structure for uniformed staff towards new occupational roles based 
on sets of competences. This was accompanied by the abolition of recruitment and 
promotion practices based on technical knowledge, and their replacement with 
competence-based development programmes at all levels of the uniformed 
hierarchy. MLD therefore assumed a new significance through the introduction of 
revised management development programmes, which were modelled around the 
modernised managerial roles. LFB was at the forefront of reforming the traditional 
rank structure to a role structure, and of the development of sets of new 
competences for fire service managers. In short, LFB led the national attempt at 
professionalisation and the use of MLD as an instrument in this process.  
 
The use of MLD during adhocratisation is well illustrated by Kent Adult Social 
Services (KASS). Social work for children and adults in the UK had traditionally 
been delivered through a classic professional bureaucracy. From 1993, however, 
the management of social services was devolved to the level of local authorities, 
although social workers continued to be regulated by strict, centralised professional 
standards (Means and Smith 1998). From 1998, there was another devolutionary 
push. The new Labour government began to incentivise local authorities to 
commission more care services from voluntary and private sector organisations, and 
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to work together with a wider range of public agency partners to stimulate and 
innovate new ways of providing care. This had significant implications for middle 
management, where the main responsibility lay for assessing and meeting care 
needs within a particular district (c.f. Flynn 2007: 87).  
 
KASS was one of the first social services departments in England to commission 
almost all of its care services from private and voluntary sector providers, rather 
than provide it directly. After pronouncing Kent Social Services as ‘poor’ in 1998, 
government inspections in the mid-late 2000s awarded maximum ratings of 
excellence to the council and the social services department, making particular 
references to excellence in leadership, innovations in care provision and 
investments in people management, including MLD (SSI/Audit Commission 2001, 
CSCI 2007). KASS therefore provides an excellent opportunity to investigate the 
role of MLD in promoting the management of new partnership arrangements and 
more adhocratic ways of coordinating care provision.  
 
More detail on each of the three case organisations, and the extent to which they 
exemplify divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation, will be provided 
in each of the case study chapters 4-6.  With regard to their exemplification of 
limited variation on the dependent variable, it is important to note that the three case 
study organisations, as leaders in their sectors, may be expected to demonstrate 
conventional best practice in MLD. In terms of limiting the effects of extraneous 
variables, the factors of organisational size, geographical location and historical 
period were kept reasonably constant. All three organisations are large, with 
between approximately 4000 and 7000 employees. All are based in the South East 
of England. Finally, the case studies all belong to the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
thereby reflecting similar operating and political environments.  
 
Given the strong extent to which the case organisations can be expected to 
exemplify the necessary variation of on the independent variable and limited 
variation on the dependent variable, and the way in which important extraneous 
variables have been held largely constant, the observed differences in the 
organisations’ MLD options and outcomes might then be expected, in line with the 
hypotheses, to be explained by the influence of organisational context.  
 
In illustrating the contribution of MLD to divisionalisation, SWT should be expected 
to have invested in both operational and strategic types of management 
development (OMD and SMD) for its middle managers, both to ensure the ongoing 
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smooth-running of the overall machine-bureaucratic operation and to promote the 
strategic development of its local business units to be more efficient and provide 
better customer service. Within this process, individual middle managers at SWT 
should be expected to have developed greater competence in operational and 
strategic management to secure the compliance of staff towards local business 
performance objectives.  
 
In contrast, in illustrating the contribution of MLD to professionalisation, LFB should 
be expected to have invested in both operational and professional types of 
management development (OMD and PMD), and in leader development for its 
middle managers. This may then be expected to have the effect of ensuring the 
smooth-running of the safety bureaucracy at the same time as promoting firefighters’ 
competence in a wider range of operational situations and their commitment to the 
new community fire safety agenda. Within this process, individual fire station 
managers should be expected to have developed competence in traditional incident 
command as well as the intrapersonal competence to motivate and develop the 
firefighters in their teams to undertake a wider range of operational tasks.  
 
Finally, in illustrating the contribution of MLD to adhocratisation, KASS should be 
expected to have invested in a professional variant of management development 
(PMD) to ensure the stability and adaption of the professional social work 
bureaucracy, as well as training in project management (PJMD), leader 
development and leadership development for its middle managers in order to 
promote more innovative, partnership-based ways of delivering care services. Within 
this process, individual social care managers should be expected to have developed 
competence in the upholding and development of professional regulations as well as 
in managing projects; in addition they should be expected to have developed the 
intrapersonal and interpersonal competence to engage in collaborative networks.  
 
There is, however, one strong feature of all three the case selections that may be 
considered a potentially interfering factor in the MLD process: that of gender bias. It 
has to be observed that SWT and LFB had male-dominated workforces, whereas 
KASS had a female-dominated workforce. The best way to have neutralised 
potential gender-effects in the case study analysis, as alluded to in the previous 
section, would have been to select multiple or paired cases. For example, LFB might 
have been matched to a case of female prison wardens undergoing a similar 
process of professionalisation. In the absence of paired or matched cases, however, 
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it is necessary to be alert to the possible gender effects that are suggested by the 
MLD literature.  
 
Research suggests that gender bias tends to affect MLD in two main ways: i) by 
restricting access to women to certain MLD activities; and ii) by influencing 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the value of MLD outcomes due to assumptions based 
on gender stereotypes . On the first point, it has been observed that the more 
informal methods that tend to be used in leader and leadership development often 
serve to discriminate against women. Learning through special job assignments, for 
example, typically relies on access to high-level informal networks, from which 
women tend to be marginalised in comparison to their male counterparts (Grugulis 
2007: 85, Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 215-16).  
 
The implication of this first type of gender bias for this research is that if leader or 
leadership development is observed as more effective at either SWT or LFB relative 
to KASS, then this may have more to do with greater opportunities for male 
managers than with the fit between the MLD activities and the organisational 
context. (It is important to reiterate, however, that these two particular MLD options 
of leader development and leadership development are not hypothetically expected 
in divisionalisation at SWT, and only leader development is hypothetically expected 
during professionalisation at LFB).  
 
The second main way in which gender bias may affect MLD is through gendered 
perceptions of managerial effectiveness and performance. This seems to be 
accentuated in competence-based MLD that relies upon purportedly objective 
statements of managerial competence (Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 210-11). As 
Grugulis (2007) observes, “Jobs are often designed around ideas of masculinity and 
femininity ...[so] Competence in work is rated more highly when employees are the 
‘right’ gender for that job” (p.84).  
 
In male-dominated environments such as SWT and LFB, therefore, if MLD is 
perceived by stakeholders to have developed competences that conform to 
stereotypically male traits of competitiveness and rationality, this may simply be a 
reflection of positive assumptions about managers’ appropriateness for their roles, 
rather than the actual effect of MLD in terms of furthering the organisation’s aims. A 
similar effect may occur in a female-dominated environment, such as KASS, if MLD 
is perceived to have developed competences that conform to stereotypically female 
traits of nurturing and empathy (c.f. Rees and Garnsey 2003, Grugulis 2007: 84-85). 
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Conversely, if, in male-dominated environments such as SWT or LFB, new 
managerial roles, which MLD is designed to support, are seen as modelled on 
‘female’ competences, then any perceived ineffectiveness of MLD might have more 
to do with negative assumptions about the value of the actual MLD outcomes, rather 
than their appropriateness for the organisational context. A similar effect may occur 
in female-dominated environments such as KASS if new managerial roles, which 
MLD is designed to support, are perceived to be based on ‘male’ competences.  
 
These two potential effects of gender bias will be reconsidered in Chapter 7, when 
the case study findings are compared. The only other strong common feature of the 
three case organisations that should be highlighted is their densely unionised 
workforces. High union density is common amongst PSOs generally, and reforms to 
management and services in PSOs have often been met with ambivalence from the 
public sector trade unions (Bach and Givan 2008: 523). The recent histories of 
adversarial employment relations in the fire service (LFB) and in SWT have already 
been noted; with regard to the third case, there is also a history of ambivalence 
amongst social workers to some of the recent reforms to social care (see The 
Guardian, 'Deep sense of shame', Social care special issue, 1 August 2007).   
 
The potential for political obstacles to the MLD process, as described in Section 2.2, 
is therefore high in all three cases. Due the requirement for specialist qualifications 
to enter work in public service environments, middle managers in PSOs tend to 
share similar occupational backgrounds to the rank-and-file, and may be members 
of the same trade unions or professional associations. This means that the middle 
managers in the cases might be reluctant, out of loyalty to their union colleagues, to 
commit to the formal aims of some MLD activities, if these activities are directed 
towards priorities of senior management that are contested by the unions. Indeed, 
the content and emphasis of the MLD interventions in the three cases, given the 
histories of adversarial employment relations, can be expected to be orientated, at 
least in part, towards developing managers to overcome employee resistance to 
organisational change.  
 
The probability of middle-managerial resistance to MLD out of union loyalty is 
highest in the fire service, in which the FBU is the dominant occupational union for 
all uniformed staff, including junior to middle managers. It may also be likely among 
social care managers in local authorities, who are traditionally social workers by 
profession and can be expected belong to the dominant trade union, Unison, and/or 
the professional association for social work, the British Association of Social 
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Workers. In train operating companies, however, managers are most likely to belong 
to the union for non-operational staff, the Transport Salaried Staffs' Association 
(TSSA), rather than the train drivers’ union ASLEF (Associated Society of 
Locomotive Engineers and Firemen) or the Rail Maritime and Transport workers 
union (RMT), thus reducing the probability of middle-managerial resistance to MLD 
out of union loyalty in this case.  
 
As with the issue of gender bias, the selection of a greater number of cases might 
have neutralised the potential effects of unionisation by matching each of the cases 
of divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation with a non-unionised but 
otherwise similar organisation. For example, SWT might have been matched with a 
non-unionised bus company. However, because the potential for political obstacles 
due to middle management unionisation is common to all three of the cases, this 
means that, in itself, unionisation need not be considered as an explanatory factor 
with regard to the similarities or differences in MLD outcomes between the cases. 
Instead, unionisation may be most appropriately considered as a dimension of the 
contextual variable of political obstacles to MLD within each case.  
 
 
3.3 Data collection strategy 
 
The type of data required in the case studies is similar to those required in training 
evaluation, on which there is a large literature. Mabey and Finch-Lees (2008) 
distinguish between two main approaches: strategic MLD evaluation and operational 
MLD evaluation. Both of these approaches are relevant to the comparative case 
study strategy and inform the choice of research methods used.  
 
Strategic MLD evaluation seeks to measure “the fit between management 
development policies and practices and the strategic goals of the organization” 
(Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 57). In the terms used in the previous chapter, this is 
the assessment of internal strategic fit, or strategic HRD competence in the 
organisation. It is concerned with the degree of appropriateness of the MLD options 
chosen in relation to business and HRM goals. Observers have pointed out that the 
precise contribution of MLD to organisational outcomes is notoriously difficult to 
identify, due to the wide-ranging objectives and activities of different types of MLD, 
their long-term orientation and the range of variables that contribute to 
organisational performance (Guest and King 2005: 250-51, Mabey and Finch-Lees 
2008: 68-69). However, as argued in the first section of this chapter, organisational 
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case studies, based on qualitative evidence, offer a suitable way of obtaining rich 
information to analyse these changing relationships. 
 
Operational MLD evaluation seeks to measure “how well training and development 
activities are designed and delivered” (Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008: 57). In the 
terms of the previous chapter, this concerns the assessment of operational HRD 
competence. There exists a range of available operational MLD evaluation 
frameworks, which offer a variety of ways to measure the results of MLD 
intervention (Tamkin et al. 2002a). A particularly thorough method is outlined by 
Mole (2000: 113-188), drawing on an example by Latham and Saari (1979). Mole 
advocates extensive data collection, mainly through questionnaires, in order to give 
measurable data on participants’ reactions, learning and job performance at various 
intervals up to one year after the intervention. He also advocates the qualitative 
assessment of participants’ conduct during audio-recorded role plays, based on 
known critical incidents for the target group, to observe changes in the participants’ 
behaviour. In addition, Mole highlights the involvement of a range of stakeholders 
and emphasises the importance of careful design in MLD evaluation. This includes 
the use of control groups for comparison with observed changes in the MLD 
participants’ behaviour, and the development of working hypotheses about the 
expected outcomes of MLD at the beginning of the design process.  
 
Mole’s recommended data collection strategy is exhaustive and necessarily tailored 
to the organisation and the specific situation. It requires the close involvement of the 
evaluator at the beginning of the MLD design process and access to a range of 
stakeholders at various points for at least one year after the main intervention. While 
this is desirable, it is not always practical or achievable. Particularly the organisation 
of control groups and the extensive use of questionnaires over a protracted time 
period are difficult for external researchers with access restrictions. Unobtrusive, 
unthreatening and limited periods of research activity in an organisation are easier 
to negotiate than ongoing, extensive and frequent repeat evaluation activities (c.f. 
Buchanan et al. 1988). A flexible, pragmatic approach is therefore usually necessary 
for external researchers.  
 
Due to restrictions of time and access, this researcher was unable to administer 
controlled, before-and-after tests of the impact of MLD intervention, as advocated by 
Mole, and had to rely on documentary evidence and retrospective accounts of 
individual, group and organisational change through interviews. The limitations of 
this uncontrolled and retrospective approach to observing MLD outcomes, but also 
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how these were largely mitigated, are discussed in more detail below. Before 
consideration of these more detailed questions, however, it is necessary to provide 
an overview and justification of the overall data collection strategy adopted here.  
 
Firstly, in line with Mole’s recommendation of careful evaluation design, the data 
collection strategy was guided by the need to establish the three initial conditions 
from Chapter 1 and to test the four hypotheses developed in Chapter 2. Secondly, 
specific data requirements were identified in advance, guided by the model of 
expected multi-levelled MLD outcomes in Figure 2.2. Finally, and consistently with 
Mole’s recommendations for multiple sources of evidence, capturing the perceptions 
of a range of stakeholders (see also Yin 1994), a mixture of primary, secondary, 
qualitative and quantitative data were collected in each case organisation.  
 
Below is a reminder of the initial conditions and hypotheses that guided the data 
collection strategy:   
 
Initial condition 1. Skill-fit to organisational structure.  
The main tasks and key skills required of middle managers vary according to four 
main roles, which correspond to Mintzberg’s four main organisational types. 
 
Initial condition 2. Line-staff division across the four roles. 
The various middle management roles found within an organisation are determined 
by the responsibility for either a line or staff function. 
 
Initial condition 3. Skill needs for structural transition.  
The skill needs of middle managers are driven by one of the four main middle 
management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational 
flexibility. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Role of MLD. 
MLD interventions for middle managers are investments to enable them to contribute 
to organisational stability and/or strategic change.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Contingent MLD options. 
MLD options for middle managers are contingent on one of the four main middle 
management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational 
flexibility.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Contingent MLD outcomes. 
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The outcomes of MLD for middle managers are contingent on one of the four main 
middle management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational 
flexibility.  
 
Hypothesis 4. Extent of structural transition and effect on MLD. 
The extent of structural transition determines the extent to which MLD serves 
organisational stability and/or change.  
  
The specific data collection requirements for the case studies, in line with the above 
initial conditions and hypotheses, are detailed in Figure 3.1. 
  
 
108 
 
 
 
 
 
Conditions 
and 
Hypotheses 
Key constructs 
(concepts to be studied) 
Data required 
(how concepts will be observed) 
Sources 
(where data will be found) 
Initial 
conditions 1-
3 
 
 
 key coordination mechanism 
- standardisation of processes, outputs and skills 
- mutual adjustment 
 structural configurations 
- machine bureaucracy 
- divisionalised form 
- professional bureaucracy 
- adhocracy 
 structural transition 
- divisionalisation 
- professionalisation 
- adhocratisation 
 
 The ‘middle line’ (and staff management) 
 Middle management roles 
- machine middle line management (Role A) 
- business division management (Role B) 
- professional middle line management (Role C) 
- middle leadership (Role D) 
 Middle management skills  
- technical skills 
- human skills (soft skills and leader skills) 
- conceptual skills 
 Organisation charts 
 Workforce statistics 
 Strategic plans 
 Performance management 
objectives and standards  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Job descriptions and 
competency profiles 
 Operational instructions 
 HRD/MLD strategies 
 Middle management 
development plans and 
programmes  
 Perceptions and experiences 
of expert witnesses 
(senior/HR/middle managers 
and employee 
representatives)  
 Corporate strategy documents 
 HR strategy documents 
 Performance management 
documentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 HR information systems 
 Interviews with expert witnesses 
- senior managers  
- HRD managers 
- middle managers 
- employee representatives 
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Figure 3.1 Data collection strategy  
 
Hypotheses Key constructs 
(concepts to be studied) 
Data required 
(how concepts will be observed) 
Sources 
(where data will be found) 
Hypothesis 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 MLD options 
- management development (operational, 
strategic, professional and project management 
development) 
- leader development  
- leadership development  
 
 MLD outcomes for individuals 
- managerial competence (operational, strategic, 
professional and project management 
competence) 
- intrapersonal competence 
- interpersonal competence 
 
 MLD outcomes for groups 
- compliance 
- commitment 
- innovation 
 
 MLD outcomes for organisations 
- organisational continuity / stability 
- strategic change / structural transition 
 
 HRD/MLD strategies 
 Middle management 
development plans and 
programmes  
 
 
 
 Critical incidents of middle 
manager learners 
 
 
 
 
 
 Business unit plans and 
outcomes 
 Perceptions/ experiences of 
expert witnesses 
 
 Organisational strategy and 
performance data 
 Perceptions/ experiences of 
expert witnesses 
 
 HR information systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Critical incident interviews with 
middle manager learners 
 
 
 
 
 
 Unit business plans/performance 
documentation 
 Interviews with expert witnesses  
 
 
 Organisational strategy and 
performance documentation 
 Interviews with expert witnesses 
Hypotheses 
3 & 4 
All of the above All of the above All of the above 
 110 
As Figure 3.1 illustrates, Initial conditions 1 and 2 are concerned with the dominant type 
of coordination and organisational structure and the pressures for structural transition in 
each case organisation. The existence of these conditions was established by studying 
organisational and strategy documentation, which is akin to strategic MLD evaluation. 
Crucially, however, the realities of how strategic change was developed and 
implemented, and how this might relate to MLD, had to be observed through the 
informal accounts and views of the key decision-makers, notably senior managers and 
HR managers. This important aspect of data collection is therefore highlighted in bold in 
Figure 3.1. 
 
Senior and HR managers’ accounts of strategic change and the role of MLD were 
ascertained through semi-structured interviews (see the interview questions in 
Appendices I and II). The use of semi-structured interviews ensures on the one hand a 
degree of consistency across interviews and cases (Bryman and Bell 2003: 346), while 
on the other allowing flexibility for the researcher to pursue emergent issues of interest, 
and to re-examine or re-visit the same line of enquiry from different angles to get closer 
to the interviewee’s real understanding, motivations or perceptions (c.f. Easterby-Smith 
et al. 2002: 75). A systematic approach to the analysis was then guided by the testing 
of the three initial conditions.  
 
The other concern of Initial conditions 1-2, along with Initial condition 3, is the role of the 
middle line and other types of staff management in the organisation, as conceptualised 
in the middle management roles A-D. To establish the existence of these roles required 
an investigation into changes to the middle management function of each organisation, 
with the additional requirement to investigate the changing skill profiles of middle 
managers. A study of job descriptions and competence profiles for middle managers 
was therefore needed, alongside a consideration of related HR and MLD strategies, 
plans and programmes, and how their aims related to the requirements of 
organisational continuity and change.  
 
Documentary evidence of the formal organisational expectations of middle managers, 
and how these were seen to have changed, had then to be triangulated with the 
informal accounts of middle managers to ascertain the realities of the situation. Middle 
managers’ perceptions and experiences of their changing roles and skill requirements 
were investigated through semi-structured interviews. Through the use of ‘interlocking 
questions’ (c.f. Winterton and Winterton 1999: 47), the views of middle managers could 
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then be either corroborated or found to conflict with those of the senior managers and 
other staff. The first two interview questions for middle managers (see Appendix III) 
were designed to collect data on how middle managers perceived their changing roles 
and skill requirements.  
 
The data collection activities required to test Hypotheses 1-4, concerning the MLD 
options and outcomes in the organisation, have a stronger association with operational 
MLD evaluation than with strategic MLD evaluation. The overall objective was to 
establish the relationship between HRM goals, different types of MLD intervention, and 
MLD outcomes at individual, group and organisational levels.  The establishment of 
these interrelationships required the researcher to draw in part upon the background 
documentation and interview data described above in relation to Initial conditions 1 and 
2. The most important data, however, were middle managers’ interview accounts of the 
changes that had resulted from MLD intervention.  
 
In the absence of controlled before-and-after tests, care had to be exercised in order to 
achieve confidence in the attribution to MLD of reported changes in individual or group 
behaviour or improvements organisational performance (see similar difficulties 
encountered by Winterton and Winterton 1999: 45 in their MLD case studies). The two 
measures taken to ensure confidence in the attribution of causality were: i) the use of 
the critical incident interview technique (Flanagan 1954); and ii) the triangulation of the 
interview results with evidence from other sources (Yin 1994).  
 
With regard to the first method, it is important to recognise that the critical incident 
interview technique dealt with the heart of the empirical task: observing how MLD 
interventions led to changes in the organisation. The technique is designed to draw out 
the interviewee’s most memorable incidents in order to identify moments of real tension 
in the workplace (Flanagan 1954, Chell 1998). In this research, the tensions of interest 
were between an individual’s skill development needs and the actual experience of 
MLD. This required advanced interviewing skills (Chell 1998), particularly in the use of 
probing questions to tease out the most important information without ‘leading’ the 
interviewee and biasing the results (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 80). In particular, the 
reasons for the memorable nature of the incidents had to be probed in relation to what 
actually changed at individual, group or organisational level. This approach should then 
produce interview data that goes beneath superficial learner perceptions of personal 
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change or the ‘placebo effects’ of participation in development activity and research 
(Chell 1998, Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 83-84).  
 
As a crucial source of evidence, the critical incidents of middle managers are 
highlighted in bold in Figure 3.1. Question 3 in the interviews for middle managers 
(Appendix III) employed the critical incident technique most explicitly and formed the 
key part of the interview. The remaining questions presented the researcher with the 
opportunity to re-examine and re-visit critical incidents and compare them in 
significance with other learning experiences. Another important consideration was the 
timing of the interview in relation to the MLD intervention. The MLD literature is 
remarkably thin on the question of timeframes for behavioural and other types of 
change attributable to MLD. However, Mole (2000: 113, 115) and Martineau (2004: 
243-45) concur that the intended changes in individual behaviour are best investigated 
within a few months and up to one year after the intervention. Once completed across a 
sample of middle managers within this timescale, patterns of critical incidents could 
then be analysed across the interviews to infer with some confidence the contribution of 
MLD for middle managers to group and organisational outcomes.  
 
The triangulation of methods, the second measure to ensure confidence in the 
attribution of changes to MLD intervention, was achieved by corroborating the reported 
patterns of critical incidents with two other main sources of evidence: other 
stakeholders’ accounts of the MLD intervention; and the organisation’s MLD evaluation 
documentation (see bottom right area of Figure 3.1). With regard to the first source, 
alternative accounts of MLD’s effectiveness, or the lack of it, were gained through semi-
structured interviews with other expert witnesses, notably with senior managers who 
may have sponsored, commissioned or supported MLD programmes for the middle 
managers in their teams. With regard to the second source, MLD evaluation 
documentation from the HRD function, the researcher obtained where possible learner 
feedback on the quality of the MLD interventions (sometimes known as ‘happy sheets’) 
and other evidence from the business units, to which the learners belonged, in the form 
of progress against business plans and other related performance data. However, due 
to the complexity involved in attributing performance improvements specifically to MLD, 
and a general tendency not to undertake in-depth evaluation for internal political 
reasons, MLD evaluation data from organisations is often unreliably broad and 
superficial (Winterton and Winterton 1999: 31, Mole 2000: 45, c.f. also Corby et al. 
2005). MLD evaluation documentation and expert witness accounts therefore helped to 
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an extent to corroborate managers’ critical incidents, but the quality of the findings 
relating to MLD outcomes was largely dependent on the middle management learner 
interview data. 
 
The dependence on the middle manager interviewees raises the issue of selection bias. 
As discussed above, the potential for such bias might have been neutralised by 
comparison with interview data from control groups of middle managers, who had not 
participated in MLD intervention. The interview data from the control groups could then 
have been compared with the reported critical incidents of the middle management 
learners in order to assess them for ‘Hawthorne effects’ (Bryman and Bell 2003: 45). As 
explained above, however, time- and access-restrictions prevented the systematic 
adoption of this strategy.  
 
Despite this, it may be argued that the existence of multiple and simultaneous MLD 
initiatives in the same case organisation served to increase confidence in the attribution 
of MLD effects through the interviews. This is because the researcher was able to 
compare the reported effects of different MLD activities across a mixture of 
respondents, some of whom would not have participated in all aspects of the combined 
intervention. Thus quasi-control groups were identifiable within the mixed sets of 
respondents, amongst whom there were managers who had participated in either none, 
one or several of the MLD activities during the period studied. The overlaps between 
the outcomes of the various learning activities in each case also served to enable 
patterns of outcomes to be identified for different combinations MLD activities, which 
could then be compared to help isolate the effects of a specific MLD activity.  
 
The issue of selection bias is further complicated by the various ways in which 
managers are selected for their participation in MLD programmes in organisations. 
There are four main possibilities: i) all managers are instructed to participate by their 
line-management or the HR function; ii) some managers are selected to participate, 
either because they are seen as having the potential to achieve higher performance as 
a result of the MLD, or because they are perceived as unable to perform satisfactorily 
unless they participate; iii) managers volunteer and therefore self-select for MLD; and 
iv) managers are randomly selected for an MLD activity as part of an ideal controlled 
experiment. These possibilities may vary from organisation to organisation, and across 
different types of MLD in the same organisation.  
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The first scenario, the compulsion of all managers in the organisation to participate in 
the same single-event intervention, could be the result, for example, of an organisation-
wide HRM initiative to ensure that the entire current stock of managers possesses a 
specific knowledge or skill in order meet new organisational requirements. Clearly, such 
a blanket, single-event approach renders the selection of control groups impossible. 
However, it allows the selection of a representative sample of interviewees, thus 
increasing confidence in the interview findings.  
 
The second scenario may lead to two different types of selection bias. Those managers 
who are selected for MLD due to perceptions about their high potential are likely to link 
learning with the anticipated rewards associated with high individual performance and 
therefore to pursue enthusiastically their MLD activities. This group of managers may 
then be expected to report stronger-than-average MLD outcomes. Conversely, those 
managers selected for MLD due to their perceived underperformance are likely to be 
less accepting of the formal goals of MLD, less inclined to respond enthusiastically, and 
therefore more likely to report weaker-than-average MLD outcomes.  
 
Managers in the third scenario, who volunteer for MLD, are likely to be positively 
predisposed towards the MLD activities and therefore motivated to meet the intended 
goals. Like the group of identified high-potential managers in the second scenario, this 
group of managers may be expected to report stronger MLD outcomes than those 
instructed to participate or encouraged to do so due to perceived underperformance. A 
middle ground, in which average-strength outcomes could be expected to be reported, 
might be occupied by managers who are ‘encouraged to volunteer’ by line managers or 
the HR function due to a perceived development need, thus a weak form of self-
selection bias.  
 
The fourth scenario – random selection - provides the ideal scientific conditions under 
which to investigate the effects of MLD, so long as a control group is also selected. This 
final scenario is, however, the least realistic of the four, given the range of stakeholder 
interests vested in MLD provision, which tend to ensure that managers are not selected 
randomly for MLD activities that require the commitment of the organisation’s scarce 
resources.  
 
In view of the time- and access-restrictions facing the researcher, and given the range 
of possibilities for selection bias, both across the case organisations and within each 
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case organisation, the approach to interviewee-selection had to be pragmatic. The 
strategy chosen was therefore to conduct interviews with ‘expert witnesses’ to the MLD 
experience, rather than attempt to achieve statistically representative interviewee 
samples. This involved identifying a target sample of ten middle manager witnesses, 
who would then be probed for their reasons and motivations for participation in MLD in 
order to detect selection bias and be alert to its possible effects. From the group of 
expert witnesses, a broad and detailed picture of MLD outcomes could then be 
constructed for each of the organisation’s MLD interventions and cross-comparisons 
could be made.  
 
The standard approach to middle manager interviewee-selection was to invite all 
participants of an identified MLD intervention from the last twelve months to be 
interviewed. Letters of invitation were sent via a HR administrator in each organisation 
(see Appendix V), explaining practical arrangements and procedures for confidentiality 
and dissemination. Positive respondents to the invitation would then be forwarded to 
the researcher to be selected for interview. To counter the possible effects of volunteer 
bias, it was attempted to achieve a cross-section of individuals by organisational 
function, gender and length of service, thus helping to limit potential distortions (c.f. 
Bryman and Bell 2003: 357). Interviews would ideally be held in a ‘neutral’ office space 
at the interviewees’ place of work, such as a meeting room (c.f. Cassell 2009: 504-5).  
 
In practice, the approach to interviewee-selection for the middle manager interviews 
was more opportunistic than intended. At SWT, the organisation’s workforce data was 
insufficient for identifying all middle managers in the organisation who had participated 
in MLD intervention in the last twelve months. Therefore, rather than invite all circa five 
hundred managers in the organisation, it was decided to invite fifty front-line to middle 
managers who had participated in three recent workshops run by the HR function to 
explore ways of increasing ‘management effectiveness’. Out of these fifty, eighteen 
managers, representing participants from two different MLD interventions, came 
forward for interview.  
 
The possibility for volunteer bias at SWT was neutralised to an extent by the balance of 
motivations that managers held for participating in the workshops from which the 
interviewees were sourced. The researcher attended one of the workshops and 
observed a roughly even division of opinion between managers. On the one hand, 
those managers who were positively predisposed to the HR function could be expected 
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to exaggerate the contribution of formal MLD intervention to their own effectiveness; on 
the other, managers who were negatively predisposed towards the HR function, and 
who attended the workshops in order to air their frustrations, could be expected to 
downplay the actual contribution of the MLD experience. Therefore, while the typical 
mid-range or neutral experience amongst middle managers at SWT might have been 
under-represented, the likelihood that both positive and negative extremes were 
represented amongst the eighteen interviewees meant that a spread of results could be 
expected.  
 
The potential for volunteer bias was also present at LFB, as the invitation to all circa 
one hundred middle-ranking managers in the organisation resulted in only fourteen 
volunteers. The managers’ motivations for volunteering for interview were less easy to 
ascertain than in the SWT case, so a representative spread of views could not be relied 
upon. Nonetheless, the fourteen managers were roughly representative of the 
demographic profile and different parts of the brigade (more on this in Chapter 5) and 
their fourteen sets of experiences, probed in detail, represented a not insignificant set of 
results.  
  
At KASS, the simple lack of positive responses to the invitation to interviews 
necessitated a ‘snowballing’ approach to interviewee-selection (see Bryman and Bell 
2003: 105). Circa eighty participants across three recent MLD interventions were invited 
to interview, but this resulted in only three volunteers. The researcher therefore initiated 
and administered the snowballing process by following leads and recommendations 
from previous interviewees in order to recruit further interviewees. There are two 
possible selection bias effects here, which may be argued to neutralise one another. On 
the one hand, the interviewee-selection necessarily reflected the preferences of the 
interviewees making the referrals, which may not have been representative, as they 
were likely to be motivated by a desire to have to their own perceptions of MLD 
supported rather than challenged. On the other hand, the snowballing interviewee-
selection process was subject to some control by the researcher, who was in the 
position to probe and infer interviewees’ reasons for recommending further 
interviewees. This could then alert the researcher to underlying bias in the interviewees’ 
responses.  
 
In summary, with regard to neutralising interviewee selection bias, pragmatic steps 
were taken in each case to ensure a sufficiently broad sample of middle managers in 
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terms of their function, professional background, gender and length of service in order 
to enable the researcher to identify meaningful patterns of MLD outcomes in each of the 
organisations. Issues of selection bias will be returned to, when analysing the interview 
data in the case study chapters 4-6. 
 
 
3.4 Fieldwork protocol and data analysis  
 
The data collection strategy described in the previous section, drawing on both strategic 
and operational MLD evaluation techniques, was designed to ensure the validity of the 
findings in each case study. This strategy has to be complemented with measures to 
ensure the reliability of each case study, so that the research could be repeated in 
further cases and by other researchers. In other words, the data collection process in 
each of the three individual case studies had to follow a common protocol (Yin 1994: 
63).  
 
The protocol for the fieldwork was largely contained within the research proposal 
document prepared for each of the participating organisations. Personal contacts 
through management development practitioner networks were used successfully in all 
three cases to gain initial access and secure agreement to undertake the fieldwork. 
Research proposals were then sent to key HR contacts in the proposed case study 
organisations with accompanying requests for an initial exploratory meeting with 
interested parties. The proposal papers outlined the rationale, aims and objectives of 
the research, proposed fieldwork activities, outcomes, timetables and arrangements for 
reporting and dissemination (see Appendix IV for an example). The initial meetings to 
discuss the proposal papers led to formal agreements around access to organisational 
documentation (invariably by email through a central administrative contact in the HR 
function), a programme of fieldwork visits and activities, including interview schedules 
and arrangements for selecting interviewees, and the preferred format for reporting and 
dissemination.  
 
Despite the intention to conduct the interviews face-to-face in a neutral office space 
(see previous section) some of the interviews had to be conducted by telephone (see 
Chapters 4-6 for more detail). This was due to the practical difficulties of travel and the 
multiple sites of work for some of the managers in all three of the organisations. The 
 118 
relative disadvantage of telephone interviews can be that the researcher is unable to 
pick up upon important non-verbal cues. Nevertheless, there is little evidence to 
suggest that data generated from telephone interviews are of higher or lower quality 
than from face-to-face interviews (Cassell 2009: 504). 
 
Notwithstanding the practical difficulties in arranging and conducting the interviews, the 
fieldwork protocol served as a useful template for the research process. Once the 
protocol had been agreed with HR managers, the main fieldwork activities took place on 
a flexible basis over an approximately three-month period, followed by a further three 
months’ lead-time for analysis and reporting back. LFB were contacted formally in 
March 2005 and the fieldwork took place in June/July 2005. SWT were contacted 
formally in May 2006, and the fieldwork took place in June/July 2006, with additional 
interviews in March 2007. KASS were contacted formally in May 2007 and the fieldwork 
took place in June/July 2007. Internal reports were disseminated to the HR managers 
and interviewees in the three cases, as originally promised in the case study proposals. 
The diagram in Figure 3.2 illustrates how the data collection process was conducted 
and how it related to the overall analytical strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 The research process 
 
Develop hypotheses
Develop research strategy (comparative case studies)
Develop case selection criteria
Develop data collection strategy (multiple sources)
Develop case study protocol
Case 1
Make initial contact with target organisation
Present fieldwork proposal
Agree fieldwork protocol with stakeholders
Identify MLD interventions, relevant documentation and interviewee samples
Undertake fieldwork (3 months)
Analyse results and report to organisational stakeholders (3 months)
Case 2: Repeat above
Case 3: Repeat above
Analysis
Triangulate 3 cases
Conclusion
Suppport or reject
hypotheses
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Some further details of the research process are necessary to explain. All interviews - 
seventy-six in total across the cases (see Appendix VI) - were audio-recorded and 
transcribed near-verbatim. The exceptions were four LFB interviews, which were 
unrecorded telephone conversations, two LFB interviews and one KASS interview in 
which the recording equipment malfunctioned, and nine interviews with senior 
managers at KASS, which took the form of informal discussions (seven of which were 
audio-recorded). For all of these sixteen exceptions, detailed interview records rather 
than transcripts were made. The near-verbatim transcripts and interview records, 
notably for the middle manager critical incident interviews, served the purposes of 
thoroughness, external transparency and the capturing of differences in stakeholders’ 
perceptions through nuances in language (c.f. Heritage 1984: 238, cited in Bryman and 
Bell 2003: 353). (The transcripts and interview records may be found in electronic 
format on a CD-ROM embedded in the back cover of this thesis). Transcripts or 
electronic copies of the interview recordings were distributed to the interviewees for 
their own records by way of reassurance against misquotation or misrepresentation. 
The transparency of the whole interview process - from the official explanatory letter of 
invitation, that emphasised the benefits to the interviewees of reflecting on their own 
MLD experience, to arrangements for confidentiality, the sharing of interview recordings 
and final dissemination - was designed to engender relationships of trust, collaboration 
and openness with the interviewees (Easterby-Smith et al. 2002: 77). 
 
The data analysis strategy was similarly systematic, guided by the initial conditions and 
the hypotheses and the conceptual model of contingent MLD outcomes. Tabulation 
frameworks were constructed in line with the data collection strategy to aid the 
identification of patterns in the documentary evidence and interviews. The treatment of 
the data from the middle manager interviews was, however, slightly different to that of 
the other interviews. This was because the analysis of the middle managers’ critical 
MLD incidents represented the most important and complex part of the overall data 
analysis process and provided the most direct evidence of MLD outcomes. A deep 
analysis of the text was therefore particularly important in order to interpret and trace 
patterns.  
 
It was decided to make use of the software Nvivo7 to help collate the middle manager 
interview data, and systematically identify the frequency and type of references made to 
the hypothetical MLD outcomes. Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software 
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such as Nvivo7 is often associated with studies using grounded theory, as it aids the 
process of coding text from large and unstructured transcripts (Lee and Fielding 1991). 
In such studies, it is conventional to move from ‘open coding’, to ‘axial’ and then to 
‘selective’ coding, as explanations are built up inductively to develop new theoretical 
constructs. However, such an inductive process was unnecessary in this research.  
 
The broadly deductive approach of this study enabled the researcher to move 
immediately to a ‘selective’ type of coding, in which already well-defined conceptual 
categories could be used to analyse the text. Thus, using the schemata developed in 
Figure 2.7, the middle manager interview transcripts could be analysed according to the 
type of MLD intervention (MD, LD and/or LSD) and the type of individual MLD outcomes 
described (managerial competence, intrapersonal competence and/or interpersonal 
competence). The individual transcripts and the collated incidences of individual MLD 
outcomes could then also be analysed for patterns of MLD outcomes at group level 
(compliance, commitment, innovation) and organisational level (stability or change).  
 
A further advantage of the Nvivo software was that it was sufficiently flexible to employ 
both a set of predefined codes (‘tree nodes’) as well as new categories for analysis as 
they emerged (‘free nodes’). Thus, the analysis of the interview transcripts with middle 
managers could not only be coded with reference to the schemata developed out of the 
hypotheses, but could also start to build a picture of the comparative role of informal 
learning and the organisational factors, such as HRD competence and political 
obstacles, that were seen to influence the success or failure of MLD interventions in 
each case. The full nodal structure used in the analysis of the middle manager interview 
transcripts may be viewed in Appendix VII.  
 
 
3.5 Overall assessment of the research design 
 
In concluding this chapter, it is pertinent to summarise and make an overall assessment 
of the quality of the research design. Useful here are Yin’s four ‘design tests’ of 
construct validity, internal validity, reliability and external validity (Yin 1994: 33).  
 
The first design test, construct validity, refers to the correct operationalisation of the 
concepts under study. In this research, construct validity is underlined by a well-
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developed theoretical model that conceptualises causal processes of MLD intervention 
and outcomes, against which empirical observations can be made. A chain of evidence 
is established by the use of organisational documentation and interviews with a range 
of expert witnesses. Finally, the dissemination and presentation of the initial findings to 
stakeholders within the case study organisations presented the opportunity for the 
construct validity to be scrutinised by those close to the reality of the changes being 
observed.  
 
The second test, internal validity, refers to the establishment of causal relationships 
between variables and factors. In this study, the aim is to produce explanations for the 
relationships observed between organisational context, MLD intervention and MLD 
outcomes. The development of initial conditions and hypotheses establishes 
expectations about the nature of these relationships. The initial conditions and 
hypotheses therefore structure and guide the analysis of the empirical data in a 
consistent way in each organisational case, including the tabulation of results using 
largely pre-defined sources of evidence. In addition, the semi-structured nature of the 
interviews helps to ensure that the relationships between organisational strategy and 
change, middle management roles, MLD interventions, MLD outcomes and other 
organisational factors are traced in a similar way in each individual case. In the absence 
of controlled before-and-after tests of MLD intervention, the critical incident interview 
technique and the triangulation of alternative sources of evidence served to strengthen 
internal validity. The use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software and 
accompanying analytical schemata served to strengthen further the internal validity by 
enabling a picture of the key relationships between variables and factors to be 
systematically built.  
 
The third test, reliability, refers to the ability to repeat the empirical enquiry with the 
same results by a different researcher. The continuum of divisionalisation, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation to represent the independent variable provides 
a clear criterion for case selection within the comparative case study design. 
Furthermore, the use of a clear fieldwork protocol in the three cases helps to ensure 
reliability. The fieldwork protocol, combined with the use of a computer-based coding 
system, provides a transparent and standardised approach covering organisational 
access, fieldwork activities, confidentiality and dissemination, data collection, 
interviewee sampling, interviewing and analysis of interview transcripts. Replication of a 
similar set of case studies would therefore not only be possible but also desirable, as 
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additional cases for each of the three types of structural transition would deepen the 
empirical enquiry. 
 
Finally, external validity refers to the generalisability of the overall findings. Matched 
pairs of cases, rather than single cases, would strengthen the explanatory power of the 
research. However, in view of the researcher’s limited resources, the priority was to 
trade breadth against depth within the comparative case study design. This meant the 
selection of cases to enable generalisation about the effects of variation across types of 
organisational structural transition, rather than the concentration of resources on 
explaining one specific context. As argued in Section 1.1, academic work has largely 
failed to appreciate the importance of organisational type in differentiating what middle 
managers do in organisations, and the skills that they require to perform a variety of 
roles. The research design of this thesis enables this gap to be addressed. Also, as 
argued in Section 2.1, the academic literature has largely failed to distinguish between 
the aims of different types of MLD investment and their contributions under different 
organisational conditions. By investigating the actual experience of three sets of MLD 
investments and their relationships with organisational context, the findings of this 
research may be generalised to demonstrate the effects of different types of MLD 
intervention under varying structural conditions.  
 
*** 
 
The three case study chapters that follow have a common structure, guided by the 
initial conditions and hypotheses. First, to research the Initial conditions 1-3, actual 
middle management roles and skill requirements and the extent to which these 
changed in line with structural transition are established. Second, to research 
Hypothesis 1, the MLD options for middle managers during the period studied are 
discussed in terms of their underlying aims and methods, and how they related to 
changes in middle management roles. Third, to research Hypothesis 2, the multi-
levelled outcomes of the MLD interventions are observed. Fourthly, to research 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, the organisational factors which best explain the MLD options and 
outcomes are assessed.  
 
Each case study therefore has four parts: i) changes to middle management roles; ii) 
MLD options; iii) contribution of MLD to change; and iv) overall assessment. The next 
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chapter presents first of the three case studies, which investigates the experience of 
MLD during divisionalisation at SWT. 
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Chapter 4. MLD and divisionalisation: the case of South West Trains 
 
 
Sending everybody … to some poncey college in Switzerland to do an MBA would be 
crazy. It would generate completely false expectations. (Interview with senior project 
engineer, South West Trains) 
 
 
This chapter investigates the contribution to divisionalisation of MLD for middle 
managers. The key hypothetical expectations during divisionalisation are twofold: i) that 
middle management roles should shift from machine middle line management (Role A) 
towards business division management (Role B); and ii) that this shift should be 
enabled by investment in both operational management development (OMD) to support 
stability in the machine bureaucracy, and strategic management development (SMD) to 
promote the process of divisionalisation.  
 
The contribution of MLD for middle managers during divisionalisation is investigated 
through a case study of the train operating company SWT. The case presents an 
account of changes to middle management roles and the experiences of two MLD 
interventions that were designed to support organisational change. There are two main 
findings. First, the case demonstrates how investment in operational management 
development (OMD) enabled organisational stability in the machine bureaucracy and 
supported limited divisionalisation in the form of devolution of HR responsibilities to line 
managers. Second, the case demonstrates how the company made a hypothetically 
unexpected investment in leader development rather than a broader form of strategic 
management development (SMD), but also how this enabled some transition from Role 
A towards Role B middle management in the more customer-facing divisions of the 
company. Overall, the case lends support to the hypotheses, but highlights how in 
practice MLD’s contribution may be constrained and distorted by a limited and uneven 
process of divisionalisation.  
 
The chapter focuses on the changes to middle management roles during the period 
1996-2006 and the contribution of MLD to organisational change from 2003-6. It draws 
on an evidence base of thirty interviews with the main stakeholders and a range of 
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organisational documentation. The first section of the chapter examines the process of 
divisionalisation, the changing roles and skill needs of middle managers and the extent 
to which these represented a shift from Role A towards Role B. The second section 
analyses the main MLD choices made by the company during this period, namely a 
suite of line management training courses and a talent management programme that 
employed leader development methods. The extent to which these represented the 
expected investments in operational management development (OMD) and strategic 
management development (SMD) are discussed. The third section analyses the 
outcomes of the two key MLD interventions at individual, group and organisational 
levels. The fourth section assesses the overall contribution of MLD to organisational 
change at SWT and the use of MLD as an instrument of divisionalisation.   
 
 
4.1 Divisionalisation and the changing roles of middle managers 
 
The process of divisionalisation at SWT derives from national rail privatisation in the UK 
in the late-1990s. The overriding objective of rail privatisation in 1996 was to make train 
services less costly to the state and more responsive to passengers. This was to be 
achieved by running the railways according to ‘business-led’, rather than ‘production-
led’ principles (Dingwall and Strangleman 2005: 479-80)3. Underlying the intended 
cultural change was a desired structural shift in the coordination mechanism in the 
industry. The structural shift in the industry entailed a move away from the 
standardisation of work processes through the use of national timetables and operating 
procedures, towards the standardisation of outputs, as applied through a national 
regime of performance indicators.  
 
Railway privatisation represented a divisionalisation of the nationwide machine 
bureaucracy in the sense that it devolved much of the control of regional train operating 
services to semi-autonomous units. Mintzberg (1979: 385, 2009: 107) argues that the 
transition of the machine bureaucracy to the divisionalised form tends to result in a 
collection of mini-machine bureaucracies. This line of argument produces the 
expectation that the train operating companies would then operate as localised but 
                                               
3
 Fifteen years on, a government review of the rail industry concluded that privatisation had 
largely succeeded in achieving higher levels of customer service, but failed in terms of reducing 
costs and prices (The Guardian, 'Railways face radical overhaul to give 'better deal for all'' 
(Report by Dan Milmo), 19 May 2011).  
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highly centralised machine bureaucracies. However, as the case of SWT will 
demonstrate, the divisionalisation of the national bureaucracy was replicated to an 
extent at local organisational level by devolving some of the responsibility for service 
performance and customer satisfaction further down to middle managers.  
 
Pre-privatisation, operating procedures for train service operators were largely 
standardised across the network. This meant that the work tasks of the operating core 
on trains and in depots and stations were effectively coordinated at national level. Some 
local devolution existed pre-privatisation: passenger services were organised on a 
regional basis, and service performance was extensively measured and attributed to 
the different parts of the network. Nevertheless, minimum safety standards and an array 
of technical specifications were centrally controlled. Procedures for obtaining train-
driving licences, for example, and compliance with other technical and health and safety 
standards were statutory concerns and could not be devolved to local level.  
 
Privatisation involved the franchising out of regional services to private operating 
companies and the relinquishing of much of the centralised regulation of work 
processes. Subject to institutional constraints, franchises could determine their own 
prices, timetables of services and terms and conditions for staff. To regulate the 
performance of local franchises, an extended performance measurement system was 
introduced across the network along with a system of contractual clauses and financial 
penalties to disincentivise underperformance.  
 
At local organisational level, the key management change was the assumption of new 
devolved responsibilities for service performance. The three main areas of performance 
measurement in the rail industry are: i) safety; ii) punctuality and reliability; and iii) 
customer satisfaction. The first two are longstanding, pre-dating privatisation and 
continuing beyond it. The key performance indicator for safety is the number of ‘SPADs’ 
(signals passed at danger) in a given time period. Punctuality and reliability are 
measured through the number of service delays and cancellations attributable to the 
local operator; these were then published in the ‘Public Performance Measure’ in the 
post-privatisation period. The third area, customer satisfaction, assumed particular 
significance post-privatisation.  This became subject to intensive monitoring through the 
sixth-monthly ‘National Passenger Survey’, commissioned by the government from the 
independent organisation Passenger Focus to measure the ‘on-train’ and ‘on-station’ 
customer experience. Although criticised for taking a narrow commercialist focus on 
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train services (Cole and Cooper 2005), the National Passenger Survey is the area of 
performance monitoring in which the train operating company is most accountable and 
subject to the greatest public exposure. 
 
To research the strategic background to changing middle management roles at SWT, 
eleven semi-structured interviews were held with key individuals from the senior 
management. These included the heads of the three large operational groups of staff 
(guards, drivers and fleet), the heads of three service functions (train service delivery, 
pensions and payroll, and information technology), the HR director and four HR/learning 
and development managers. An additional unstructured interview was held with two 
representatives from the train drivers’ trade union ASLEF to gain an employee 
perspective on the changes.  
 
SWT was the first of the regional passenger services in the UK to be privatised in 
February 1996. In the first few years of the franchise after privatisation, the company 
operated a centralised machine bureaucracy model. The Stagecoach Group, which had 
previously specialised in bus services, acquired the franchise in 1996, inheriting 5500 
staff. The company went on to retain the franchise in 2002 and 2006. Under 
Stagecoach’s license, SWT was subsidised heavily in the first two franchise periods by 
public funds4 and, like all train operating companies, was subject to performance 
contracts with the government’s rail regulator. In its first few years it did not radically 
change its organisational structure to become more flexible; rather it attempted to 
achieve financial efficiencies by slimming it down and shedding staff.  
 
Organisational and management problems soon became apparent, however. Financial 
and customer service performance was poor and employment relations deteriorated 
during the first franchise period and into the early part of the second. In 1996 the 
company experienced a series of industrial disputes and received fines from the 
regulator for poor performance, which was manifested in service cancellations, delays 
and customer complaints (see Financial Times 10 January 2002, Wolmar 2005: 77-78). 
A series of downsizing measures followed in 1997, but ongoing employment relations 
                                               
4
 Wolmar (2005) reports that SWT was making annual pre-tax profits of around £50m through 
the 2000s, yet also received a £51m subsidy for the first franchise in 1996 and a £170m subsidy 
on re-franchising in 2002, £55m of which was for the leasing of a new stock of trains from 
Siemens. Then, in 2006, Stagecoach paid £1.19bn to re-franchise for 10 years, but  
controversially raised ticket prices on off-peak services by 20% in 2007  (The Guardian, 18 May 
2007).  
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problems came to a head with two forty-eight hour stoppages by the RMT in January 
2002. Overall, by the company’s own estimates, industrial disputes between 1996 and 
2002 cost approximately £18m (SWT documentation). As the HR director described the 
problems in the early 2000s:  
 
[Stagecoach] had a disastrous start when they got rid of too many drivers and they 
couldn’t run the timetable; and they got heavily fined. They were headline news in the 
[Evening] Standard, I think, for about the first eighteen months of their franchise.... 
Government is always there in the background.... the word was, “You’ve got to find a 
way out of this mess....” So the pressure was on there and also [with regard to] the 
unions.... we realised that our relationship with them had to change and they in turn 
realised that it wasn’t good for their members to have this constant fighting going on. 
(Interview with HR Director) 
 
 
To address the company’s problems, SWT’s directors embarked on a reappraisal of 
employee relations and the company’s management structure. Out of this reappraisal 
came a new corporate strategy in May 2003 that aimed to transform the organisation 
from a traditional rail operator to a modern customer service provider. An important part 
of the diagnosis was that line managers had been overly occupied with the supervision 
of technical work tasks, and that customer satisfaction, as the route to greater 
profitability, would be best achieved by devolving greater responsibility to local 
managers for managing their staff and their team’s contribution to business 
performance. As the HR director, who had previously been part of the HR team at 
Tesco plc, explained:  
 
[W]hen we did a major restructuring of the management function back in 2003, we 
actually modelled our organisation on my experience of Tesco’s in terms of how they 
managed and organised their management team. The emphasis was all about 
managing through people, rather than going out, hands-on and doing it yourself. That 
has been a very significant change for this company, but also within the industry. …I 
think we were the first and I don’t think too many other companies within our industry 
have made that leap (Interview with HR Director) 
 
The new ‘Employee-Centred Strategy’ led to a restructuring of the management 
function in 2003. In order to demonstrate how this represented a process of 
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divisionalisation, it is necessary to explore three main features of the restructuring 
process in some detail.  
 
First of all, the company became a much more ‘managed’ organisation. The total 
number of managers was seen to increase from 320 in 1999 to 489 in 2003, and then to 
545 by 2006, representing a greater number of locally-managed teams and an overall 
manager-employee ratio in 2006 of approximately 1:10.  The operating core was 
constituted of three main functions: customer service, drivers and fleet. In an attempt to 
orientate the organisation’s activities more strongly towards customers, the company 
almost doubled the number of managers in the customer service function (responsible 
for tickets, face-to-face service and passenger information in stations and on trains) 
from 69 to 135 between 2002 and 2003. By 2006, the managers in the customer 
service function had grown to 175, outnumbering the managers in two next largest 
functions: the drivers’ function (‘operations’) and the fleet function, which had 174 and 
104 managers respectively. Figure 4.1 shows the trends in manager headcount by 
function at SWT between 2000 and 2006.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Managers at South West Trains by function 2000-2006  
 
(Source: SWT HRM Information System) 
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Secondly, the company began to recruit more managers externally. By 2006 
approximately thirty per cent of all managers had been recruited from outside the 
company. This included the recruitment of some individuals from outside the railway 
industry, in a sector which had traditionally sourced its managers internally. Despite 
this, according to estimates by the HR team, approximately half of the managers at 
SWT had spent their entire careers working on the South West rail network5.  
Thirdly, the company simplified the management structure significantly by reducing the 
management tiers to four levels: directors, senior management, middle management 
and front-line management. At the same time, it changed managerial responsibilities to 
place greater emphasis on the local implementation of HR policies. The flattening of the 
hierarchy and the broadening of the line management role were designed to bring 
managers closer to front-line staff and to pay more attention to staff’s interactions with 
customers and therefore to the quality of service provided.  
 
The restructuring at SWT in 2003 represented a divisionalisation of the machine 
bureaucracy in that it devolved responsibility for business and HR performance firstly 
across the three divisions of customer service, drivers and fleet, and secondly across 
teams within the divisions at local station or depot level. New local responsibilities for 
customer satisfaction were created and distributed across an increased and partly 
externally-sourced group of local managers.  HR procedures that had previously been 
administered by the HR function, particularly around absence and discipline, became 
the direct responsibility of line managers across the company.  
 
Like in the national process of divisionalisation, however, the coordination of some 
important functions at SWT remained firmly in the control of the centralised 
technostructure. As with the retention of technical and safety standards at national 
level, timetabling and most of the management decisions around physical and financial 
resources at SWT were retained at company headquarters. Because the broadening of 
divisional responsibilities at SWT was essentially restricted to customer service 
                                               
5
 In 2006, 43% of managers had been in post more than ten years, compared to 58% of supervisors, 51% 
of senior managers and 32% of all staff (SWT HR information system).  
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performance and HR matters, it is more accurate to describe the restructuring process 
at SWT as ‘limited divisionalisation’.  
 
The strong focus on the devolution of HR responsibilities to line managers meant that 
the employee-centred strategy had an explicitly political dimension. Integral to senior 
management’s strategy to achieve profitability through improved customer service was 
the strengthening of line management in relation to the trade unions. Central to this was 
an attempted shift in the emphasis of the employment relationship away from 
engagement with staff through the unions to the individual employee’s relationship with 
his or her manager. As the Head of Drivers put it:  
 
We need to move away from, “…I’ve got a problem…I’ll go and see my union…my union 
will sort it out,” rather than, “I’ve got a problem, let’s go and see my manager and my 
manager will sort it out.” So, there’s a lot of work about reinforcing the employee-centred 
strategy and try[ing to]... get people to see that managers are there for them (Interview 
with Head of Drivers). 
 
 
In the eyes of the trade union representatives, the employee-centred strategy was 
motivated more by political reasons than by reasons of customer service or efficiency. 
The train drivers’ union representatives interviewed complained that the organisation of 
SWT had not in fact changed fundamentally, but had become simply a more profit-
driven version of its former self.  However, while the trade unions may have perceived 
the post-2003 organisational changes in these terms, it is important to acknowledge 
that the restructuring in 2003 was primarily concerned with strengthening and 
reorganising the management function, not the operating core. It was an attempt to 
increase the size of the management function and broaden the roles of individual 
managers to suit the newly divisionalised bureaucracy, rather than alter the essentially 
machine-bureaucratic work tasks of the operating core.  
 
The new management configuration had significant implications for the middle line, 
which underwent a partial transition from Role A-type machine middle line management 
towards Role B-type business division management. In the ideal machine bureaucracy, 
the middle line is primarily responsible for managing workflow according to 
standardised procedures and for disturbance-handling when the ‘machine’ fails to 
function. In the divisionalised form, the middle line has a broader set of responsibilities 
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for the strategy and resources of a business unit and is accountable to senior 
management for its performance.  
 
The typical middle line manager in a train operating company is responsible for an 
operational business unit in the form of a station or depot. He or she heads up a team 
of front-line managers and a group of operational staff, principally drivers, guards or 
fleet operatives. These teams constitute the operating core of the organisation. Within 
the technostructure, middle managers head up teams of specialist technical staff, such 
as engineers, and on the support side, they head up teams of administrative and 
support service staff, such as finance or security officers. The changes to the middle 
line, as opposed to staff management, are of most interest when analysing the effects 
of divisionalisation at SWT, as line management is where the main transition is 
theoretically expected to occur. The transition in the middle line in the post-2003 period 
is represented in Figure 4.2.  
 
Role A  
(machine middle line management) 
Role B  
(business division management) 
Driver depot management 
 Investigation of safety incidents 
 Implementation of staff sickness and 
care procedures 
 Driver-competence checks 
 Overseeing rolling stock-maintenance 
checks 
As in Role A, plus: 
 Implementation of absence-
management and discipline policies 
 Staff development and engagement 
 Action planning for local improvements 
in train reliability and punctuality 
Station management 
 Procedural and safety-compliance 
checks 
 Implementation of staff sickness and 
care procedures 
 Guard-competence checks 
 Overseeing stock and equipment 
maintenance  
As in Role A, plus: 
 Implementation of absence-
management and discipline policies 
 Staff development and engagement 
 Action planning for local improvements 
in on-station and on-train customer 
satisfaction 
Fleet depot management 
 Procedural and safety-compliance 
checks 
 Implementation of staff sickness and 
care procedures 
 Overseeing equipment and premises  
maintenance 
As in Role A, plus: 
 Implementation of absence-
management and discipline policies 
 Staff development and engagement 
 Action planning for local improvements 
in train readiness- and –presentation 
Figure 4.2 Transition in the middle line at South West Trains 
 
 
Before the employee-centred strategy and the management restructuring at SWT, 
station, train depot and fleet depot managers were primarily focussed on the technical 
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aspects of workflow. After the management restructuring at SWT, the work priorities of 
the three main parts of the operating core – customer service, operations (driving) and 
fleet – became orientated towards the new and increasingly detailed performance 
control framework, derived directly from the national performance indicators and 
enabled by the use of information technology. The priority of the middle line shifted from 
responsibility for observance of operational procedures towards accountability for the 
performance of individual business units in the form of stations and depots. The 
strongest emphasis within this new accountability was on effective people management 
to ensure staff engagement with the business, as measured by a staff satisfaction 
survey, as an overall means to ensure improved customer satisfaction.  
 
In the case of driver depot managers, the key managerial responsibilities were to 
implement changes to investigate safety incidents, manage staff sickness and 
implement regulations around drivers’ competence. After the implementation of the new 
strategy, however, the emphasis shifted towards people management concerns. As one 
experienced driver-manager related:  
 
When I first took on the role it was basically assessing…investigating incidents, dealing 
with driver attendance…, maintaining the driver’s competence, make sure their rules are 
all done, make sure their cab rides are carried out, make sure you’ve got process in 
place for their sickness for those that don’t demonstrate a good level of sickness – 
things like that were high-profile. But now we’re sort of more into people management; 
that’s sort of high-profile now.... Now it’s more like ‘how is the driver within himself?’ as 
opposed to things he did wrong. (Interview with driver standards manager) 
  
 
The refashioning of the middle line also altered the work of station managers and fleet 
depot managers. Whereas station management had been primarily concerned to 
ensure compliance with technical regulations on the station and with managing staff 
sickness, it became closely linked to on-station and on-train customer satisfaction 
targets derived from the National Passenger Survey, such as the ‘availability’ and 
‘attitude and helpfulness’ of their staff, and the frequency and quality of passenger 
information. The company used its own ‘mystery shopper’ surveys to generate internal 
performance data, in addition to that of the published passenger survey. Fleet depot 
managers, who had been primarily concerned with technical compliance in maintaining 
rolling stock, became increasingly evaluated in terms of the speed with which trains 
were made available for service from their depots, as well as the ‘train presentation’ 
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scores arising out of internal and external assessments of the quality of the trains’ 
appearance and facilities on leaving the depot.  
 
Driver depot managers were slightly more removed from the measurement of customer 
service6 but were monitored for their team’s attributable contribution towards train 
punctuality and reliability. Not all service delays and cancellations could be attributed to 
the individual driver depots, as there may be a number of other contributory factors, 
such as technical faults and coordination problems on the rail network. The most 
immediate performance indicators were therefore concerned with the attendance rates 
of drivers in the depots and their motivation and engagement according to staff 
satisfaction surveys. 
 
Overall, it would be too much of a generalisation to suggest that the middle line at SWT 
underwent a full transition from Role A machine middle line management to Role B 
business division management. While the station and depot management roles were 
broadened by new responsibilities for various forms of business performance, this did 
not extend to full discretion over the strategy of the business unit or the deployment of 
local physical and financial resources. Some limited discretion at station or depot level 
was necessarily afforded to local managers to make small incremental improvements, 
for example, to the appearance of the station environment or trains. But strategic 
resource management tended to be the responsibility of the company’s senior 
management and technostructure, or the most senior middle managers, such as the 
group station managers (of which there were in eleven in 2006). On balance, it is clear 
that the process of limited divisionalisation had the effect of broadening middle line 
responsibilities, but that the transition from Role A- to Role B-type management was 
partial and mainly concentrated in the station and fleet divisions rather than in the driver 
function.  
 
On the staff side, there were no fundamental changes to middle management roles. 
The technostructure simply grew at the SWT headquarters to oversee the performance 
control system and to identify where safety, punctuality, reliability, and customer 
satisfaction problems could be attributed and how they could be resolved. Support 
services such as cleaning and maintenance were partly brought under the control of the 
                                               
6
 Unlike drivers on the London Underground, SWT drivers were not ‘customer-facing’ in the 
sense that they were not responsible for passenger information announcements on trains; this 
was the responsibility of the on-train guards.  
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group station managers but, within the services themselves, work tasks continued to be 
coordinated essentially as before. The support service teams involved with finance and 
information technology grew, but they remained under centralised control at 
headquarters and were essentially unchanged in terms of their management processes.  
 
Staff management therefore continued to be characterised by adhocratic-type 
approaches (Role D) in the most knowledge-intensive parts of the organisation (such as 
service delay-attribution in the technostructure and information technology in the 
support services) and by machine-bureaucratic approaches (Role A) in the most 
routinised services (such as clerical functions in finance, performance-monitoring in the 
technostructure, and cleaning and catering in the support services). The most 
fundamental management changes in the organisation were in the middle line, which 
had implications for the development of management skills.  
 
 
4.2 MLD options 
 
Under divisionalisation, and the accompanying shift from machine middle line 
management (Role A) towards business division management (Role B), the theoretical 
expectation is that the organisation should invest in both operational management 
development (OMD) to support centralised bureaucratic coordination, and strategic 
management development (SMD) as it introduces divisionalisation.  
 
As will be demonstrated, in line with the partial divisionalisation and partial transition in 
the middle line observed at SWT, the MLD investments made for middle managers in 
the company only partially conformed to the hypothetical pattern. OMD was 
represented by a range of short training courses in various technical aspects of railway 
management and a suite of people management training courses. These latter courses 
received particular attention and heavy investment to support the devolution of HR 
responsibilities to line managers after 2003. As the company continued to devolve 
responsibilities, and as middle management roles broadened further, investment in 
SMD for middle managers increased, but this tended to employ leader development 
methods instead of strategic management education and development. While leader 
development was hypothesised in Section 2.3 as more likely to be found in professional 
environments (see Figure 2.5), in which mutual adjustment is more important than 
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standardisation, it was used at SWT to try and improve divisional business 
performance. Only a few, more experienced middle managers were sponsored to 
participate in a broader type of SMD.  
 
An overview of the MLD investments made at SWT in the period 2003-7, broken down 
according to OMD and SMD, is illustrated in Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3  MLD interventions at South West Trains 2003-7 
 
 
4.2.1 Operational management development 
 
All newly appointed SWT managers attended a week-long induction programme, 
followed by a series of day-courses, interspersed over several months. The selected 
day courses for middle managers varied somewhat, according to the differing technical 
and health and safety requirements of the manager’s functional role. For example, while 
drugs and alcohol awareness training was mandatory for all managers, training in how 
to investigate accidents tended to be particular to driver depot managers. Similarly, 
training in train breakdowns and derailments tended to be particular to fleet depot 
managers, and training in ticketing systems particular to station and revenue inspection 
managers. The most significant training, however, which was mandatory for all SWT 
managers, concerned staff attendance and discipline management.  
 
 
MLD interventions at SWT (2003-07)  
 
Operational management development  
Various technical railway-management 
training courses 
‘Managing for Attendance and Poor 
Performance’ (2-day course) 
‘Managing discipline’ (3-day course) 
‘Time With Your Manager’ training (1-day 
course) 
 
Workshops for driver-managers from 2004 
(leader development methods) 
 1-day workshops on self- and people 
management tools and techniques 
Strategic Management Development 
The ‘Wow Factor’ (2003) 
 3-day introspective small group 
workshop 
 
Talent Management Programme (2005-07) 
(leader development methods) 
 360-degree feedback 
 Online psychometric tests 
 One-to-one interview with HR 
consultant 
 Personal development planning 
 Ongoing line manager support 
 137 
Ensuring sufficient staffing levels and discipline to provide a safe and consistent service 
is a vital part of managing this type of machine bureaucracy in a safety-critical operating 
environment. Attendance and discipline management is therefore important but 
challenging. Train operating companies have to run a twenty-four hour, seven-day-a-
week operation in often hostile conditions. As one interviewee characterised the 
unglamorous work of his station and depot manager colleagues: “They’re sacking 
people regularly because of poor behaviour. They’re breaking up fights. They’re 
working nights” (Interview with senior project engineer).  
 
In the case of SWT, issues of staff attendance and discipline were made more acute by 
privatisation and the history of adversarial employment relations. By the end of 2001, 
staff absence at SWT was 6.45 per cent of total working hours. In 2003, absence at 
SWT was lower but still running at 5.16 per cent, significantly above the average of 4.2 
per cent for the transport sector (CIPD 2003). The financial costs of sickness absence 
became a major concern to senior management, especially in the light of the company’s 
low profitability in the early part of the franchise. Furthermore, although exact data on 
grievance and discipline were unavailable, the senior management were also 
concerned about the number of long and expensive grievance and disciplinary cases 
going to appeal stage and to employment tribunals.  
 
Beyond the imperatives of the smooth-running of the machine bureaucracy and the 
financial concerns surrounding sickness absence, the level of staff attendance also had 
a direct impact on the level of customer service provided by the company. Staff 
absences led directly to cancellations and delays of train services and to reduced levels 
of service on trains and stations. The management of attendance therefore become a 
key strategic issue in the post-privatisation period and the during the accompanying 
divisionalisation process.  
 
The management of staff absence and discipline were central to SWT’s employee-
centred strategy. In consultation with the trade unions7 and with the facilitation of the 
independent employment relations body ACAS (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration 
Service), new policies on attendance, performance management and discipline were 
agreed. The policies aimed to address the issues of absence and discipline in a robust, 
fair and transparent fashion. In addition, there was a new expectation on line managers 
                                               
7 The recognised unions were the RMT, representing guards and other operational staff, the drivers’ union 
ASLEF, and TSSA, representing administrative, professional, technical and managerial staff. 
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to take responsibility for managing absence and discipline issues themselves in the first 
instance, rather than refer them on to the HR department. Staff attendance rates 
became an important performance indicator for each business unit.   
 
The key feature of the new absence management policy, named ‘Managing for 
Attendance’, was to clarify the difference between sickness and absence, and to 
provide simplified procedures for managing them. The policy emphasised full 
attendance as the key objective and addressed absence as often having multiple 
causes rather than necessarily being sickness-related. The new attendance procedure 
therefore contained a clear series of ‘triggers’, stages and timescales and it required the 
line manager to take responsibility for initiating the procedure in response to absence 
data provided by the HR department. In addition, this responsibility included 
communicating with one’s staff directly in the early stages of a period of absence, 
keeping records, and, through one-to-one interviews, discussing the pattern of absence, 
strategies for increasing attendance and options for support.   
 
The reworked policies for grievance, discipline and performance management were 
also characterised by a simplification of the procedures at progressive stages. The new 
policies distinguished between the monitoring of operational incidents and taking action 
as a result of disciplinary incidents. Line managers were presented with detailed 
guidance on their roles and responsibilities at the various stages. In particular, the 
policies required greater involvement of line managers in the early stages of disciplinary 
procedures, including acting as ‘investigating officers’ in disciplinary incidents and 
making them responsible for issuing minor disciplinary notices to their staff.  
 
The new attendance and discipline measures were therefore ‘hard’ rather than ‘soft’ 
instruments of people management, in that they were concerned with compliance and 
the achievement of short-term, quantifiable results. However, the company also 
introduced a soft HR intervention as part of its attempt to address underlying issues of 
staff motivation. ‘Time with Your Manager’ was a system of sixth-monthly, informal but 
compulsory one-to-one discussions, unrelated to performance appraisal, to be held 
between the line manager and each direct report. The process was designed to 
improve relationships between managers and staff, by focussing on support and the 
long-term development of each individual employee.  
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Training for line managers was a key component of the introduction of the new HR 
policies. A raft of training interventions was developed from 2003 to enable line 
managers to become competent and confident in implementing the new procedures. 
The courses that emerged from the Employee-Centred Strategy evolved into a 
mandatory line management training programme. By 2006, the three main courses 
were: Discipline (three days); Managing for Attendance and Poor Performance (two 
days); and Time with Your Manager (one day). These three courses represented the 
main investment in MLD made at SWT. The training courses were run by external 
trainers for all managers and made extensive use of role-play, in particular around 
‘dealing with difficult people’ and disciplinary interviews. The drivers’ function extended 
this type of work by contracting an external leadership development consultant to run 
extra workshops on the use of specific tools and techniques for self-management and 
people management.  
 
Taken together, the core people management and technical training courses 
represented SWT’s investment in OMD. The main aim was to ensure successful 
coordination in the machine bureaucracy through compliance with regulatory 
requirements and minimum standards of employee performance and conduct. Included 
within this, however, was a strong emphasis on devolved HR responsibilities. In this 
sense, the people management aspect of OMD supported part of the divisionalisation 
process as well as the ongoing stability of the machine bureaucracy.  
 
4.2.2 Strategic management development 
 
The more strategically-orientated dimension of MLD intervention for middle managers 
at SWT began with a culture-change initiative in 2003. This was followed by a ‘talent 
management’ programme in 2005.  
 
In the early part of 2003, all managers were included in an initiative to develop a 
distinctive ‘vision’ and a new set of ‘values and behaviours’ for the company. The 
consultation was launched through a three-day mandatory programme called ‘The Wow 
Factor’, facilitated by an external HR consultancy. Based on a model of ‘values-centred 
leadership’ and the concept of emotional intelligence, the programme was delivered to 
small teams and was introspective in nature. Participants were encouraged to explore 
and share their self-perceptions, their feelings about the company and their 
relationships with their colleagues, their personal values, beliefs and choices. In short, 
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the aim of the programme was to explore “the emotional aspect of management and 
how people felt about themselves and, in turn, how that would impact on the way they 
would manage their people” (Interview with HR Director).   
 
The Wow course was an unusual type of intervention for a traditional, blue-collar and 
uniformed industry, and it divided opinion among its participants. For example, the head 
of information technology described it as “excellent in parts”, while the head of guards 
described it as “appalling”, “diabolical” and a “waste of time”. The long-term significance 
of the Wow course was that it led to the development of the company’s official ‘vision, 
values and behaviours’, which became the reference point for formulating future 
company policy. The Wow course also placed MLD high on the strategic agenda. While 
line management training put a heavy emphasis on line managers’ communication 
skills, the Wow course was the first intervention under the Stagecoach franchise to 
highlight the emotional and relational dimension of line management.  
 
In 2005, the board decided that, as part of its new HR strategy, it would try to identify 
and retain its future senior managers, and to invest in a talent management 
programme. The talent management programme began in May 2005 for fifty ‘high-
potential’ volunteers, sponsored by their line managers. In common with many talent 
management initiatives, the objectives were multiple and rather general (cf. Lewis and 
Heckman 2006, Iles 2007: 106). The stated aims of the talent management programme 
at SWT were: i) the retention of managers; ii) the development of individual managers; 
and iii) improved individual and business performance.  Measurable evaluation criteria 
were not specified.  
 
In contrast to the group-based activities of the Wow course, the talent management 
activities were individualised. The fifty participants on the programme, selected from 
approximately two hundred applicants, consisted largely of middle managers, who were 
seen as having the potential to become senior managers in the medium-term future. In 
the latter months of 2005, each manager completed several online psychometric tests 
and participated in a 360-degree feedback exercise, using the company’s management 
competence framework and rating scales. The participants then had a one-to-one 
session with a HR consultant, lasting three to four hours, to analyse the results of the 
tests and the 360-degree feedback exercise. The interviews resulted in personal 
development plans, the implementation of which relied on the continuing support of the 
participants’ line managers and the HR function throughout 2006.  
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In terms of the talent management programme’s overall strategic significance, it is 
important to point out that the programme was not just an isolated intervention for a 
select group of perceived high-performers. The programme was in fact viewed as a pilot 
that would be expanded to all managers by 2008 so that each manager in the company 
would have a personal development plan that was linked to corporate strategic 
objectives.  
 
As already noted, the methods used in the Wow and talent management programmes 
were essentially leader development methods, which might be expected in a more 
professionalised environment to develop the intrapersonal competence of individual 
managers to support the mechanism of mutual adjustment. However, the motivations 
for Wow and talent management were multifarious and went beyond a concern with 
individuals’ intrapersonal competence. The primary motivations behind Wow and the 
talent management programme were in fact related to more specific strategic concerns 
about managers’ human skills. Whereas Wow was primarily concerned with the 
development of managers’ understanding and commitment to the corporate aims of 
customer service, the talent management programme was concerned to increase 
managerial retention, to improve individual and business performance and to provide 
career development and succession. These intertwined with the more general concerns 
to develop intrapersonal competence in individual managers. In this sense, although 
Wow and talent management utilised conventional leader development methods rather 
than broad education and development in strategic and operations management 
models, they can be seen as a narrow form of strategic management development 
(SMD). 
 
There was some evidence of investment in a broader type of SMD for some individuals, 
notably the more experienced middle managers. One interviewee had, for example, 
been sponsored to study for an MBA. He reflected that:  
 
[T]he Wow course…and to some extent the talent management programme, will focus 
on softer skills, how you come across to people, how you communicate. But where there 
is a real lack in the organisation is [in] general business education. There are people … 
in management posts… who don’t understand ... a simple line graph, who don’t know 
what a KPI [key performance indicator] is, who don’t know how to construct a paper or a 
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business case…. the hole that needs to be plugged is to give people the harder skills  
(Interview with Head of Train Service Delivery) 
 
This sentiment, that there was a need for more general business management 
education, was shared by a number of other middle manager interviewees. It suggested 
a demand for more general SMD-type provision beyond the company’s mandatory 
people management training and the talent management programme, especially in the 
more senior part of the middle line.  
 
That investment in broader SMD was not prioritised is a reflection of the limited nature 
of divisionalisation at SWT. While divisionalisation demanded that managers pay 
greater attention to performance data, there was no significant increase in managerial 
discretion amongst middle managers over the allocation of resources or the strategic 
management of business units. Choices with regard to financial or physical resource 
management were relevant to some station and fleet depot managers, but not to the 
extent that decisions relied on the development of advanced conceptual skills or more 
formal education in strategic management models. The key priority across the 
management group was the development of human skills for the purposes of 
communicating and managing staff to improve customer service, and the team’s local 
contribution to the overall level of customer satisfaction. Therefore, the main thrust of 
SMD was orientated towards leader development-type activities.   
 
In summary, the MLD choices made at SWT for middle managers largely reflected the 
organisational needs of the machine bureaucracy, combined with the needs of some 
aspects of divisionalisation, notably the devolution of HR responsibilities and 
responsibility for customer satisfaction. How these interventions were applied and 
experienced by their participants is the subject of the next section.  
 
 
4.3 Contribution of MLD to divisionalisation 
 
Following the model of MLD options and outcomes developed in Figure 2.8, it is 
expected that, under divisionalisation, operational management development (OMD) 
should lead to operational managerial competence (OMC) among individual middle 
managers. This should ensure the compliance of staff with routinised operational 
demands at group level and contribute to the stability of the machine bureaucracy. It is 
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also expected that strategic management development (SMD) should lead, at the level 
of the individual manager, to a degree of strategic managerial competence (some 
SMC). This should ensure a degree of compliance at group level with the specific 
demands and performance expectations of the business unit or division.  
 
Given the partial nature of divisionalisation at SWT, however, and the accompanying 
limits on the authority in divisionalised management roles, it is to be expected that the 
outcomes at individual, group and organisational level should be weaker in relation to 
SMD than in relation to OMD. Null or negative outcomes might even be expected, as 
the Wow course and the talent management programme actually resembled leader 
development rather than broad strategic management development (SMD). As will be 
shown, however, although weaker than the outcomes of OMD, there was some 
evidence of positive outcomes associated with SMD. Specifically, improvements to 
divisionalised business performance were attributable to SMD in the customer-facing 
division (i.e. retail), more so than in the fleet or driver depots. An overview of the 
expected MLD outcomes as compared with the actual outcomes at SWT is provided in 
Figure 4.4.  
 
 
Structural 
transition 
MLD intervention Individual 
outcomes 
Group  
outcomes 
Contribution to 
organisational 
outcomes 
 
Divisionalisation 
  
  (Role A→B 
middle 
management) 
OMD 
 Technical and 
line 
management 
training 
 Workshops for 
driver 
managers 
OMC 
 Competence and 
confidence in 
applying 
organisational 
policies 
Compliance 
 Increased 
staff 
attendance  
Organisational 
stability 
 Improved 
operational 
efficiency and 
customer 
satisfaction 
 
SMD  
[LD methods] 
 Wow course 
 Talent 
management 
programme 
 
Some SMC 
 Strategic 
awareness and 
some 
intrapersonal 
competence 
 
 
 [Some 
increased 
staff 
motivation] 
 
 Improvements 
in some 
divisional 
performance 
(station 
management) 
  
 
Role A = machine middle line management; Role B = business division management; OMD = 
operational management development; SMD = strategic management development; LD = leader 
development; OMC = operational managerial competence; SMC = strategic managerial 
competence; Actual SWT outcomes in italics 
Figure 4.4  Expected and actual MLD outcomes at South West Trains 
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In broad terms, as illustrated in Figure 4.4, SWT’s investment in OMD was found to 
have led to the expected outcomes at individual level in terms of improved managerial 
competence and self-confidence, leading to more effective management of staff 
attendance at group level. As will be seen, this may be linked to evidence of greater 
operational business efficiency and customer satisfaction at organisational level. Also 
illustrated in Figure 4.4 are the outcomes of SMD. Due to the unexpected use of leader 
development methods for SMD purposes, a slightly unexpected pattern of outcomes at 
individual and group levels was observed, including some evidence of increased 
intrapersonal competence at individual level and some increased staff motivation at 
group level. At organisational level, SMD was observed to have contributed to the main 
expected strategic goal of improved divisional performance, though, as will be 
explained, this applied mainly to station management rather than fleet depot and driver 
depot management.  
 
The findings relating MLD outcomes in the SWT case will now be explained in more 
detail, broken down according to OMD and SMD respectively. The data comes primarily 
from the interviews with eighteen middle managers. These included thirteen line 
managers and five staff managers from across the company. Five of the line managers 
were relatively new in post at SWT and had participated in the OMD only. The 
remaining ten had participated in both OMD and in the talent management aspect of 
SMD. In addition, two of these interviewees had been with the company long enough to 
have participated in the 2003 Wow intervention, and a further two had participated in 
the leader development workshops in the drivers’ function. The views of various senior 
managers and the ASLEF representatives are also taken into account.  
 
4.3.1 Contribution of operational management development  
 
The most significant MLD experiences for the five newer managers, who had only 
participated in OMD, were the ‘harder’ aspects of people management training, notably 
the attendance and discipline management courses. Six out of the ten interviewees, 
who had participated in both OMD and SMD, also considered training in attendance 
management and discipline as very significant, with three describing it as more 
important and consequential than the talent management programme. Training in the 
‘softer’ aspect of people management, namely the Time With Your Manager course, 
was considered less significant by interviewees, although some managers claimed to 
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have learnt to pay greater attention to individual employees and their motivation as a 
result of OMD generally.  
 
With regard to OMD, the critical incidents of the five newer managers are most 
interesting to explore. These managers may be considered a quasi control group in that 
their experiences of OMD may be expected to be less affected by other MLD 
interventions with different aims. The MLD outcomes relating to this group of managers 
are summarised in Figure 4.5.  
 
 
Individual 
outcomes 
Group outcomes Contribution to 
organisational 
outcomes 
More effective 
management of 
attendance and 
discipline (3) 
 
Greater confidence 
in managing staff 
(1) 
 
Improved one-to- 
communication 
skills (1) 
 
Improved staff 
attendance (2) 
 
 
Perceived 
improvement in staff 
motivation (2) 
 
Improved service 
reliability (1) 
 
Improved depot 
performance  
(2) 
 
(brackets indicate number of interviewees) 
Figure 4.5 Outcomes of operational management development at South West 
Trains 
 
 
In terms of individual-level outcomes, all five of the newer managers interviewed 
confirmed that the OMD left them feeling confident and competent to implement HR 
policies. Much of the success of the training lay in the impressing upon line managers 
of the legal importance of implementing the attendance management policy correctly. 
As a group station manager succinctly put it:   
 
There is actually a very specific process to follow about certain questions that you must 
ask up-front. There are certain things that you must do and not say, and say, and 
record. And without that training, you are screwed (Interview with group station manager 
2) 
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It was also clear from several interviews that the use of actors to help role-play common 
one-to-one disciplinary scenarios made the experience of the attendance and discipline 
management training particularly memorable. As one of the five newer managers 
related:  
 
I’ve come unstuck a couple of times in role play and I’ve really had to sit back and think 
“I did that wrong”, or “Hold on, can we stop and start again… before I dig myself an even 
bigger hole?” And I think by making the mistakes at [that] level, you don’t make them 
then, when you’re in the field. (Interview with fleet depot manager 2) 
 
The quality of the design and delivery of the training therefore seemed to be an 
important factor in its effectiveness. 
 
In terms of facilitating the devolution of HRM, OMD was effective in making line 
managers aware of their new responsibilities, as opposed to previous practices of 
referring on individual cases to the HR function. As one manager, an ex-engineer who 
had recently joined SWT from an engineering division of the civil service, explained: “[In 
my old job] I’d always had an infrastructure around me which applied those things to the 
people” (Interview with fleet depot manager 1). 
 
With regard to promoting divisionalisation, in the sense of encouraging managers to be 
proactive in assuming local responsibility for business performance, interviews with two 
of the five newer managers suggested that OMD had had an effect. For example, one 
highlighted how the training course in attendance management had changed the way 
he viewed and approached the managing of staff attendance on his depot: 
 
Every morning I speak to the managers [on my depot] and say “Right, who’s off? What 
have you done about it? Have you called them? Have you referred them to occupational 
health? Have you had the challenging conversations?” (Interview with fleet depot 
manager 3) 
 
 
At the level of group outcomes, the evidence suggests that competence and confidence 
at the level of individual managers (and, in some cases, their enthusiastic commitment) 
converted into improved staff attendance and discipline across the company. All five of 
the newer managers described specific critical incidents of improvements in staff 
attendance and performance as a result of their effective implementation of the HR 
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policies. Two of the talent management group also made a specific point out of the 
increased attendance in their teams as a result of OMD. To take a specific example, 
one manager claimed to have managed to reduce staff absence on his depot from 
approximately fourteen to three per cent within one year. As he related:  
 
[T]he attendance [at my depot] was really poor.… I used to look at the attendance board 
and some days bang my head against it.…So what I did was I stuck rigidly to a set of 
ideas that I had and used the attendance process the way it was supposed to be used 
(Interview with fleet depot manager 3) 
 
 
Improvements in staff attendance in an organisation may be attributable to various 
factors (Marsden and Moriconi 2008). Nevertheless, the company-level data certainly 
support the interpretation that the development of the new attendance management 
policy, coupled with effective training, was correlated with markedly increased staff 
attendance from 2003 onwards (see Figure 4.6).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.6  Staff attendance at South West Trains 2000-2006 
(Source: SWT HR Information System) 
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At organisational level, improved staff attendance had a direct effect on improving 
service reliability. Strategic Rail Authority statistics (2005) record the percentage of 
SWT’s trains arriving on time as increased from 74 to 90 per cent from Quarter 4 of 
2003-4 to Quarter 4 of 2004-5, and the National Passenger Survey records passenger 
satisfaction with punctuality and reliability as increased from approximately 60 to over 
80 per cent between Autumn 2003 and Autumn 2006 (Passenger Focus 2006: 36). 
Both improvements took the company above the sector average. Other factors such as 
investment in new rolling stock and a revised timetable in 2005-6 doubtless helped 
improve train reliability and customer satisfaction in the middle years of the decade. 
Nonetheless, the full range of evidence suggests a positive correlation between 
improved operational performance and the line management training introduced 
through the Employee-Centred Strategy. 
 
Beyond the enforcement of ‘hard’ attendance and discipline management policies, 
softer outcomes of line management training were also evident in the claims of some 
managers that they were practising more frequent informal communication alongside 
the application of necessary HR procedures. However, only one individual from the five 
newer managers reported Time With Your Manager training, specifically designed to 
promote the softer side of line management, as his most significant MLD experience. 
He claimed that this training enabled him to develop questioning techniques when 
talking to and counselling staff, and, as an example, related how he had consequently 
secured special support and resources for a member of staff with dyslexia (Interview 
with fleet depot manager 2). Overall, however, the interview evidence suggests that the 
impact of Time With Your Manager training was over-shadowed by the ‘harder’ realities 
of people management. This was certainly the perception of the ASLEF representatives 
who dismissed the Time With Your Manager practices as a pointless ‘noting exercise’.  
 
Despite the apparent lack of impact of the Time With Your Manager training, three of 
the five newer managers linked their newly-developed competence in people 
management to the group-level outcome of improved staff motivation. Two of them 
went further to make connections to the organisational-level outcome of improved depot 
performance. As one of the fleet depot managers related:  
 
My ground frame operators now do other works, they assist me. At weekends they’ll do 
CET [chemical emission toilets] work… although there are no cleaners on duty, rather 
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than sit around - as they used to do - for the whole day. They’ll wash the trains at the 
weekend…I’ve asked them to do engineering checks….they’re all additional works that 
we’ve given them, but they’ve accepted them, because I’ve asked them, rather than told 
them. We are the only fleet depot that has had a hundred per cent of trains left depot on 
time at start of service. We get them in the right order, at the right time, and away they 
go. (Interview with fleet depot manager 1)  
 
The other fleet depot manager, also as a result of his greater appreciation of the 
importance of informal communication learnt through the people-management courses, 
claimed to have helped motivate staff to have turned around his fleet depot’s 
performance to achieve virtually no ‘TINS’ (‘trains not in service’) in the previous quarter 
and an improvement in train presentation scores from 94 to 98 per cent, compared to 
the company benchmark score of 90 per cent. 
 
Such isolated examples alone cannot be taken as firm evidence of the overall 
contribution of OMD to increased staff motivation and improved operational 
performance.  However, the claims of increased staff motivation are reinforced by the 
company’s anonymous and externally-administered staff satisfaction survey, named 
‘Tell Us’. In the 2005 staff satisfaction survey, completed by 65 per cent of employees, 
64 per cent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement ‘I am likely to 
go above and beyond my normal duties’ and 90 per cent strongly agreed or agreed with 
the statement ‘my manager treats me with respect’.  
 
These statistics suggest generally positive line manager-individual relationships in the 
company during this period, which appear to have been aided by OMD. However, the 
evidence is more ambiguous with regard to the claims by all five newer managers in 
their interviews that OMD had improved their relationships with staff by enabling them 
to apply (and being seen to apply) HR policies with fairness and consistency. Other 
interview accounts, and Tell Us data, contradict this perception by showing a lack of 
consistency in this area across the company. As a driver depot manager related:  
 
We had an operational incident about six weeks ago….The driver got a bit of a slap on 
the wrist and got some points on his license, which is not the end of the world… the 
guard received a disciplinary Form 1 [first written warning]…. and the platform staff got 
the sack. They were all involved in the same thing, yet the end-product is vastly different 
…. it’s very difficult to breed a kind of teamwork ethic amongst the whole company when 
they’ve seen the guy that gets paid twice as much as everybody else [is] fine and back 
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out there the next day…. that’s down to people’s interpretation of how they apply the 
disciplinary policy…. I think more robust training would have prevented that. (Interview 
with driver depot manager 2) 
 
The perception that training was ineffective overall in achieving consistency in treatment 
by line managers is supported by other Tell Us survey data from 2005, in which only 33 
per cent of front-line staff strongly agreed or agreed with the statement that ‘The way 
policies are implemented at [the company] is fair and just’.  
 
The disparity in the Tell Us data between the positive results at line manager level and 
the comparatively negative results at organisational level suggests that, while line 
managers were generally well regarded by staff, the policies that they were tasked with 
implementing were not. This may have been a reflection of more general employee 
dissatisfaction with the increasing assertiveness of the HR function in the day-to-day 
employment relationship, against which employees had traditionally been cushioned 
through the intermediation of trade union representatives.  Indeed, a negative attitude 
towards the company’s HR policies was clearly expressed by the ASLEF 
representatives, who maintained that line managers, despite positive relationships with 
staff in some cases, were effectively unquestioning agents of senior management, and 
were responsible for the ‘blind application’ of policies and the enforcement of top-down 
HR directives: 
 
[ASLEF representative 1]: They [the managers] have team meetings… where they are 
given objectives forcibly. When an individual will perhaps try to personalise his 
approach, if it’s outside their expected profile, they’ll be corrected and they’ll be 
reminded perpetually “if you perform poorly, we’ll remove you.” It happens very 
regularly, you see managers fail, dismissed, removed. (Interview with ASLEF 
representatives) 
 
 
In summary, the following picture of the outcomes of OMD has emerged. While there is 
evidence to suggest that training in attendance management contributed to reductions 
in staff absence, the full range of interview data implies that this was largely due to a 
process of rigid enforcement of HR policies, with which employees had little choice but 
to comply. The softer dimension of line management training, the Time With Your 
Manager course, was not prioritised as highly in terms of MLD investment and made 
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less of obvious impact. Nevertheless, staff satisfaction survey data suggest that many 
individual managers had positive relationships with their staff and that the company 
enjoyed relatively high levels of staff motivation. This might have been attributable to 
the more general strategic effort to reinforce the importance of the softer aspects of line 
management through the company’s ‘vision, values and behaviours’ initiative. Within 
this process of reinforcement, the Time With Your Manager course may then have 
made a contribution to staff motivation.  
 
The conclusion may be drawn that OMD served largely to support the stability of the 
machine bureaucracy by attempting to standardise the implementation of centralised 
HR rules. Various initiatives to promote the importance of positive relationships at local 
level between managers and staff also seemed to contribute to the smooth-running of 
the machine bureaucracy. Beyond this, the softer people management initiatives may 
have helped to enable some effective divisionalisation in the form of encouraging 
greater local managerial responsibility for customer satisfaction through more effective 
people management.  
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4.3.2 Contribution of strategic management development (talent management 
programme) 
 
The talent management programme, as already noted, had three objectives: i) the 
retention of managers8; ii) the development of individual managers9; and iii) improved 
individual and business performance. From the point of view of SMD’s contribution to 
divisionalisation, the third objective is of principal interest.  
 
The critical incidents reported in the interviews with the ten middle manager participants 
were the main source of data. Eight interviewees were from the middle line, including 
three group station managers, two driver depot managers, a driver standards manager, 
a guards depot manager and a fleet depot manager. These differences in function 
prove to be significant for the outcomes of SMD. The remaining two staff managers 
were from the technical side, namely a performance, compliance and planning manager 
(hereafter ‘performance manager’), and a senior project engineer.  
 
Overall, the interviews demonstrated that the talent management programme did not 
make as strong an impact across the group as compared with OMD in the previous 
section. As will be shown, this was partly to do with some inappropriate selection for the 
programme and lack of organisational support for the ongoing learning process. 
However, as will also be shown, those individuals, through whom the talent 
management intervention did produce some discernible changes for the business, 
demonstrated striking similarities in their critical incidents. Moreover, the group station 
managers, responsible for customer-facing divisions, and in possession of detailed and 
frequent local performance information, demonstrated the strongest contribution to 
business outcomes through their participation in MLD. A summary of the individual, 
group and business outcomes as identified in the interviews is presented in Figure 4.7.  
                                               
8 In terms of the first objective, the ‘retention of talented managers’, the intervention may in fact 
have exacerbated the problem of managerial turnover in a year when the company was 
preparing for re-franchising. Internal documentation shows that fourteen of the fifty talent 
management participants (28 per cent) left the organisation voluntarily in 2006-7 as compared to 
approximately 15 per cent of all managers across the company. Immediately after the new 
franchise agreement in 2007, the company resolved to cut the manager-headcount by 33 per 
cent and offered voluntary redundancy to all managers. 
 
9 In terms of the second objective of the talent management programme, ‘to develop the careers 
of high-performing managers within the company’, SWT could claim a little more success. 
Internal documentation claimed that more than fifteen of the fifty participants had moved into 
new and, in some cases, more senior management positions within a year of the intervention. 
Only four participants, however, attributed their career moves to the talent management 
programme (SWT documentation). The programme was scrapped under the new franchise in 
2009.  
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Individual outcomes Group outcomes Contribution to 
organisational 
outcomes 
 
Increased reflection and 
self-confidence in 
managerial role (3) 
 
Greater reflection on 
communication styles (2) 
 
 
More effective objective-
setting with individuals  
(4) and with team (1) 
 
General improvement in 
customer service 
indicators (2 – group 
station mangers) 
 
Improved business 
processes (1 – 
performance manager) 
 
Self-(re)assurance (1) 
 
Purchasing-negotiation 
skills (1) 
  
 
No change (3) 
 
  
 
(brackets indicate number of interviewees) 
Figure 4.7 Outcomes of strategic management development at South West Trains 
 
 
For five of the ten interviewees (see the second row of Figure 4.7), the talent 
management programme represented their most significant MLD experience. The 
relative lack of prior experience of leader development was the common factor amongst 
the five. For this reason, the time and attention invested through the talent management 
programme made a generally strong impact. As one summarised:  
 
[The talent management programme] is most thorough thing that I think I’ve ever 
undertaken. …There were four or five online exercises … and the 360-interviews. And 
then to do the whole five hours of one-to-one interview, which was a really in-depth look 
at yourself and consideration of the results, and drawing up an action plan against that. 
That felt really thorough. Certainly, the opportunity to just step back as an individual for 
that period of time - in a business which traditionally just does stuff, doesn’t stop to 
reflect and then moves on to the next thing that it’s got to do - [that has] been really 
good. (Interview with performance manager)  
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The interviews with these five managers demonstrated clearly that the 360-degree 
feedback and the accompanying introspective discussions with the HR consultant were 
the most influential elements of the programme, as they provided the opportunity to 
reflect on one’s personality and role in the organisation. In contrast, activities connected 
to the personal development plans, including any related coaching and mentoring, were 
insignificant. The reason for this was that the full learning transfer process initiated by 
the talent management programme, requiring ongoing challenge and support, was not 
followed through. A lack of HRD competence in the organisation - in terms of the ill-
matching of managers to the MLD intervention, as well as the lack of challenge and 
support - was also at the root of the ineffectiveness of the programme for the remaining 
five managers (see the bottom two rows of Figure 4.7).  
 
However, for the five managers for whom the talent management programme was 
effective (see the second row of Figure 4.7), the reported incidents of change at 
individual level were all linked to increased reflection and a greater sense of self-
confidence in one’s managerial role. Partly, the increased self-confidence came from 
the prestige of being identified as a ‘high-performer’, and being seen by senior 
management as having the potential soon to be promoted up the hierarchy. Beyond 
this, however, the interviews revealed two main themes in terms of individual outcomes: 
i) a greater awareness of one’s strategic role (3 managers); and ii) greater awareness 
of different communication styles (2 managers).  
 
With regard to the first theme, the common element was that the talent management 
intervention forced the managers to reflect on their role within the organisation and how 
they worked with their team members to meet objectives. The driver depot manager in 
the group, for example, came to his role from a customer service rather than a driving 
background. He recognised that the talent management programme had highlighted for 
him how he contributed to the business:  
 
I can’t go out and assess train drivers because I haven’t been a train driver. So I have to 
really focus on managing my team to do that.... [The talent management programme 
has] helped me to realise that I do bring some stuff to the party, rather than just fire-
fighting and doing what people say. I can think of new and better ways of doing things 
(Interview with driver depot manager 2) 
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Similarly, the performance manager found that the 360-degree feedback session forced 
him to focus more closely on ensuring that his team’s objectives were fully understood 
across the team: “[J]ust because I was confident and capable or clear what A to B 
meant, some people actually needed the road map that went with it of how you get from 
A to B” (Interview with performance manager). The fleet depot manager, rather than 
focus on specific business objectives, argued that the general experience of the talent 
management programme encouraged her to introduce more reflective practice into her 
management team: “just a general philosophy of taking time out to reflect on what 
we’ve done and thinking about how we can improve it for next time” (Interview with fleet 
depot manager 4).   
 
The second theme of self-reflection concerned an increased awareness of 
communication styles. As a result of the first individual feedback session in the talent 
management programme, two station managers realised that their communication 
styles were often perceived by staff as overly direct, and that softer, more open styles of 
communication were more effective with certain members of staff. As one of these 
managers explained:  
 
[T]here were certain specific incidences of feedback where I thought ‘Ooh, blimey. I 
didn’t realise I was perceived in that sense’. Much of it was to do with [that] I am a quite 
a direct person and sometimes I might be a little bit too direct, to the point of being blunt 
…. some of my managers actually really appreciate the direct, blunt approach, because 
they know where they stand. But I had to adapt myself for some of my team, because 
they obviously didn’t react to that particular way of management (Interview with group 
station manager 3) 
 
This newfound appreciation of the effectiveness of a softer, more diplomatic approach 
to communication was echoed in a third interview, in which a station manager 
recollected the Wow course:  
 
[I]t’s taught me to be more tolerant of … people and understand why they haven’t got 
the same standards as I have, and how we can still come to the same desired outcome 
… but using the way they prefer to operate (Interview with group station manager 1) 
 
 
As well as reflecting a degree of intrapersonal competence, which is to be expected as 
a result of leader development-type intervention, these individual level outcomes are 
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reflective of a degree of strategic managerial competence (SMC) required for 
divisionalisation. The ability to be more reflective about one’s managerial position in 
relation to organisational goals, and how to negotiate different ways of achieving them 
at local level, is part of the competence required to promote divisional performance. 
Evidence of development of this type of competence (SMC) was most accentuated 
amongst those in station management roles. These managers faced the greatest 
uncertainty in how work tasks should be accomplished due to their responsibility for 
interaction with customers. This appears to account for their greater need for the softer 
skills of communication relative to driver or fleet depot managers.  
 
In terms of group-level outcomes, the five interviewees above tended to describe how 
their increased self-awareness led to more effective interactions with others. 
Interviewees invariably speculated that the changes in their behaviour made them more 
effective as managers across the organisation, and that they had helped to increase 
staff motivation in their teams. While these claims cannot be substantiated without more 
objective and measurable evidence, it was interesting to discern from the interviews the 
ways in which the managers claimed to have achieved more effective interactions.  
 
The unifying theme was a perceived improvement in working towards objectives with 
individuals and, in one case, with the team. Three interviewees described how they had 
improved the ways in which they defined objectives and communicated these through 
regular one-to-one and team meetings. In particular, they claimed that the talent 
management programme had enabled them to take better account of the bigger 
strategic picture and how their teams’ objectives were located within this, as well as 
improving their ability to formulate and communicate clear objectives. Two managers 
placed special emphasis on how their attitude towards one-to-one meetings had 
changed as a result of the talent management programme, as the following two quotes 
illustrate.  
 
I absolutely categorically don’t miss one-to-ones, ever, with my direct reports …. 
previously, it would be a bit of a case of ‘What are you doing this morning?’ ‘Oh, 
nothing’. ‘Oh, cool, do you want to do your one-to-one?’ But now….I know exactly when 
they are… They’re structured, I know what I’m going to discuss in advance, I make sure 
I’m prepared, I make sure they bring stuff in so that they‘re accountable for their actions. 
(Interview with driver depot manager 2) 
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I’ve actually looked at the one-to-ones I was carrying out twelve to fifteen months ago in 
comparison the one-to-ones that I’m doing at the current time and there is a distinct 
difference in the quality. There’s far more guidance, coaching and specific objectives to 
improve within them. (Interview with group station manager 3) 
 
 
In a slightly different vein, the performance manager from the staff side related how the 
talent management programme had led him to introduce an exercise into monthly team 
meetings to involve all team members in understanding each other’s objectives. As a 
result, this manager claimed that the whole team had become “very clear of what the 
objectives are, and what we’re trying to achieve” (Interview with performance manager). 
In contrast to the previous two managers, however, the performance manager was 
responsible for a small, knowledge-intensive, office-based team, which kept regular 
business hours (a self-confessed ‘ivory tower’). This was a more conducive 
environment for team communication than a twenty-four-hour-a-day depot environment, 
in which more isolated interactions with individuals were more typical.  
  
Beyond the outcome of more regular and purposeful communication of objectives, four 
managers claimed a greater degree of consultation with team members about methods 
for achieving objectives, as a result of the talent management programme. In particular, 
two station managers related how they began to practice informal types of coaching 
with the front-line managers in their teams. One related how he had invited feedback 
from a station manager on his communication style, who told him that he wanted more 
explanation and guidance. As a result, the group station manager claimed:  
 
I changed … how I approached my one-to-ones and my walkrounds with him, and there 
was a noticeable difference in how he performed within his job role as well, because he 
felt more comfortable to come to me and ask for things (Interview with group station 
manager 3) 
  
Another group station manager had a similar experience, in which he introduced a 
coaching-type approach as a result of personal insights gained through the Wow 
course:  
 
I was out with a guy, one of my managers, last week, just going round his group of 
stations and helping him see what I see, and telling him how I approach addressing 
looking at a station and what is right and what’s wrong about it and just giving him a few 
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pointers about some of things that I do that perhaps he doesn’t. The way I approach 
things, what I call the thirty-minute station walk-round. Just getting him to see how I 
approach looking at stuff, and then getting him to tell me how he approaches it and just 
giving him some pointers about what he could do differently. (Interview with group 
station manager 1) 
 
 
For the driver depot manager, the discussion of objectives with individuals was more 
concerned with behavioural style. He related how his increased self-awareness as a 
result of the talent management programme had led him to confront the behaviour of 
one of his front-line managers. He explained how this manager, though hard-working 
and technically competent, had a habit of upsetting drivers by only communicating with 
them in order to point out problems with their performance. Through regular one-to-one 
meetings the depot manager continually pointed out to the front-line manager how he 
was perceived within the team and how he could soften his style. He claimed that the 
manager gradually began to change his behaviour by engaging in more informal 
conversation and by taking more care to have constructive interactions with staff.  
Relating this change back to the talent management intervention, the manager argued:  
 
 [T]hat’s come through me being organised enough to really, properly allocate quality 
time to them [one-to-one meetings], and equally be courageous enough to tell them 
[staff] where I think they need to change …. people are prepared to say that to me, so I 
equally need to be prepared to say that to other people. (Interview with driver depot 
manager 2) 
 
 
Amongst these incidences of greater communication concerning objectives, it is 
important to note that, while the communication processes themselves may have been 
relatively open and subject to some negotiation between the line manager and the 
direct report, the behavioural outcomes - framed by the company’s official vision, values 
and behaviours - were not. As one group station manager put it: “How you get the 
message across is obviously down to the individual person, but ultimately the same 
message needs to be conveyed” (Interview with group station manager 3). The 
interviewees invariably spoke in terms of setting objectives ‘for’ their staff, rather than 
‘with’ them. This reflects the process of divisionalisation, in which outcomes tend to be 
standardised across the organisation, although a degree of flexibility and variation in 
methods may occur at local level.  
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The process of tracing individual and group outcomes of the talent management 
programme to the organisational level proved difficult, as specific connections between 
managers’ learning and business performance were not straightforward. Only three of 
the ten talent management interviewees were able to identify a connection between 
their individual learning and more general business outcomes. This was partly to do 
with the personalised nature of the talent management programme, but it was also to 
do with the programme’s rather vague objectives and the general lack of attention to 
evaluation of learning in the organisation over the longer term.  
 
It is significant, however, that the group station managers were the most able to 
establish connections between their learning and business performance outcomes. 
These managers were in the position to set objectives for their staff that could directly 
influence trends in business performance, due to the existence of detailed customer 
service indicators in their areas of responsibility. For example, the group station 
manager, who had related how he began to coach a station manager during ‘thirty-
minute station walkarounds’, was able to demonstrate how this had contributed to 
improvements in the ‘mystery shopper’ scores rising “slowly but surely” in this particular 
manager’s station. In a similar way, the performance manager, who introduced greater 
clarity in working with objectives in his team, argued that this had contributed to a new 
joint performance management process with Network Rail being commended as 
industry best practice. He was also confident that the new process had contributed to 
sharply improving performance on the ‘time-to-five’ indicator that measured the 
company’s train punctuality.  
 
In contrast, driver depot managers had less immediate divisional performance 
indicators around which to frame objectives for their staff. Beyond the enforcement of 
compliance with competence standards, driver depot managers were left to negotiate 
around attitudinal and behavioural issues with their front-line managers to encourage 
them to build more motivational relationships with the drivers in their teams in a general 
effort to raise train service performance. The reference point in such negotiations is the 
company’s ‘vision, values and behaviours’, including such requirements as ‘honesty’ 
and ‘respect’. But, as one driver depot manager mused: “how can you train somebody 
to be ‘honest’? .... How can you make somebody ‘respectful’?” (Interview with driver 
depot manager 2)  
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As mentioned at the beginning of this subsection, the talent management programme 
was not uniformly effective. In the cases of five managers (see the bottom two rows of 
Figure 4.7) this was due to a lack of HRD competence at SWT. Three of the five 
managers related how their previous experience of MLD had been effectively ignored, 
and how their personal development plans were either too vague to recall in detail or 
not meaningful in terms of their job practice. Two of the three in the very bottom row did 
not even mention their participation in the talent management programme when invited 
in their interviews to recall their MLD experiences. Even when prompted, none of these 
three could identify how the intervention had led to any new insights or learning 
experiences. For the remaining two managers (in the third row of Figure 4.7) the talent 
management programme was accepted as having led to perceptible outcomes; the 
senior project engineer received sponsorship to go on a purchasing-negotiation skills 
course, and the guard depot manager felt that the programme had provided her with 
reassurance in her managerial abilities. But there were no significant changes to report 
at individual level. As the latter manager put it: “The results that I had [from the 360 
degree feedback] were very good…but there was nothing for me to change” (Interview 
with guards depot manager).  
 
Yet beyond the issue of the relative lack of HRD competence at SWT, the reasons for 
the talent management programme’s ineffectiveness in the drivers’ function appeared to 
have deeper structural reasons. For driver depot manager 1, for example, the talent 
management intervention had been ineffective because the working environment simply 
constrained the opportunities for practising more flexible approaches to management. 
As he commented: “It was quite difficult for me to find anything that I felt I couldn’t do 
that related to the job” (Interview with driver depot manager 1). Similarly, the driver 
standards manager had a personal development plan that could not be implemented 
effectively, as part of it depended on his participation in budgeting meetings, the 
opportunities for which did not easily or naturally arise in his area of work. The lack of fit 
between the use of leader development methods and this part of the middle line lends 
support to the hypothesis that MLD produces null or negative outcomes if ill-matched to 
organisational requirements.   
 
In conclusion, while some of the expected outcomes of SMD were observable at SWT, 
the achievement of the full range of multi-levelled outcomes was prevented by the 
structural constraints of the machine bureaucracy, the limited nature of divisionalisation 
and a relative lack of HRD competence. The lack of HRD competence was both 
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strategic, in terms of investing in ill-fitting SMD options, and operational, in terms of the 
ineffective application of assessment-challenge-support principles. Nevertheless, some 
effective and well-matched use of SMD was observed in the most autonomous, 
customer-facing part of the organisation, namely station management, and also 
suggested amongst those technical managers who had the opportunity to coordinate 
the work of their staff in more flexible ways.  
 
 
4.4 Assessment  
 
The case of SWT lends broad support to the theoretical model of MLD options and 
outcomes under divisionalisation, as advanced in Chapter 2. To illustrate this, the actual 
outcomes of MLD at SWT as compared with the theoretical model of MLD outcomes 
under divisionalisation are revisited in Figure 4.8.   
 
Structural 
transition 
MLD 
intervention 
Individual 
outcomes 
Group  
outcomes 
Organisational 
outcomes 
 
Divisionalisation 
  
  (Role A→B 
middle 
management) 
OMD OMC  
Staff 
compliance 
 
 
 
 
Organisational 
stability 
 
(increased 
performance in 
customer 
service) 
 
SMD 
 
 
 
Some SMC 
 
 
 
 
 
LD 
  
 
 
[intrapersonal 
competence] 
 
 
 
[Some staff 
commitment] 
 
Role A = machine middle line management; Role B = business division management; OMD = 
operational management development; SMD = strategic management development; LD = leader 
development; OMC = operational managerial competence; SMC = strategic managerial 
competence  
Figure 4.8 Actual MLD options and outcomes at South West Trains 
 
 
SWT followed the pattern of expected MLD options and outcomes with regard to 
operational management development (see the top half of Figure 4.8), but with an 
unexpectedly strong focus on developing human skills. The company invested, as 
expected, in standard technical and procedural training for the middle line to meet the 
demands of stability in the machine bureaucracy. But it concentrated primarily on 
people management training in order to adjust to a commercial environment and the 
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devolution of HR responsibilities. Investment in OMD at SWT was effective for two main 
reasons. First, it was designed and delivered effectively. Second, it was closely 
matched to the needs of organisational coordination. This was evident in its apparently 
important contribution to increased staff attendance and the relative absence during the 
post-2003 period of employment relations incidents such as strikes and lengthy 
disciplinary cases, which had severely disrupted operations in the early part of the 
franchise.  
 
In contrast to OMD, the way in which the company invested in SMD deviated somewhat 
from the theoretical model. The Wow course, the driver manager workshops and the 
talent management programme all addressed a perceived need for improved human 
skills amongst front-line and middle managers in order to help secure staff commitment 
to new strategic objectives. In the light of the strategic priority of customer service and 
the history of adversarial employment relations, this type of MLD, using leader 
development methods (LD), took priority over investment in broader strategic 
management development (represented by SMD in Figure 4.8) because the real extent 
of divisionalisation in the company was limited. While leader development did not fit 
exactly with parts of the organisation, which lacked the opportunity to coordinate work 
through mutual adjustment, it nevertheless served to develop a degree of intrapersonal 
competence amongst managers. This was most pronounced amongst station managers 
who could enable adjustment to local divisional priorities amongst their staff to 
concentrate on specific improvements in customer service. For most middle managers 
at SWT, however, divisionalisation did not herald a significantly new degree of flexibility 
and discretion in managerial decision-making, with which a broader type of SMD might 
have been compatible. Investment in MLD was therefore shaped by a limited and even 
process of divisionalisation.  
 
The conclusion that the experience of SWT broadly supports the hypothetical pattern of 
MLD options and outcomes under divisionalisation may be sharpened by a 
consideration of what the counterfactual outcomes might have been. For example, SWT 
might have made a blanket investment in strategically-orientated management 
education for all managers, such as sponsorship for to study for MBAs, in order to 
respond to the newly commercialised environment. As the senior project engineer 
indicates in the opening quote to this chapter, however, this would have gone far 
beyond the requirements of the still limited divisional management structure. The 
likelihood that such an investment would have been tolerated by a senior management, 
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who were otherwise supportive of widespread MLD investment, is small. Similarly, the 
company might have invested in more open and collective leadership development 
activities for its middle managers, such as action learning sets; but this would also have 
been unsuitable for the still essentially bureaucratic rather than adhocratic approach to 
the coordination of the organisation’s core work tasks.  
 
The confidence with which conclusions may be drawn in this case derives from the 
strength of the expert witness testimonies. With regard to the people-management 
training (OMD), the critical incidents reported by the five newer managers were 
triangulated with other sources of evidence including staff attendance and staff 
satisfaction survey data, all of which indicated a largely successful effort on the part of 
the HRM function to reduce absence and increase staff motivation. The emphasis on 
staff compliance may have outweighed the more motivational commitment-related 
outcomes, and trade union resistance to the assertive implementation of the new HRM 
policies may also have played a constraining role. But there seems to be little doubt that 
that the training had far-reaching effects. Notably, the five key interviewees, along with 
other managers in the talent management group, had no particular incentive to 
overstate the effect of OMD, as they were not personally responsible for the HR policies 
that it supported, nor were they responsible for their own selection to participate in the 
training, thus reducing the probability of selection bias.   
 
Indeed, such was the size and reach of the investment in OMD, that it attracted criticism 
from senior managers from the non-operational side of the business. For example, both 
the head of pensions and payroll and the head of information technology refused to 
send all their management team members on the supposedly mandatory line 
management training courses. The latter described the courses as “patronising” and not 
geared to the needs of the managers in his team, who did not need to spend several 
days away from the workplace “going over procedures”, being “told how to conduct 
interviews” or “doing role plays”. While arguably effective for the eighty per cent of 
managers on the operational side of the business, it seems that OMD reached the limits 
of its effectiveness in the technostructure and support side of the business.  
 
With regard to confidence in the conclusions regarding the more strategically-orientated 
talent management programme, the assertion that SMD contributed to a small 
improvement in business performance relies heavily on the interviews with the ten 
talent management participants. In contrast to OMD, the critical incidents identified from 
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SMD were less easy to triangulate with other sources of evidence. However, the 
unevenness of the results from the talent management sample, who either self-selected 
or were encouraged onto the programme, and who volunteered to be interviewed, 
provides some assurance that the reported critical incidents were not uniformly subject 
to Hawthorne effects. This group of identified ‘high potential’ managers might have 
been expected to report strong performance-related MLD outcomes, but they actually 
revealed little psychological investment in the success of the programme in terms of 
either their personal advancement or its effect on business performance. That the 
strongest MLD outcomes at organisational level could be identified by a particular 
function, namely station management, rather than the personal motivations of the 
respondents, serves to strengthen confidence in the objectivity of the results of the 
critical incident interviews.  
 
There are three main alternative ways of reading the SWT experience and suggesting 
that MLD was not strategically driven and shaped by organisational contingencies. 
Firstly, one might argue that, although SWT’s investment in operational management 
development (line management training) was effective overall, its investment in leader 
development (Wow, talent management) was excessive, ill-advised and badly 
managed, despite some unintended positive outcomes for station managers. Indeed, as 
highlighted in Section 2.2, the poor handling of MLD interventions by HRD practitioners 
has been widely observed, particularly in their lack of appreciation of business priorities. 
However, it is important also to point out that the talent management initiative at SWT 
served two other HR objectives alongside strategic business objectives, and that the 
broader type of SMD, such as sponsorship for MBAs, was employed sparingly for the 
more senior middle managers, for whom the demands of divisionalisation were most 
acute. The use of MLD was therefore generally aligned with strategic priorities.  
 
A second, neo-institutionalist explanation of the SWT experience would point to the 
tendency amongst HR practitioners to imitate MLD practices, such as leader 
development, that had become commonplace in the sector (in this case, privatised 
services). In the case of SWT, however, it has to be pointed out that the company was 
in fact leading the market in its MLD practices, rather than following. The main 
inspiration for the MLD initiatives came from the supermarket retail sector. Far from 
mimicking best practice in similar PSOs, the MLD interventions were adapted to the 
specific needs of the railway industry context.  
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Finally, a third interpretation of the SWT experience would be that, instead of a 
response to organisational efficiency demands, MLD choices reflected political motives: 
on the one hand, to discipline line managers to conform with the new HR policies and 
accept the commercial priorities of senior management through OMD; on the other 
hand, to reward and incorporate further through SMD those ‘talented’ managers who 
were already identified with these priorities.  
 
With regard to the politics of the talent management programme, the point has already 
been made that this was intended as a pilot for all managers, rather than for a favoured 
group of insiders. It also has to be appreciated that, while political struggles between 
management and the unions were important at SWT, they were not all-dominant: 
investments in the softer aspects of people management were motivated by a 
consultative and participative view of management practice, not an autocratic one. The 
operational realities of the environment may have caused the harder aspects of people 
management to have been prioritised over the softer aspects; however, the initiatives to 
develop the softer side were strategically motivated to improve customer service, 
regardless of managers’ political allegiances to the rank-and-file from which many 
originated. The softer-orientated aspects of MLD represented more than just short-term 
political manoeuvring by management in its wider political contest with the unions.  
 
Overall, while the case lends support to the central hypothesis of contingent MLD 
outcomes, it also highlights the unexpectedly strong importance of human skills in the 
middle line of machine bureaucracies, especially where there has been significant 
organisational conflict and change. OMD is clearly important to support organisational 
stability in the machine bureaucracy, but the development of softer, human skills may 
need to be emphasised more strongly than originally conceptualised, above those of 
technical and conceptual skills.  
 
The case has also highlighted the importance for MLD of the differences between 
divisions in the same organisation and of the variegated nature of the middle line in a 
divisionalised bureaucracy. When directed at improving divisional business 
performance, the case suggests that MLD based on leader development methods is 
likely to be most effective in those divisions that are orientated towards customer 
service (such as stations/passenger retail), where uncertainty in work tasks is highest. 
In contrast, the divisions that necessarily retain a strongly centralised and bureaucratic 
method of coordination (such as the driving function), this type of MLD may contribute 
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towards the amelioration of the social climate, but it is less likely to impact on 
improvements in business performance, which is strongly influenced by management 
decisions made outside the division. A middle ground may be occupied by other types 
of divisions, in which a comparatively varied service is provided by relatively 
autonomous and decentralised business units (such as fleet maintenance), as there is 
some uncertainty in work tasks but also a strong degree of centralised control.  
 
In conclusion, the SWT case has demonstrated the actual complexities but also the 
underlying structural reasons for both the effective and ineffective use of MLD as an 
instrument of organisational stability and change in divisionalising machine 
bureaucracies. In the two cases that follow, quite different patterns of MLD options were 
observed as they supported professionalisation and adhocratisation. The MLD 
investment options in these two cases conformed more closely to the hypothetical 
pattern than at SWT but, particularly in the next case of LFB, the political obstacles 
were found to be greater.  
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Chapter 5. MLD and professionalisation: the case of the London Fire 
Brigade 
 
[I]t’s like the King’s New Clothes. We will believe that we have better people because it 
says so on paper. (Interview with station commander 2 and FBU representative, London 
Fire Brigade) 
 
 
This chapter investigates the role of MLD for middle managers during the 
professionalisation of a safety bureaucracy. As explained in Section 1.2, the safety 
bureaucracy is a variant of the machine bureaucracy, in which middle managers are 
responsible for managing workflow in the form of practising, implementing and adjusting 
emergency routines, rather than continuous work processes. For this reason, the 
middle line in the safety bureaucracy is described as ‘emergency middle line 
management’, as a variant of machine middle line management. The 
professionalisation of the safety bureaucracy refers to the broadening of the work and 
skill requirements of the operating core to fulfil a wider range of specialist functions 
beyond the core activity of emergency response.  
 
The key hypothetical expectations during professionalisation are that: i) middle 
management roles should shift from machine/emergency middle line management 
(Role A) towards professional middle line management (Role C), in which the middle 
line assumes greater responsibility for maintaining and developing professional 
standards and liaising with other parts of the bureaucracy; and that ii) the organisation 
should invest in both operational management development (OMD) to support stability 
in the machine/safety bureaucracy, and professional management development (PMD) 
combined with leader development to promote professionalisation.  
 
The contribution of MLD for middle managers during professionalisation is investigated 
through a case study of the fire brigade LFB. The case presents an account of changes 
to middle management roles in the period 2001-5 and the experiences of a new 
competence-based MLD system, designed to support organisational change. The two 
main findings are that: i) the competence-based system encompassed OMD, PMD and 
a degree of leader development; ii) the new development system contributed to a 
successful shift towards a more professionalised approach to incident management 
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and, to a lesser extent, employee development, but was otherwise constrained by 
political and institutional factors. Overall the case illustrates MLD’s role in enabling a 
partial transition to professionalisation. It also highlights the importance of 
countervailing political and institutional factors that are accentuated during 
professionalisation.   
 
The first section of the chapter discusses the national policy and local organisational 
drivers of professionalisation and the subsequent changes to middle managers at LFB 
from the traditional station commander role towards a modernised station manager role.  
The second section examines the introduction of the competence-based development 
system in the early 2000s, how this related to the changes to middle management, and 
how it combined PMD and leader development with OMD. The third section analyses 
managers’ experiences of MLD from 2001-5, which demonstrate how MLD contributed 
to a professionalisation of parts of the middle management role, but which also 
emphasise the political and institutional obstacles to managerial learning. The final 
section of the chapter assesses the overall contribution of MLD to professionalisation at 
LFB and the broader lessons that may be drawn from the case.   
 
 
 5.1 Professionalisation and the changing roles of middle management 
 
As described in Section 3.2.1, pressures from the operating environment had been 
building since the 1990s to broaden the skills of firefighters to include a wider range of 
specialist functions and fire prevention activities, such as the conducting of premises 
safety checks and participating in smoke alarm awareness campaigns. Although 
piecemeal reforms were already underway, it was not until the early-2000s that 
professionalisation in the UK Fire and Rescue Service (hereafter, the ‘fire service’) was 
formalised through the government’s modernisation reforms. The reforms aimed to 
improve services by making them more flexible and responsive to a wider range of 
operational demands. Integral to this was a political strategy to break traditional 
corporatist governance structures and strengthen the relative power of employers vis-à-
vis the FBU.    
 
The fire service in the post-war period of the twentieth century operated fundamentally 
as a national safety bureaucracy. As Fitzgerald (2005) observes, the level of funding 
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from central government, accounting for over eighty per cent of the service’s resources, 
was, until the reforms of the early-2000s, determined by “prescriptive national fire cover 
criteria” which “decided the number of fire stations, appliances and ultimately the 
uniform establishment of brigades” (p. 651). Although brigades had long been 
regionalised by local authority, the work tasks of firefighters, representing the operating 
core, were standardised according to the centrally-agreed ‘Manuals of Firemanship’. 
Originating in the 1950s, these manuals set out the standard operating procedures for 
fighting fires and dealing with emergency incidents. Overall this amounted to “a 
multitude of semi-Taylorist procedures”, which were then implemented through “FBU 
controlled teamwork” and developed through the “watch culture” (ibid). The watch 
culture refers to the identification of firefighters with a small group of colleagues on the 
same, longstanding shift. Contractually, the employer of both firefighters and non-
uniformed staff was the local fire authority, with non-uniformed staff employed on the 
standard terms and conditions for local government employees. Firefighters’ pay and 
conditions were however agreed at national level with the FBU through a centralised 
corporatist governance structure and enshrined in the “sacrosanct Grey Book national 
agreement” (Fitzgerald 2005: 656).   
 
Firefighters’ training was also highly regulated and typically delivered through the 
national Fire Service College in Gloucestershire. Firefighters became qualified and 
available for promotion to more senior ranks through a national system of fire service 
examinations, then selected for promotion through an internal ‘round’ of internal 
applications. Some operational training and development was devolved; LFB, for 
example, had its own training centre in Southwark. However, work processes for 
uniformed staff and formal HR processes remained essentially standardised according 
to national agreements, which were then implemented locally by fire authorities through 
consultative committees that included local government and FBU representation (ibid).  
 
Professionalisation in the early-2000s is best understood in the wider context of the new 
Labour government’s modernisation agenda (c.f. Andrews 2010: 600). Most public 
services had been subject to significant change in the 1980s and early-1990s due to the 
NPM reforms of the previous Conservative governments. NPM-type measures also 
affected the fire service, mainly in the area of local budget allocations that were linked 
to increasingly tight, ‘value for money’ assessments. However:  
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The fire service was protected from the early onslaught of new public management ... 
through its relatively low cost to the public purse, the high level of public sympathy for 
workers doing a dangerous job and a pay formula that removed overt conflict. 
(Fitzgerald 2005: 648) 
 
As national levels of funding for fire cover and firefighters’ pay remained relatively 
insulated from cuts throughout the 1990s, the search for greater efficiencies focussed 
on attempts to make firefighters’ working conditions more flexible, including the 
covering of extra fire prevention duties. This search continued after 1997 into the early 
years of the new Labour administration, which was also characterised by tight local 
budgets and increasingly adversarial employment relations (Fitzgerald 2005: 665-56).  
 
Labour formalised its strategy of modernisation in the 1999 Local Government Act, 
signalling a new approach to the management of fire service. The Act charged local 
authorities, including fire authorities, with the duty to seek ‘continuous improvement’ in 
services. The strategy included a “radical refocusing of councils’ traditional roles”, in 
order to tackle “the old culture of paternalism and inwardness” (DETR 1998, cited in 
Andrews 2010: 600). Central to the strategy were the use of “rational planning 
processes” and “increased levels of consultation with external stakeholders” (Andrews 
2010: 600).  
 
For the fire service, Labour’s modernisation agenda would translate into a top-down, 
professionalisation strategy, demanding a new approach to planning local services and 
workforce reform. It took a further deterioration of employment relations, culminating in 
a forty per cent pay claim by the FBU, to trigger a major government review of the fire 
service in 2002, chaired by Professor Sir George Bain (see Independent Review of the 
Fire Service 2002), and leading to the 2003 White Paper Our Fire and Rescue Service 
(ODPM 2003). After a prolonged and acrimonious industrial dispute from 2002-4, the 
government passed the 2004 Fire and Rescue Act, implementing most of Bain’s 
recommendations, with the FBU’s eventual acquiescence (Andrews 2010: 601).  
 
The modernisation strategy for the fire service had two main components: i) the 
introduction of authority-based ‘integrated risk management plans’ (IRMPs), to promote 
greater responsiveness to local needs and priorities; and ii) the ‘integrated personal 
development system’ (IPDS), to institutionalise a set of new roles and skill-requirements 
for uniformed staff and managers (Andrews 2010: 602-3). IRMPs broke the link 
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between centralised government funding and the national fire cover prescriptions, and 
developed a new funding formula based around local authority community fire safety 
plans.  The IRMPs required fire authorities “to actively engage in the provision of 
advice, guidance and information to citizens, households and businesses on a host of 
community safety issues” (Andrews 2010: 601). IPDS was heralded as the “cornerstone 
of the Government’s reform of the human resource management of the fire and rescue 
service” (ODPM 2003: 57). The military-type thirteen-tier ‘rank’ structure for uniformed 
staff was abolished and replaced by seven ‘roles’, including six levels of management. 
The seven new occupational roles were linked to a detailed nationwide competence-
based career development framework. IPDS was formalised as the new basis for 
selecting and promoting uniformed staff, guided by the principle that firefighters should 
be able to demonstrate broad sets of skills and competence in order to progress their 
careers, rather than the technical expertise that had largely defined one’s rank.   
 
The aims behind IRMPs and IPDS have a close fit with the theoretical concept of 
professionalisation as a knowledge-driven change in organisational management (see 
Section 1.4). IRMPs represent the closer involvement of specialists (uniformed staff) in 
the management of the local organisation through greater liaison with other parts of the 
bureaucracy and its stakeholders. IPDS represents a move towards the standardisation 
of skills as an approach to coordination, in recognising the increasing complexity of the 
operating environment and the specialist knowledge required by the operating core, in 
contrast to coordination by standardisation of work processes in the machine/safety 
bureaucracy. As also noted in Section 1.4, the more typical interpretation of 
professionalisation is as a political strategy of groups of skilled employees who seek to 
maintain their autonomy from management control. The changes to the fire service 
indeed had a strongly political dimension. But in this case, professionalisation 
resembled more a top-down strategy of management control (Andrews 2010: 602) than 
a ‘bottom-up’, self-empowering strategy of firefighters to enhance their own professional 
status.  
 
Despite the top-down, policy-driven nature of the fire service reforms, there are strong 
theoretical grounds for viewing them as professionalising in organisational management 
terms. While the reforms were to an extent ideologically-driven by ‘managerialism’ 
(ibid), and while they also represented a political strategy to outmanoeuvre and 
disempower the FBU (Seifert and Sibley 2011), the substance of the reforms, in the 
form of the IRMPs and IPDS, nevertheless represented a knowledge-driven strategy of 
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organisational change. The FBU had in fact long championed greater recognition of 
firefighters’ increasingly specialist skills and were supportive of the IPDS project even 
during the 2002-4 dispute (FBU 2003: 14). That firefighters should be seen as 
‘professionals’ was not disputed, and uniformed officers had long monopolised senior 
positions in the fire service. The question was how, in such a politically-charged 
environment, professionalisation and the involvement of uniformed staff in managerial 
decisions would be defined. Ultimately, the prevailing ideological and political context 
enabled the government, not firefighter representatives, to determine management 
processes and new employee roles (c.f. Andrews 2010: 603-4).  
 
Middle managers in local brigades were seen as pivotal to the provision of a 
modernised and professionalised service. The middle line of a fire brigade is constituted 
by those officers responsible for heading up its operational units, namely fire stations, or 
a small number of fire stations. Station commanders (eventually replaced by the term 
‘station manager’ post-2005) invariably came from the uniformed side of the service, 
which typically accounted for around eighty per cent of the brigade’s workforce.  
 
Professionalisation involved a remodelling of the station manager role. The original 
station commander model is consistent with the concept of emergency middle line 
management (Role A), whereas the remodelled station manager role resembled 
professional middle line management (Role C). As outlined in Chapter 1, Role A 
management in machine or safety bureaucracies is primarily concerned with ensuring 
workflow (or emergency routines), conflict management, disturbance-handling and 
vertical liaison. In contrast, Role C management in professional bureaucracies is more 
concerned with professional-managerial collaboration and coordination through mutual 
adjustment.  
 
The intended shift in middle management roles from a Role A to a Role C model as it 
applied to the fire service is summarised in Figure 5.1.  
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Emergency middle line 
management (Role A) 
 
 Managing workflow  
leading incidents and practising 
emergency routines 
 Conflict resolution 
managing human relations on 
the station 
 Liaison 
introducing new equipment and 
procedures 
Professional middle line 
management (Role C) 
 
 Professional-managerial 
collaboration  
incident monitoring, cross-
organisational liaison 
 Mutual adjustment  
staff development, community 
fire safety partnership-working 
Figure 5.1 Transition in middle management roles during professionalisation in 
the fire service 
 
 
The Role A model could be observed in the traditional approach to station command, 
which prioritised technical activities in the form of taking a leading role at fire incidents 
and ensuring compliance with standardised procedures. With regard to conflict 
resolution, the key emphasis was on staff discipline in the station and resolving human 
relations issues that undermined discipline and order. Although there was little formal 
responsibility for staff development, due to the intensity of station life and the time spent 
in the company of colleagues during ‘down-time’ in between fire incidents, station 
commanders played an important informal leadership role within the watch culture. 
Liaison activity was mainly concerned with the introduction of new equipment and 
procedures within the station. This also included a significant amount of administrative 
and upward reporting duties, which increased throughout the 1990s (Carvalho et al. 
2006). However, it was senior managers rather than station commanders that 
performed most of the formal liaison activity with the other parts of the bureaucracy, 
such as the HR function and support services.  
 
The Role C model was evident in the espoused new station manager role, which had 
four distinctive features. Firstly, station managers assumed a monitoring role rather 
performing a practical, hands-on role at fire incidents. Linked to this was the second 
feature, which involved greater liaison activity with other parts of the bureaucracy to 
coordinate plans for improvements to operational efficiency and effectiveness. The third 
new expectation was that station managers should engage more with developing staff, 
in the form of the IPDS standards. Fourthly, station managers were expected to engage 
more in partnership-working. This was a key part of the strategic objective to move 
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away from emergency response towards community fire safety, requiring the station 
manager to interact directly with other stakeholders in the local authority area.  
 
These four new features of the role represented a transition to greater professional-
managerial collaboration and the use of mutual adjustment. Station managers, 
particularly in their monitoring and staff development roles, would increasingly be 
expected to exercise informal influence and negotiation, rather than control through 
formal authority, to coordinate the station’s activities.  
 
001 
Interviewing techniques and incident 
debriefs 
034 
Purpose and principles of quality 
assurance 
003 Leadership skills 1 037 Principles and purposes of assessment 
004 
Equality and fairness - Equal 
Opportunities and anti discrimination 
038 Managing people performance 
005 Personal Development 039 
Identifying and planning development 
needs 
006 Health, safety and risk management 040 Coaching and mentoring 
007 Employee relations 041 Budget planning and control 
009 Investigation techniques 042 Planning personnel requirements 
010 Report writing 044 Planning and allocating work 
011 Planning and leading meetings 1 048 Environmental risks and control 
012 
Statutory requirements for people 
management 
049 Developing community relationships 
013 Information collection methods 050 Negotiating skills 
014 Presentation skills 053 Leadership styles 
015 Managing Conflict 062 Managing yourself 
016 Resource management - local level 071 
Manage and provide information for 
internal and external purposes 
018 Conducting Inspections 072 Crisis and contingency management 
019 Conducting formal investigations 076 Analyse training needs 
020 
Presenting evidence at formal 
proceedings 
078 
Principles and practice of training and 
development 
021 Planning techniques 082 Group dynamics 
022 Building teams 085 Plan fire and explosion investigation 
023 
Continuous improvement in the 
workplace 
086 Investigate the scene of fire or explosion 
024 Preparing management information 087 
Collate and evaluate documentary and 
witness evidence for investigations 
025 
Effective planning and management of 
meetings 2 
088 Report findings of investigations 
026 Working with your community 089 
The role and importance of command 
support 
027 Incident Command 2 090 
Co-ordinating information for command 
support 
028 
Incident debriefs - reviewing 
performance 
  
 
Figure 5.2 Competence modules for station commanders  
 
Source: IPDS module database www.ipds.co.uk (now www.skillsforjustice-ipds.com), 
accessed 24/4/06. Shaded modules are specific to the station commander role.  
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The changes to management roles, as they were actually expressed in formal 
documentation, can be analysed in more detail through the IPDS station commander 
‘role map’ (see Figure 5.2). The role map constitutes a list of ‘modules’ in which station 
commanders had to demonstrate their competence in order to be available for 
promotion.  
 
The forty-nine modules in Figure 5.2 are a selection from a total of ninety IPDS modules 
and represent the full portfolio within the nationally-agreed station commander’s role-
map. However, twenty-six of these modules were already required to be demonstrated 
to perform the next role down in the hierarchy (i.e. ‘watch commander’). The remaining 
twenty-three modules are therefore highlighted in Figure 5.2 to represent the modules 
that had to be completed in order to be promoted from watch commander to station 
commander. These are reorganised by theme in Figure 5.3. 
 
Operations management modules People management modules 
019 Conducting formal investigations 022 Building teams 
021 Planning techniques 025 
Effective planning and management 
of meetings 2 
023 
 
Continuous improvement in the 
workplace 
037 
Principles and purposes of 
assessment 
027 Incident Command 2 038 Managing people performance 
034 
 
Purpose and principles of quality 
assurance  
039 
Identifying and planning development 
needs 
072 Crisis and contingency management 040 Coaching and mentoring 
085 Plan fire and explosion investigation 042 Planning personnel requirements 
087 
 
Collate and evaluate documentary 
and witness evidence for 
investigations 
044 Planning and allocating work 
088 Report findings of investigations 053 Leadership styles 
020 Presenting evidence at formal 
proceedings 
 
Miscellaneous modules 
  024 Preparing management information 
  041 Budget planning and control 
  050 Negotiating skills 
  049 Developing community relationships 
 
Figure 5.3 Development modules for promotion from watch manager to station 
commander by theme  
 
(Adapted from IPDS module database www.ipds.co.uk, accessed on 24/4/06 (later 
changed to www.skillsforjustice-ipds.com ))  
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The blend of modules represented in Figure 5.3 confirms the shape of the 
professionalised station commander role. First and foremost was the commander’s 
overall operational responsibility for the fire station. The continued importance of 
advanced and up-to-date technical knowledge is demonstrated by such modules as 
027, 072 and 085, related to formal investigations of incidents, crisis management and 
the controlling of explosions on firegrounds. There are also a number of generic 
operations management modules, such as planning, continuous improvement and 
quality assurance (see modules 021, 023 and 034 respectively). Of particular note is 
the emphasis on incident investigation, in which the station commander acts as the 
post-incident investigating officer, rather than leave investigations to specialist officers 
from headquarters (see modules 019, 087, 088 and 020). This is an indication of the 
new monitoring role and the transference of responsibility away from external technical 
experts towards a more empowered and professional operating core and middle line.  
 
The second main area of responsibility in the station commander role map is people 
management, including the conventional line management responsibilities of planning 
work, running meetings and conducting performance appraisals (see modules 044, 025 
and 038), but also containing a formal responsibility for employee assessment and 
development (see modules 037 and 039). The modules in this area are indicative of the 
more empowering and developmental approach to management that characterised the 
remodelled station manager role. As one senior manager at the LFB described the 
change in emphasis:  
 
Previously it’s been about moulding firefighters into a particular type, about shouting at 
people, giving them instructions. Now it’s about understanding the different ways in 
which people learn and getting the balance right between the necessary discipline in 
appropriate situations and allowing the other work [community fire safety, employee 
development] to go on, when firefighters can become more proactive. (Interview with 
Head of Development Delivery) 
 
 
The miscellaneous modules on information management, budgeting, negotiation and 
developing community relationships (see modules 024, 041, 050 and 049) were 
reflective of the new emphases on: i) professional-managerial collaboration in the form 
of greater internal coordination between station managers and other parts of the 
 177 
bureaucracy’s management; and ii) partnership-working to enable the strategic change 
towards community fire safety. It is notable, however, that these latter dimensions of the 
station manager role are small in comparison to the operations management and 
people management dimensions, at least in terms of the number of modules. This is 
perhaps indicative of the prioritising of technical and people management concerns 
over local resource management and external liaison in the early stages of transition 
from a national safety bureaucracy towards a professional bureaucracy.  
 
To research these changes at the organisational level, managerial roles at LFB were 
analysed through organisational documentation and interviews with four senior 
managers from the training and development function, nine operational middle 
managers and five staff managers.  
 
LFB, with approximately 6800 staff, was the largest brigade in the UK. The Greater 
London Authority, created in 2000, included the new London Fire and Emergency 
Planning Authority to oversee the work of LFB and integrate it with other safety-critical 
public services in the capital.  As the 2003 White Paper viewed it:  
 
London is a good example of an effective regional authority that provides a coherent 
regional perspective across all London boroughs. It is large enough to be effective. 
Resources are shared effectively. Efficiency savings and economies of scale have been 
generated. There is strong political leadership of the authority. (ODPM 2003: 34) 
The institutional structures surrounding LFB were therefore relatively advanced in terms 
of developing the local strategic aims that might shape station managers’ priorities and 
encourage them to liaise with other local services.   
At LFB, operational staff were organised under the largest of the Authority’s three 
directorates, the Fire and Community Safety Directorate, headed by the Deputy 
Commissioner. All operational staff were full time and organised into shifts, and were 
dominated by white males10. Employees were based across more than one hundred fire 
                                               
10
 Increasing the demographic diversity of the workforce was an important modernisation goal. In 2005, 
only 3 per cent of uniformed operational staff at LFB were female, although women comprised 50 per cent 
of main grade administrative staff and 11 per cent of top earners across the whole organisation. Black and 
minority ethnic persons comprised 9 per cent of uniformed operational staff, 25 per cent of all other staff, 
and 6 per cent of the organisation’s top earners (LFEPA 2005).   
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stations, though non-uniformed staff tended to be located in the headquarters. By 2005, 
in line with the national reforms, the uniformed staffing structure had seven main roles 
from firefighter upwards. A smaller group of approximately one hundred control staff, 
who worked in the headquarters’ control centre, still had a traditional rank structure. 
Non-uniformed staff were organised according to local authority grades, from ‘principal 
officers’, to ‘main grade’ officers, craft and manual and engineering staff and station 
cooks. The staffing structure for LFB is represented in Figure 5.4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 London Fire Brigade staffing structure 2005 (Adapted from LFB website, 
accessed 24/04/06)  
 
The most noticeable and symbolic change brought about by the restructuring process 
was the replacement of the traditional military-style stripes on uniforms with single 
status clothing for station- and office-based work. Beyond this, restructuring on the 
uniformed side represented a flattening of the organisational hierarchy. Station 
 
Uniformed, operational staff
Commissioner for Fire and Emergency Planning
Deputy Commissioner for Fire and Emergency Planning
Responsible for the day-to-day running of the Brigade's operational workforce.
Assistant commissioner
Responsible for main organisational functions e.g. community fire safety, service 
delivery, training and development.
Area manager
Responsible for day-to-day management of an area of fire brigade operations or policy.
Group manager
Responsible for management of a group of fire stations or day-to-day work in a specific 
policy area.
Station manager
Responsible for management of a fire station or day-to-day work in a specific policy area.
Watch manager B
In charge of the watch at larger fire stations. 
Watch manager A
Firefighter, in charge of the watch at smaller fire stations or the crew of a fire appliance. 
Crew manager
Firefighter in charge of the crew of a fire appliance at many stations. 
Firefighter
Carries out day-to-day fire fighting and fire safety work.
Control staff
Working in control centre at HQ
Organised by ranks
Non-uniformed 
staff
Principal officers
main grade managers 
(MG7-9)
Main grade officers
(MG1-6)
Other support staff
craft and manual and 
engineering staff and station 
cooks 
 179 
managers were the middle managers in the compressed hierarchy, reporting to a group 
or area manager, and responsible for watch managers as their first-line managers. 
 
Interviews with several station commanders suggested that the new monitoring 
responsibilities of the role had become firmly embedded. Whereas the traditional station 
commander role had tended to be concerned with direct supervision of the work of the 
officers and firefighters at incidents, in the new role they were only to take formal 
charge once more than thirty firefighters had become involved in an incident. There 
were also indications that station commanders combined their monitoring activities with 
staff development by adopting a supportive and empowering approach with the most 
senior firefighter at the incident, typically the watch commander. As one station 
commander related:  
 
In the past it was easier for a manager to turn up and just to take over because he was 
the highest ranking officer on the fireground. Now … we actually have to explain why we 
took over …. If I do know the person who is in charge, how good they are or if I need to 
develop them, it gives me a chance to look at the incident without everyone coming to 
me saying ‘What should I do? What should I do?’ There’s a good chance to appraise the 
incident, a good chance to listen, to see how well the person’s doing …. listen to their 
plan and what they’re going to do, and just give them guidance and a bit of advice and 
support …. if you’ve done your job properly, he’ll [the officer] feel comfortable with what 
he’s done, he’ll feel good within himself and hopefully they’ll be a few little things that 
he’ll have picked up from what I’ve told him (Interview with station commander 1) 
 
With regard to station commanders’ other professionalised responsibilities, however, 
namely collaboration with non-uniformed managers from across the service and 
external liaison with partner organisations, there were fewer indications of a transition 
away from traditional bureaucratic management practices. Although there were some 
isolated examples of station commanders being involved in local projects together with 
external agencies such as the police and housing authorities, much of the centralised 
bureaucracy appeared to have remained. There was no evidence, for example, of 
station commanders having any discretion or responsibility for managing the station’s 
financial budget. As one senior non-uniformed manager described the LFB:  
The way the organisation is managed at the very top … is … very political, so 
sometimes decisions are made that are not necessarily for the good of the brigade but 
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for the good of the government and for appearances’ sake.… There isn’t one individual 
who is driving; there is a whole host of individuals. Because there is no one common 
goal - such as making more money or becoming more efficient, as in the private sector - 
it’s much harder to get things implemented.… People at very senior levels are often 
concerned about detail, such as font size, and how things work, as opposed to the broad 
brush strokes. The culture below is very much ‘tell me what to do and I’ll do it’, rather 
than ‘give me an idea of what to do and I’ll give you some options’. It has been a 
militaristic style organisation for many years. (Interview with vocational learning 
manager) 
Accounts such as these reinforce the impression that only a partial shift in the station 
commander role had occurred in the direction of professionalisation.  
On the non-uniformed side, the theoretical expectation in the transition from a national 
safety bureaucracy towards a professional bureaucracy is that the support services 
should be augmented at the local level to support the newly devolved operation. 
However, localised support services at the LFB were already well-established due the 
longstanding regional structure of the brigades and the close relationships with local 
authorities. Therefore few changes in the management of support staff occurred in the 
early 2000s.  
With regard to technical staff, responsible for setting and monitoring operational 
procedures, the theoretical expectation during professionalisation is that there should 
be a reduction in the size of the technostructure at national level and an augmentation 
of the local technostructure, as the operating core assumes greater responsibility for the 
standardisation of its own work. In fact, the national technostructure represented by the 
Fire Service Inspectorate remained strongly influential, as the lead body for technical 
standards. Moreover, national-level activity related to performance monitoring and 
reporting actually increased significantly due to the introduction of NPM-type quality 
management measures (Carvalho et al. 2006). The national technostructure was 
therefore augmented rather than decreased, and a parallel technostructure covering 
areas such as planning and performance management was built up at local level within 
the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority.  
With specific regard to training and development, however, the influence of the national 
technostructure may be said to have been reduced. Brigades had traditionally relied on 
the national Fire Service College to provide training and to regulate professional 
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standards for firefighters. But the introduction of the new role maps, particularly for 
senior uniformed staff, meant that brigades became increasingly responsible for 
assessing and developing competence at local level. As LFB developed its own HR and 
training and development functions, it relied less on the national technostructure, and 
became almost completely autonomous in terms of its MLD.  
Overall, therefore, the area in which managerial work at LFB can be said to have 
changed most fundamentally relates to station managers, particularly in terms of 
incident management and staff development. This change was supported by the MLD 
strategy, which is the subject of the next section.  
 
5.2 MLD options 
 
During professionalisation of the safety bureaucracy, three main areas of MLD 
investment should be expected: i) operational management development (OMD) to 
ensure essential technical knowledge and basic human skills for the stability of the 
safety bureaucracy; ii) professional management development (PMD) to promote the 
learning of administrative and managerial skills amongst operational managers; and iii) 
leader development to develop more advanced human skills amongst managers and to 
enable greater mutual adjustment. This section of the chapter analyses the extent to 
which MLD investments at LFB conformed to this expected pattern.  
 
The key MLD investment made at LFB during the period studied was the competence-
based and modular ‘station commander development programme’, the constituent 
modules of which encompassed both OMD and PMD and elements of leader 
development. The details of the station commander development programme and how 
it related to the theoretically expected pattern of MLD investment is summarised in 
Figure 5.5. 
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Middle management roles  MLD investment 
Station Commander Development 
Programme 
Emergency Middle line management (Role A) 
 Managing workflow  
leading incidents and practising emergency 
routines 
 Conflict resolution 
managing human relations on the station 
 Liaison 
introducing new equipment and procedures 
Operational Management 
development (OMD) 
 Operations management modules 
 Line management modules 
Towards... 
 
Professional middle line management (Role C) 
 Professional-managerial collaboration  
incident monitoring, cross-organisational liaison 
 Mutual adjustment  
staff development, community fire safety 
Professional management 
development (PMD) 
 Incident management modules  
 Administrative and resource 
management modules 
Leader development  
 Employee-development modules 
 Leadership, negotiation and 
community relations modules  
Figure 5.5 MLD investment at the London Fire Brigade 
LFB-specific detail in italics 
 
In order to understand how the station commander development programme evolved to 
address OMD, PMD and leader development needs, it is necessary to explain some of 
the historical background.  
 
During the 2000s, LFB moved away from the national Fire Service College training 
courses towards a competence-based system and the requirements of IPDS as part of 
a longer-term process of developing MLD in London. Traditionally, like other brigades, 
LFB had relied on residential ‘progression courses’ for station commanders at the Fire 
Service College, with each course lasting several weeks at a time. The courses ran 
alongside the national system of fire service examinations to form the basis for 
promotion to more senior ranks. However, during the mid-1990s senior managers at 
LFB became increasingly dissatisfied with what they saw as an inflexible and closed 
system. The predominantly technical examinations were considered to lack sufficient 
relevance to the local context. The system was also thought to be an obstacle to 
recruiting a strong and diverse flow of managers. Many potential managerial recruits 
chose to supplement their income with second jobs, such as taxi-driving, rather than 
study for promotion. Furthermore, the examinations were the only formalised aspect of 
the promotion process. After passing the examinations, candidates could be put forward 
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to be interviewed for promotion to a higher rank, and there was little transparency or 
control over the end-part of this process.  
 
In an attempt to break down what it saw as a culture of ‘jobs for the boys’, LFB took the 
initiative to develop its own competence-based framework as the basis for selection and 
promotion. Communication skills and behavioural competences, as well as technical 
and managerial knowledge, were included in the framework.  From the late-1990s, LFB 
gradually broke away from the Fire Service College - the last fire service examinations 
were taken by LFB employees in 2005 - and delivered its own management 
development activities. During this breakaway process, it pioneered an ‘integrated 
management development model’, which became the prototype for the development of 
senior officers and for the national IPDS project.  
 
IPDS was formally adopted across England and Wales in 2001 as the system for 
firefighters’ career development and promotion-selection. (The Scottish Fire Service 
implemented IPDS independently). The swift adoption of IPDS became an important 
national-level target against which brigades were measured. There were a number of 
nationally-agreed targets for HR-related activity, such as increasing the gender and 
cultural diversity of the workforce and reducing sickness absence and retirement 
through ill-health. MLD provision, however, was effectively a localised matter, with 
individual brigades holding the responsibility for ensuring that managers were 
developed and assessed in line with the IPDS framework. IPDS did not extend to non-
uniformed roles, despite the intention of the government to integrate staff in brigades to 
form ‘single services’ (Independent Review of the Fire Service 2002: 73 paras 7.60-
7.62).  
 
In the early 2000s, LFB followed the national pattern of having an IPDS-compliant but 
locally-designed MLD strategy, focussed exclusively on uniformed managers. By 2005, 
the complete MLD provision at LFB was represented by three highly structured and 
formalised development programmes: i) the station/area commander development 
programme (for middle/senior management); ii) the crew/watch commander 
development programme (for front-line management); iii) and firefighter development 
programmes (for potential managers). The programmes were designed as sets of 
modules to enable individuals to demonstrate specific knowledge, skills and behavioural 
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competences11. In addition to the formal development programmes, the training and 
development function at LFB offered a suite of stand-alone MLD courses, particularly 
on leadership skills, which were also open to non-uniformed managers. Finally, there 
was a provision of sponsorship for individuals to attend external, qualifications-based 
courses. This was very limited, however; in 2005/6 only ten members of staff were 
sponsored for external management qualifications.  
 
Figure 5.6 provides an overview of the entire MLD provision for middle managers at 
LFB in 2005.  
 
Operational Middle Managers Non-uniformed 
managers 
 
Station Commander Development Programme 
(IPDS-compliant) 
 
 Operations management 
 People management 
 Resource management 
 Community fire safety 
 
 
 Day-courses on leadership, including ‘Values Centred Leadership’ and ‘7 Habits’  
 Various coaching and management skills day-courses 
 Sponsorship for external qualifications 
Figure 5.6 MLD provision for middle managers at the London Fire Brigade  
 
 
5.2.1 Station commander development programme  
 
The station commander development programme (see the shaded area of Figure 5.6) 
combined OMD and PMD and included some leader development for middle managers. 
As illustrated by the station commander role map in the previous section (see Figure 
5.3) a significant OMD emphasis on technical competence was retained within the 
operations management modules to ensure that managers were qualified to supervise 
emergency incidents and ultimately to ensure the stability of the safety bureaucracy. 
PMD was represented by the modules concerned with the more general business 
management and community fire safety modules. The station commander development 
programme also aimed to provide leader development in its coverage of the softer 
                                               
11
 In addition to IPDS compliance, the modules were further adjusted in 2005 to include 
‘personal qualities and attributes’ (PQAs) which aligned them with the National Occupational 
Standards for Leadership and Management. 
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elements of people management, namely in the leadership- and staff development-
related modules. However, it did not employ to any significant extent the more 
individualised methods, such as 360-degree feedback and coaching, which normally 
characterise leader development.  
 
The main learning methods used in the station commander development programme 
were classroom-based, which is common to OMD. These were supplemented by 
workplace-based methods of competence assessment, which is more common to PMD 
(see Figure 2.5). The programme’s four main elements were: i) a selection and 
assessment centre, lasting two-three days; ii) a series of taught sessions, delivered in 
one- to two-week blocks, using a traditional course-based approach within classrooms 
and various practical activities at external venues; iii) completion of a development file 
and a portfolio of evidence, usually lasting one-two years; and iv) periodic workplace 
assessment, including a placement of usually six months in at least one other area of 
the organisation. Successful completion of all four stages of the process deemed the 
candidate competent and available for selection for promotion. The complete process 
was lengthy, typically lasting two-three years, and represented the normal journey for 
promotion from watch commander to ‘assistant district officer’ (a collective term for a 
station commander or a manager in charge of a significant service area).  
 
In order to gain a deeper insight into how the station commander development 
programme combined OMD, PMD and, to a lesser extent, leader development, it is 
instructive to examine one of the key modules in detail. Each module had: i) a scoping 
statement; ii) ‘knowledge objectives’ (approximately five in number); iii) ‘skill objectives’ 
(approximately five in number); and iv) a range of ‘personal skills’. Figure 5.7 
reproduces the specification of module 027 ‘Incident Command 2’ which encapsulates 
the remodelled, professionalised approach to incident management. 
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IPDS Module 027 ‘Incident Command 2’ 
 
Scope: 
This module is about skills and knowledge in monitoring and/or taking control at incident 
in progress. It includes: 
- collecting information on the incident status and current plans  
- supporting current incident commander to resolve the incident 
This may include taking over command of the incident as demanded by the level of risk 
and/or complexity of the developing incident. 
 
Skill Objectives 
 
Analytical skills  
Collect information through observation and consultation with current incident 
commander, draw conclusions and agree further action with incident commander to 
progress the resolution of the incident.  
 
Planning and problem solving  
Produce plans to resolve incidents, taking account of all influencing factors and 
complexity of the situation. Generate solutions to meet actual and anticipating problems. 
Liaise with other services to identify all relevant issues and generate combined 
solutions, including deployment of joint resources.  
 
Leadership  
Provide support and direction to incident and sector commanders and support officers, 
develop and improve skills and competence of others. 
 
Knowledge Objectives 
 
Incident command systems - roles, responsibilities and limits of authority  
Methods and types of communication systems both on the incident ground and remote  
Role and responsibilities of self and other operational plans on the incident ground  
Procedures and protocols for operating with other emergency and support services  
How to access information about availability, capabilities and limitations of operational 
equipment  
How to access specialist advice and support  
Hazards and risks of the incident ground and relevant action to minimise and control  
Control measures for minimising risk at the incident ground  
Styles and leadership and how to apply them at the incident ground 
 
Relevant Personal Skills  
 
Acting Assertively    
Behaving ethically 
Building teams 
Communicating 
Conceptualising 
Relating to others 
Searching for information 
Striving for excellence 
Taking Decisions 
 
Figure 5.7 Specification for IPDS Module 027 ‘Incident Command 2’  
(Source: IPDS module database www.ipds.co.uk, accessed 24/4/06 (now 
www.skillsforjustice-ipds.com ))  
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Figure 5.7 illustrates how the station commander was expected to play a supporting 
role to the leading firefighter at an incident, and only to take direct control as a last 
resort (see scoping statement). Training in technical knowledge and skills was required 
(see knowledge objectives related to ‘procedures and protocols for operating with other 
emergency and support services’, ‘availability, capabilities and limitations of operational 
equipment’, ‘hazards and risks’ and ‘control measures’). There was also a strong 
emphasis on understanding the delimitations of formal authority and responsibility (see 
for example the knowledge objective ‘incident command systems’).  
 
These last two aspects of incident management lend themselves readily to classroom 
instruction and simulated fireground training, and they have a strong association with 
OMD. The aspects concerned with service liaison (under ‘planning and problem-
solving’) and access to specialist advice and support (see knowledge objectives) have a 
stronger association with PMD. These more generic areas of management were taught 
both in classroom settings and developed in the workplace by requiring the individual to 
reflect and record naturally-arising experiences. The aspects of incident management 
concerned with consultation, communication, leadership and staff development (see 
especially the final skill and knowledge objectives) have a strong association with the 
development of intrapersonal competence and thus the aims of leader development. 
However, the methods used to develop station commanders in these areas were 
classroom- and competence-based, rather than the more individualised and less 
prescribed activities typically associated with leader development.  
 
The provision of various day-courses on leadership, coaching and other management 
skills for staff from across the authority (see Figure 5.5) indicated the strategic intent of 
the LFB to promote intrapersonal competence and to encourage greater collaboration 
between uniformed and non-uniformed staff. However, significant resources were not 
allocated to these activities and there was no clear organisational rationale behind 
them. According to the Head of Development Delivery: “At the moment, we’ve got lots 
of things going on, but they’re floating around. In particular we’ve got leadership 
courses here, there and everywhere with no clear idea of where they sit” (Interview with 
Head of Development Delivery). Similarly, while there was significant potential for the 
use of coaching during the completion of the development file and the six-month work 
placement, such activities were not prioritised in practice.  
 
 188 
The strategic limitations of IPDS began to be recognised at national level. In 2005, the 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister published for consultation a ‘leadership and 
development strategy’ to address “strategic imperatives”, notably community fire safety. 
The strategy proposed a model of leadership at all levels of management and for all 
parts of the service, including three fast-track development programmes for ‘high-
potential’ individuals to move into middle and strategic management (ODPM 2005). 
These programmes promised greater use of leader development-type methods. By 
2007, however, the strategy had still not been implemented at LFB.  
 
Overall, therefore, the MLD choices made for middle managers at LFB are best 
summarised as an investment in partial professionalisation. The competence-based 
IPDS system supported professionalisation by institutionalising a less bureaucratic and 
more professional approach to incident management, and by promoting greater 
engagement with staff development and collaboration with the organisation’s support 
services and partners. However, while the MLD intervention aimed to develop some of 
the skills required for greater mutual adjustment at middle management level, the partial 
nature of professionalisation was reflected in the limited investment in more 
individualised methods of leader development.   
 
 
5.3 Contribution of MLD to professionalisation 
 
As the middle line undergoes a transition from emergency middle line management 
(Role A) to professional middle line management (Role C), the hypothetical outcomes 
at individual level are that: i) through OMD, managers should lead to operational 
management competence (OMC), and ii) through PMD and leader development, 
managers should develop professional managerial competence (PMC) and 
intrapersonal competence. At group level, it is hypothesised that: i) OMC should lead to 
compliance amongst staff teams with rules of the safety bureaucracy; and ii) that PMC 
and managers’ greater intrapersonal competence should lead to increased commitment 
amongst staff to the new professional standards.  At organisational level, the group 
outcome of compliance with the rules of the safety bureaucracy should help to ensure 
organisational stability, while staff commitment to new professional standards should 
contribute to a process of professionalisation.  
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As will be shown in this section of the chapter, the experiences of MLD at LFB 
conformed partially to this pattern of expected outcomes, serving to ensure staff 
compliance and organisational stability in the safety bureaucracy, and supporting 
professionalisation of incident management and employee development, but making 
less of an impact in terms of promoting community fire safety. The outcomes of MLD at 
LFB are considered in two parts: the station commander development programme for 
operational middle managers; and MLD for non-uniformed managers. In each part, the 
individual, group and organisational outcomes are considered in order.  
 
5.3.1 Contribution of the station commander development programme 
 
Figure 5.8 summarises the hypothetical MLD outcomes at individual level and how they 
could be expected to be achieved in the fire service.  
 
Middle management roles under 
professionalisation 
MLD investments 
Station Commander 
Development Programme 
Expected MLD outcomes for 
individuals 
Emergency Middle line 
management (Role A) 
 Managing workflow  
leading incidents and 
practising emergency routines 
 Conflict resolution 
managing human relations on 
the station 
 Liaison 
introducing new equipment and 
procedures 
Operational Management 
development (OMD) 
 Operations management 
modules 
 Line management modules 
Operational managerial 
competence (OMC) 
 Specialist knowledge 
 Basic human skills  
 Planning and coordination 
skills 
 
Towards... 
 
Professional middle line 
management (Role C) 
 Professional-managerial 
collaboration  
incident monitoring, cross-
organisational liaison 
 Mutual adjustment  
staff development, community 
fire safety 
Professional management 
development (PMD) 
 Incident management 
modules  
 Administrative and resource 
management modules 
Leader development (LD) 
 Employee-development 
modules 
 Leadership, negotiation and 
community relations 
modules  
Professional managerial 
competence (PMC) 
 Broad organisational 
knowledge 
 Applied management 
skills 
 Staff development 
knowledge and skills 
 
Intrapersonal competence 
 Advanced human skills 
(leader skills)  
Figure 5.8 Expected MLD outcomes for individuals at the London Fire Brigade  
LFB-specific detail in italics 
 
As Figure 5.8 shows, in the context of the fire service, operational managerial 
competence (OMC) is primarily concerned with: i) specialist technical knowledge to 
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supervise emergency incidents; ii) basic human skills to line-manage people and 
resolve conflicts on the station; and iii) planning and coordination skills to introduce new 
equipment and implement adjustments to routines. Professional managerial 
competence (PMC) and intrapersonal competence are concerned with: i) broad 
organisational knowledge to enable liaison with other parts of the bureaucracy and 
specialist services; ii) applied management skills to monitor and plan improvements to 
operational performance; iii) staff development knowledge and skills to help develop 
firefighters’ competence within the IPDS framework; and iv) advanced human skills 
(leader skills) for collaboration and partnership with the non-uniformed parts of the 
organisation and external stakeholders to promote community fire safety.  
As will be shown, the actual MLD outcomes at LFB demonstrate a contribution towards 
developing OMC in individual managers and a degree of PMC and intrapersonal 
competence. The application of PMC and intrapersonal competence was limited to 
principally to incident management and employee development, rather than increasing 
employee motivation towards the new community safety strategy.  
A clear pattern of individual-level outcomes for the station commander development 
programme was identifiable from the interviews. The main evidence of individual MLD 
outcomes for uniformed managers comes from nine critical incident interviews. Seven 
of the interviewees were station commanders, one of whom was an FBU 
representative, and all of whom were based in different fire stations across London.  
The remaining two interviewees were ex-station commanders, based at the LFB’s 
training centre in non-operational roles. All the interviewees had been firefighters and 
had over ten years’ service at LFB, as was typical for the role. Roughly mirroring the 
brigade’s demographic profile, the interviewees included seven white males, one white 
woman and one black male. Wider group- and organisational-level outcomes were 
inferred from organisational documentation and Audit Commission reports.  
The pattern of MLD outcomes for uniformed middle managers is represented in Figure 
5.9.  
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Individual outcomes Group outcomes Contribution to 
organisational  
outcomes 
Assurance of operational  
managerial competence 
(all 9) 
 
Assurance of 
professional managerial 
competence  
(2 (new managers)) 
 
Certification of 
professional managerial 
competence (remaining 
7) 
Technical compliance 
 
 
 
Commitment to 
professionalised 
incident management 
 
Uneven commitment 
to new approaches to 
professional 
development  
Stability of the 
safety bureaucracy 
 
 
 
 
Partial 
professionalisation 
 
(Brackets indicate number of interviewees) 
Figure 5.9 Outcomes of MLD at the London Fire Brigade 
 
 
At individual level, the most common reaction of the interviewees to the station 
commander development programme was unenthusiastic and neutral. The typically 
reported experience was that the programme was ‘nothing new’ and of having ‘done it 
all before’. As Figure 5.9 shows, and as will be explained, the individual outcomes are 
best described as ‘assurance’ and certification’. Importantly, however, it was evident 
from the interviews that the station commander development programme could not be 
treated as an isolated MLD intervention; it was inextricably linked with previous watch 
commander development and informal learning in fire stations, which were in fact 
reported as more memorable and influential.  
 
Taken together with the watch commander development and informal learning 
experiences, and despite the somewhat neutral reports of the interviewees, the station 
commander development programme could then be observed through deeper analysis 
to have made a contribution at group and organisational levels. At group level, firstly 
with regard to incident management, there was a mutually reinforcing relationship 
between watch commander development, informal learning and the station commander 
development programme. Thus, MLD can be said to have contributed at group level to 
securing technical compliance and promoting commitment to professionalised incident 
management. With regard to IPDS and its related practices, the relationships between 
the different learning experiences were mutually supportive in some cases, but 
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divergent and conflicting in others. Thus, MLD can be said to have contributed at group 
level to developing uneven commitment to the new professionalised model of staff 
development. The combination of outcomes at group level contributed to the stability of 
the safety bureaucracy and a partial transition in the form of professionalisation at 
organisational level.  
 
To return to the individual level in more detail, the most significant MLD experience for 
the interviewees concerned the development of technical and management expertise at 
operational incidents. Much of this derived from the watch commander training, which 
was tailored to the London context and delivered in Southwark. As one ex-station 
commander related:  
 
[T]he junior officers’ course [at the Fire Service College] ... was so generic. It was ship-
fires and stuff, and I’m never likely to go to a ship-fire in London. But the Watch 
Commander Development programme was very specific; it was for London, it was for 
my role, it was about what was expected of me…. It taught me very basically how to 
fight a fire from a command-and-control point of view.... they actually said “This is how 
you should do it. This is textbook” ….  It gave me more confidence....  I hope that this 
doesn’t come across as arrogant - it confirmed that some of stuff that I was doing that 
was expected of me wasn’t a guess…. It gave me a lot of manuals, so if I was ever 
unsure of something, [for example] a chemical incident, there was a little book that I 
referred to. That sort of thing I found very helpful. (Interview with assistant district officer 
1) 
 
This illustrates how the foundation for station commander development was to provide 
individual managers with assurance of their operational managerial competence to 
practice effective command-and-control at incidents.  Such competence helped to 
ensure technical compliance at group level amongst firefighters, and ultimately the 
stability of the safety bureaucracy.  
 
Similarly to the experience of the watch commander development programme, two 
newer station commanders described how the station commander development 
programme principally served to reassure them of their abilities to fulfil their new role 
and responsibilities (see top left of Figure 5.9). For the other seven interviewees, who 
were more experienced station commanders, rather than a reassurance, MLD was 
perceived mainly as an institutional certification of their existing managerial competence 
(bottom left of Figure 5.9). As one station commander put it:   
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I’d been doing the role for a few years. I’m not saying I was perfect but I was evidencing 
a lot of stuff which I’d proved competence in anyway…. [My borough commander] knew 
I was competent at the end of the day. (Interview with station commander 4) 
 
The competence referred to by the interviewees was invariably related to incident 
management. There was strong evidence of commitment to the ‘hands-off’, 
developmental approach to incident management, as framed in the IPDS competence 
statements. Three interviewees explicitly rejected the heroic, ‘hands-on’ approach to 
leading at fire incidents, or the ‘Captain Kirk’ style of leadership, as one called it. Rather 
than issuing instructions or taking charge unnecessarily, one station commander 
described how he had adopted a coaching-type approach towards the next officer in 
command at fire incidents, asking ‘have you considered?’ questions.  
 
The modelling of new incident management practices ran through the different IPDS 
development programmes at management levels, and this seemed to play a significant 
part in embedding the more professionalised approaches into normal managerial 
practice. One of the younger station commanders recalled his watch management 
training and illustrated the importance of formal development in this area:  
 
[The trainers] couldn’t … stop me getting involved at incidents. I would just be running in 
there headlong … because I didn’t trust anybody else to do it. So it was a bit of a 
problem for me but I didn’t realise it at the time.… And then one day, on the last couple 
of days of the … course, they said “Right … on this drill… we want you to assess the 
next officer in charge…. Where do you think [he] should be standing?” I said, “Where I 
am”. And it was like the heavens opened and I suddenly realised that, as a manager, 
you need to see the big picture, you need to step away and you can see everything. It 
was just changed overnight (Interview with station commander 1) 
 
For others, however, the newly endorsed and taught approach to incident management 
represented a continuation rather than a change. For example, a more experienced 
station commander (also an FBU representative) claimed: 
 
In my career [of thirty-one years] I have only ever once had to order someone to do 
something: that’s how I like to manage people. In terms of the formal training, nothing 
has been that significant. (Interview with station commander 2 - emphasis added) 
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With regard to incident management, it is reasonable to conclude that MLD, alongside 
informal learning on fire stations, contributed to a successful shift away from command-
and-control management towards a more empowering and developmental approach. 
Indeed, the Audit Commission had already noted in 2004 the emergence of more 
thorough and reflective practices in this area:  
 
LFEPA [London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority] takes seriously the need to 
learn from experience. For example, after every incident attended by more than four 
appliances, there is a review of the organisation’s response in order to identify learning 
(Audit Commission 2004: 24, para 112). 
 
 
The second significant area of MLD’s contribution concerned the station commander’s 
enhanced responsibility for professionalised staff development. This was revealed 
through the interviewees’ perceptions and attitudes towards IPDS, as both users and 
supposed champions of the new system on the fire station. However, the results in this 
area were mixed in comparison to those relating to incident management.  
 
On the more positive side, there was evidence of general commitment to competence-
based development as a fairer and more transparent model of professional 
development and basis for promotion. Support for the new system was expressed by 
five of the nine interviewees, both in terms of their own careers and for their staff. With 
one exception, none of the interviewees expressly defended the previous, more 
informal system of promotion. As one station commander related:  
 
In the old days, if you like, it was if the boss knew you as a good egg, worth his salt, et 
cetera, then you were deemed competent and you would progress. It was very 
subjective in a way, because it could almost be whether they liked you or not – you were 
favoured or you weren’t. (Interview with station commander 7) 
 
There were some concerns, however, that the new system had become overly 
formalised. Another station commander argued: “It went from being a boy’s club of 
people you knew… but [then] it’s swung right away to the other end of the scale where 
people would be promoted purely by their point score” (Interview with station manager 
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1). On balance, however, the system was seen to represent “definitely a step in the 
right direction” (Interview with station commander 2, and FBU representative).  
 
Commitment to IPDS extended beyond support for its underlying principles to an 
appreciation of the competence-based approach to learning. As the female station 
manager related: “I quite liked the development record, though I know a lot a people 
don’t like them. Parts of it I’d already done, but to do other parts and get feedback was 
very useful” (Interview with station manager 6). In addition, she welcomed the 
opportunity to prove her managerial competence in an alternative way to examinations 
and classroom instruction: “men are so competitive – there’s a lot of ego and bravado – 
and it makes it difficult to learn in that environment” (ibid). Another station commander 
valued the development record, but recognised that its success as a method was 
dependent on line management support:  
 
[I]f I’d done the development record with a manager I respected and I learnt a lot from, 
that would [have been] perfect …. The actual manager I did my development record 
with… I wouldn’t say is the best manager I’ve ever worked with…. I found it [the 
development record] a bit of a passive process to be honest (Interview with station 
commander 4) 
 
 
To turn to the more negative side, the interviews revealed some ambivalence towards 
IPDS, particularly with regard to the paper-based development record. On a superficial 
level, the negative reactions to the development record were predictable. As one station 
commander caricatured the IPDS development files: “the candidate writes chapter and 
verse... ‘I put my socks on, then I put my underpants on, and then I did this, and then I 
did that’” (Interview with station commander 3). Such complaints about the cumbersome 
and unnecessary nature of the evidence-gathering process are entirely consistent with 
other negative accounts of competence- and portfolio-based assessment and 
development (c.f. Grugulis 2000).  
 
However, the other main expression of ambivalence amongst station commanders took 
the form of scepticism that IDPS could successfully uphold and improve safety and 
professional standards. At the extreme end, one argued that it was “appalling” that the 
Fire Service College examinations had been abolished, and that these had been a 
much better way of ensuring standards. Three other interviewees also expressed 
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varying degrees of concern about relying on a competence-based system to ensure 
that staff were sufficiently qualified to handle safety-critical situations. The more 
measured end of opinion was summarised by one experienced station manager and 
FBU representative:  
 
IPDS should be OK in principle, but in practice [it] can’t completely verify whether people 
are suitable or not, especially when it comes to safety…. some people can slip through 
the net…. if you speak to the assessors, they say that they would like to do more and do 
it better, such as having more time with the trainees, to sit down and talk to them and 
monitor them…. it’s like the King’s New Clothes – we will believe that we have better 
people because it says so on paper. (Interview with station commander 2) 
 
Further probing revealed that much of the unease about IPDS amongst station 
commanders was rooted in the legacy of the firefighters’ dispute of 2002-4 and the 
growing influence of non-uniformed staff over MLD. For one non-uniformed manager, 
resistance to IPDS amongst operational staff could be explained by a cultural antipathy 
towards non-practical tasks:  
 
Frankly I think that they [uniformed staff] just don’t like writing things down and justifying 
what they do, which is a perhaps reflection of the practical nature and culture of the job. 
(Interview with vocational learning manager) 
 
But for several station commanders, IPDS was concerned with more fundamental 
questions of what constituted professional standards in the fire service, who should 
determine them, and how they should be demonstrated. While one newer station 
commander held the simple resigned view that, “we are run now by non-uniformed 
people” (Interview with station commander 1), others expressed a clear resentment of 
what they saw as interference by politicians and bureaucrats in technical firefighting 
matters. As one ex-station commander explained his pride in the uniformed tradition:  
 
For me, the fire service for a long time was a uniformed service. I’m not saying that’s a 
good or bad thing, that’s just fact. As time moves on … we’re employing more and more 
main grade staff. For the uniformed side, as I see it, it’s a career. It’s a job for life…and 
there’s quite a lot of us like that. It’s something we belong to, it’s something we believe 
in, we’re very, very proud of it. Yes, I know some of the faults with it. It’s highlighted in 
many, many papers… But we’re part of something. I don’t feel the same with the non-
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uniformed side. To them it’s a paid job…. There doesn’t seem to be the same level of 
commitment. (Interview with assistant district officer 2) 
 
He went on to relate how he and his colleagues challenged their non-uniformed co-
workers to match their professional status and higher salaries:  
 
 We’re saying [to them] “OK then, go downstairs, enrol as a trainee firefighter, if you get 
through all the assessment processes, then do all the training, prove your competence 
as a firefighter, then wait for the crew commander round, be successful in that, get your 
course, get competency as crew commander, same again for the watch commander, 
then get promoted to station officer, and then you can come up here and do this as well 
and be on my salary.” (Interview with assistant district officer 1) 
 
The involvement of non-specialists in determining and institutionalising the modernised 
station manager role through the IPDS framework was clearly responsible for some 
residual resentment among uniformed staff. With the firefighters’ dispute officially 
resolved, however, the interview evidence overall suggests that a gradual acceptance, 
even a commitment to the new regulatory framework for professional development had 
begun to take hold.  
 
Audit Commission reports support this interpretation. In its 2005 Comprehensive 
Performance Assessment, the Commission had complained of a general lack of 
progress nationally in embedding IPDS into normal working methods:  
 
The changes to the fire and rescue service that IPDS is intended to realise are not yet 
being achieved and there is little understanding, particularly among staff, of what that 
outcome will look and feel like…. good authorities [of which LFB was one] still have 
progress to make in embedding IPDS within their systems and culture. (Audit 
Commission 2006: 37 para 82) 
 
By 2009, however, the Commission noted that:  
 
LFEPA has implemented the Integrated Personal Development System. It has a clear 
focus on upholding skills and competencies. Personal reviews identify training needs. 
(Audit Commission 2009: 25, para 85) 
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The partial commitment to a new competence-based, professionalised system of 
employee development evident from the interviews in 2005 may be explained by 
reference to political obstacles and a certain lack of strategic HRD competence, as 
conceptualised in Section 2.2. As will be demonstrated, these two contextual factors 
also help to explain why MLD was not observed to make a greater contribution towards 
developing middle managers’ broader organisational knowledge and applied 
management skills, in order to promote greater professional-managerial collaboration 
and LFB’s community fire safety strategy. Figure 5.10 reflects back on the 
hypothetically expected outcomes at individual level, as detailed in Figure 5.8, to 
illustrate at multiple levels where MLD was actually effective, where it was less 
effective, and where it was not effective.  
 
 
Individual MLD outcomes  
 
Group outcomes Contribution to 
Organisational 
outcomes 
Operational managerial 
competence (OMC) 
 Specialist knowledge 
 Basic human skills 
 Planning and 
coordination skills 
 
 
 
 
Staff compliance 
 
 
 
Organisational stability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Partial professionalisation  
Professional managerial 
competence (PMC) 
 Broad organisational 
knowledge 
 Applied management 
skills 
 Staff development 
knowledge and skills 
 
Intrapersonal competence 
 Advanced human skills  
 
 
 
Staff compliance 
 
Uneven professional 
commitment 
.........................constraints............................ 
 
Political obstacles (managerial resistance) .............lack of strategic HRD competence 
 
LFB-specific detail in italics; observed MLD outcomes are highlighted (darker shading denotes 
stronger observations) 
Figure 5.10 Partial effectiveness of MLD at the London Fire Brigade  
 
 
With the benefit of the full range of evidence, there are four key observations that can 
now be made with regard to the areas of limited MLD impact and absent MLD 
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outcomes at LFB. Firstly, while applied management skills were developed in relation to 
professionalised incident management, there was little evidence of managers 
developing more general management skills such as in administration and information-
management. Secondly, station commanders’ commitment to staff development in line 
with IPDS was not as strong as might have been expected. Thirdly, the development of 
broader organisational knowledge was not a salient outcome. Fourthly, people 
management and human skills did not feature strongly amongst the reported MLD 
outcomes.  
 
Although MLD may be said to have made some contribution to achieving the expected 
group and organisational outcomes at LFB, this may have been more salient, had 
political obstacles not been so strong and had other HR processes supported the kinds 
of changes to middle management towards which MLD was directed. The impact of 
political obstacles and lack of strategic HRD competence will be discussed in turn.  
 
Political obstacles, in the form of strong informal learning practices that militated against 
the formal MLD process, help to explain why managers at LFB did not report more 
strongly as MLD outcomes the development of people management and staff 
development skills and broader organisational knowledge. A recurring theme in the 
interviews concerned the difference between the formal content of the station 
commander development programme and the realities of management on the station. 
One station commander spoke for many when she observed that “the development 
record and the development programme…didn’t bear any relation to the job” (Interview 
with station manager 6). Another station commander reflected on what he saw as the 
gulf between the motivational theory that was taught and the reality of people 
management practice on the fire station:  
 
It was refreshing to see that the Fire Service did such training, [but] less refreshing to 
realise that it was never implemented….You were taught lessons which you never 
implemented because the Fire Service just didn’t run like that....The management 
training, apart from some aspects of discipline, which was based directly on our 
discipline code … was “nice to know”, almost, because you never got to do it. And if you 
tried to do it, you were out of step with the organisation. (Interview with station 
commander 7) 
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In contrast to managers’ weak recognition of the value of the formal development 
programmes, there was a longstanding tradition of informal learning on fire stations. As 
one station commander described it:  
 
I was at a station where there was quite a turnover of staff, one of the leading firefighters 
was always away on courses or secondments; there was always an opportunity. It was 
like that at a lot of the stations where the people who were interested in promotion would 
be mentored by the existing office staff, groomed in way, in ‘this is what you do’. You 
tended to be put on the turntable ladder … you would attend incidents but you wouldn’t 
necessarily be in charge. So it was a natural thing. (Interview with station commander 3) 
 
 
This ‘natural’ system of ‘grooming’ those interested in promotion represented exactly 
the type of informal practice that IPDS and other modernisation reforms sought to 
replace, on the grounds that such practices were unfair and opaque. The female station 
commander interviewed reminded of the informal system’s marginalising effects: “If you 
are one of the boys, people stick together and watch out for each other and you can 
network” (Interview with station manager 6). However, it was clear that even after the 
formal introduction of IPDS informal practices continued to play an important but 
unofficial role in the development process. As one newer station commander related:  
 
[M]y way of developing myself as a firefighter was, that once I’d learnt my job as a 
firefighter, [to] follow the junior officers around and [do] the office work.… I learnt all the 
office side of that job before I did most of the management training… So when you turn 
up at the fire station for your first bit of promotion, you don’t have to go asking all these 
people what to do and seem like a bit of a clot … We’re a great organisation for helping 
each other out and that’s what happens. (Interview with station manager 1)  
 
This tradition of managerial learning and promotion can be seen as successful 
partnership between self-motivated individuals, informal organisation and formal 
development intervention. However, its success appeared to rely upon the individual 
being an ‘insider’ and having access to the support and cooperation of senior 
colleagues in fire stations.  
 
The importance of the watch culture among uniformed staff, to which middle line 
managers also belonged, had long been recognised as a potential barrier to 
organisational change in the fire service. As Baigent et al (2003) demonstrate in their 
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‘Sunrise’ report into firefighter training, the official version of firefighting promoted during 
formal development activities at the training centre could be easily subverted and 
undermined back in the fire stations by watch and station commanders, who ‘knew 
better’ than those responsible for designing the training. For new firefighters to learn to 
display a cynical attitude towards IPDS became part of ‘fitting in’ and learning how to 
play the ‘them-and-us game’ between those responsible for training and those on the 
front line in fire stations. The watch culture, born out of the intensity of station life and 
the close-knit nature of the working environment, was able to transmit more powerful 
messages about the real nature of firefighting than those taught in formal development 
activities. As the leading personnel at fire stations, middle managers were close to the 
watch culture and often identified more readily with the unofficial culture than with their 
senior management colleagues. As Fitzgerald (2005) argues, the perpetuation of 
“strongly entrenched working practices” is rooted in “the identity of firefighters with their 
union through the watch system and the consequential mark this leaves on future 
managers who come through the single-tier [qualified firefighter only] entry system” 
(p.649).  
 
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that the traditions of informal learning and the 
legacy of the firefighters’ dispute were insurmountable political obstacles to MLD’s 
contribution to professionalisation. For example, evidence of MLD’s successful 
contribution to broadening one’s organisational knowledge, instead of being constrained 
by the insulating effects of the uniformed watch culture, came from the female station 
commander. She related her experience while on secondment to an administrative 
function in the fire authority:  
 
I did a number of different courses that were very useful, even if they were not 
specifically for managers. These courses helped me arbitrate, how to present the 
management side to audiences and they broadened my knowledge. They equipped me 
better than some of the specific management development programmes. (Interview with 
station commander 6) 
 
Another station commander interviewee demonstrated a notably strong commitment to 
the new competence-based system of staff development due to its potential value for 
recruiting staff from non-traditional backgrounds, rather than relying on the traditional 
group of white male insiders: 
 
 202 
The raw ability is there [in non-traditional managerial recruits]. It’s the way it comes out. 
The way it’s being tested for [in the old system] is not going to enable that person to 
show what they’ve got....  In fact, the additional dimension [of what they have to offer] is 
what’s stopping them coming in (Interview with station commander 7) 
 
 
Station commanders located in the middle line of the organisation were in a powerful 
position to influence the relationship between informal learning and the formal staff 
development system that embodied an important part of the intended 
professionalisation process. Station managers could encourage commitment to IPDS 
by treating informal learning practices as of equal importance or complementary to it. 
Alternatively they could undermine the formal staff development system by denigrating 
it or presenting informal learning as more legitimate. On balance, at LFB, the evidence 
suggests that middle managers lay between these two positions, and that this 
contributed to an uneven commitment to the formal development of broader 
management skills, organisational knowledge and specific people management skills.  
 
A similar pattern of uneven commitment could be observed with regard to the new 
strategic priority of community fire safety. This dimension of the station commander’s 
role was hardly reflected at all in the interviews with middle managers in 2005. With the 
exception of one young, fast-tracked station commander, the managers interviewed for 
this research made no reflections on community fire safety activities, either as part of 
their current role, or as an aspect of their managerial learning.  
 
Some underlying resistance from firefighters towards the community fire safety strategy 
was indeed detectable. As even one young station commander put it:  
 
[W]e need to make sure our focus is still on the training and that we can do the job that 
we’re paid for. The public expect us to turn up and save them from their house going up, 
to save their property. (Interview with station commander 1) 
 
Or, as put more bluntly by an ex-station commander:  
 
The London Fire Brigade is firemen and fire engines, so to speak. (Interview with 
assistance district officer 2) 
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However, the main reason for MLD’s lack of apparent impact in the area of community 
fire safety in 2005, as with its relative failure to promote broader organisational 
knowledge and wider set of applied management skills in the middle line, lay in the 
actual limited implementation of the national reforms at local authority level and a 
relative lack of strategic HRD competence at brigade-organisational level. More 
specifically this manifested itself in underdeveloped HRM practices and the retention of 
strongly centralised organisational structures, rather than a professional organisational 
model in which middle managers were more empowered and to which MLD could make 
a stronger contribution.  
 
In Section 5.1, the observation was made that station commanders’ roles had not been 
fully professionalised in the sense that their discretion was limited in various ways. The 
management of station budgets, for example, lay outside the responsibility of the station 
commander, and the central training function retained considerable involvement in the 
assessment of firefighters’ competence in stations. This was despite the requirement on 
station commanders to complete development modules on managing finance and 
employee development. Similarly, as the Audit Commission reports cited above 
indicate, performance management processes for staff were not fully developed in 2005 
to support managers’ learning in the area of employee development and review.  
 
With regard to the new strategy of community fire safety, despite the ambitious policy 
aims and insistence on IRMPs at authority level, there was a longstanding question in 
the service of how to resource fire prevention activities. As Fitzgerald (2005: 657) points 
out, prior to the modernisation White Paper of 2003, a leaked review of the ‘Pathfinder’ 
fire prevention pilot projects had suggested that a doubling of resources was necessary 
to meet the goals of a fully modernised fire service (although this was later denied by 
the government).  This became a bone of contention during the firefighters’ dispute, 
with the FBU arguing that:  
 
In general Community Fire Safety work is inadequately funded by Central Government 
and there is no material incentive for Brigades to improve Community Fire Safety 
performance. (FBU 2003: 19) 
 
 
By 2007/8, however, there were indications of greater progress towards community fire 
safety. The Audit Commission reported that LFB firefighters were spending ten per cent 
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of their time on community safety, which was two per cent above target (Audit 
Commission 2009: 30, para 111). Yet as far as managerial work was concerned, both 
the interview evidence and Audit Commission reports suggested that borough 
commanders rather than station commanders (that is senior rather than middle 
managers) tended to be primarily engaged in community fire safety. In their 2009 
report, the Audit Commission cited only one example of a station manager (sic) taking a 
lead in community fire safety by chairing the Lambeth Safety Council; the other 
examples all belonged to borough commanders, who were reported as having become 
‘effective community leaders’ (Audit Commission 2009: 16, paras 52-53).  
 
It is therefore reasonable to conclude that, in 2005, significant opportunities to support 
and lead community-based fire prevention activities were not readily available at the 
level of fire station management. Even if a deep commitment to this new strategic 
priority had been had been stimulated amongst station commanders through MLD, the 
structures to support the enactment of this new professional responsibility were not yet 
fully formed. Similarly, the lack of broader managerial decision-making processes and 
more developed HRM policies meant that other learning from MLD in the areas of 
professional-managerial collaboration could not be fully applied by middle managers.  
 
In short, as things stood in 2005, the limited implementation of national reforms at 
authority level led to only a partial structural transition towards the professional 
bureaucracy at organisational level, which prevented LFB from developing full strategic 
HRD competence and opportunities within which the full range of professionalised MLD 
could be applied.  
 
5.3.2 Contribution of MLD for non-uniformed staff 
 
Finally, it is instructive to report the very clear finding from the interviews with the five 
non-uniformed managers, as this puts into perspective the overall contribution of MLD 
in the organisation.  
 
The non-uniformed interviewees came from across the organisation and included an 
administration manager, a recruitment manager, a performance planning officer, an 
information and planning officer, and a fire safety inspection officer. The five reflected 
the more diverse demographic profile of the non-uniformed staff, including four women 
and two black or minority ethnic persons. It was clear that MLD provision for non-
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uniformed managers was not widespread and resulted in no significant outcomes. 
When asked about their most significant MLD experiences at LFB, all except one 
replied that there was ‘nothing specific’ to relate. The following quotes illustrate a lack of 
a formal MLD strategy for non-uniformed managers.  
 
Where can I go? .... How can I transfer? (Interview with fire safety inspection officer) 
 
You kind of start and you go. You just have to gauge it. We have a facility and there’s a 
whole host of different courses that are available such as VCL [Value-Centred 
Leadership]. But it doesn’t necessarily give you any formal strategies in which to 
manage or lead effectively (Interview with information and planning officer) 
 
Main grade staff are not developed, uniformed managers are. (Interview with 
administration manager) 
 
 
It is possible that these interview findings contained negative Hawthorne effects. The 
volunteers’ original willingness to be interviewed may have been motivated by their 
general enthusiasm for training and development and therefore their subsequent 
frustration about the lack of structured provision for them at LFB. The one positive 
interviewee of the five, while keen to display her enthusiasm for development for which 
she had been sponsored by her line managers, had in common with the other four 
interviews the inability to report any specific changes to which MLD was attributable. 
The overall pattern of MLD outcomes demonstrated across the non-uniformed 
interviewees is therefore strongly consistent. 
 
The lack of significant investment and impact of MLD provision for non-uniformed 
managers at LFB is indicative of the prevailing strategic concerns to professionalise the 
operating core. Small investments in basic management or supervisory training were 
made in recognition of the continuing needs of non-uniformed managers of teams with 
mainly routinised work tasks. But in comparison to concerns with management skills on 
the uniformed side, where the intention to change working methods was stronger, the 
need to develop the existing non-uniformed workforce was not a strategic priority. 
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5.4 Assessment  
 
Overall, the case of LFB lends support to the theoretical model of contingent MLD 
options and outcomes during professionalisation, as advanced in Chapter 2. However, 
the case study also highlights how the potential for political obstacles to MLD’s 
contribution is accentuated in the professionalisation process. The actual pattern of 
MLD options and outcomes for middle managers at LFB is represented in Figure 5.11.  
 
Structural transition 
and change to 
middle line 
MLD 
intervention 
Individual 
outcomes 
Group  
outcomes 
Organisational 
outcomes 
Professionalisation 
 
 (Role A→C) 
 
 
OMD 
 
OMC 
 
Staff compliance  
 
 
 
Uneven 
professional 
commitment 
 
Organisational 
stability in the 
safety bureaucracy 
 
PMD 
 
Some PMC 
 
Limited 
professionalisation  
LD 
 
Some intrapersonal 
competence 
 
Role A = machine middle line management; Role C = professional middle line management; OMD 
= operational management development; PMD = professional management development; LD = 
leader development; OMC = operational managerial competence; PMC = professional managerial 
competence; small font represents weaker results 
Figure 5.11 Actual MLD options and outcomes at the London Fire Brigade 
 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the LFB case represents an intended shift from Role A to 
Role C middle management.  In terms of MLD options, the station commander 
development programme, and the IPDS competence framework more generally, 
represented an MLD intervention that aimed to provide both operational management 
development (OMD), as well as more professionalised management development 
(PMD). There was also a small, non-compulsory provision of leader development (LD) 
through LFB’s training and development department.  
 
The MLD investments were generally successful in securing the expected staff 
compliance, to ensure the stability of the safety bureaucracy, and a degree of the 
expected professionalisation, manifested in more participatory approaches to managing 
incidents and employee development. MLD contributed less effectively to other aspects 
of professionalisation, namely the involvement of middle managers in wider managerial 
decision-making activities and the promotion of strategic change in the direction of 
community fire safety. The contextual variables of political obstacles and strategic HRD 
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competence provided the main reasons for why MLD did not make a greater 
contribution to professionalisation, as will be explored further.  
 
The rough conformance to the expected pattern of MLD options and outcomes at LFB 
may be illustrated more sharply by a consideration of possible counterfactual options 
and outcomes that might have been. In terms of MLD options, LFB could have invested 
in a narrower set of training activities, similar to that of SWT; however, the broader skills 
required of middle managers at LFB, for example for incident management, staff 
development and community liaison, ensured that a broader competence-based 
approach was required to support professionalisation, even if limited in its eventual 
scope. At the other extreme, LFB might have invested in collective, non-prescriptive 
leadership development activities to promote greater innovation; however, the 
standardised operating environment did not demand this, although a small investment 
in individualised leader development was made. In terms of MLD outcomes, although 
constrained for the reasons described in the previous section, there were few perverse 
results, such as, for example, the development of interpersonal competence instead of 
the operational and professional managerial competence expected.  
 
The interview accounts, on which much of the above conclusions about MLD’s 
contribution rely, contained many strongly expressed opinions. The potential negative 
Hawthorne effects on the non-uniformed managers who volunteered for interview have 
been discussed in the previous subsection. In the case of the uniformed managers 
interviewed, the contested nature of the modernisation reforms and the legacy of the 
firefighters’ dispute may have led to two types of selection bias.  One the one hand, 
some interviewees were motivated to emphasise the success of technical training and 
downplay the value of development in broader managerial skills. On the other hand, 
interviewees who did not identify themselves as watch culture ‘insiders’ may have 
overemphasised their enthusiasm for IPDS, as for them it represented a fairer and more 
transparent system of development. It was therefore necessary to probe behind some 
of the uniformed managers’ more negative or partial accounts, and the more positive 
ones, to identify the critical incidents in which MLD had genuinely effected change, and 
where it had been less effective. Wider support for the overall pattern of outcomes 
could then be inferred from other sources, in particular from Audit Commission reports.  
 
The observed pattern of MLD’s partial contribution to organisational change receives 
further support from Andrews (2010). In his study of fire authority performance in 
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England from 2001-6, as measured by the Audit Commission, the author concludes that 
“the implementation of the IPDS appears to be having an especially marked positive 
impact”, whereas the implementation of IRMPs had less effect (p.613). Recognising 
that HRM reform in the service continues to be a controversial issue (ibid), Andrews 
comments that IPDS clearly led to improved HRM outcomes and may have helped 
develop greater trust between managers and staff (p.609). However, he also observes 
that “the implementation of IRMPs [which promote community fire safety] has been 
especially challenging for fire authorities” and contributed less to improving 
organisational performance (p.611).  
 
The political obstacles observed in the LFB case suggest that a wider theoretical 
conclusion may be drawn about MLD’s role during professionalisation.  In contrast to 
divisionalisation, in which the work processes of the operating core essentially continue 
to be standardised in a machine-bureaucratic way,  professionalisation necessarily 
involves a widening of employee roles, a process of re-codification that recognises 
more advanced and specialist skills in the operating core. If, as in the case of 
firefighting, the work tasks of the operating core have traditionally been controlled by 
representatives of organised labour in a machine bureaucracy, then the process of 
redefinition of employee roles is likely to be subject to powerful union interests, to which 
middle managers are also likely to be loyal. As observed in Section 5.1, 
professionalisation in its political sense is typically expected to be a bottom-up process, 
in which skilled specialists circumvent management control by negotiating more 
autonomous work roles. If, however, the political context surrounding 
professionalisation is adversarial, then the likelihood is increased that the remodelling of 
employee and managerial roles will be strongly contested. In short, while political 
obstacles to MLD may be encountered in any organisation, their potential is 
accentuated during professionalisation.  
 
However, post-2005 evidence on LFB suggests that political obstacles, even during 
professionalisation, are neither permanent nor insurmountable. By 2009, the Audit 
Commission was reporting that MLD had started to make a greater contribution at LFB 
towards the involvement of uniformed managers in wider aspects of fire service 
management and the promotion of the strategic priority of community fire safety. The 
Commission noted the implementation of the 2005 national leadership and 
development strategy and the successful introduction of two programmes, the Targeted 
Development Programme and the Graduate Entry Scheme, designed to fast-track the 
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development and promotion of a more diverse group of middle managers (Audit 
Commission 2009: 24). The Targeted Development Programme had seventeen 
participants, nearly a third of whom were from black or minority ethnic backgrounds. 
The Graduate Entry Scheme had fourteen participants, six of whom were women 
(LFEPA 2009). Although small in terms of numbers of candidates, the programmes 
were notable in their apparent use of methods such as coaching, mentoring and special 
job assignments, unlike the more conventional management development methods 
employed in the station commander development programme. In particular, the 
Targeted Development Programme was seen by the Audit Commission to have 
“contribute[d] effectively to organisational projects” (Audit Commission 2009: 24, para 
82).  
 
This later development of MLD strategy at LFB may also be an indication that the 
government’s modernisation reforms had started to embed more deeply at authority 
level, thus enabling a greater degree of strategic HRD competence in the organisation. 
The reality in 2005 was that LFB was still strongly centralised. This was mainly because 
the operating environment was still highly regulated, and because emergency response 
activities predominated over community fire safety, a situation compounded by a lack of 
investment in localised fire prevention activities. Despite a formal redefinition of the 
station commander role to encourage a more participatory approach to management, in 
practice middle managerial discretion remained constrained. Without these constraints, 
it is arguable that MLD would have made a greater contribution to organisational 
change.  
 
This interpretation of the pattern of results in the LFB case needs to be compared 
against possible rival explanations. The first rival explanation, particularly for the relative 
lack of impact of MLD, would be that MLD represented not a strategic investment in 
organisational change, but an instrument of political domination and control, which was 
successfully opposed and resisted by unionised firefighters. While there is some 
evidence to support this interpretation, for example in the way that the government 
outmanoeuvred and disempowered the FBU during the 2002-4 dispute, there is also too 
much evidence to the contrary. As explained in Section 5.1, a degree of political 
consensus was in fact shown to exist between stakeholders, including the FBU, in the 
sense that investment in career development and professionalisation of firefighting was 
generally seen as empowering and progressive.  
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The second rival explanation would be a neo-institutionalist explanation one: that MLD 
in the fire service represented little more than an ideological fashion for managerialism 
in the public services, and had little substantial real impact on changing management 
practice towards a more flexible and efficient model. Certainly this was the view of 
several FBU-loyal uniformed interviewees who downplayed the actual impact of MLD. 
However this argument is not fully sustainable.  As Andrews has argued:  
 
Despite sharing this [managerialist] ideological bond with other public service reforms, 
fire service modernisation nonetheless entailed the development and introduction of new 
measures that were designed specifically to meet the changing needs of the service. 
(Andrews 2010: 602) 
 
In particular, IPDS and IRMPs, to which MLD was directed to support, were rooted in 
the very specific context of the fire service and implemented with clear intended 
efficiency outcomes, some of which the reforms appeared to achieve (see Andrews 
2010).  
 
The third and final rival explanation for the partial nature of the MLD outcomes, and the 
resistance displayed by some uniformed managers, would be one that emphasised 
MLD as a reproducer of managerial identity. In particular it might be argued that 
firefighting is rooted in a stereotypically masculine, manual working class identity, which 
values physicality, heroism and risk-taking. Modernisation, particularly in the form of 
community fire safety and fire prevention activities, arguably represented a threat to this 
occupational identity, resulting in resistance from uniformed managers. As Thurnell-
Reid and Parker (2008) observe in their qualitative study of sixteen firefighters on the 
‘Green Watch’ in Middleton:   
 
Implicit within this process of organisational modernisation and change, is the need for 
Service personnel to be approachable, communicative and caring to the needs of the 
general public (clients). For members of Green Watch, this shift meant the adoption of 
what were widely perceived to be more ‘feminine’ workplace qualities (Thurnell-Reid and 
Parker 2008: 132) 
  
In this perspective, uniformed managers’ underplaying of the value of MLD may be 
interpreted as a militating against the production of a new, stereotypically feminine and 
white collar occupational identity. The problem with this line of argument, however, is 
that there were clear structural reasons for managers, including the female manager 
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interviewed for this research, to report a limited contribution for MLD to organisational 
change. Uniformed staff were not opposed to community fire safety activities per se; 
indeed, as Thurnell-Reid and Parker (2008) also go on to illustrate, several members of 
Green Watch came to value them and incorporate them into their occupational identities 
(p.133). Rather, MLD failed to make a greater contribution in the area of community fire 
safety because the modernisation reforms were not well funded or embedded at local 
level, so managers did not perceive this particular aspect of learning as important.  
 
MLD’s contribution in this case is best explained as part of an incomplete process of 
transition from safety bureaucracy to professional bureaucracy. Ultimately the 
organisation in 2005 remained closer to the safety bureaucracy than the professional 
bureaucracy, due to the limited implementation of the modernisation reforms at 
authority level and due to a highly politicised context that erected obstacles to the 
learning transfer process. This prevented full strategic HRD competence at LFB and 
constrained opportunities for the full range of intended MLD outcomes to be achieved.  
 
This mirroring of MLD options and outcomes against the degree of structural transition 
is also evident in the next case, which illustrates MLD’s contribution to adhocratisation, 
but with fewer political obstacles.  
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Chapter 6. MLD and adhocratisation: the case of Kent Adult Social 
Services 
 
You want the good ideas… but you want some time and space and some understanding 
of how we deliver them, really. (Interview with district manager 6, Kent Adult Social 
Services) 
 
 
This chapter investigates the role of MLD for middle managers during the 
adhocratisation of a professional bureaucracy. The key hypothetical expectations during 
adhocratisation are that: i) middle management roles should shift from professional 
middle line management (Role C) towards middle leadership (Role D), in which the 
work of middle managers becomes less concerned with coordination through 
professional standards and more concerned with multi-disciplinary projects; and that ii) 
the organisation invests in professional management development (PMD) and leader 
development to support the stability of the professional bureaucracy, as well as project 
management development (PJMD) and leadership development to promote greater 
adhocracy.  
 
The contribution of MLD is investigated through the case of the adult social services 
department, KASS, in which investments in PMD, leader development and leadership 
development for middle managers were made during the period 2005-7 amidst far-
reaching changes at national and organisational levels. The case has three main 
findings. Firstly, the case demonstrates how investment in competence-based 
management development made a significant contribution to the stability and 
effectiveness of the professional bureaucracy by helping to align managerial efforts to 
strategic organisational goals. Secondly, the case demonstrates how investment in 
leader development made a contribution to promoting more effective mutual 
adjustment, but also how the impact of this type of intervention was constrained by an 
over-generalised approach. Thirdly, the case illustrated how investment in leadership 
development enabled greater project-based and lateral coordination amongst 
managers, but also how the outcomes of such intervention were shaped by the limits of 
managerial discretion and by institutional regulation. Overall the case lends support to 
the hypotheses, while shedding some additional light on the importance of HRD 
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competence and the relationship between MLD, management structures and 
institutional regulation.  
 
The chapter has four sections. The first section analyses the changes to adult social 
care management from the mid-1990s to the late-2000s and their implications for 
middle management roles and skills at KASS. The second section discusses the aims 
and methods of the three main MLD interventions at KASS, and the extent to which 
they were directed at meeting the needs of the professional bureaucracy and the 
demand for greater adhocracy. The third section examines the evidence of multi-
levelled outcomes of the MLD interventions and the extent to which these met the 
hypothetical expectations. The final section of the chapter assesses the overall 
contribution of MLD to adhocratisation.  
 
 
6.1 Adhocratisation and the changing roles of middle management 
 
Adult social care has been essentially been coordinated in the post second world war 
period through a professional social work bureaucracy, but has seen two main phases 
of change since the mid-1990s: marketisation and modernisation. The latter phase, 
which introduced greater demands for inter-agency partnership working and the 
personalisation of care, has been responsible for introducing a degree of adhocracy.  
 
Adult social care encompasses a range of personalised services, such as support for 
older people, for people with physical or sensory impairments, learning disabilities 
and/or mental health problems. Care can be provided in a range of settings, including 
residential facilities, supported housing and, increasingly, in people’s own homes 
through outreach services. The history of institutional arrangements for the provision of 
adult social care is complex and reveals a highly uneven pattern of development 
between the different services (Means and Smith 1998: 16-34). In essence, however, 
local authorities assumed the responsibility in the post-war period, in conjunction with 
the National Health Service (NHS), to ensure that care services were provided to those 
legally entitled to them. Local authorities employed professionally qualified social 
workers to diagnose, prescribe and monitor services for individual residents. Subject to 
budgetary constraints and a host of regulatory safeguards, services were then provided 
to local residents by specialist care workers. 
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Marketisation of adult care services dates from the Conservative administration’s NHS 
and Community Care Act of 1990, which devolved care budgets to local social services 
departments, as well as the responsibility for assessing the eligibility of individuals to 
receive care within new and stricter limits. From 1993, social services departments 
assumed the role of purchasing care on the behalf of eligible individuals, from a quasi-
market of local authority homes and independent providers. Care services provided 
directly by the local authority then had to compete with private and voluntary sector 
providers, and ensure value for money from the allocated budgets (Flynn 2007: 87).   
 
Modernisation reforms date from the Labour government’s White Paper Modernising 
Social Services of 1998. These measures went beyond the ‘purchaser-provider split’ of 
the 1990 Act and demanded closer partnerships between social services and other 
stakeholders. Increased emphasis was placed upon the coordination of interventions 
between social services, the health service, housing associations, voluntary sector 
providers and employment and skills agencies.  Social services managers became 
expected to stimulate the development of care services by working together more 
closely with partners (ibid). 
 
Greater complexity, but also intensified regulation from the centre, was introduced by 
the Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003. This 
consolidated the quality management regime in social services, and opened up greater 
opportunities for user-involvement and for individuals to choose and purchase their own 
care directly, with the ultimate aim of reducing people’s dependence on local authority 
provision. The creation of the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) in 2004 
introduced a unified standards framework that was applied to local authorities as well as 
other provider organisations, requiring significant changes to internal systems and 
processes. 
 
Labour’s modernisation reforms had the dual effects of increasing marketisation and 
local autonomy on the one hand, while strengthening centralised controls on the other. 
Devolution of responsibility for budgets and care provision broadened management 
responsibilities at local authority level, but discretion over how resources were spent 
and prioritised, and how performance was defined, reported and monitored was 
increasingly subject to national regulation. This meant that the coordination mechanism 
in social care moved towards the standardisation of outputs, typically associated with 
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the divisionalised form, rather than by the standardisation of skills, typically associated 
with the professional bureaucracy.  
 
Yet despite the increase in centralised performance controls, the modernisation reforms 
introduced sufficient uncertainty and complexity at local level to demand the exercising 
of professional discretion in management decisions. The oversight of complex 
contracting arrangements, sometimes involving multiple partners, combined with the 
introduction of a new qualitative, outcomes-based quality management regime, could 
not be easily standardised or routinised. The technical understanding necessary for this 
oversight lay beyond the knowledge and skills of non-specialist staff, who were required 
to collaborate relatively closely with care professionals in order to make management 
decisions.  
 
While centralised controls may have reduced professional discretion overall and 
intensified the work of social workers, due to the devolution of complex responsibilities, 
the involvement of more senior professionals in local management decisions actually 
increased (c.f. Whipp et al. 2005: 101-2). This meant that mutual adjustment – a key 
coordination mechanism employed in the middle line of professional bureaucracies - 
became increasingly important for the middle line and front-line managers in social 
care, who assumed broader responsibilities for liaison with non-specialist staff. Rather 
than pure managerialisation or pure professionalisation, the developments in social 
care management in the mid-1990s represent a ‘professional managerial hybridisation’ 
(Ferlie and Geraghty 2005: 434).  
 
The pressures to adopt more adhocratic ways of delivering services were exemplified 
by the introduction of individualised care plans. This heightened uncertainty and 
complexity in the commissioning, contracting and monitoring of care provision. The 
growing expectation was that local managers would commission care services in 
collaboration with a range of other service providers in pursuit of various, shared social 
care and health outcomes, with the ultimate effect of saving or freeing up local authority 
resources.  Such collaborative working arrangements require not only mutual 
adjustment; they also produce opportunities for innovation in care services at local level 
(c.f. Means and Smith 1998: 166). 
 
The changes to adult social care management arising from marketisation and 
modernisation resulted in pressures of change to middle management roles in local 
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authority professional social work bureaucracies. The typical middle line manager in 
social care is a district manager. The operational side of social care management tends 
to be geographically organised, so middle line managers, typically qualified social 
workers or health professionals, take responsibility for the provision and quality of care 
in a local authority district. He or she acts as the interface between senior management, 
responsible for policy and strategy at authority level, and front-line management across 
the district, who are responsible either for the direct provision of care by staff teams, or 
for the quality of care commissioned from the private and/or voluntary sectors. 
Increasingly, district managers have also become responsible for developing 
partnerships with other services within the local authority and with other organisations 
such as the local health service and social housing providers. The other significant 
group of middle managers is represented by mid-level administrative managers, who 
are responsible for various support services such as contracting, finance and quality 
assurance. Support functions within local social services departments grew in 
importance after the devolution reforms of the mid-1990s.  
 
The shift in middle management roles, from professional middle line management (Role 
C) towards middle leadership (Role D), resulting from the shift in the adult social care 
environment from marketisation to modernisation, and from professional-managerial 
hybridisation to adhocratisation, is summarised in Figure 6.1. 
 
‘marketisation’  
(leading to professional-managerial hybridisation) 
‘modernisation’  
(leading to some adhocratisation) 
 Professional middle line management (Role C) Middle leadership (Role D) 
Specialist professional activities 
 Social work supervision 
 Care-planning and monitoring 
 
Applied management activities 
 Budgeting and financial management 
 Contracting/commissioning  
 
Professional-managerial collaboration 
 Liaison and mutual adjustment with: 
o social services administration 
managers 
o other local authority managers 
o NHS managers 
Partnership-working 
 Mutual adjustment with 
private/voluntary sector partner 
organisations 
 Common quality-management 
standards 
 
Project-management and innovation  
 local partnership projects for new 
care arrangements and/or services 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Changes in middle management roles in adult social care 
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Role C professional middle line management was theorised in Section 1.3 as consisting 
principally of professional-managerial collaboration and mutual adjustment. Operational 
middle managers were seen to require not just advanced specialist knowledge but also 
more generic management skills. These two aspects were expected to be combined 
through liaison activity and mutual adjustment with other parts of the bureaucracy. In 
the context of adult social care, specialist activities of senior professional staff 
comprised mainly of supervision and care-planning to ensure compliance and the 
development of social work standards. The more general business management 
activities such as budgeting, financial management, contracting and commissioning 
were augmented by the marketisation reforms.  
 
Role D middle leadership was theorised in Section 1.3 as chiefly concerned with project 
management and innovation. While advanced technical knowledge was seen as a 
prerequisite for certain specialist projects, a high degree of mutual adjustment with non-
specialists was expected as the organisation seeks the development of innovative 
solutions to managing in an uncertain and complex environment. In the adult social care 
context, the modernisation reforms concerned with personalisation of care, partnership-
working, the unified quality management framework and the stimulation of new ways of 
providing care increased demand for middle leadership behaviour. In particular, the shift 
from contracting to partnership-working heightened the need for professional-
managerial collaboration and mutual adjustment. The scope for partnership-working 
was extended from other parts of the social services and the NHS to organisations from 
the private and voluntary sectors, framed within a common set of quality standards. 
Project-working and innovation took the form of local partnership initiatives to develop 
more personalised and integrated arrangements for providing care and for new types of 
services.  
 
The shift in management roles in adult social care during the late-2000s had significant 
implications for middle management skills. In Section 2.3 it was theorised that Role C 
professional middle line management required advanced specialist knowledge, human 
skills and the conceptual skills to manage the changing regulatory environment.  Role D 
middle leadership was theorised as requiring project management, advanced human 
skills and the conceptual skills to understand innovation and strategic change priorities. 
This shift in skill requirements was largely reflected in national policy interventions.  
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A government report in 2000 signalled the shift in skill requirements. It claimed that 
“First-line and middle managers will be severely challenged by the demands of the 
modernising agenda” (Topss 2000, cited in Topss 2004: i). The report commented 
further that there was a lack of a “sufficient management skill mix in the sector to 
respond to the challenges of managing cross-service boundaries with health, education, 
housing, or of service standards and new inspection and regulation structures” (ibid). A 
national skills strategy was then developed and published in 2004, which applied the 
competence-based National Occupational Standards in Leadership and Management to 
the social care profession and produced a ‘statement’ of what leaders and managers in 
social care ‘should do’ (Topss 2004). Detailed standards in leadership and 
management for the sector, and a list of recognised management qualifications against 
which they could be matched, were eventually published in February 2008 (Skills for 
Care 2008).  
 
Officially, the national social care management standards were only guidelines, but they 
had a strong standardising effect across the sector. At first-line management level, for 
individual registered care home managers, it was made compulsory to possess not only 
a specialist care qualification, but also a national ‘level 4’ management qualification 
(CSCI 2008). Management qualifications remained voluntary for mid-level managers 
overseeing care in the local authorities, although the professional norms set by the 
sector skills council, Skills for Care, were in fact used by CSCI as benchmarks of 
leadership and management capacity. It was therefore in local authorities’ interests to 
ensure that qualified social workers in managerial roles or those seeking promotion 
studied for level 4-equivalent management qualifications, often within the ‘post-
qualifying framework’ for advanced professional development in social work.  
 
Overall, the model of social care management was the product of a top-down, 
prescriptive, competence-based approach to ensure both professional and generic 
managerial competence. However, the prescriptive tendency was curtailed in two 
respects. First, the policy documents placed a considerable emphasis on leadership, 
using the terms ‘leaders’ and ‘managers’ interchangeably. This reflected a recognition 
of the importance of senior social workers’ less predictable and tangible roles in 
motivating staff, participating in interdisciplinary collaboration and promoting innovation, 
alongside the more sector-specific managerial responsibilities. Second, the national 
policy espoused a ‘whole systems model’, involving an integrated approach to learning 
and development across individual managers, employers and partners. This provided 
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for a significant degree of local flexibility in the definition of specific managerial roles 
and in choices over how to develop managers and their careers.  
 
The national policy documentation implicitly recognised the importance of technical, 
human and conceptual skills in professional social care management (Role C) and the 
advanced human skills required for middle leadership (Role D). To illustrate the detailed 
ways in which the changes to social care management impacted at the local 
organisational level, some background to KASS is required.  The evidence is drawn 
from organisational documentation, interviews and consultations with nine of the 
council’s senior managers, including the chief executive, and interviews with eighteen of 
KASS’s middle managers during 2007.  
 
KASS was created as a new directorate for adult care services within Kent County 
Council (KCC) in 2005. As in many local authorities, the 2004 Children’s Act had led to 
the breaking up of the social services department into two departments, one focussing 
on children (including schools and family services) and another on adults. The 
breakdown of KASS’s workforce for 2006 and 2007 can be seen in Table 6.1.  
 
 
 2006 2007 
Headcount   3967.0 3798.0 
FTE  2955.0 2825.9 
Full-Time FTE  1726.0 1673.0 
Part-Time FTE  1220.2 1151.6 
Male FTE 551.9 504.5 
Part-Time (Male) FTE 114.9 96.5 
Female FTE  2394.7 2320.0 
Part-Time (Female) FTE 1105.7 1055.0 
 
Table 6.1 Workforce data for Kent Adult Social Services 2006-07  
(Source: KCC Adult Social Services Workforce Plan 2006-2010) 
  
 
Table 6.1 shows the large proportion of part-time females at KASS, which is typical for 
the social care sector. Also typical was the long service amongst senior staff; the 
related data for KASS are shown in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2 Length of service amongst staff and management at Kent Adult Social 
Services in 2007  
(Source: KCC Adult Social Services Workforce Plan 2006-2010)  
 
 
The focal group of this research, middle managers, is represented by the 83 managers 
in grades 13 and 14 out of a total of 98 middle and senior managers (84.7 per cent). 
Front-line managers were recorded as staff at the top of the social work pay-scale 
rather than part of the council’s management grading system. 
 
To summarise, mid-level managers at KASS were mainly female and long-serving. In 
addition, it can be deduced from the available data that middle line managers, 
responsible for operational teams, were matched in number, even outnumbered, by 
administrative managers. The breakdown of managers across the different teams in 
KASS is represented in Table 6.3.  
 
 
Number of managers at KASS by team in 2007 
East Kent Area 16 
West Kent Area 15 
Mental Health and County Duty Service 6 
Resources (incl. Finance) 15 
Policy Performance and Quality Assurance 15 
Other  31 
Total 98 
 
Table 6.3 Managers by team at Kent Adult Social Services in 2007  
(Source: KCC Adult Social Services Workforce Plan 2006-2010)  
 
 
The teams responsible for the core operational work of the directorate were the East 
and West Kent Area teams and the Mental Health and County Duty Service. As a rule 
of thumb, approximately 80 per cent of the managers in each team can be expected to 
Length of service 
as at 2007 
0-2 
Yrs 
3-5 
Yrs 
6-10 
Yrs 
11-15 
Yrs 
16-20 
Yrs 
20+ 
Yrs 
Total 
All employees 908 857 662 640 435 297 3799 
Grade 13 managers  3 4 4 11 23 15 60 
Grade 14 managers 2 2 1 3 10 5 23 
Grade 15 managers 2 0 0 0 5 3 10 
Senior managers 1 0 0 0 1 3 5 
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be middle managers at grades 13 or 14, totalling approximately 78 of the total 98 
managers in KASS. Therefore, of the 38 managers in these teams, it is reasonable to 
assume that approximately 31 were middle line managers, leaving approximately 47 
middle managers to be categorised as administrative or ‘other’ managers. The ‘purest’ 
form of middle line managers were the district managers in the East and West Kent 
areas, each responsible for the provision and quality of care in a district of the county. 
The main two teams on the support service side of the directorate, as Table 6.3 shows, 
were in resources, finance, policy performance and quality assurance. A typical middle 
manager from one of these teams would be responsible for an administrative team or a 
number of administrative teams, each supporting a particular service, sometimes for a 
particular area of the county.  
 
The large size of the group of mid-level administration managers, relative to the middle 
line, highlights the significant potential for professional-managerial collaboration and 
inter-departmental project work at KASS. These activities are key features of 
professional middle line management (Role C) and middle leadership (Role D). How the 
organisation sought to develop the requisite skills for both these roles is the subject of 
the next section of the chapter.  
 
 
6.2 MLD options 
 
The theoretical expectation during adhocratisation is that investments should be made 
in professionalised management development (PMD) and leader development to 
support the effectiveness of the professional bureaucracy, with some additional 
investment in project management development (PJMD) and leadership development 
to support the move towards greater adhocracy.  
 
In the context of adult social care, PMD should be expected to aim to develop 
competence both in the specialist professional aspects of social care management, 
such as care-planning, and in the applied managerial aspects, such as budgeting and 
contracting. This lends itself to a relatively prescriptive, competence-based approach to 
learning. Leader development, employing mainly individualised learning methods, 
should be expected to aim to develop intrapersonal competence amongst social care 
managers to increase the effectiveness of mutual adjustment in the organisation. 
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PJMD, which lends itself largely to conventional training methods, should be expected 
to aim to develop competence in project-based work. Finally, leadership development, 
using open, group-based learning methods, should be expected to aim to develop 
greater collective flexibility and adaptive capacity amongst managers to respond to the 
changes in the adult social care environment.   
 
In making three significant MLD interventions during 2005-7, KASS conformed quite 
closely to this set of theoretical expectations. The three main interventions were the 
diploma in management, a three-day workshop entitled ‘From Good to Great’ and a 
programme of activities named ‘Inspirational Leadership’. Crudely, the diploma in 
management served professional management development (PMD) needs in the 
organisation and some leader development needs; From Good to Great represented an 
additional attempt to address leader development needs; and Inspirational Leadership 
was an attempt at leadership development for middle managers. The organisation also 
provided for some middle managers to be trained in the use of the project management 
software (Prince II) (see PJMD), but this was a small investment in comparison to the 
other three interventions.  
 
Figure 6.2 summarises the key MLD interventions at KASS and the extent to which 
these conformed to theoretical expectations about MLD options during adhocratisation.  
 
Expected MLD options during adhocratisation Actual MLD options at KASS 
Professional management development (PMD) 
 competence-based development in 
specialist-professional and applied 
management skills 
Diploma in Management 
 compliant with the National 
Occupational Standards in 
Leadership and Management in Care 
Leader development  
 individualised development in 
intrapersonal competence 
From Good to Great 
 three-day workshop on leader skills 
Project management development (PJMD) 
 training in project-management tools and 
techniques 
Prince II training 
 instruction in project management 
software 
Leadership development  
 group-based development for greater 
adaptive capacity 
Inspirational Leadership 
 nine-month series of one-two day 
workshops and action learning sets 
concerned with adult social care 
management 
 
(dashed arrow and italics represent smaller investment in MLD) 
Figure 6.2 Expected and actual MLD options at Kent Adult Social Services 
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The evolution of the MLD interventions at KASS requires some further explanation in 
order to establish their conformance to the theoretical expectations. Precise and explicit 
objectives behind the MLD interventions did generally not exist; however, it was 
possible to infer their underlying aims through interviews with senior managers. It was 
clear that the various MLD interventions were both a response to the changing 
requirements for leadership and management skills in social care from the mid-1990s 
onwards, as well as part of a local HR strategy to address recruitment and retention 
problems in social work.  
 
A suite of management qualifications, accredited by the Chartered Management 
Institute, was introduced in 1994 (coinciding with the national marketisation reforms and 
the devolution of care budgets, although not necessarily by design). Certificates and 
diplomas in management were delivered at various levels for supervisors, first-line and 
middle managers in partnership with a local university. A small number of candidates 
were also sourced from partner organisations, such as the local police force and fire 
authority. The qualifications were broad in nature and aimed to develop generic 
management knowledge and skills amongst senior staff at the council, including 
managers from the social services department, who were the heaviest users of the 
management qualifications out of the council’s five directorates.  
 
In the late-1990s, the two key HR problems for KASS were staff retention and 
motivation. These had a significant influence on shaping MLD strategy. In 1998, the 
vacancy rate for social workers was around 40 per cent, compared to 25 per cent for 
the rest of the council (KCC HR documentation 1998). To address motivation and 
retention problems the social services directorate invested in its own ‘staff care 
package’ in 1998, introducing a range of measures under a ‘ten point plan’ to improve 
the quality of the employee’s experience. The measures included commitments on 
wellbeing, training and development and work-life balance. Improved people 
management and supervision were central to the staff care package, so management 
qualifications became an important part of the overall attempt to develop line managers’ 
competence in these areas.  
 
The suite of accredited management qualifications developed over the years until 2005, 
when the council became an accredited Chartered Management Institute centre and the 
qualifications were brought in-house. Increasingly, management qualifications became 
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desirable requirements of advertised management positions. Between 2005 and 2007, 
105 managers from across the council enrolled on the diploma in management, with a 
98 per cent completion rate. 34 of the 105 managers over the period came from social 
services or KASS, equal to over a third of the middle to senior managers from the 
directorate.  The diploma was a conventional, competence-based management 
development programme, run internally by KCC’s learning and development function. It 
was a year-long, part-time qualification accredited at national level 5 by the Chartered 
Management Institute. For KASS managers, the qualification was also eventually 
mapped against the National Occupational Standards for Leadership and Management 
in Care.  
 
The qualification consisted of eight modules, delivered principally through monthly 
taught sessions. Each module was assessed through a piece of workplace-based 
coursework. In addition, candidates had to complete a final 10,000-word project. The 
module content was roughly equally balanced between people management and other 
resource management priorities. The eight modules (in rearranged order) were: 
 
 Developing your management style 
 Recruitment and selection 
 Managing performance 
 Developing teams and individuals 
 Managing information and communication 
 Customer focus, marketing and planning 
 Maintaining and improving health, safety and quality 
 Planning and controlling physical and financial resources 
 
The first four modules were focussed on the knowledge and skills required for effective 
people management, with some attention to leadership skills, reflecting the general 
emphasis placed by the council upon supervision and line management. The remaining 
four modules also covered general management knowledge, but were strongly 
contextualised according to organisational and specific professional priorities. Since the 
diploma had become an in-house programme, it only recruited candidates from within 
the council. All assessments were individually negotiated with the tutors and related to 
specific issues in the candidates’ own teams. Therefore, social care managers who 
studied ‘customer focus and marketing’, for example, adapted and applied marketing 
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theory to issues specifically concerned with the needs of social care clients. The applied 
nature of the diploma in management at KASS makes it a prime example of 
professional management development (PMD) as theorised in Section 2.3.   
 
In the 2000s, MLD strategy at KASS became increasingly concerned with leadership. 
The growing preoccupation with leadership is reflected in the evolution of the council’s 
‘Strategy for Staff’, originally published in 1998, and revised in 2001, 2004 and 2008. 
Effective people management and supervisory skills were a priority in all the 
documents, but the 2004 strategy explicitly emphasised the need for leadership “to 
inspire others through their ability to make sense of our complex environment and offer 
direction, purpose and support”. The 2008 strategy went further, emphasising 
‘inspirational leadership’, required “to work effectively across traditional boundaries, 
work collaboratively and in partnership to provide direction, support and epitomise 
behaviour that reinforces our values” (KCC HR documentation).  
 
As noted above, the specific organisational goals behind these types of corporate-level 
statements are elusive. Yet the rhetorical shifts are notable: from an emphasis on 
people management in 1998, to ‘inspiring others’ in 2004, to ‘working collaboratively’ 
and ‘across traditional boundaries’ in 2008. These echo the broader shifts that were 
taking place in the adult social care environment and the corresponding changes in 
approaches to coordination: from effective control, to staff motivation towards 
organisational goals, to a more outward-looking and adhocratic way of working. The two 
leadership-orientated interventions at KASS, From Good to Great and Inspirational 
Leadership, may be seen as responses to these shifts. The former was primarily 
concerned with the shift towards developing individual managers’ abilities to motivate 
staff, while the latter was concerned with the shift towards the development of new 
ways of working within the middle management group.  
 
From Good to Great was developed in 2005 as a three-day residential leader 
development course for more experienced middle managers and new or aspiring senior 
managers. In comparison to the diploma in management it was a less significant 
investment, but it nonetheless provided for 50 participants between 2006 and 2007, in 
four cohorts of roughly equal size. Out of the total of 50 participants, 12 were from 
KASS, representing approximately 12 per cent of all middle and senior managers in the 
directorate. The programme consisted of a broad mixture of activities, including an 
emotional intelligence questionnaire with feedback from a certified trainer, various 
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individual reflective exercises and participative group tasks.  The content of the 
programme was conceived and presented as a list of skill-based topics, as follows:  
 
 Leadership and managing diversity  
 Building successful teams 
 Implementing strategy  
 Coaching and mentoring  
 Challenging self-limiting beliefs  
 Conflict and pressure management 
 Leading change 
 Influencing  
 
Despite its group-based delivery mode, its individualistic orientation was evident in 
language of the programme title and its objectives: “[The programme] will assist each 
participant to engage in future work with the wisdom and determination to act on a 
newly found understanding in innovative ways that will further enhance the performance 
of the department and the quality of your own life” (KCC Learning and Development 
documentation). The underlying aim of the programme was chiefly concerned with 
developing intrapersonal competence in the sense of better understanding one’s own 
approach to management and its relationship to the wider strategic picture.  
 
‘Inspirational Leadership’ was a nine month-long, KASS-based programme of activities 
for middle managers in social care, also with rather vague aims (“to really make a 
difference to the future of the organisation” (KASS learning and development 
documentation)). The programme ran in three cohorts between 2006 and 2007 for 31 
managers in total, including all of the district managers at the time. The programme was 
an attempt to provide an opportunity for middle managers to come together to reflect 
upon and respond constructively to a period of considerable environmental change and 
organisational restructuring. It was seen as a more flexible and less time-consuming 
alternative to the centrally-provided diploma in management and was structured as a 
series of non-assessed monthly workshops, each over 1-2 days, facilitated by an 
external trainer.  
 
The workshop activities were a varied mix of management games and exercises, 
interspersed with individual and group reflective activities. The list of workshop activities 
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below is taken from the course literature, in its original order (the logic behind which is 
difficult to discern):  
 
 ‘Open Business’ purchasing game 
 scientific management simulation exercise 
 group reflection on social control  
 ‘Saboteur’ problem-solving exercise  
 discussion of the practice of coaching 
 group production of a training video around people management skills  
 group debate exercise around organisational change 
 business simulation exercise 
 individual career planning and reflection on goals 
 team strategic planning exercise 
 self-evaluation and personal development planning 
 ‘High Court Trial’ game around decision-making and justice 
 group discussion of the manager as team developer 
 workplace-based team development project 
 ‘own-and-other-peoples’-perception’ exercise  
 ‘Team Modelling’ exercise 
 Ongoing paired coaching  
 
The above activities were dispersed over nine monthly group workshops and were then 
followed by a series of monthly ‘action learning set’ meetings. The action learning sets 
were facilitated by the external trainer for the first three months and were self-organised 
thereafter. The sets were comprised of small, voluntary groups of managers who 
wished to address particular work-based issues in a practical way, supported by 
relevant management models and theories.  
 
There were similarities between Inspirational Leadership and From Good to Great, but 
also important differences, which allow the former to be characterised as a leadership 
development intervention as opposed to a leader development intervention. In common 
with From Good to Great, the objectives of Inspirational Leadership were somewhat 
vague and the activities were skills- rather than knowledge-based. However, partly 
because the participants of Inspirational Leadership were more narrowly selected from 
within the same directorate, the discussions and exercises addressed specific, practical 
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and shared concerns regarding adult social care management, particularly towards the 
end of the programme. Despite its apparently lengthy list of prescribed activities, the 
open and collective nature of Inspirational Leadership meant that it resembled a 
leadership development intervention. It may be interpreted as an investment in the 
middle line to enable a more adhocratic approach in adult social care management.  
 
In summary, the three main MLD interventions – the diploma in management, From 
Good to Great and Inspirational Leadership - although quite different in size, collectively 
represented a significant investment in the development of the middle management of 
the organisation. Conforming quite closely to the theoretically expected MLD options 
under adhocratisation, the interventions aimed to ensure the effectiveness and stability 
in the managerialised professional bureaucracy, at the same time as enabling change 
in the direction of greater adhocracy.  
 
 
6.3 Contribution of MLD to adhocratisation 
 
Given that the MLD options conformed quite closely to theoretical expectations, and 
assuming HRD competence at KASS, it is to be expected that the MLD outcomes 
should also follow the contingent model of MLD outcomes developed in Chapter 2. The 
hypothetical MLD outcomes under adhocratisation at individual level are reproduced in 
Figure 6.3, including an illustration of the extent to which these were met at KASS.  
 
While not matching the hypothetical outcomes exactly, the actual MLD outcomes at 
individual level conformed strongly to specific elements of them. For example, 
‘increased self-awareness’ represents an important element if not the complete set of 
outcomes expected within intrapersonal competence (as in Figure 2.3).  
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MLD options during 
adhocratisation at KASS 
Expected individual MLD 
outcomes  
Actual individual MLD 
outcomes at KASS 
Professional management 
development (PMD) 
 diploma in management 
Professional managerial 
competence (PMC) 
Increased strategic and 
self-awareness 
Leader development  
 aspects of the diploma 
in management 
 ‘From Good to Great’ 
Intrapersonal competence Increased self-awareness 
and -confidence 
Project management development 
(PJMD) 
 Prince II training 
Some project management 
competence (PJMC) 
Some project management 
competence 
Leadership development  
 ‘Inspirational 
Leadership’ 
Some interpersonal 
competence  
Some improved problem-
solving capacity and 
implementation of strategy 
 
(italics represent smaller investment and less significant expected/actual outcomes) 
Figure 6.3 Expected and actual individual MLD outcomes at Kent Adult Social 
Services  
 
 
Figure 6.4 summarises the expected and actual MLD outcomes at group and 
organisational levels under adhocratisation.  
 
MLD intervention for 
adhocratisation 
Group outcomes Contribution to 
organisational outcomes 
Professional managerial 
development (PMD) 
 Diploma in 
management 
 
Leader development  
 From Good to Great 
 
Staff compliance and  
commitment 
 Alignment of staff 
with council and 
departmental 
strategic objectives  
 
Stability and adaptation in 
the professional 
bureaucracy 
 Improved HRM 
outcomes 
 Improved 
performance in 
external audit 
 
Project management 
development (PJMD) 
 Prince II training 
 
Leadership development  
 Inspirational 
Leadership 
 
 
Innovation 
 Improved 
collaboration 
between managers 
and with external 
partners 
 
 
Emergent strategic change 
 Contribution of 
middle managers 
to shaping 
organisational 
strategy 
 
(actual interventions and outcomes in italics) 
Figure 6.4  Expected and actual group- and organisational-level MLD outcomes at 
Kent Adult Social Services 
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As Figure 6.4 illustrates, the first set of theoretical expectations is that PMD and leader 
development should result in the group-level outcome of staff compliance with 
professional standards as well as commitment to organisational strategic goals, leading 
to the organisational-level outcome of a contribution to the stability and adaptability of 
the professional bureaucracy. The second set of expectations is that PJMD and 
leadership development should result in the group-level outcome of innovation, leading 
to the organisational-level outcome of an emergent strategic contribution. As will be 
shown, these expected outcomes were also broadly confirmed in the KASS case, 
although applied and shaped according to the adult social care and institutional context. 
 
The multi-levelled outcomes of the three main MLD interventions (diploma in 
management, From Good to Great and Inspirational Leadership) are now examined in 
turn. The main source of evidence was the eighteen critical incident interviews with 
middle managers. The interviews were held in July-August 2007, with the exception of 
one interview which took place in October 2007. Four interviews were conducted face-
to-face and fourteen by telephone. The interview data were corroborated where 
possible by HR and performance management documentation.  
 
Table 6.4 summarises the key information about the middle manager interview sample.   
 
  2005* 2006 2007 Total Interviews 
Diploma in 
Management 
KASS 12 14 8 34 7 (20.6%) 
All directorates 27 48 30 105  
From Good to 
Great 
KASS - 7 5 12 6 (50.0%) 
All directorates - 28 22 50  
Inspirational 
Leadership 
KASS 10 21 - 31 5 (16.1%) 
All directorates 10 21 - 31  
 
* Figures apply to whole Social Services department before KASS was created in 2005.  
Table 6.4 MLD participants from Kent Adult Social Services 2005-07 and interview 
sample 
 
 
The difficulties in recruiting interviewees at KASS, as described in Section 3.4, were 
exacerbated by the redeployment and turnover of managers, which was approximately 
ten per cent per year in the years 2005-7 (KCC HR documentation). The possibilities for 
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volunteer bias were also discussed in Section 3.4; the extent to which this may have 
affected the reporting of MLD outcomes will be returned to as an issue in the final 
section of the chapter.  
 
6.3.1 Contribution of professional management development (diploma in management) 
 
Of the seven managers interviewed about their experiences of the diploma in 
management, four worked on the operational side and three worked in the support 
services. The sample therefore roughly reflected the operational/support split in KASS. 
It also mirrored the demographic profile of managers within the directorate. The group 
were largely female (five out of seven) and were long-serving (six managers had over 
ten years’ service). 
 
Two of the seven managers were archetypal mid-hierarchy managers, in the sense that 
they managed a number of front-line managers across various operational teams. The 
others, although also reporting directly to senior management, had direct responsibility 
for front-line staff (except one, a project planning manager, who had no direct reports). 
That the diploma in management sample did not include more archetypal mid-hierarchy 
managers is to be explained by the fact that those already in middle management posts 
tended to have completed the diploma prior to 2005. Also, within the support services of 
the organisation, hierarchies were sufficiently flat so as to not to employ significant 
numbers of front-line managers or supervisors. The seven interviewees were typical of 
the diploma in management target group, namely new or aspiring middle managers 
without significant previous MLD experience.  
 
The individual MLD outcomes inferred from the middle manager interviews were 
broadly in line with the expected outcome of professional-managerial competence, 
involving the learning of conventional management tools, techniques and models as 
they applied to the professional bureaucratic environment. However, the most striking 
outcome, rather than the acquisition of any specific area of knowledge, was the 
development of a greater strategic awareness. More than any other outcome, the 
critical incidents reported pointed towards a gradual, general understanding of the 
‘bigger picture’. Figure 6.5 summarises the main findings of the interviews with the 
diploma group.  
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Individual outcomes Group outcomes Contribution to 
organisational outcomes 
Increased strategic 
awareness (7) 
 
Increased self-
awareness (4) 
 
Improved project-
management (1) 
 
Improved change-
management (1) 
 
Improved health & 
safety-management 
(1) 
 
Financial 
management skills (1) 
 
More effective 
working with 
objectives (4) 
 
Staff involvement and 
development (3) 
 
Effective management 
of change (1) 
 
Improved 
communication with 
individuals (1) 
 
 
 
Strategic improvements to 
services (4) 
 
Budget savings (1) 
 
(Brackets indicate number of interviewees) 
Figure 6.5 Outcomes of the diploma in management at Kent Adult Social Services 
 
 
The most significant thread of outcomes – linking the individual and group levels - starts 
with the development of greater strategic awareness amongst individuals.  All seven 
diploma interviewees perceived that the programme had helped them understand the 
council’s corporate strategy more clearly and their own place within it. The project 
planning manager was typical in her description of this learning outcome:  
 
Before I actually went onto the [diploma in management], I understood [the] Council and 
the strategic objectives and all the rest of it, but I think it for me put everything into 
perspective…for instance, personal action planning and team action planning. I see the 
purpose behind that … how it links with your unit plan, the annual plan, and how 
important it is for managers to see that that happens. (Interview with project planning 
manager) 
 
Four diploma interviewees were able to link a sense of increased strategic awareness 
to more effective objective-setting with their teams and individual reports. These 
managers invariably spoke of how they had learnt, and become enthused, to break 
down the different levels of objectives in the organisation and explain to staff how 
corporate strategy was related to their team business plans and personal development 
plans. To do this, they drew on KCC’s organisation’s behavioural competence and 
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performance-related reward framework, ‘Ways2Success’. For example, the web team 
manager and the team leader both described how they had started to present 
condensed strategic plans to their teams in new, accessible formats to try and ensure 
that their staff understood and were motivated by how they were contributing to the 
collective corporate effort. As the web team manager explained: 
 
I’m not that far away from being a teamster myself to have forgotten what it’s like to be 
in the team room and to be asked to do things that are not connected to anything – it’s 
just a task. Now at the other side of the fence I can see all of the connections, and the 
DMS [diploma] has made me try hard to try and sell those (Interview with web team 
manager) 
 
The interviewees’ emphasis on target-setting and action-planning at all levels reinforces 
the observations made in official reports that KCC had a strong culture of working to 
objectives (CSCI 2007, Audit Commission 2008). The diploma in management was 
clearly successful in helping to impress this culture on the more junior and 
inexperienced middle managers, and in contributing to the organisation’s effectiveness 
in terms of meeting its formal objectives.  
 
The second main thread of outcomes is related to individuals’ development of a greater 
self-awareness. Exposure to theories about different management styles during the 
diploma led four managers to reflect on their own management style. For example, the 
exchequer manager decided to seek feedback on how her colleagues perceived her, 
learning that “I can come across as unapproachable when I’m busy“. The most 
commonly claimed result of such self-reflection was to pay greater attention to 
communication with team members and to make a greater effort to involve them in 
decisions and develop them professionally. For example, the senior support time and 
recovery worker described how she began to share out specific responsibilities 
amongst her team, such as for taking a lead on hospital discharge or liaison with 
community groups to involve people with mental health problems.  
 
The tying together of the two main threads of individual and group MLD outcomes – on 
the one hand, increased strategic awareness linked to more effective working with 
objectives, and on the other, increased self awareness linked to greater staff 
involvement and development – is manifested in five specific claims of outcomes at the 
organisational level.  
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The first organisational-level outcome was of a tactical rather than strategic nature. It 
illustrates how the diploma, by developing greater strategic and self-awareness in one 
individual, enabled the implementation of budget cuts. The manager related how she 
combined her newly acquired budgeting skills with her fresh understanding of the wider 
strategic and financial issues facing the organisation:  
 
I used to get really, really angry. But now I don’t, because I understand the budget 
allocation and that the government only gives you so much and you’ve got to look at 
how best you can use those monies so that everybody is treated equally and that you 
can actually manage the service. And you do have to cut corners sometimes because 
it’s not a bottomless pit. (Interview with team leader) 
 
The team leader’s increased self-awareness was also an important factor in learning to 
‘sell’ budget decisions to her team:  
 
When they [the team] get upset I explain… “We’ve had less government funding” or 
“There’s been money hived off for this and money hived off or for that”.…They’re not 
happy because obviously they’re the ones that have to deliver the problems to the 
clients if we have to reduce services, and they find that difficult. But I help them through 
with it and I think it’s easier now they understand why (Interview with team leader) 
 
Although a small and localised example, this illustrates MLD’s wider role in helping to 
secure compliance with business strategy in a professional bureaucracy. It 
demonstrates how senior professionals become equipped with technical skills such as 
financial management; but it also shows how MLD helps to incorporate them into 
identifying with and taking responsibility for implementing the wider strategic agenda, in 
this case the unpopular and difficult business of budget cuts.  
         
The other four incidences of contributions to organisational outcomes were more clearly 
related to new strategic priorities. Firstly, the exchequer manager described how her 
newly developed strategic insight helped her to realise how narrow and transactional 
her team’s relationships were with other parts of the organisation. Building on this, and 
a new appreciation of the importance of effective communication, she initiated 
development activities and specific discussions with her staff to try to make her team 
more open and responsive to other parts of the organisation. As she related:  
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[M]y senior finance and benefits officer had a problem with care management phoning in 
all the time, asking [for] information. So she basically instructed her little team to say 
…”Can you send an email?” So I met with her and the team and said “How do you think 
that alters people’s perception of finance? We are a team and when somebody phones 
in, we need to get a response…or action needs to be taken. By asking them to then 
send an email, it’s not only causing them more work when they’re just as stretched as 
we are, but it gives a bad message about communication in the function.” (Interview with 
exchequer manager) 
 
This small example has relevance in terms of the wider strategic role of MLD in a 
professional bureaucracy. While the business outcome of MLD described in the 
example (improved intra-organisational communication) may not be linked to a specific 
strategic goal, it plays an important role in promoting mutual adjustment. This is the key 
mechanism by which support services and the middle line attempt to coordinate the 
professional organisation’s activities. In short, this is an example of how MLD helps to 
ensure organisational continuity in a professional bureaucracy.   
 
In a second example from the support side of the organisation, the web team manager 
related how more effective objective-setting and team involvement in exercises such as 
health and safety audits had the overall effect of promoting user access and 
engagement with adult care services through the website. This was a key strategic 
objective for KASS, and relied upon effective liaison and collaboration with other parts 
of the organisation. The web team’s efforts at KASS were publicised both internally and 
externally for their good practice and the manager linked much of this success to his 
development of greater strategic and self-awareness on the diploma in management.  
 
The remaining two examples came from the operational side of the organisation and 
were concerned with the application of more specific managerial techniques. The 
locality organiser and the senior practitioner both described how they applied their new 
project management and change management knowledge to initiate and see through 
specific changes to services offered to clients. The locality organiser related how, as 
part of his final project on the diploma, he initiated and implemented the re-design of the 
clustering of care provision in his geographical area. Using project management tools, 
together with a deeper understanding of organisational strategy, he liaised with the 
appropriate stakeholders to create multi-disciplinary provision that was concentrated in 
the area of the district with the greatest need. The new service was said to meet clients’ 
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needs more effectively while achieving significant cost-savings. Similarly, the senior 
practitioner related how, building on her newfound self-confidence and strategic 
awareness, she applied change management tools to merge the work of two teams of 
staff to create a new ‘Home Service Active Care’ project in her district, making more 
effective use of the existing resources and savings of approximately £80,000.  
 
There is a strong correlation between the views expressed by the interviewees and 
Investors in People reports. The Investors in People report on KCC in June 2007 and 
the 2006/7 internal Investors in People review within KASS both commented on the 
capability and effectiveness of managers, as well as the strong focus on business 
planning. The former report observed that “Business planning is an inclusive process 
which means people understand the business activity of their service and the 
contribution they make” (Investors in People Re-assessment Report 2006/7 for KCC). 
The diploma and the other in-house management qualifications were clearly important 
in enabling this organisational process. MLD helped to reinforce the strong performance 
management culture, driven by regular one-to-one supervision meetings between 
managers and their staff, as well as the appraisal and development system, based on 
the Ways2Success framework developed in 2002. Performance management 
combined with a reward strategy that recognised achievement, including performance-
related pay (at KCC named ‘Total Contribution Pay’), cash and non-cash gifts, 
development leave days, away-days, social events and personal thank you cards. The 
diploma is best seen as part of a package of HR measures, but a key instrument within 
that package to reinforce the organisation’s line management processes.  
 
The additional evidence above lends support to the view that MLD played an important 
role in helping to promote improvements in HRM outcomes and organisational 
efficiency and effectiveness at KASS. The investment in management development 
qualifications was seen as having contributed to KCC’s achievement of ‘excellent’ 
ratings in the CSCI inspections and the Audit Commission’s Comprehensive 
Performance Assessments over the period from 1994 onwards. There were successive 
references in external reports to the effectiveness of leadership and the management of 
priorities across the council, and in social services specifically. The council achieved 
Investors in People accreditation in 1999 and retained its accreditation thereafter. 
Social worker vacancy rates declined to 12.25 per cent in 2000 and remained at a 6 per 
cent average from 2003 to 2006, as compared to a national rate of 9.4 per cent in 2006. 
The staff turnover rate in the newly created KASS directorate was lower than the 13 per 
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cent average for KCC and the 11.5 per cent rate for all employees in adult social care 
nationally in 2006 (KCC HR documentation; LGA 2007).  
 
Overall, as hypothesised, the diploma in management made a significant contribution to 
developing professional-managerial competence. The overall pattern of outcomes 
reported in the interviews strongly suggests that the diploma in management was 
effective in promoting efficiency and effectiveness in the professional bureaucracy. The 
most significant contribution of the diploma concerned the linking of managerial efforts 
to organisational strategy as it related to adult social care. This was underpinned by the 
learning of general and applied business management skills, such as financial 
management and health and safety management.  
 
Arguably the most striking aspect of the diploma’s success in developing competent 
middle managers at KASS is the individuals’ positive experiences of the competence-
based development programme. As observed in the previous chapter, experiences of 
competence-based MLD at LFB and among managers in Grugulis’ research (1997, 
2000) revealed much negativity and cynicism.  It is arguable, however, that the negative 
experiences at LFB had more to do with the portfolio-building process, than with the use 
of competence frameworks per se. The NVQ portfolio-building model had in fact been 
used for the diploma in management at KASS in the late-1990s. But, as one participant 
described it, it was neither a “proper management course“ nor “a learning experience“; 
rather “It was a ‘demonstrating one’s competence’ experience” (Interview with district 
manager 3).  
 
The experience of the diploma in management at KASS shows that competence-based 
management qualifications can be relevant, developmental and strategically aligned, so 
long as the underpinning knowledge and skills are learnt and applied in a 
contextualised way and are supported by complementary HR processes and an 
effective internal HR function. The complex, professional environment of adult social 
care management, often with vague and qualitative aims that need to be interpreted by 
managers rather than blindly implemented, appears to provide the conditions to avoid 
perfunctory and irrelevant evidence-gathering, and to support broad competence-based 
MLD that can be meaningfully applied.  
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6.3.2 Contribution of leader development (From Good to Great) 
   
The six From Good to Great interviewees were slightly more experienced and senior 
than the diploma interviewees, in line with the target group for this intervention. Two of 
them were district managers, and therefore from the middle line. The other four, from 
the service side of the directorate, were more mixed in terms of their responsibilities. 
Like the district managers, two of them managed front-line managers of specific service 
teams in performance planning and finance respectively. The remaining two included 
the head of contracting and quality assurance and a budget manager, both of whom 
line-managed teams of administrative staff.  
 
This group’s relative seniority was reflected in the prior experience of MLD of four of the 
six interviewees. Two had already participated in short residential leader development 
workshops earlier in their careers at KASS, and another two held recognised 
management qualifications (a diploma in management studies with an external provider 
and an in-house executive diploma in management). The group reflected the profile of 
KASS managers in that five of the six were female and all were long-serving, each with 
over ten years’ service. The group contained a mixture of professional and vocational 
backgrounds, although the district managers both came from health and social care 
backgrounds (one previously a social worker, the other a nurse).  
 
Figure 6.6 summarises the main findings of the interviews with the From Good to Great 
group. At the level of individual outcomes, a slightly fragmented pattern of critical 
incidents was observed, but a consistent theme was identifiable at the group level. The 
overall contribution to organisational-level outcomes was less clearly identifiable.  
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Individual outcomes Group outcomes Contribution to 
organisational 
outcomes 
Increased self-
awareness (5) 
 
Increased self-
confidence (1) 
 
Increased 
reflectiveness (1) 
 
Improved 
communication style 
(1) 
 
 
Extra effort from staff 
in outreach work (2) 
 
Improved stress-
management in the 
team (1) 
 
Development of 
services in the 
community (2) 
No change (1) 
 
  
 
(Brackets indicate number of interviewees) 
Figure 6.6 Outcomes of the From Good to Great course at Kent Adult Social 
Services 
 
 
At individual level, the most common outcome of From Good to Great was increased 
self-awareness, as is to be expected from introspective, individualised leader 
development interventions. There were, however, discernible differences in the degrees 
and types of self-awareness reported across the group. Without exception, the 
interviewees’ initial reflection on From Good to Great was to recognise the opportunity it 
provided to take ‘time out’ and reflect on one’s own practice, rather than absorb new 
theory or knowledge. However, the extent to which this time-out manifested itself in 
changed practice was less identifiable. Indeed, one manager suggested that, for her, 
From Good to Great had a sedative, rather than changing effect:  
 
I have to be honest… I am incredibly busy in my job and I use these [courses] to reflect. 
So even if they sat there and played nursery rhymes, it would be something that would 
be good for work (Interview with head of contracting and QA) 
 
 
The other From Good to Great interviewees invariably spoke of the opportunity to 
reflect on their personalities, particularly in terms of how they were perceived in their 
interactions with colleagues. Emphasis was placed on communication skills, notably the 
use of body language and the voice, and listening and questioning techniques. As one 
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interviewee described it, the programme “took you through the whole process of human 
interaction” (interview with district manager 1).  
 
Despite similarities in the reflections on the content of From Good to Great, however, 
the strength of the impact at individual level varied across the group. For district 
manager 1, for example, the course was “very freeing…. chang[ing] what I do and how I 
do it”. For the head of performance and planning, although “nothing new, amazing [or] 
different”, the programme was “just what I needed”. For those interviewees with 
previous experience of MLD, however, From Good to Great made much less of an 
impact. For the area finance manager and district manager 2, it provided some practical 
skills to complement the more theoretical but also more substantial diploma and 
executive diploma programmes. For the head of contracting and QA, it was a collection 
of “lots of little things”, but adding up to much less than her learning from a previous 
leader development workshop. Therefore, in contrast to the sensationalist rhetoric of 
From Good to Great, the overall reality of the learner’s experience was more mundane.  
 
In addition to variability in the strength of the reported increase in self-awareness, there 
were differences among the interviewees in its application. For example, district 
manager 1 saw herself as “energetic”, “strong” and “powerful”, but realised during From 
Good to Great that her impatient style could be overbearing and counterproductive 
when dealing with others. In contrast, district manager 2 came to the realisation that he 
needed to be more authoritative in the way that he communicated, particularly when 
reporting upwards. Similarly, the head of performance and planning learnt ways of 
becoming more direct and decisive in order to be more effective. In a different vein, the 
area finance manager’s increased self-awareness took the form of fresh insights into 
her work-life balance.   
 
At team level, three interviewees made connections between their increased self-
awareness and perceived changes in their team members’ behaviour. District manager 
1 and the head of performance and planning related similar critical incidents concerning 
strategies to motivate individual members of staff to become more engaged in outreach 
services, which necessitated working beyond the boundaries of the council to 
collaborate more closely with voluntary sector groups. The former related how “I could 
never get … this guy to actually ever be involved in anything at all in the voluntary 
sector”. However, as a result of insights gained through From Good to Great, she took a 
less directive approach with this individual, with the effect that within a few months he 
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had attached himself to three subcommittees for various community projects. As the 
district manager explained: 
 
I just actually talked through what we needed …and … how we could input, and what he 
saw as what should our role be in this, given the changes to ways local authorities were 
working, and getting him to think about it rather than me dictate…. [Now he’s] actually 
getting involved in the most deprived ward of [the district]… And it’s actually beginning to 
get us, as social services, as a positive force in there, rather than an authority to be 
avoided at all costs (Interview with district manager 1) 
 
Similarly, the head of performance and planning related how she learnt to adopt an 
uncharacteristically searching and challenging approach to questioning in order to 
motivate a recalcitrant manager to work more effectively on community-based projects:  
 
[T]he kind of questions I would be saying to him were “How did you help Jane to express 
that?” or “Are you working with Paul to make sure that he understands this?”, to get him 
thinking more about how he could be more effective during the process, and then 
subsequently to make sure that he’s still linked in…. [H]e’s coming to me more now with 
suggestions and examples of what he’s doing.… [H]e is actually doing more to generate 
the evidence (Interview with head of performance and planning – names changed).  
 
The similarity between the two incidents is striking. It reflects a small but strategic 
success of From Good to Great in enabling managers with limited previous experience 
of MLD to convert intrapersonal insights into changing the behaviour of others to make 
greater efforts to reach out beyond the team.  
 
In a slightly different example, the budget manager described how the extra confidence 
in her leadership and management abilities gained through From Good to Great 
enabled her to take a more proactive and empowering approach to addressing low 
morale and negative attitudes within her team. The pace and scale of change in adult 
social care in the early-2000s and the subsequent increase in reporting activity had 
clearly put the finance function under significant strain. As the budget manager 
described:  
 
I think it [From Good to Great] made me help the team because I’d gone through a stage 
where I said “I am just fed up with their constant moaning. I can see why they’re 
moaning. They’re not going to change anything through moaning. Why do they have to 
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keep moaning and being so miserable?” …. I think we got … into this rut. I said … “I’ve 
really got to pull them out of it”. This ‘Good to Great’ really did it (Interview with budget 
manager) 
 
The manager related how she organised and led an away-day for her team, designed to 
enable her team members to identify for themselves how they might manage workloads 
and their stress more effectively. Apart from the team “seeming happier” afterwards, the 
more tangible result of the away-day was for team members to be more assertive in 
their negotiations around deadlines for providing reports to other teams, which was, 
according to the budget manager, a “big change for them”.  
 
The above three examples of leader development outcomes are clear cases of 
improvements in mutual adjustment between professional colleagues, both within and 
beyond the organisation. In the cases of the other three managers, however, their 
communication styles were already informed and shaped by previous experience of 
MLD. From Good to Great was therefore superficial and inconsequential by comparison 
to the diploma or executive diploma.  
 
With regard to contribution to organisational-level outcomes, only two interviewees were 
able to make connections between their From Good to Great-related learning and 
consequences for KASS’ services. Two incidences, were, however, of a similar 
strategic nature and are worth exploring. District manager 1 and the head of 
performance and planning, who related more effective interactions with individual team 
members and their subsequent extra efforts with the voluntary sector, were both able to 
identify specific projects where these extra efforts were having an impact. For example, 
district manager 1, referring back to the reluctant team member described above, 
observed that:  
 
[The voluntary sector partners are] saying he’s happy to resolve issues, he’s happy to 
work with them on developing some of their processes and they really value his 
presence there. And what it means is that I have a very solid social services presence 
on various steering committees – on ‘Headway’ [a sheltered housing project for people 
with acquired brain injury], one my befriending services and one of the neighbourhood 
programmes that [the] Council is dealing with. And they’ve all got excellent things to say 
about him, which I never thought ever that they would. (Interview with district manager 
1) 
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In the context of improving collaboration between KASS and the voluntary sector, it is 
also interesting to note the experiences of district manager 2. While he did not consider 
From Good to Great to be particularly significant for him, his participation in the 
council’s executive diploma in management led him to initiate and manage a social 
enterprise. The manager’s project, as part of the executive diploma, involved the setting 
up and running of a wood recycling business as a collaboration between voluntary 
groups that worked with people with learning disabilities, the local authority and a 
external funding body.  
 
Like changes in team behaviour, such changes at business level are difficult to 
measure and evidence. But they are significant for this type of organisation. The 
professional bureaucracy requires its staff to engage in external liaison and to help 
introduce new ways of working into the organisation. It appears that the leader 
development intervention in this case had some small success in promoting this 
professionalised approach. However, the necessary conditions for success appeared to 
be that the participants had little or no previous experience of MLD, and that they 
managed the type of service that provided its team members with the opportunities to 
reach out beyond the organisation.  
 
Overall, while the individual level outcomes across the From Good to Great sample 
were somewhat fragmented, they converged in terms of their contribution at group and 
organisational levels. It may be that the individual outcomes might have been more 
coherent had this leader development intervention been more extensive in terms of its 
methods. For example 360-degree feedback and coaching did not feature within the 
course, or as a follow-up activity. However, the evidence suggests that the intervention 
as it stood succeeded in making some managers more reflective and enabled them to 
develop more motivating relationships with staff in relation to the organisation’s 
strategic goals. Therefore, as hypothesised, elements of intrapersonal competence 
were developed at individual level as a result of leader development, albeit in a 
relatively weak form, and these were linked to evidence of expected group- and 
organisational-level effects.  
 
6.3.3 Contribution of leadership development (Inspirational Leadership) 
 
Of all the middle managers interviewed, the Inspirational Leadership interviewees were 
typical of the middle line at KASS. They included four district managers and a 
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‘continuous improvement’ manager from the support side of the service. The 
interviewees were long-serving (all the district managers had over ten years’ service, 
the continuous improvement manager had six) and comprised of three female and two 
males. Three of the district managers were qualified social workers, and the fourth was 
an occupational therapist, reflecting typical professional health and social care routes 
into management. (The continuous improvement manager had originally worked as a 
human resource manager). All five interviewees held recognised management 
qualifications, dating from before the introduction of the in-house diploma in 2005. 
Figure 6.7 summarises the main findings of the interviews with the Inspirational 
Leadership group.  
 
 
Individual outcomes Group outcomes Contribution to 
organisational  
outcomes 
 
 
Increased self-
awareness (3) 
 
Increased strategic 
awareness (1) 
 
Improved partnership-
working (1) 
 
More effective 
interactions with 
colleagues (1) 
 
Greater effectiveness 
in working across 
boundaries (1) 
 
 
 
Improved strategic 
implementation - 
actions from the 
County District 
Managers Group (4) 
No change (2)  
 
(Brackets indicate number of interviewees) 
Figure 6.7 Outcomes of the Inspirational Leadership programme at Kent Adult 
Social Services 
 
 
The interviews in this group were small in number but painted a consistent picture of 
MLD outcomes. As Figure 6.7 shows, while the strength of the impact of Inspirational 
Leadership was variable at individual level, and patterns of outcomes were difficult to 
identify at group level, there was notable congruence at organisational level. The 
intervention was significant for three individuals in terms of a perceived greater self-
awareness, particularly in terms of how they worked with others outside the team. The 
most striking finding, however, related to the contribution to organisational-level 
outcomes. All four district managers, whether or not they found Inspirational Leadership 
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to have been significant for them as individuals, recognised the importance of the 
County District Managers Group that resulted from the action learning sets.  
 
Like From Good to Great, Inspirational Leadership did not have a universally strong 
impact. For two of the five managers interviewed, the intervention failed to cover new 
ground or lead to any particular new insights. Again, this was mainly due to previous 
experience of more substantial MLD interventions. As district manager 3 related:  
 
Building paper boats and things like that isn’t something I need to do to learn something 
from…. Some people find it very interesting because it gets peers together … they talk 
about issues that are very interesting and the facilitator interjects with occasionally 
models and theories that actually fit what people are saying. You may learn from that, 
and you may be able to take something away from that, and you may not…. it depends 
on where you are at in your development and your knowledge. (Interview with district 
manager 3) 
 
 
For the other three interviewees, however, the introspective exercises, and the periodic 
sharing of experiences with peers over several months, enabled them to reflect on their 
leadership styles and how they related to others. For example, the activities of the 
programme enabled district manager 6 to take a calmer and more measured approach 
to working with her managerial colleagues. As she related:  
 
I think we did one [exercise], we were made boats or something, and mine had to be 
done, dusted, sorted and floating before anybody else’s…[laughing] and I learnt that 
“Actually … you might have upset three other people, even though the boat floats” 
(Interview with district manager 6) 
 
As a result of exercises such as the boat-building example, this manager reflected:  
 
I think I realised that actually it’s okay that other people can join in and not get there as 
quick as you can, and that’s fine. It makes it a richer kind of thing if you’ve brought 
people along as opposed to just treading on them because they can’t get it [laughs] 
(Interview with district manager 6) 
 
This manager believed that such insights into her own behaviour helped her to be more 
effective in interacting with senior managers and colleagues from partner organisations.  
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Similarly, district manager 4 argued that the discussions with other district managers 
during Inspirational Leadership and learning about different perspectives had helped 
him to be more effective in his interactions with staff and care-provider partners. 
Although he did not provide any specific examples, this manager claimed that the 
Inspirational Leadership programme enabled him to use his ‘emotional intelligence’ 
more effectively by “thinking a bit more carefully about your options in terms of how you 
respond and the outcome that you are seeking, rather than necessarily just thinking 
about how you feel like responding” (Interview with district manager 4).  
 
The continuous improvement manager made more specific links between her individual 
style and wider organisational objectives. The Inspirational Leadership activities 
enabled her to gain more insights into strategic issues, “rather than being so 
introspective and territorial”. In particular, working together with colleagues on a live 
case of a prison-building project in Chile provided the opportunity to experiment and 
reflect on her own style. This, she believed, enhanced her ability to work more 
effectively in an unfamiliar directorate, “accepting that the environment and practices 
are different [to what I’m used to] but that I am the best person for the job” (Interview 
with continuous improvement manager). Indeed, the tendency to look ‘up and out’, 
rather than ‘down the line’, was a notable theme within the reported individual outcomes 
of Inspirational Leadership.  
 
The effects at group level of this tendency to reach out beyond the team were 
discernable in three of the five interviews. District manager 4 argued that the reflections 
from the Inspirational Leadership programme enabled him to become more effective not 
only in dealing with performance issues with his staff but also in contract negotiations 
with care-providers. In a similar vein, the continuous improvement manager made 
connections between her learning on the Inspirational Leadership programme and 
greater effectiveness in working with managers across the KASS directorate to maintain 
the Investors in People standards. In the clearest example, district manager 6 described 
how, as a result of intrapersonal insights from the Inspirational Leadership programme, 
she changed her approach to planning the redesign of dementia care services in her 
district:  
 
One of the concerns is I’m not an expert on dementia … so I felt very vulnerable on that 
side of it. I also really need help on board… this particular part of health have been quite 
 247 
difficult …they just don’t seem that organised. They don’t seem to have the …will or 
enthusiasm to get this going…. I could do this without health and without the voluntary 
sector because we could still deliver our social care bit, and before I probably would 
have just thought ‘Oh, just get on with it’ , whereas now I’ll keep going back and keep 
bringing them back to the table. (Interview with district manager 6) 
  
 
The last three examples illustrate how Inspirational Leadership seemed to enable 
middle managers to pay attention to specific strategic relationships beyond the team. 
While the programme does not appear to have contributed significantly to HR-related 
improvements in the conventional sense of increasing staff motivation and commitment, 
its principal contribution may have been to improve the effectiveness of relationships 
between internal and external partners.  
 
Tangible organisational-level outcomes emerged from the specific focus on care 
management within the Inspirational Leadership intervention. The action learning sets 
that followed the structured part of the programme, converted with time into County 
District Manager Group meetings. These were effectively bimonthly development 
meetings for district managers, convened by the district managers themselves and held 
without the presence of the trainer-facilitator. Even the two interviewees who did not 
feel they had personally benefited from the Inspirational Leadership programme 
considered the creation of this structure to be a significant outcome for the directorate. 
As district manager 3, who had been dismissive of the boat-building exercise, 
explained:  
 
[T]he learning sets became … business meetings.... that for me was the big outcome 
really, that we’ve now got a meeting which, to me, addresses the kind of things I hear 
other people talk about because they’re of great importance and troublesome to me. 
(Interview with district manager 3) 
 
As a direct result of the Inspirational Leadership intervention, the County District 
Managers Group became an information-sharing and joint problem-solving forum for 
addressing issues of strategic implementation, and had already led to some concrete 
organisational changes by the middle of 2007.  
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To an extent, the County District Managers Group filled the structural void in the 
organisation’s hierarchy by providing district managers with the opportunity to come 
together from across the county to standardise their activities, as devolution and 
restructuring had tended to isolate them from one another. The group was, however, 
more than just a missing part of the restructured bureaucracy. The terms of reference of 
the County District Managers Group specifically defined its role as providing ‘a reality 
check’ on the policy decisions being made at senior management levels. Indeed, the 
minutes of the County District Managers Group meetings from 2006-07 illustrate the 
wide range of policy issues that were discussed, including the arrangements for direct 
payments to care-providers by clients and the introduction of twenty-four-hours-a-day, 
virtual and remote care-provision.  
 
The County District Managers Group was also more than a mere ‘talking shop’ or a 
short-lived initiative of a few enthusiastic district managers. Notably, the group was 
responsible for the pioneering, developing, piloting and rolling out a new manual called 
‘Commissioning for Performance’ with an accompanying training programme, to help 
especially new district managers navigate the intricacies of commissioning care 
services. In addition, it became a recognised group that various senior managers would 
also attend to discuss the practicalities of relevant policy decisions. As district manager 
5 explained:  
 
We have become a formally recognised group of managers with which the senior 
management team consults and seeks views before they actually come up with a new 
strategy or policy and implement it. We advise them of what is sensible, realistic, 
possible or not, because we have a better understanding of the basics of the business. 
(Interview with district manager 5) 
 
District manager 3 was similarly enthusiastic:  
 
We now have a really very vibrant county district managers group which is attended by 
our heads of services and also influences policy because we feed those things that we 
discuss back to HQ and they are now communicating with us. That’s really been very 
positive. (Interview with district manager 3) 
 
The history of problems in strategy-implementation at KASS is evident from external 
reports. While the CSCI 2007 report commented that “the senior management team 
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provide robust leadership and a vision on the direction of travel” (2007: 3-4), the 2008 
Corporate Assessment for KCC also remarked that:   
 
The carry-through of priorities into business and delivery plans, although generally good, 
has some gaps and needs better quality-checking. Targets tend to be over-focused on 
achieving planned activity rather than on outcomes for local people, and are not always 
SMART.  (Audit Commission 2008: 21 para 65) 
 
 
The issue of poorly implemented strategy is especially pertinent for the middle line. For 
example, district manager 6, who was instrumental in setting up the County District 
Managers Group, described the introduction of a new electronic system for monitoring 
and paying for the work of care-providers in 2006:  
 
[The district managers] kept saying this isn’t going to work, and then …we get an email 
from HQ saying “You have to make this work”… it’s a ridiculous system, and we can’t 
make it work. We’d love to make it work, I’m a great believer that it should work and we 
need it, because that’s the future. But the actual practicalities of it, the detail, they don’t 
want to hear…. it just puts more pressure on the very people that are supposed to 
implement it (Interview with district manager 6) 
 
As a result of the problems with the new electronic payment system in 2006, many 
care-providers either did not get paid at all or did not receive correct payments for 
several months. This situation was said to have ‘rattled’ relationships between the 
partners and significantly increased the stress on staff at KASS.  
 
With respect to MLD, therefore, the importance for the middle line of learning to 
manage external relationships is heightened in this type of professional bureaucracy, 
which increasingly engaged in partnership work and more adhocratic working methods. 
The collective and emergent learning activities of the Inspirational Leadership 
programme appeared to enable this direction of organisational change at KASS. As 
district manager 6 put it:  
 
You want the good ideas, you want all of those things, but you want some time and 
space and some understanding of how we deliver them, really. (Interview with district 
manager 6) 
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Overall, as hypothesised with regard to leadership development, the Inspirational 
Leadership intervention largely succeeded in developing interpersonal competence at 
individual level, particularly with regard to improved problem-solving, socialisation, 
teamwork and strategy-implementation. That individual-level outcomes were not more 
strongly evident appeared to be related to inappropriate matching of candidates to the 
intervention, and thus a relative lack of HRD competence in the organisation. 
Alternatively, the uneven nature of the individual responses may be inherent in the 
open-ended and deliberately vague approach to learning in this type of development 
activity, which does not meet the needs of those individuals who prefer working towards 
more specific and explicit learning outcomes.  
 
The reported group- and organisational-level outcomes of Inspirational Leadership 
resembled the hypothetical outcomes, but strongly illustrated the influence of job and 
organisational context. At group level, instead of innovation in the sense of the 
generation of new ideas for business processes, Inspirational Leadership led to 
innovation in the form of the County District Managers group, which improved 
collaboration between managers and external partners. Similarly, at organisational-
level, instead of emergent strategic change in the sense of developing new services or 
markets, Inspirational Leadership enabled middle managers to shape organisational 
strategy, rather than develop or redirect it. Leadership development, and perhaps 
project management training, therefore contributed to a movement in the direction of 
greater adhocracy at KASS, but in a way that was consistent with the constraints of the 
local authority, social care institutional arrangements and the middle manager’s 
authority.  
 
 
6.4 Assessment  
 
The case of KASS has provided a detailed insight into the potential and actual role of 
MLD in a managerialised professional bureaucracy that sought to introduce a greater 
degree of adhocracy. While generally consistent with the theoretical expectations of 
contingent MLD options and outcomes set out in Chapter 2, the case highlights the 
importance of specific internal and wider institutional factors in enabling and shaping 
the actual MLD contribution during this type of organisational change. The expected 
and actual outcomes of MLD at KASS are summarised in Figure 6.8.  
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Structural 
transition and 
change in the 
middle line 
MLD 
intervention 
Individual 
outcomes 
Group 
outcomes 
Organisational 
outcomes 
 
Adhocratisation 
  
Role C→D 
 
 
PMD 
 
PMC 
 
 
 
Staff compliance 
and commitment 
 
Stability and 
adjustment in the 
professional 
bureaucracy 
 
 
 
Emergent 
strategic change 
 
[Contribution of 
middle managers 
to shaping 
organisational 
strategy] 
  
LD 
 
Intrapersonal 
competence 
 PJMD  PJMC  
 
LSD 
 
Interpersonal 
competence 
 
Innovation 
 
[Improved 
collaboration 
between 
managers and 
with external 
partners] 
 
 
Role C = professional middle line management; Role D = middle leadership; PMD = professional 
management development; LD = leader development; PJMD = project management development; 
PMC = professional managerial competence; PJMC = project management competence 
Small font denotes small intervention and outcomes; italics denote actual outcomes at KASS 
 
Figure 6.8 Actual options and outcomes of MLD at Kent Adult social services 
 
 
Figure 6.8 illustrates how the three main MLD interventions for middle managers at 
KASS in 2005-7 reflected the expectation that such an organisation would invest in 
professional management development (PMD), leader development (LD) and 
leadership development (LSD). It was also expected that the pressure for change in the 
direction of adhocracy would result in a greater supply of project management 
development (PJMD). However, there was little evidence of widespread investment in 
project management training at KASS; only two of the eighteen interviewees referred 
specifically to their experiences in this area. Apart from relatively weak subsequent 
outcomes in the area of project management competence (PJMC), the other types of 
competence at individual level (PMC, intrapersonal competence and interpersonal 
competence) were in evidence as a result of PMD, leader development and leadership 
development, as hypothesised.  
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A counterfactual pattern of MLD options would have been, for example, that KASS 
invested in a narrower type of management training, such as at SWT. Alternatively it 
might have neglected leader development, as at LFB. A counterfactual set of MLD 
outcomes would have been that the three main programmes produced either null or 
negative outcomes, or produced outcomes that followed unexpected patterns. While 
there were some examples of null outcomes, such as in the From Good to Great 
programme, which failed to make a significant impact in changing some managers’ 
practice, the reasons for this were linked to inappropriate candidate-selection for the 
programmes due to a lack of operational HRD competence in the organisation, rather 
than the inappropriateness of intervention itself. There were also some examples of 
unexpected patterns of outcomes, in that management development (represented by 
the diploma in management) was observed to lead to outcomes of greater intrapersonal 
competence for some individuals, as well as the more general type of managerial 
competence. This type of overlap is, however, to be expected in any management 
development intervention that devotes some attention to reflecting on one’s 
management style and its fit with organisational goals. Similarly, the leadership 
programme at KASS (Inspirational Leadership) was also observed to produce some 
examples of improved intrapersonal competence, which overlapped with its main 
expected outcome of interpersonal competence. However, as Day (2001) argues, the 
building up social capital and networks of relationships through leadership development 
is actually based on individual managers’ intrapersonal qualities, thus “highlight[ing] the 
importance of developing both intrapersonal and interpersonal competence, and the 
linking of leader and leadership development” (p.585, emphasis added).  
 
The largely positive nature of the interview accounts of MLD from middle managers, on 
which these conclusions rely, raises the possibility of Hawthorne effects. However, it is 
notable that the positive accounts were counterbalanced to an extent by some negative 
accounts and the inability of some interviewees to describe critical incidents of change, 
particularly in the cases of leader and leadership development. This indicates that the 
volunteer sample of interviewees was not uniformly subject to Hawthorne effects and 
that the use of the snowballing selection technique had some success in sourcing a 
group of relatively typical participants in MLD who could offer objective expert witness 
accounts. Unlike LFB, middle managers at KASS were relatively removed from the 
front-line operating core, often in an ‘arm’s length’ commissioning relationship, rather 
than intimately bound up with a watch or shift culture. KASS managers who offered 
negative or neutral accounts therefore had less incentive than at LFB to downplay the 
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effects of MLD as an expression of managerial resistance to the organisation’s 
changing aims. Similarly, the managers who gave positive accounts of MLD’s effects 
had little personal investment or incentive to promote or defend the organisational 
policies that they claimed to have learnt to implement more effectively. In fact, 
interviewees were sometimes very expressive of the difficulties of implementing KCC’s 
organisational policies, a point which is returned to below.  
 
To return to the proposed structural explanation for the pattern of MLD investment at 
KASS, it is instructive to consider the weak investment made in project management 
development. It could be argued that the lack of emphasis on project management 
training should be explained by a lack of operational HRD competence at KCC, in that 
the HRD function simply failed to identify, prioritise or sufficiently resource this important 
development need. However, a more structural explanation would be that, in 2007, the 
adoption of project-based, adhocratic working methods was actually insufficiently 
advanced at KASS, and that there was a relatively weak demand for training in this 
area.  
 
The way that the pattern of MLD choices developed from 2007 onwards reinforces this 
more structural explanation. In particular, the eventual fate of the Inspirational 
Leadership programme lends support to the interpretation that MLD strategy at KASS 
was an enabler of limited adhocracy, and that greater adhocracy would have produced 
greater demand for leadership development as well as project management 
development (PJMD). After eighteen months of activity, the programme was scrapped 
towards the end of 2007 in favour of From Good to Great. This was partly due to 
internal politics (the former programme was KASS-based, whereas its replacement, 
From Good to Great, was administered by the central KCC learning and development 
function). However, the change in MLD strategy can also be interpreted as a reflection 
of the pressure to standardise leader development at the centre, rather than continue to 
sponsor decentralised and unpredictable leadership development activity in one of the 
directorates.  
 
In 2006, KASS was still in the aftermath of a period of restructuring and in the early 
stages of a new directorate for adult social care, so Inspirational Leadership provided 
the middle line with the opportunity to make sense of the new and complex 
organisational environment, and to consolidate the new working methods required by it. 
The subsequent creation of a new and more flexible structure within the directorate, the 
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County District Managers Group, to support the refashioned middle line and its role in 
helping to implement strategy, superseded the contribution of the Inspirational 
Leadership programme. In effect, the Inspirational Leadership intervention served the 
temporary objective of increasing adaptive capacity at this level of the organisation, 
then became formalised and incorporated into a new structure.  
 
Despite the scrapping of Inspirational Leadership, there is evidence to suggest that 
adhocratisation pressures persisted and were manifested in other MLD interventions 
that were directed at more senior managers. In particular, a leadership development 
programme for the council’s senior managers and local partners, the ‘Kent Leadership 
Programme’, was run from September 2006 and sustained at least until 2010 (I&DeA 
2010). The council’s HRD function intended to extend this programme to middle 
managers, but it is unclear whether this actually came to fruition.  
 
While the experience of project management development and Inspirational Leadership 
illustrate the limits of adhocratisation at KASS, the experience of the two larger 
interventions at KASS - the diploma in management and From Good to Great - provides 
strong empirical support for the overall theoretical model. These two interventions also 
provide some additional insights into how MLD contributes in the professional 
bureaucracy.  
 
The diploma in management at KASS was closely aligned with a clear and distinct 
organisational strategy. As such, it is a good example of an MLD intervention that 
provides direct support to the efficiency and the effectiveness of the managerialised 
professional bureaucracy. The intervention was neither purely ‘managerial’ nor purely 
‘professional’, but a contextualised blend of both. The experience of the diploma in 
management at KASS illustrates the necessary balancing act between managerial and 
professional demands that is inherent to the developing of the middle line in 
managerialised professional bureaucracies. It also illuminates the potential tensions 
between these contributions, depending on the strength of internal strategic alignment 
on the one hand, and the professional discretion afforded to managers on the other. 
While the clarity of strategic goals, and their communication throughout the 
organisation, will necessarily vary from organisation to organisation, the freedom of 
middle managers to allocate resources and to initiate changes to services is also likely 
to vary.  To an extent this degree of freedom is dependent on the professional expertise 
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required to make managerial decisions and the extent to which managers are 
constrained by professional regulations.  
 
KASS illustrated a set of circumstances in which both organisational strategy was 
clearly communicated and the middle line exercised considerable professional 
discretion over how to allocate resources and provide services. With regard to the 
diploma in management, the strong corporate focus was the source of both its main 
strength and its main weakness. On the one hand, the interviews and external reports 
support the view that the diploma and other in-house management qualifications helped 
ensure that the organisation was efficiently and effectively managed by establishing 
clear and consistent expectations at all levels. On the other hand, there is also evidence 
that the inward-looking content of the programme potentially discouraged managers 
from adopting a broader outlook on their management and leadership responsibilities.  
 
The perception that KCC management qualifications were excessively inward-looking 
derived from what some saw as a more general organisational culture of arrogance. As 
one district manager expressed it:  
 
KCC is very different to other organisations. It’s a little world of its own. And you have to 
learn the KCC-speak, the KCC politics, the KCC philosophy…. if you want to be part of 
that you have to actually convert to it. Because the theory is that it’s different but also 
superior to everywhere else…. Kent has three stars, it’s an ‘excellent’ authority but it’s 
also quite arrogant about its importance in the world. And the fact is that there are other 
authorities doing good things out there that KCC might be able to learn, but of course 
that isn’t the way (Interview with district manager 3) 
 
Far from simply representing the views of one disgruntled employee, the above criticism 
of KCC was echoed in the 2008 Corporate Assessment by the Audit Commission:  
 
The Council has for ten years been seeking excellence and its organisation is 
impressive, high-quality, responsive and gives good value-for-money. But this has 
required a drive and firmness of direction that is seen by some as over-dominant…. 
Although KCC's strengths are widely-appreciated, there is some alienation at what is 
perceived by some to be an over-dominant style with some local partners that does not 
take enough time to listen and build consensus. KCC's branding is active and strong, but 
this can be misconstrued as an over-inclination to take credit for partnership work…. 
 256 
The Council can be unproductively sensitive to external criticism. (Audit Commission 
2008: 6-7) 
 
Therefore, while the diploma made an important contribution to managerial 
effectiveness and efficiency in terms of internal strategic alignment, it may also have 
contributed to constraining the effectiveness of the external dimension of corporate 
strategy.  
 
Counterbalancing the constraints of centralisation and standardisation at KASS were 
the professional traditions of its health and social care middle managers. In particular, 
the tradition of regular one-to-one supervision, common in health and social care work, 
seemed to complement the emphasis placed at KCC on rigorous and active line 
management. In this sense, the diploma’s promotion of the managerial practice of 
regular negotiation and monitoring of strategically-aligned work objectives with staff was 
reinforced by other professional practices. Also, the relatively high degree of discretion 
required for managerial decision-making in the social care field meant that middle 
managers were able to exercise considerable influence over how strategic plans were 
implemented and how priorities were best communicated and negotiated with staff. 
Managerial decisions in social work were still relatively non-routine and unpredictable; 
particularly the intricacies of commissioning care for individual care plans required 
relatively advanced specialist knowledge. Therefore, instead of encouraging a passive 
role for the middle line as top-down implementers of strategic plans, the lessons learnt 
about internal strategic alignment in the diploma were necessarily applied in a way that 
required professionally informed choices.  
 
Two generalisations may be made with regard to professional management 
development (PMD). Firstly, in an organisation with a weaker approach to strategic 
management, this type of MLD is likely to make a weaker contribution to managerial 
effectiveness, as the lack of direction and clear parameters in which to apply one’s 
managerial learning are more likely to exist. Secondly, those professionals, who face 
less technical complexity in managerial decision-making, are likely to be less able to 
apply their learning, as the opportunities to make decisions about the allocation of 
resources are less likely to exist. The strength of strategic management and the degree 
of specialist knowledge required in managerial decisions seem to be the two important 
variables in the effectiveness of professional management development.  
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The partial impact of From Good to Great provides an insight into the importance of a 
specific type of HRD competence in leader development. Some of the interviewees’ 
experiences suggested that leader development can play an important role in 
developing greater intrapersonal awareness in middle managers in this type of 
organisational environment, particularly for those without prior MLD experience or for 
those facing new demands to reach out beyond the team. But the overall experience 
from KASS highlights the dangers of investing in sporadic leader development 
interventions in large institutional settings without paying sufficient attention to 
diagnosing individual MLD needs or investment in follow-up and ongoing development 
activity for individuals, such as through coaching and mentoring. The tendency to use 
over-generalised, off-the-shelf leader development methods may be accentuated in 
professional bureaucracies, due to their typically large size, which encourages the use 
of economies of scale, rather than well-tailored individualised interventions. If sparingly 
employed and well-targeted, however, the case study evidence does suggest that even 
brief and standardised leader development interventions can, as hypothesised, 
contribute to enabling more effective mutual adjustment in professional environments.  
 
Finally, the experience of the Inspirational Leadership programme illustrates how 
structural transition in the direction of multi-disciplinary, project-based work, as 
hypothesised, may be enabled to an extent by leadership development for middle 
managers. However, the contribution of leadership development for this group of 
managers was also shown to be limited to specific windows of opportunity for 
organisational change. In effect, leadership development for middle managers was 
shown here to be an enabler of limited adhocratisation, or a more flexible bureaucracy 
(c.f. Boxall and Purcell 2008: 212).  
 
Overall, the KASS case study provides a contextualised account of how MLD for middle 
managers enabled stability in the professional bureaucracy and a limited move in the 
direction of adhocracy. That MLD did not promote a more substantial contribution to 
adhocratisation is explained by a relative lack of HRD competence in relation to leader 
and leadership development and by the constraints of institutional regulations and mid-
hierarchy job roles.  
 
Some of the evidence, on which these conclusions rely, might be interpreted in 
alternative ways. Firstly, one might advance a neo-institutionalist rather than a structural 
and strategic organisational explanation for the findings. In particular, one might argue 
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that the indicators of KASS’s improved organisational performance, as in the reports 
from the Audit Commission and CSCI, do not represent real organisational efficiencies. 
Instead it might be argued that they represent the enthusiasm of the HR function and 
senior management to follow the prevailing norms in the sector, which themselves are 
based on highly subjective measures of performance. In this interpretation, MLD’s role 
in aligning managers’ actions to the organisation’s objectives, particularly through the 
more prescriptive interventions such as the diploma in management, represents an 
exercise in conformance to institutional requirements, rather an instrument to help meet 
the strategic needs of the professional bureaucracy. Similarly, the investments in leader 
development and leadership development could be simply seen as a reflection of 
managerial fashions in the local government sector, rather than a strategic commitment 
to improving staff motivation and organisational adaptation. That the leader and 
leadership development interventions were only partially effective would be further 
evidence that they represented little more than a faddish preoccupation with the rhetoric 
of inspirational leadership and innovation.  
 
The problem with this line of argument is that the KASS case suggests a strong 
contribution by MLD, alongside other interventions, to real improvements in HRM and 
organisational outcomes. This is evident not least in the alleviation of the severe 
turnover problem amongst social workers and the stabilising of the organisation in the 
early-2000s. Moreover, the externally-commissioned reports of improved organisational 
effectiveness in the mid-2000s resonated strongly with interviewees’ concrete examples 
of improved professional-managerial collaborations and of more effective work with 
external partners as a result of MLD. In view of such observations, it would be too 
simplistic to explain the substantial investments in the three MLD interventions merely 
as products of mimeticism.   
 
The second and related main alternative interpretation of the KASS case study findings 
would be to explain the MLD investments as largely successful instruments of political 
control. In this interpretation MLD would be seen as a strategy to neutralise the 
resistance of professionals to managerialist reforms and to co-opt them into the 
marketisation and modernisation agendas. KASS managers’ general enthusiasm for 
MLD would therefore be explained as a part of a process of reinforcement of the values 
and priorities of policy elites, which senior professionals learn to accept and internalise 
in return for the rewards of managerial status and salary.  Similarly, the encouragement 
for managers to form action learning sets, and the subsequent semi-formal recognition 
 259 
of the County District Managers’ Group, would be interpreted as an incorporation 
strategy, in which professionals appear to take on new managerial responsibilities 
readily and voluntarily, yet in which no real extra competence or empowerment is 
actually developed.  
 
There is no doubt that the marketisation and modernisation reforms in the UK have 
produced some deep unease amongst social workers and other care professionals 
about compromises in ethical and public service values (see for example The Guardian, 
'Deep sense of shame', Social care special issue, 1 August 2007). There are also wider 
societal concerns about the quality of care provided at the front line and hence the 
extent to which organisational and management improvements such as those reported 
by CSCI may be seen as meaningful (see for example Beresford 2008). All of this 
reinforces the argument that perceptions of improved managerial effectiveness are very 
far removed from the realities of social care on the ground.  
 
However, the evidence from KASS suggests a conscious and voluntary congruence 
between individual and organisational managers’ goals, particularly with regard to the 
strategic objectives of personalising care and providing integrated services in 
collaboration with the NHS and private and voluntary sector organisations. Indeed, the 
interviewees were on the whole very reflective about the balancing of their professional 
values with managerial priorities. The main resistance or unease detected among 
individual managers concerned the level of resourcing for their clients’ care, rather than 
the acceptance of responsibility for it. Local responsibility for commissioning and 
partnership arrangements for care was generally seen as an opportunity for managers 
to exercise both professional discretion and their generic management skills. MLD 
interventions, despite some poor internal HRD-management and some institutional 
constraints, were largely experienced as positive learning processes that enabled 
managers to serve the needs of the professional bureaucracy and more adhocratic 
ways of working.  
 
On balance, therefore, the KASS case supports the central hypothesis that MLD 
options and outcomes are shaped by structural organisational contingencies. The 
extent to which all three case studies collectively support the range of hypotheses is the 
subject of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7. Synthesis of case study evidence and review of hypotheses 
 
 
The ultimate goal is to treat the evidence fairly, to produce compelling analytic 
conclusions, and to rule out alternative interpretations. (Yin 1994: 103, on analysing 
case study evidence) 
 
 
Three initial conditions and four hypotheses were developed in the first two theoretical 
chapters of the thesis. The initial conditions deduced variation in middle management 
roles and skills according to Mintzbergian organisational types. Based on these 
conditions, the hypotheses proposed an organisational contingency explanation for 
variation in MLD options and their outcomes.  
 
The three initial conditions were based on the argument that demand for new middle 
management skills should be explained through an organisation’s search for greater 
flexibility, and hence movements on a Mintzbergian map of structural transitions, 
manifested in the three processes of divisionalisation, professionalisation and 
adhocratisation. The four hypotheses then proposed that MLD options and their 
outcomes were contingent on the four main Mintzbergian types and the three directions 
of structural transition. MLD options were differentiated as management development 
(‘operational’, ‘strategic’, ‘professional’ and ‘project’ management development),  leader 
development and leadership development. MLD outcomes were conceptualised as 
multi-levelled, including managerial, intrapersonal and/or interpersonal competence at 
individual level, compliance and commitment with organisational goals at group/staff 
level, and contributions to different types of stability and change at organisational level.  
 
The model of expected MLD outcomes rests on two main assumptions: firstly, that the 
organisation has the competence to apply conventional ‘best MLD practice’ principles 
(assessment, challenge and support) and the strategic HRD competence to achieve an 
internal strategic fit in MLD; and secondly, that political obstacles to MLD are 
surmountable. Assuming that HRD competence enables MLD and political obstacles do 
not constrain MLD, then the degree to which expected MLD outcomes are met was 
hypothesised as determined by the degree of structural transition, namely the extent of 
divisionalisation, professionalisation or adhocratisation.  
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This chapter reviews the initial conditions and hypotheses in the light of the combined 
empirical evidence presented in Chapters 4-6.  The chapter shows how the hypotheses 
are broadly supported by the cross-case evidence, but also points to the main ways in 
which the theoretical model needs to be refined, in particular with regard to political 
obstacles to MLD. The merits and demerits of the main alternative interpretations of the 
case study findings are also considered.  
 
 
Initial condition 1. Skill fit to organisational structure 
 
The main tasks and key skills required of middle managers vary according to four main 
roles, which correspond to Mintzberg’s four main organisational types. 
 
The question here is the extent to which the middle managerial work and skill 
requirements observed in the case studies reflected the Roles A-D developed in 
Section 1.3. An overview of the middle management roles observed in the three case 
organisations is provided in Figure 7.1.  
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Mintzberg’s 4 main 
organisational 
types 
Theoretical 
middle line role 
Middle line roles observed in case studies 
South West 
Trains 
London Fire 
Brigade 
Kent Adult 
Social Services 
Machine 
bureaucracy 
(+ safety 
bureaucracy variant) 
Machine middle 
line management 
(+emergency 
middle line variant) 
(Role A) 
  ● 
Devolution 
(limited 
divisionalisation) 
 
● 
Professionalisation 
 
Divisionalised form Business division 
management 
(Role B) 
    ●  ● 
 
Managerialisation 
Professional 
bureaucracy 
Professional middle 
line management 
(Role C) 
  ● ● 
Adhocratisation 
Adhocracy Middle leadership 
(Role D) 
 
   ● 
 
Shaded areas denote expected observations; darker shading denotes stronger expected observations 
Dot sizes increase according to strength of observations; dashed arrow denotes unexpected direction 
of change 
Figure 7.1 Middle management roles observed in the case studies 
 
 
The SWT case illustrates the applicability of the concept of Role A middle management 
but suggests some necessary refinements to it. The case also provides some insight 
into the devolution of managerial responsibility in the machine bureaucracy, as a weak 
form of Role B division management. The third column of Figure 7.1 illustrates how, as 
expected, Role A middle management was strongly observed at SWT and Role B 
management was observed to a lesser extent. This reflects the essentially machine-
bureaucratic structure of SWT and the limited process of divisionalisation, which is 
described in Figure 7.1 as ‘devolution’. Full transition to the divisionalised form would 
have required a greater diversification of services or markets. Instead, the organisation 
devolved HR and performance responsibilities to middle managers rather than full 
strategic control of semi-autonomous business units.  
 
As seen in Section 4.1, people management and the requirement for human skills was 
an unexpectedly prominent priority at SWT, both as an element of Role A machine 
middle line management and in the transition towards a type of Role B business 
division management. While the soft skills for communication and interaction were 
expected as important elements of middle managerial work, they were accentuated in 
comparison to the technical aspects. The importance of people management was then 
further heightened due to the devolution of HR responsibilities to the line, including both 
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the hard aspects such as attendance management and the soft aspects requiring more 
advanced human skills for staff motivation and development.  
 
The original model of Role B management in Section 1.3 emphasised the strategic 
management of the business unit’s general resources as a key activity. At SWT, station 
and fleet depot managers, rather than driver depot managers, assumed some strategic 
management responsibility for unit performance. However, this came without the 
significant decision-making and financial freedoms that are typically associated with 
divisionalised management. Also, the main emphasis for station and fleet depot 
managers was the achievement of unit performance through softer people 
management, or effective leadership, rather than through the management of other 
types of resources. In effect, soft people management and leadership constituted the 
main strategic management responsibilities in this divisionalising organisation. For 
driver depot managers, for example, staff satisfaction scores, as measured by the Tell 
Us survey, became perhaps their most important business unit performance indicator 
(see Section 4.3).  
 
The unexpectedly prominent emphasis on people management and human skills at 
SWT derives from the change in strategic priority away from operational efficiency 
towards customer service. When the machine bureaucracy is forced to become more 
responsive to customers, a higher premium is placed upon the people management 
dimension of Role A management. This aspect of machine bureaucracies in 
increasingly competitive and customer-oriented environments appears to have been 
underestimated in the original Mintzbergian model. Furthermore, if the machine 
bureaucracy is a natural monopoly provider, unable to diversify its services or markets, 
the SWT evidence suggests that such organisations necessarily maintain standardised 
work processes as their main dominant coordination mechanism and retain much 
centralised control over managerial decisions and resources. In its search for greater 
efficiency the machine bureaucracy is likely devolve only a certain amount of 
responsibility for business performance to middle managers. This is most likely to be 
pronounced amongst those managers in customer-facing divisions or in those parts of 
the organisation to which business performance data may be locally attributed. In this 
type of structural transition, Role B business division management is largely limited to 
the process of influencing staff towards the achievement of localised but centrally 
directed improvements in business performance, without the full range of strategic 
functions at its disposal or a requirement for a broader range of technical knowledge 
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and conceptual skills. Such effects of partial structural transition are also somewhat 
under-theorised in Mintzberg’s original model.  
 
The SWT evidence supports the basic premise that the main tasks and key skills of 
middle management are structured by the needs of the divisionalising machine 
bureaucracy and that they are captured by the Role A and Role B models. Certainly, 
these two models describe middle managerial work at SWT more accurately than Roles 
C and D.  Nevertheless the SWT case study also suggests that the concepts of Roles A 
and B require some updating to include people management as a prominent aspect of 
the middle manager’s work, as customer service assumes greater strategic importance 
in contemporary machine bureaucracies. The roles played by increasingly sophisticated 
performance monitoring regimes and the supporting information technology appear to 
be key enablers in the process of devolution of managerial responsibility as a form of 
limited divisionalisation.   
 
The managerial work observed at LFB strongly reflects the theoretical construct of 
emergency middle line management, the safety bureaucracy variant of Role A middle 
management. This provided an accurate model for capturing the activities and 
technical, human and conceptual skill requirements of the station commander at LFB 
pre-modernisation. As Section 5.1 showed, the key managerial activities included: i) 
managing workflow in the form of the practising of standardised routines and leading 
efficient and effective emergency response at incidents; ii) vertical liaison in the form of 
the introducing new processes, regulations and technological changes in firefighting 
and in fire safety; and iii) conflict resolution in the form of mediating unofficial disputes 
between the fire station staff and other parts of the bureaucracy and managing informal 
relationships on the fire station.  
 
The LFB case also demonstrated the value of the Role C model to describe some of the 
changes to station management during partial professionalisation. Particularly the 
emphasis on coordination through the standardisation of skills through IPDS, rather 
than standardisation of processes through the Manuals of Firemanship, captured the 
more professionalised approach to management that became embedded at LFB. The 
increased importance of mutual adjustment in the station management role was also 
demonstrated in the new ways in which station commanders were expected to use 
more advanced human skills to support more junior officers at fire incidents, in their 
oversight of the development of operational staff on the station, and in their 
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collaborative activities with other parts of the bureaucracy as part of post-incident 
investigations. However, more extensive professional-managerial collaboration was 
less advanced than expected due to the limited implementation of the community fire 
safety reforms and some residual managerial resistance to modernisation. In spite of 
these limitations and obstacles, there were signs that greater engagement in 
community fire safety and other broader management responsibilities were emerging 
around 2006/7. In sum, Roles A and C - not Roles B or D - provided the most accurate 
models for describing middle managerial work at LFB and how it was changing.  
 
The case of KASS lent support to the validity of the Role C model. It suggested, 
however, as seen in Section 6.1, that marketisation reforms in professional 
bureaucracies, at least in the social care sector, may have altered the work of senior 
professionals from a Role C model of professional middle line management, towards a 
professional-managerial hybrid. The devolution of budgets to senior professionals in 
social care, and the commissioning of services from private and voluntary sector 
providers, required significant new technical and conceptual skills and provided 
considerable scope for the exercising of discretion by middle managers over the 
allocation of resources. This was more akin to Role B business division management, 
except without the same strategic or operational freedoms.  
 
Accepting the hybrid Role C/B as the starting point, the predicted shift during 
adhocratisation towards Role D middle leadership was reflected in the KASS case. 
Modernisation reforms encouraged a more open, adhocratic approach to coordination 
of services, which changed the nature of the middle line to include a greater emphasis 
on lateral relationships and project work, rather than the more traditionally insular 
approach and emphasis on vertical liaison. KASS did not fully depict Role D middle 
leadership, because professional and institutional controls over decisions remained 
strong. Rather, a professional-managerial Role C/B seems to offer the most accurate 
model of the middle management role in those professions in which marketisation 
reforms have had a strong impact. Role D middle leadership offers a good description 
of the peripheral changes to which professional-managerial hybrids are subject, due to 
environmental pressures to coordinate services in a more ad hoc way.  
 
Taken together, the three cases suggest that the conceptual Roles A-D of middle 
management capture well the main types of work and skills in the middle line, at least 
across a variety of typical changes in PSOs. More detailed observational methods such 
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as those used by Huy (2002), Balogun (2003, 2007), Weide and Wilderom (2004) and 
Mintzberg (1973,  2009) would be needed to establish the precise nature of middle 
managerial work with greater validity. Nevertheless, it may be concluded at this stage 
that Initial condition 1 is largely established by the case study evidence.  
 
 
Initial condition 2. Line-staff division across the four roles 
 
The various types of middle management found within an organisation are determined 
by the responsibility for either a line or staff function. 
 
The question here is whether the four middle management roles that were observed in 
the case studies could also be differentiated according to line or staff management 
functions within each single organisation. Figure 7.2 summarises the line-staff division 
as it related to the four middle management roles, as conceptualised in Section 1.3, and 
compares this with the middle management roles observed in the three case 
organisations.  
 
The shaded areas of Figure 7.2 highlight how the dominant middle management roles A 
and C in the three case organisations were primarily observed. Role A was also 
observed in the staff management of the three case organisations, along with Role D, 
which was dominant in parts of the organisations’ technostructures and support 
services.  
 
At SWT, Role A machine line management, as well as representing the middle line in 
the roles of station, driver and fleet depot managers, as noted in Section 4.1, was also 
dominant in the train service control function (part of the technostructure) and among 
the clerical teams undertaking routinised administration tasks such as in payroll and 
pensions (part of the support staff). The only other type of middle management 
observed to be dominant in any other part of SWT appeared to be Role D middle 
leadership. This was found in the less hierarchical, more adhocratic and knowledge-
based service teams such as information technology, performance management and 
engineering, as also noted in Section 4.1.  
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Arrows depict direction of transition; shaded areas denote expected observations; 
darker shading denotes stronger expected observations 
 
Figure 7.2 Middle management roles according to line and staff management 
functions as observed in the case studies 
 
 
At LFB, Role A machine line management was observed in the middle line in the form 
of station commanders, as well as among managers of routine administration work in 
support service teams such as fire safety inspection and personnel (see Section 5.1). 
As in SWT, the only other type of middle management observed to be dominant in any 
other part of LFB was Role D middle leadership. This was most apparent in the less 
hierarchical, project-based teams such as in training and development.  
 
At KASS, Role C professional middle line management was observed in the work of the 
middle line in the roles of the district managers (see Section 6.1). However, more than 
in the other two cases, as expected in a professional bureaucracy, the distinction 
between line and staff responsibilities was relatively blurred. As observed in the 
previous section, the work of the middle line also approximated some elements of Role 
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B business division management, due to a degree of local responsibility for resource-
allocation, as well as a degree of Role D middle leadership, due to adhocratisation and 
involvement in project work. Support staff were also connected with the operational side 
through project work and some matrix structures. Role D middle leadership was 
therefore more apparent in the managerial work of KASS than in the other two cases.  
 
An additional dimension to the line-staff division in the KASS case was observed in the 
finance function. While some of this non-operational work was routinised, and required 
predominantly Role A management, the use of projects and matrix structures to 
coordinate work across the organisation meant that managers even from the more 
machine-like parts of the support services would occasionally engage in adhocratic 
approaches to their work (see left-pointing horizontal dotted line in Figure 7.2). Although 
not reported in Section 6.3, the possession of accounting qualifications by some 
managers and supervisors in the finance function also suggests that the work of the 
finance function might have been sufficiently complex in parts to warrant  professional 
Role C-type professional middle management at times (see right-pointing horizontal 
dotted line in Figure 7.2).  
 
In line with the hypothesis, the main roles of middle management A, C and D observed 
within each of the three case organisations, were largely distinguishable according to 
responsibility for line or staff management. Line management responsibility determined 
that one of the three main roles of middle management A, C and D would be practised. 
On the non-operational side of the organisation, the dominant type of work tasks in the 
team determined whether the management practised by staff managers would 
resemble either Role A or Role D. Roles B and C were generally not observed on the 
non-operational side of the organisations, as these represented line rather than staff 
functions (or an intermeshing of line and staff). Overall, therefore, it may be concluded 
that Initial condition 2 is established by the case study evidence.  
 
 
Initial condition 3. Skill needs for structural transition  
 
The skill needs of middle managers are driven by one of the four main middle 
management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational flexibility. 
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It has already been established that middle management roles and the changes to 
these roles in the three case study organisations broadly corresponded to the expected 
conditions. The next question is whether the functional requirements of the dominant 
middle management roles and the transition towards new roles produced corresponding 
sets of skill needs in the case study organisations.  The technical, human and 
conceptual skills that were expected to be required by the four middle line roles in 
Section 1.3 are reproduced in Figure 7.3, including the directions of change that are 
expected as the organisation seeks greater flexibility.  
 
 
 Divisionalisation  →    Professionalisation   →    Adhocratisation 
 Role A 
skills set 
Role B  
skills set 
Role C  
skills set 
Role D  
skills set 
Technical skills relevant 
business and 
technical 
knowledge. 
tools and 
techniques of 
resource 
management 
and performance 
monitoring 
specialist 
professional 
knowledge and 
credibility 
project 
management 
Human skills soft skills for 
communication 
and interaction 
soft skills for 
communication 
and interaction 
leader skills for 
mutual 
adjustment 
leader skills for 
mutual 
adjustment 
Conceptual skills ability to 
implement 
organisational 
policies 
understanding of 
systems of 
output-
standardisation 
and business 
strategy 
understanding of 
systems of skills-
standardisation 
and the changing 
regulatory 
environment 
understanding 
of processes of 
innovation and 
strategic 
change 
 
Role A = machine middle line management; Role B= business division management; 
Role C = professional middle line management; Role D = middle leadership 
Figure 7.3 Middle management skill requirements 
 
 
Figure 7.4 applies the basic template in Figure 7.3 to illustrate the main skill 
requirements of the middle line observed at SWT.  
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 Divisionalisation  →    Professionalisation   →    Adhocratisation 
 Role A  
skills set 
Role B  
skills set 
Role C  
skills set 
Role D  
skills set 
Technical skills relevant 
business and 
technical 
knowledge 
tools and 
techniques of 
resource 
management 
and performance 
monitoring 
specialist 
professional 
knowledge and 
credibility 
project 
management 
Human skills soft skills for 
communication 
and interaction 
soft skills for 
communication 
and interaction 
leader skills for 
mutual 
adjustment 
leader skills for 
mutual 
adjustment 
Conceptual skills ability to 
implement 
organisational 
policies 
understanding of 
systems of 
output-
standardisation 
and business 
strategy 
understanding of 
systems of skills-
standardisation 
and the changing 
regulatory 
environment 
understanding 
of processes of 
innovation and 
strategic 
change 
 
See Figure 7.3 for key to middle management roles; shaded areas denote expected 
observations 
 
Figure 7.4 Middle management skill requirements at South West Trains 
 
 
The shaded area in Figure 7.4 represents the expected skills required by the middle line 
under divisionalisation, and the thick bordered area represents the actual skill 
requirements observed at SWT. The requirements for Role A and Role B human skills 
and for Role A conceptual skills were strongly evident at SWT, in line with the 
company’s strategic emphasis on the quality of the line manager-employee relationship 
and the strong operational emphasis placed upon the correct implementation of HR and 
health and safety policies. As discussed in the previous section, due to the emphasis on 
customer service in parts of the organisation, there was also an unexpected emphasis 
on leader skills. There was, however, less emphasis placed on both Role A and Role B 
technical skills at SWT than might have been expected in a divisionalising machine 
bureaucracy.  
 
The lack of a stronger emphasis on Role A technical skills at SWT derives from the 
strategic shift away from technical expertise among line managers towards the priorities 
of customer service. The company required its managers to have the technical 
knowledge to ensure that minimum operational and health and safety standards were 
met. But post-2003, it began to place less emphasis on managers’ technical 
competence, for example to perform route-cause analysis of safety incidents in the 
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drivers function (see Section 4.1), or perhaps the use of ticketing technology in the 
station function and the use of specialist equipment in the fleet function.  
 
The lack of a stronger emphasis on Role B technical skills derives from the limited 
nature of divisionalisation at SWT. As has been noted above with reference to Initial 
condition 1, organisational change at SWT resulted in the devolution of a relatively 
narrow range of managerial responsibilities down the line, rather than a broad set of 
strategic responsibilities. While a degree of technical and conceptual skill was 
necessary to enable middle managers to work within the performance monitoring 
framework at SWT and set meaningful objectives for their staff, the technical skills of 
strategic and resource management were less in demand.  
 
Similarly, due to the relatively limited divisionalisation at SWT, the conceptual skills for 
strategic management associated with Role B were not extensively demanded of 
middle managers. Although managers required the skills to understand the business’ 
key outputs and plans, for many, such as driver depot managers, the most important 
coordination decisions concerned driver-attendance and –satisfaction as measured by 
the staff satisfaction survey (see also Initial condition 1). Coordination decisions 
concerning train delays and cancellations, on the other hand, could often not be directly 
influenced by management at depot level. Slightly more complex coordination systems 
existed for station and fleet depot managers, relating to the physical development of the 
station or depot and its use of technology, but not to the extent that middle managers 
had to work with complex sets of strategic options (see Section 4.1). Nevertheless, the 
complexity of the issues around staff motivation meant that the relative lack of demand 
for Role B conceptual skills was counterbalanced by a demand for leader skills, 
normally associated with Role C and Role D middle management.  
 
Overall, the middle management skill profile observed at SWT is largely consistent with 
the theoretical expectations in a divisionalising machine bureaucracy, in terms of Role A 
and Role B human and conceptual skills, and partly in terms of Role A and Role B 
technical skills. Importantly, in line with Initial condition 3, there was little evidence of 
demand for Role C or Role D skills. 
  
Figure 7.5 illustrates the main skill requirements of the middle line observed at LFB.  
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 Divisionalisation  →    Professionalisation   →    Adhocratisation 
 Role A  
skills set 
Role B  
skills set 
Role C  
skills set 
Role D  
skills set 
Technical skills relevant 
business and 
technical 
knowledge. 
tools and 
techniques of 
resource 
management 
and performance 
monitoring 
specialist 
professional 
knowledge and 
credibility 
project 
management 
Human skills soft skills for 
communication 
and interaction 
soft skills for 
communication 
and interaction 
leader skills for 
mutual 
adjustment 
leader skills for 
mutual 
adjustment 
Conceptual skills ability to 
implement 
organisational 
policies 
understanding of 
systems of 
output-
standardisation 
and business 
strategy 
understanding of 
systems of skills-
standardisation 
and the changing 
regulatory 
environment 
understanding 
of processes of 
innovation and 
strategic 
change 
 
See Figure 7.3 for key to middle management roles; shaded areas denote expected 
observations 
 
Figure 7.5 Middle management skill requirements at the London Fire Brigade 
 
 
As indicated in Figure 7.5, the skill requirements of the middle line observed at LFB 
reflected the importance of technical expertise and knowledge of regulations amongst 
operational managers in the professionalising safety bureaucracy. The strong 
requirements for Role A technical skills requirements were therefore as expected, due 
to the organisation’s heavy emphasis on safety-critical matters. Similarly, the strong 
requirements for Role A conceptual skills were as expected, due to the necessary 
understanding of changing rules and regulations and how these related to operational 
work.  
 
Although professionalisation at LFB was shown to be partial (see Section 5.1), the 
demands of Role C technical and conceptual skills were still relatively strong. In order to 
play a supporting and developmental role rather than a supervisory role at fire incidents, 
station commanders required an advanced level of professional knowledge and 
credibility in the eyes of their watch commanders and fire station staff. Similarly, in order 
to oversee the development of fire station staff in line with the new staff development 
system (IPDS) and changing regulations around such plans as community fire safety, 
station commanders required the conceptual skills to advise on professional standards 
and how these might be learnt and upheld.  
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A smaller emphasis than expected was placed on the human skills of middle managers 
at LFB, both in the traditional safety bureaucracy and in its more professionalised form. 
The relative lack of emphasis on Role A human skills at LFB was a reflection of the lack 
of formalised people management practices at local level, such as line manager-
involvement in performance and development reviews. Despite this, considerable 
people management responsibilities were assumed as part of the station commander’s 
informal role; more tacit requirements for human skills were therefore present, if not 
formally demanded by the senior management and HR function (see Section 5.1). 
There was also evidence that more formalised processes around staff performance and 
development were introduced around 2007 (see Section 5.4).   
 
The relative lack of formal demand for Role C human skills, namely the leader skills for 
mutual adjustment, can be explained by the relative lack of collaborative activity 
between the middle line and the support staff observed at LFB. The needs of 
professionalisation in the middle line were reflected to the extent that leader skills were 
required for the supporting and developmental role played by station commanders with 
respect to emergency incidents and in staff development generally. As was noted in 
Section 5.3, however, in practice the extent of professional-managerial collaboration at 
middle level in areas such as community fire safety management, requiring stronger 
liaison with stakeholders beyond the station, was underdeveloped.   
 
Overall, the skill profile observed at LFB is consistent with the theoretical expectations 
in a professionalising safety bureaucracy, in terms of both Role A and Role C technical 
and conceptual skills, and partly in terms of human skills. Importantly, and in line with 
Initial condition 3, there was no strong evidence of demand for Role B or Role D skills.  
 
Figure 7.6 illustrates the main skill requirements of the middle line observed at KASS. 
This is the most complex picture of middle management skill requirements out of all the 
three cases. It reflects the various demands of a professional-managerial hybrid 
organisation under adhocratisation pressures. While Role C requirements for technical, 
human and conceptual skills sets were clearly in evidence as expected, elements of 
Role B skills were unexpectedly as evident as those of Role D.  
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 Divisionalisation  →    Professionalisation   →    Adhocratisation 
 Role A  
skills set 
Role B  
skills set 
Role C  
skills set 
Role D  
skills set 
Technical skills relevant 
business and 
technical 
knowledge. 
tools and 
techniques of 
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management 
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monitoring 
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professional 
knowledge and 
credibility 
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management 
Human skills soft skills for 
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and interaction 
soft skills for 
communication 
and interaction 
leader skills for 
mutual 
adjustment 
leader skills for 
mutual 
adjustment 
Conceptual skills ability to 
implement 
organisational 
policies 
understanding of 
systems of 
output-
standardisation 
and business 
strategy 
understanding of 
systems of skills-
standardisation 
and the changing 
regulatory 
environment 
understanding of 
processes of 
innovation and 
strategic change 
 
See Figure 7.3 for key to middle management roles; shaded areas denote expected 
observations 
 
Figure 7.6 Middle management skill requirements at Kent Adult Social Services  
 
 
As Figure 7.6 shows, the requirement for advanced human skills was constant across 
both the professional-managerial hybrid and the temporarily adhocratised form. 
However, the impact of managerialism on social services meant that middle managers 
at KASS required some of the skills associated with the Role B business division 
manager. As seen in Section 6.1, devolved discretion over the planning of services and 
the allocation of resources generated a demand for broader technical skills, including 
those of budgeting, forecasting and managerial control, than normally required by 
senior professionals. Also required was a degree of Role B conceptual skill in order to 
take strategic decisions about care provision arrangements across a district or a 
specific service.  
 
As also seen in Section 6.1, the impact of modernisation reforms meant that middle 
managers at KASS required, as expected, some of the skills associated with Role D 
middle leadership. In terms of technical skills, there was some limited evidence that 
competence in project management was demanded in order to coordinate partnership-
working with the NHS and private and voluntary sector organisations (see Section 6.4). 
In terms of conceptual skills, there was also evidence that a detailed understanding of 
the changing strategic environment for local government and adult social care was 
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required, along with the ability to find innovative solutions to respond effectively to the 
environmental changes (see Section 6.3).  
 
Overall, the skill profile observed at KASS is consistent with the theoretical expectation 
of an adhocratising professional bureaucracy, certainly in terms of the three sets of 
Role C skills and Role D human skills, and partially in terms of Role D technical and 
conceptual skills. However, the evidence suggests that marketisation produced 
demands for a set of technical and conceptual skills that have much in common with 
Role B business division management, and which are therefore broader than originally 
expected in the Mintzbergian model.  
 
Taken together, the case studies indicate that structural organisational transition is an 
important factor in shaping the skill requirements of middle managers. The case studies 
nevertheless raise the question of whether full transitions are likely and achievable. For 
example, a full transition from a safety bureaucracy to a professional bureaucracy 
would require less centralised and external control and a greater use of mutual 
adjustment at least between line and staff management. The alternative is that the 
organisation remains in a permanent semi-professionalised state, requiring a hybrid skill 
set that does not fully recognise the importance of advanced human/leader skills. 
Similarly, during adhocratisation, the additional middle leadership skills required by 
middle managers in addition to a professional-managerial skill set may be recognised 
only temporarily or periodically during times of significant environmental change.  
 
All in all, however, the skill requirements observed in the three cases, while not as 
precisely drawn as in the original model outlined in Figure 7.3, were broadly in line with 
theoretical expectations. The partial and overlapping aspects of the patterns in the three 
cases were not sufficiently strong as to warrant a denial of Initial condition 3. The 
expected combinations of skill sets remained broadly intact, while suggesting the need 
for a more nuanced understanding of the skills for machine and professional middle line 
management under structural transition. It may therefore be concluded that Initial 
condition 3 is largely established by the case study evidence.  
 
Hypothesis 1. Role of MLD 
 
MLD interventions for middle managers are investments to enable them to contribute to 
organisational stability and/or strategic change.  
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In Chapter 2, it was hypothesised that MLD for middle managers was most 
appropriately understood as a set of interventions to enable the organisation to manage 
the strategic tensions involved in stability and change. This view was preferred over 
other versions such as MLD as a form of psychological reward, a political tool of elites 
for enhancing control, or a managerial discourse and process of identity-construction. It 
was also proposed that MLD interventions took three main forms - management 
development, leader development and leadership development - which respectively 
served three different HRM goals: i) efficient and effective management; ii) effective 
leading of staff; and iii) adaptive capacity . 
 
Considered together, the case studies support the preferred interpretation of MLD, 
while recognising the secondary importance of the reward-orientated interpretation (in 
the SWT case) and the more political interpretation (in the LFB case). The theoretical 
distinction between the three main types of MLD was also well illustrated in the three 
cases, although several overlaps were also demonstrated in practice.  
 
Figure 7.7 adapts the original model of MLD interventions constructed in Figure 2.1 to 
summarise the case study evidence as it relates to Hypothesis 1. The arrows in Figure 
7.7 illustrate the main relationships observed between the MLD activities of the three 
cases and their underlying HRM goals, the types of MLD intervention employed and 
their broad, intended organisational outcomes. 
 
As Figure 7.7 shows, the KASS case demonstrated the most strategically integrated 
and coherent set of MLD interventions. In particular, the investment in management 
development in the form of the diploma in management demonstrated a strong 
relationship between the expected elements of the MLD process, as it represented an 
investment in support of the aim of more effective and efficient management to achieve 
the necessary coordination to achieve explicit strategic organisational goals.  
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Dashed arrows denote weaker relationships  
Figure 7.7 MLD options in the case studies
HRM goals MLD 
intervention 
MLD options in the case studies Intended 
organisational 
outcomes South West 
Trains 
London Fire 
Brigade 
Kent Adult 
Social Services 
 
 
 
More efficient/ 
effective 
management 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Management 
development  
 
 
operational 
management 
development 
 
 
 
Station 
commander 
development 
programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diploma in 
management 
 
Continuity of 
service for 
customers 
 
Effective 
implementation 
of business 
plans  
 
 
 
More effective 
leading of staff 
 
 
 
Leader  
development  
 
 
strategic 
management 
development 
(talent 
management) 
  
 
 
 
‘From Good to 
Great’ 
 
 
 
Planned 
strategic 
change 
 
 
 
 
Adaptive 
capacity  
 
 
Leadership 
development 
 
 
  
‘Inspirational 
Leadership’ 
 
Emergent 
strategic 
change 
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The KASS case also provided the clearest example of investment in leader 
development in line with theoretical expectations. As described in Section 6.2, From 
Good to Great did not utilise the full range of typical leader development methods, but 
had a clear focus on introducing the individual manager to ways in which they could 
develop their intrapersonal competence. There was a strong relationship between the 
HRM goal of more effective leading of staff, coupled with the expectation at 
organisational level that such investment should encourage more proactive and 
motivating management within teams in order to advance the strategic plans of the 
organisation.  
 
The goals behind the leadership development investment at KASS, Inspirational 
Leadership, were somewhat vague, but it is clear that the motivation arose from the 
complexity and uncertainty in the new organisational and social care management 
environment. This led to an investment in a collective and non-prescriptive intervention 
that would provide a space out of which management solutions to organisational 
problems might emerge. In short, the Inspirational Leadership intervention, as 
expected, aimed at building adaptive capacity among middle managers. However, as 
discussed in Section 6.4, due to the tactical rather than strategic concerns of the 
participants, and by virtue of their mid-level positions in the hierarchy, the 
organisational-level contribution of Inspirational Leadership effectively contributed 
towards planned strategic change, or effective strategic implementation, rather than the 
outcome of emergent strategic change typically associated with leadership 
development.   
 
In all, the KASS case lent strong support to the hypothesis that MLD interventions are 
investments in organisational stability and strategic change. Further support came from 
the SWT case, certainly in terms of its operational management development, and less 
directly from its investment in leader development.  As described in Section 4.2, there 
was a notably strong relationship at SWT between the underlying strategic objective of 
improved staff attendance and discipline, the design of the operational management 
development, and the intended organisational outcome of the smooth-running of the 
train service. The case demonstrated an investment in a conventional form of 
operational management development clearly intended to ensure organisational 
stability and continuity of service, fully in line with theoretical expectations.  
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Leader development at SWT painted a slightly more complicated picture of MLD 
investment. As described in Section 4.2, the main rationale for the talent management 
programme, rather than to improve the quality of the leading of staff in the organisation, 
was to identify and prepare front-line and middle managers for succession to senior 
management. The overall effect of the talent management programme was therefore to 
‘reward’ a select group of managers with a significant amount of individualised attention 
and advice on how to develop their intrapersonal competence. As shown in Section 4.3, 
this investment nonetheless contributed indirectly to the furthering of some strategic-
level plans, such as improvements to business performance within the station 
management division. But the relationship to organisational outcomes was weaker than 
for leader development at KASS.  
 
The investment in management development at LFB illustrates the complexity of the 
underlying aims and intended organisational contributions of competence-based 
development. More than the other two cases, LFB problematised the concept of 
‘efficient and effective management’ and demonstrated its subjective nature. On the 
one hand, as Section 5.2 showed, the investment in competence-based management 
development at LFB was designed to improve coordination at fire incidents. On the 
other, it was a political instrument to institutionalise new terms and conditions and new 
HR practices of recruitment, promotion and career development. The clarity of the 
connection between management development at LFB and organisational-strategic 
aims was therefore less pronounced than in the other two cases.  
 
In summary, the SWT and KASS cases demonstrated evidence of investment in 
organisational stability and strategic change through their management development 
interventions and, in the latter case, leader development. But the political and 
psychological-contractual motivations underlying MLD investment were also 
demonstrated in the LFB and SWT cases. Furthermore, a limitation of the theoretical 
model was highlighted by the preoccupation with strategy-implementation concerns in 
the leadership development intervention at KASS, rather than with the outcome of 
emergent strategic change that is normally associated with this type of MLD.  
 
Despite some deviations from the theoretically expected pattern of MLD options, the 
evidence suggests overall that MLD investment for middle managers is fundamentally 
motivated by the intention to enable them contribute to the strategic aims of the 
organisation. A multiplicity of stakeholder interests and HRM goals may also drive these 
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types of investments, and the intended contribution to strategic change might be more 
constrained in reality than much of the MLD literature implies. On balance, however, it 
may be concluded that Hypothesis 1 is largely supported by the case study 
evidence.  
 
 
Hypothesis 2. Contingent MLD options 
 
MLD options for middle managers are contingent on one of the four main middle 
management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational flexibility.  
 
In Chapter 2 it was hypothesised that the skill requirements of different middle 
management roles and the pressures to move towards a more flexible structure can be 
expected to drive the choices made in organisations to invest in various combinations of 
management development, leader development and leadership development. More 
specifically, it was argued that: i) various types of management development options 
(operational, strategic, professional and project management development) should be 
expected to be selected according to one of the middle management Roles A-D and/or 
a middle management role associated with greater organisational flexibility; ii) leader 
development was most likely to be provided for Role C professional middle line 
managers, or Role A/B managers under professionalisation; and iii) leadership 
development was most likely to be provided for Role D middle leaders or Role C 
managers under adhocratisation.  
 
The MLD options in the case studies reflected theoretical expectations to a significant 
degree, but with some exceptions and omissions. Figure 7.8 maps out the theoretically 
expected combinations of MLD options against the observed options in the three case 
study organisations, including a categorisation of these choices as management 
development, leader development and leadership development.  
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Expected MLD 
options 
Observed MLD interventions in the cases 
South West  
Trains 
London Fire 
Brigade 
Kent Adult Social 
Services 
Divisionalisation 
OMD + SMD 
 
 
Operational 
management 
training (OMD) 
 
  
Professionalisation 
OMD/SMD  
+ PMD + LD 
Talent 
management 
(SMD/LD) 
Station commander 
development 
programme  
(OMD + PMD) 
(+ some LD) 
 
 
Adhocratisation 
OMD/SMD/PMD + 
PJMD + LD + LSD 
  Diploma in 
management (PMD) 
(+ some PJMD) 
From Good to Great 
(LD) 
Inspirational 
Leadership (LSD) 
 
OMD = operational management development; SMD = strategic management development; PMD 
= professional management development; PJMD = project management development; LD = 
leader development; LSD = leadership development 
Figure 7.8 Expected versus actual MLD options in the three case studies 
 
 
 
As Figure 7.8 shows, the KASS case again provided the strongest support for the 
hypothesis out of the three cases. In line with the expected requirements of the 
adhocratising professional bureaucracy, the organisation invested, albeit to differing 
degrees, in professional management development (PMD), leader development (LD) 
and leadership development (LSD), though less so in project management 
development (PJMD). As noted in Section 6.2, with its emphasis on the learning of 
applied management tools and techniques, coupled with the study of the adult social 
care environment, the diploma in management at KASS is a prime example of 
professional management development (PMD). In addition, as was also shown in 
Section 6.2, leader development at KASS was a clear attempt to complement 
professionalised management competence with the more advanced human skills 
required for mutual adjustment to influence and lead change in the professional 
bureaucracy.  
 
The additional MLD investments at KASS, namely project management (PJMD) and 
leadership development (LSD), were, as expected, associated with the introduction of 
greater adhocracy. The investment in PJMD, in the form of Prince II software training, 
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was apparently very limited (see Section 6.4). However, it may be imagined, if not 
specifically reported by the interviewees, that a stock of middle managers were 
introduced to project management techniques through the module ‘planning and 
controlling physical and financial resources’ during their participation in the diploma in 
management (see Section 6.2, see also Chartered Management Institute 2010). 
Similarly, the outcomes of management development, leader development and 
leadership overlapped at KASS, but were mutually reinforcing of different types of 
competence (see again Section 6.4). The contribution of leadership development  
towards greater adhocracy in the form of the Inspirational Leadership programme was 
admittedly temporary, in that it was scrapped after eighteen months; however, as noted 
in Section 6.4, other leadership development activities, in which middle managers may 
also have participated, did continue until at least 2010.  
 
The weak investment in PJMD and the temporary investment in leadership 
development for middle managers may therefore be explained as support for limited 
adhocratisation during a period of uncertainty in the middle line after restructuring in 
2005. It might be argued that these additional investments were motivated by faddism, 
and that such a large and monopolistic organisation as KCC was in any case in the 
position to offer a range of courses to suit various individual and stakeholder 
preferences, regardless of strategic priorities. The overall pattern and timing of MLD 
investments observed at KASS suggests, however, that in line with the hypothesis, 
MLD options were strongly related, first to the demands for efficient coordination in the 
professional bureaucracy, and second to the pressures of adhocratisation.  
 
The LFB case lent support to the hypothesis, in that the station commander 
development programme at LFB represented, as expected, an investment in both 
operational and professionalised management development (OMD and PMD). As noted 
in Section 5.2, there was also some limited evidence of leader development (LD), which 
can be interpreted as an attempt to support the practice of mutual adjustment as 
required by professionalisation. But overall this latter investment was small, fragmented 
and uncoordinated. As the actual extent of the fire service modernisation reforms was 
constrained (see Section 5.4), the leader development workshops and those parts of 
the station commander development programme that were concerned with community 
fire safety and professional-managerial collaboration reflected aspirational rather than 
real organisational requirements. MLD at LFB can therefore be seen as an instrument 
to promote the idea as well as the practice of professionalisation.  
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The strongest alternative interpretation of the MLD choices made at LFB is that the 
rhetoric of investing in managers, rather than the actual serving of the needs of 
professionalisation, masked the real underlying agenda of making financial efficiency 
savings in the fire service. The new competence-based system, with its emphasis on 
portfolio building and workplace assessments, rather than external courses and 
examinations, may indeed have been motivated at least in part by the wish to reduce 
the time and resources spent on development away from the workplace at the Fire 
Service College (see Section 5.2). However, to give primacy to this interpretation is to 
ignore that significant resources were spent on classroom instruction and fireground 
simulation training within London itself, and that the strategic decision to replace the 
examinations with a competence-based approach to development and promotion-
selection was taken in London well before the compulsory nationwide introduction of 
IPDS. It can be concluded, therefore, that investment in operational and 
professionalised management development at LFB was motivated more by concerns 
about strategic effectiveness than about cost-cutting.  
 
Similarly, it would be over-simplistic to dismiss the isolated leadership workshops 
provided at LFB as faddish and unnecessary, or as a cheap alternative to fully 
individualised leader development, requiring such resource-intensive activities as 360-
degree feedback and coaching. The evidence presented in Section 5.4 towards the end 
of the LFB case study, of investment in leader and leadership development for new 
middle managers from amongst university graduates and individuals from more diverse 
backgrounds, suggests that post-2005 LFB was going beyond the isolated workshops 
and was beginning to respond strategically to the need for greater mutual adjustment 
and professionalisation in its MLD choices.  
 
The SWT case produced the most unexpected pattern of MLD intervention. The 
process of divisionalisation in the machine bureaucracy was anticipated to result in the 
provision of operational management development (OMD) and some investment in 
strategic management development (SMD) for middle managers. As Section 4.2 
showed, the former type of management development was indeed strongly evident, but 
there was little evidence, except for a select few experienced middle managers, of any 
investment in the latter type, at least in its expected form. Instead, strategic 
management development at SWT took the form of leader development (LD).  
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It was expected that leader development needs would be less prominent in the machine 
bureaucracy, in which standardisation of work processes forms the dominant 
coordinating mechanism, as opposed to mutual adjustment. The experience of SWT, 
however, suggests that human skills are of large significance for middle managers in 
organisations that have a substantial customer service-orientated function and that 
have experienced radical change, such as changes in ownership and restructuring (see 
discussion in Section 4.4). This resonates with the findings of Huy (2002) in his case of 
‘Servico’, from which he concludes that the intense emotions aroused by radical change 
in organisations place significant responsibilities on middle managers to attend to the 
emotions of their subordinates. Such responsibilities demand the development of 
intrapersonal competence, which is the primary objective of leader development.  
 
The SWT experience suggests that not only the original Role A model of machine 
middle line management underemphasises the importance of human skills, but also that 
the theoretical distinction proposed in Section 1.3 between the basic soft skills for 
communication and interaction on the one hand, and advanced human skills (leader 
skills) for mutual adjustment on the other, might be overdrawn (see Figure 1.4). 
Particularly in customer service-oriented machine bureaucracies that have experienced 
significant change, it can be argued that leader development for middle managers is to 
be expected as an important MLD option.  
 
Across the three cases, the evidence can be said to largely support the hypothesis. At 
KASS, all four of the expected MLD investments were observed. At LFB, only one of 
the three expected MLD interventions (LD) was partially absent, though leader skill 
needs were to some extent addressed through the IPDS-based management 
development programme (PMD and OMD). At SWT, one of the two expected MLD 
interventions (SMD) was largely absent in its expected form, although substituted with a 
leader development intervention (LD) which served the key strategic purpose of 
employee motivation and development. Where MLD investments were observed to be 
weak or temporary, this tended to be related to the limited nature of structural transition, 
which is also consistent with the theoretical model. On balance, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Hypothesis 2 is largely supported by the case study evidence. 
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Hypothesis 3. Contingent MLD outcomes 
 
The outcomes of MLD for middle managers are contingent on one of the four main 
middle management roles and/or another role associated with greater organisational 
flexibility.  
 
In Chapter 2 it was hypothesised that not only the options but also the outcomes of 
MLD for middle managers are contingent one of the four middle management roles 
and/or another role associated with greater organisational flexibility.  The basis for this 
argument was that that the specific organisational and job context provided the 
necessary opportunities for middle managers to apply and transfer their learning from 
MLD activities into the workplace. This proposition was developed to assert that those 
MLD investments which did not fit with the organisational and job context would fail to 
result in their intended outcomes due to lack of opportunity for learning transfer. 
Intended MLD outcomes were modelled as multi-levelled, including individual, group 
and organisational outcomes.  
 
Figure 7.9 develops the original model of contingent outcomes of MLD for middle 
managers under structural transition by including the actual experience of MLD in the 
three case studies. Taking into account the partial and unexpected MLD investments for 
middle managers discussed under Hypothesis 2, the MLD outcomes observed at the 
various levels in the case studies broadly followed the expected pattern. This is to say 
that the organisational and job context were largely decisive in shaping the actual MLD 
outcomes. There were, however, some weak and unintended outcomes, the reasons 
for which will also be discussed.  
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Figure 7.9 MLD outcomes in the three case studies 
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As Figure 7.9 shows, the first of the two MLD interventions at SWT, namely the suite of 
line management training courses representing OMD, demonstrated strongly the 
expected pattern of outcomes at individual, group and organisational levels. Partly this 
was because the training had specific aims and measurable, direct results, making the 
outcomes relatively easy to identify. Nonetheless, as the triangulated evidence from 
interviews with new managers and staff absence, staff satisfaction and other business 
performance data indicated (see Section 4.3.1), there was little doubt that OMD was 
effective in achieving operational managerial competence (OMC) at individual level and 
staff compliance at group level, thereby contributing to the overall stability of the 
machine bureaucracy at organisational level. In addition, the outcomes of the 
unexpected second MLD intervention at SWT, leader development (LD), led to the 
development of some intrapersonal competence and a type of strategic managerial 
competence (SMC), as shown mainly by the interview data (see Section 4.3.2). In turn, 
this appeared to help increase staff commitment and make a contribution towards some 
improved performance against business unit objectives, notably in improving customer 
service standards in some stations. For those managers with less clearly defined 
divisionalised responsibilities, however, such as driver depot managers, leader 
development seemed largely ineffectual. In this sense, the mixed outcomes of leader 
development lend support to the hypothesis that the options and outcomes of MLD are 
predominantly shaped by organisational and job context.  
At LFB, the pattern of outcomes for the more operational aspects of the station 
commander development programme (OMD) was consistent with theoretical 
expectations at individual, team and organisational levels. Although the outcomes of 
OMD were more difficult to measure than in the SWT case, the confidence with which 
station commanders reported the outcomes of their technically-oriented training, notably 
in incident command, and evidence from the Audit Commission about LFB’s operational 
effectiveness, strongly suggested the expected pattern (see Section 5.3.1). Certainly, 
developing operational managerial competence (OMC) seemed to contribute, as 
expected, to the achievement of staff compliance at group level, most notably in the 
discipline and competence of firefighters at incidents, thereby contributing to the overall 
stability of the safety bureaucracy.  
 
The outcomes of the professionally-orientated aspects of the station management 
development programme (PMD) at LFB were less salient. Although interview data and 
Audit Commission evidence suggested a contribution towards more professionalised 
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approaches to incident management and staff development (see Section 5.3.1), the 
contested nature of professionalisation and the limited implementation of the 
modernisation reforms in terms of community fire safety constrained the achievement of 
the wider intended outcomes of professional managerial competence (PMC), 
particularly in terms of closer and ongoing collaboration with other parts of the 
bureaucracy and the support staff (see Section 5.4). Elements of the station 
commander development programme, such as modules on employee development, 
combined with sporadic leadership development workshops, also open to non-
uniformed managers, may have helped developed greater intrapersonal competence in 
some individuals. Overall, however, the organisation did not possess the HRD 
competence to deliver leader development in a strategic and systematic way and 
therefore failed to make a significant impact in this area (see Section 5.3.2). But with 
greater HRD competence and less political resistance from uniformed managers, LFB 
might have achieved a greater degree of professional-managerial and intrapersonal 
competence in its middle managers, and therefore a greater contribution towards 
modernisation.  
 
In the third case of KASS, the MLD experience broadly followed the expected pattern, 
but also with some fragmented outcomes. Professional management development 
(PMD) was shown, through the strong convergence in the accounts of the diploma in 
management participants and in external inspection reports (see Section 6.3.1), to 
result in the expected outcome of individual managerial competence to coordinate work 
in the professional-managerial hybrid (akin to PMC). The same range of evidence also 
pointed towards the achievement of the expected group-level outcomes of staff 
compliance with professional standards in social care and staff commitment to 
particular strategic developments (such as the consolidation of different care services in 
a district), thereby contributing to overall stability and adaptation in the professional 
bureaucracy. Leader development (LD) in the form of From Good to Great produced 
slightly weaker outcomes, largely due to some ineffective learning-management. 
Nevertheless the leader development outcomes were in line with the expectation that 
managers should develop greater intrapersonal competence, in particular in terms of 
their self-awareness, thus contributing to greater commitment amongst their staff to 
developing care services in accordance with the organisational strategy, such as 
through partnerships with the voluntary sector (see Section 6.3.2).   
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The outcomes of the MLD interventions that were designed to support adhocratisation 
at KASS were somewhat fragmented in comparison to the expected outcomes in the 
theoretical model. This is to be mainly explained by the temporary nature of 
adhocratisation at KASS, therefore still consistent with the hypothesis that outcomes 
are shaped by organisational needs rather than other factors. As was argued in Section 
6.4, the relatively limited opportunity in reality for middle managers at KASS to work 
collectively in project-driven ways provides the main explanation for lack of greater 
investment and outcomes from project management training. The outcomes of 
leadership development (LSD) were more identifiable, with the overall interview 
evidence from the Inspirational Leadership programme suggesting the expected 
development of interpersonal competence at individual level, as managers developed 
the skills of networking and participated in workshops to make collective sense of the 
changed social care management environment (see Section 6.3.3). A lack of 
operational HRD competence led to some individuals being insufficiently challenged by 
the leadership development activities. However, at group level, a clear innovation was 
observed in the County District Managers Group, though bounded by the context of the 
middle management role and the institutional constraints of the professional 
bureaucracy. The eventual contribution of this bounded innovation was to improve the 
effectiveness of strategy-implementation and create a semi-formalised new structure. In 
this sense, MLD outcomes at KASS were shaped by a temporary period of adhocracy 
followed by re-bureaucratisation (see Section 6.4).  
 
The evidence from across the three cases therefore suggests the strong influence of 
organisational structural context on MLD outcomes. The three main alternative ways of 
interpreting the evidence have been discussed and largely discounted at the end of 
each of the case study chapters. These alternative interpretations related to: MLD as 
fad or fashion; MLD as an instrument of domination and control; and MLD as a 
reproducer of managerial identity. When the evidence from the three cases is 
considered together, however, as in the above discussion of the evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 2, it is pertinent to focus down on two main alternative ways of interpreting 
the synthesised case study evidence. Firstly, given the tendency across all three cases 
to invest in leader development, apparently regardless of context, the argument has to 
be considered that the demand for advanced human skills amongst middle managers is 
universal rather than contingent. Secondly, the argument needs to be reconsidered that 
MLD, rather than a function of organisational context, is better understood as a site of 
political control and resistance.   
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On the first question of the universal demand for leader development, the differences 
between the cases are instructive. Soft skill outcomes were prominent in the SWT case, 
but less prominent in the other machine-like bureaucracy at LFB, in which the 
development of a culture of customer service was less important for successful 
coordination. In the KASS case, soft skill outcomes were also important, but explicitly 
driven by the demand for effective mutual adjustment in the professional bureaucracy 
and for adhocratisation. Overall, therefore, the central importance of advanced human 
skills as an inevitable focus of management learning under any conditions has to be 
questioned. Instead it is possible to discern between different types and emphases in 
soft skills according to organisational and job contexts.  
 
It would also be wrong to dismiss investment in soft skills-development as HR-faddism, 
or as a tendency to pay rhetorical rather than substantial commitment to strategic MLD. 
At SWT, the leader development intervention was indeed somewhat piecemeal, 
ineffectual and short-lived, aimed at a relatively small number of ‘high performers’; this 
may have been largely responsible for its relatively weak outcomes. However, the main 
organisational contribution made by the intervention, apart from serving to retain some 
of the managers, was to soften the styles of some managers on the operational side, 
and to ease a process of commitment amongst staff towards divisionalised objectives. 
Similarly, the investment in leader development at LFB, although paled into significance 
by the more technical elements of the competence-based management development 
programme, became progressively stronger and more strategically implemented in the 
latter years of the 2000s, in recognition of the softer skills required by middle managers 
to ease the process of mutual adjustment.  HR-faddism and over-hyped MLD rhetoric 
may have explained some of the negative or null MLD outcomes in the case studies, 
but in a piecemeal and isolated fashion rather than in a general way.  
 
The second main potential objection to the organisational-contingency explanation, 
concerning MLD as an expression of political conflict, links back to the discussion at the 
end of Section 3.2.1 of unionisation as a potential obstacle to MLD. In the LFB case in 
Chapter 5, it was concluded that the influence on the MLD process of conflict between 
the employers and the FBU was strong, but neither consistent nor insurmountable. A 
comparison with the SWT case is instructive, in which political tensions between 
management and unions were also important. At SWT, the training of line managers, 
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particularly in attendance and discipline management, may be interpreted a means of 
extending managerial control over a strongly unionised staff.  
 
Yet it is important to recognise that even the controversial attendance and discipline 
policies at SWT were agreed by the unions as essential tools of coordination for the 
smooth-running of the business. Although staff at SWT may have subsequently 
experienced the company’s HR policies as instruments of political control, especially as 
employment relations problems resurfaced periodically (see for example ASLEF's strike 
action at SWT over taxi fares around the time as this fieldwork, BBC News Online, 18 
July 2006), the reported experiences of individual middle and front-line managers 
suggest that MLD was primarily a strategic, functional response to organisational 
requirements, rather than a tactical move in the political conflict with the unionised 
operating core. Insofar as MLD was directed towards overcoming employee resistance 
to the formal HR policies, adversarial union-management relations were seen as an 
obstacle to be surmounted in the interests of customer service, rather than the primary 
motivation behind the investment in MLD.  
 
A more consensual political environment appeared to exist at KASS, at least amongst 
its management, as the needs of the professional-managerial hybrid organisation 
seemed to be relatively uncontroversial in terms of the practicalities of middle 
managerial work. The congruence between individuals’ learning outcomes and the 
strategic goals underpinning the MLD interventions at KASS has been discussed (see 
Section 6.4). Whereas informal learning at LFB did not fully match with the formal 
strategic outcomes of MLD, informal learning amongst managers at KASS largely 
complemented the achievement of intended MLD outcomes. Even at LFB, there was a 
degree of consensus around the need for professionalised incident management, if not 
around other strategic MLD goals such as community fire safety. Therefore, while MLD 
outcomes may be partly a product of a contested and political process, particularly in 
uniformed and unionised machine bureaucratic-environments, the overall evidence 
suggests that that they are primarily shaped by the organisational context, within which 
political differences may constrain the conditions for effective learning transfer. 
 
Before reaching a final conclusion regarding the reasons for the patterns of MLD 
outcomes across the cases, it is important to consider the influence of the other 
potentially interfering factor identified in Section 3.2.1: that of gender bias.  It was 
argued in Section 3.2.1 that gender bias might be expected: i) to restrict access for 
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women particularly to leader and leadership development activities, the informal 
methods of which tend to rely on membership of elite networks; and ii) to influence 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the value of MLD outcomes according to gendered 
assumptions about managerial job roles. 
 
The first type of gender effect would have led to the observation of uneven participation 
in leader and leadership development activities in the case organisations due to the 
marginalisation of women. However, there was no apparent evidence of this in the three 
cases. KASS was a female-dominated organisation, as were the leader development 
and leadership development activities, at least on the basis of the interviewee sample. 
With respect to leadership development, the lack of investment in this type of MLD in 
the other two organisations prevents a comparative judgement. With respect to leader 
development, however, it may be observed that, at LFB, the miscellaneous leadership 
workshops were expressly designed to encourage the participation of non-uniformed 
managers, who tended to be female. At SWT, the participants in the talent management 
programme were over 33 per cent women, as opposed to 20 per cent of managers in 
the company overall in 2006 (SWT documentation). It cannot be argued, therefore, that 
the pattern of selection of managers for leader development across the cases can be 
explained by gender bias.   
 
The second type of gender effect, related to stereotypical assumptions about 
managerial job roles and the perceived value of MLD outcomes, is potentially stronger 
in the three cases. It was implied in Section 3.2.1 that female-dominated organisational 
environments, that also demand stereotypically female managerial behaviours, might 
over-report the strength of the outcomes from leader and leadership development, as 
these types of MLD are generally designed to promote the softer skills concerned with 
communicating and interrelating. The parallel argument would then be that male-
dominated environments, that also demand stereotypically male behaviours, might 
under-report the outcomes of such intervention. At the female-dominated KASS, there 
was indeed a generally positive response to leader and leadership development, 
whereas at the male-dominated LFB, managers tended to resist formal development 
interventions directed towards softer skills concerned with employee motivation and 
community fire safety. Following on from the point made in Section 5.4 about the 
possibility of gender bias in the reported MLD outcomes at LFB, it is possible that 
gendered assumptions about the value of softer skills played a role in the contrasting 
experiences of leader development in LFB and KASS.  However, a contrast between 
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LFB and the male-dominated SWT is also instructive, in that the experiences of SWT’s 
managers of developing their softer skills were generally positive, despite the male-
dominated environment and the continued importance attached to the ‘hard’ skills 
required in the railway industry (such as driving and fleet maintenance in hostile 
conditions).  
 
The most plausible explanation for these differences in the demand and perceived 
value of the softer MLD outcomes across the cases is that the professionalised 
environment at KASS was the most conducive to the softer-orientated leader and 
leadership development options. KASS afforded the greatest opportunities out of the 
three organisations for managers to reflect on their styles and adapt them for the 
purposes of mutual adjustment. Conversely the environment at LFB, and to a lesser 
extent that of SWT, presented less opportunity to apply this type of learning due to the 
more mechanical nature of the core work tasks of the organisation. Gender may have 
played some role in determining perceptions how the softer MLD outcomes were 
perceived in the cases, but the primary reasons for differences in the strength of 
investment in the softer types of MLD and in their subsequent outcomes lies in the 
nature of the services provided by the organisations: namely the ‘harder’, more physical 
emergency services in the case of LFB; the ‘harder’, safety-critical transport services in 
the case of SWT (though with a stronger orientation towards ‘softer’ customer services); 
and the ‘softer’ caring services in the case of KASS.  
 
In the final analysis, that the Initial conditions 1-3 were established in the case studies 
serves to strengthen the validity of the overall proposition that MLD outcomes are 
shaped by structural organisational context.  That the case studies established with 
some confidence that middle management roles and skill sets, and the changes to 
them, varied according to organisational structure and the strategies of divisionalisation, 
professionalisation and adhocratisation, provided a solid set of job and organisational 
structural contexts to which MLD was then applied, and within which MLD outcomes 
could be observed. Nevertheless, with regard to Hypothesis 3, it is necessary to 
reconsider the possible counterfactual explanations for the MLD outcomes.  
 
Counterfactual explanations for the patterns of MLD options and outcomes were 
discussed and largely discounted at the end of each of the case study chapters. Taken 
together, however, the case study evidence presents the following key question: could 
the observed changes in the cases have been observed without MLD intervention? Or, 
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more specifically: i) could the improvements in HR and business performance at SWT 
have been achieved without investment in line management training (and, to an extent, 
talent management)?; ii) could progressively improved Audit Commission reports at 
LFB have been achieved without the station commander development programme?; 
and iii) could progressively improved external assessments at KASS been achieved 
without investment in a portfolio of MLD activities?  
 
As discussed in Section 3.5, counterfactual explanations of group and organisational 
level changes are impossible to prove conclusively without the collection of ‘before-and-
after’ data and without studying the differences between experiment and control groups. 
However, so far as the specific question of line management training at SWT is 
concerned, there was such a strong connection between the accounts of middle 
managers, staff satisfaction survey data and HR performance data on the operational 
side of the business, that other explanations for the observed changes at group and 
organisational level are implausible. Indeed this interpretation of a strong connection is 
reinforced by the negative accounts of managers on the non-operational side of the 
business, who resented compliance with what they saw as unnecessary investment in 
line management training, precisely because it was so relevant and effective on the 
operational side (see Section 4.4).  
 
With regard to the station commander development programme at LFB, there is a 
stronger case for arguing that changes in the organisation would have been achieved 
without MLD intervention. Such was the strength of both the top-down centralised 
control over working methods and the culture of informal learning on the fire station, 
that it is plausible for the more professionalised approach to incident management, for 
example, to have been introduced without managers having to complete the relevant 
competence-based management development modules. Indeed, the more sceptical 
accounts of middle managers’ experience of training emphasised this point of view (see 
Section 5.3). However, it is important to recognise the role of the competence-based 
system of development as a process of validation of learnt practice, rather than the 
learning experience itself. Therefore, while scepticism of the station commander 
development programme itself may have been expressed, it nevertheless provided the 
framework within which the learning of new working methods could be taught, 
practiced, shaped and validated. In this sense, the group- and organisational-level 
outcomes at LFB were the product of MLD ‘intervention’.  
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Lastly, with regard to the combination of MLD interventions at KASS, it has already 
been acknowledged that MLD formed part of a bundle of staff care and HR measures to 
which improved HR outcomes could be attributed (see Section 6.4). With regard to the 
specific contribution of MLD, the consistency between the accounts of middle 
management learners and Investors in People reports, particularly with regard to the 
diploma in management, suggests that MLD played a decisive role in reinforcing the 
official HR policies and the strategic goals of KASS and KCC. It is therefore 
questionable whether such strong strategic coherence at KASS could have been 
achieved without the significant MLD investment. Similarly, the interview and 
documentary evidence suggests a strong causal relationship between leadership 
development activity and new approaches to coordination that were introduced through 
middle managers to help navigate the new uncertainties in the organisational and 
regulatory environment.  
 
On balance, despite the influence of other factors on the actual MLD outcomes, it may 
be concluded that the influence of organisational and job context provides the best 
explanation for the pattern observed across the case studies, which was broadly in line 
with the theoretical model of contingent MLD outcomes. It is reasonable to conclude 
that Hypothesis 3 is largely supported by the case study evidence.  
 
 
Hypothesis 4. Extent of structural transition and effect on MLD 
 
The extent of structural transition determines the extent to which MLD serves 
organisational stability and/or change.  
 
The limits to structural transition in the three case studies have been argued to have 
strongly influenced the patterns of MLD options and outcomes. The remaining question 
is whether the balance of MLD’s contribution to organisational stability vis-à-vis 
organisational change is shaped by the extent of structural transition. 
 
The central argument in this thesis has been that MLD options are driven and MLD 
outcomes are shaped by varying organisational requirements. It should therefore follow 
that the extent of transition from one organisational type to another has a decisive 
influence on MLD’s eventual contribution. The greater the extent of transition, the 
greater the balance of MLD’s contribution towards organisational change; the smaller 
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the extent of transition, the greater the balance of MLD’s contribution towards 
organisational stability.  
 
Any firm confirmation or rejection of this hypothesis is, however, very difficult. This is 
because the precise extent of transition, that is the difference between the original 
organisational type, representing organisational stability, and the adoption of a more 
flexible type, representing realised structural change, is almost impossible to establish 
without advanced measurement techniques. Nevertheless, patterns of MLD options and 
outcomes are identifiable across the three case studies and these provide an insight 
into the balance of MLD’s contribution.  
 
The pattern at SWT was that limited divisionalisation led to MLD options that served 
mainly to support the stability of the machine bureaucracy, albeit one with devolved HR 
responsibilities. The partial nature of the transition – in fact devolution rather than 
divisionalisation - had a decisive influence in determining the effective contribution of 
MLD at SWT. Ultimately, after the upheaval of privatisation and a period of adverse 
employment relations, the need for stability in the ‘slimmed down’ machine bureaucracy 
was the dominant influence in shaping MLD’s overall contribution, rather than the need 
for change towards the divisionalised form. In this sense, MLD served mainly to enable 
change within the organisational type, rather than across organisational types.  
 
At LFB, the intention was to employ MLD as a strategic instrument to promote 
organisational change in the form of professionalisation. First-and-foremost MLD served 
to support the stability of the safety bureaucracy, but it also succeeded in preparing 
managers for some aspects of professionalisation, by promoting and legitimising new 
approaches to incident management and, to an extent, mutual adjustment and 
professional-managerial collaboration. Even so, the LFB case illustrates how MLD 
options may be less constrained by the limited degree of actual structural transition than 
the eventual MLD outcomes.  
 
The KASS case illustrated most clearly the balance between MLD’s contribution to 
organisational stability vis-à-vis change. The needs of the professional bureaucracy 
were predominant in determining the main MLD options and shaping their outcomes. 
Additional MLD investments were then driven by the needs of adhocratisation, but the 
partial and temporary nature of this shift limited the MLD investment and curtailed the 
organisational reach and sustainability of the MLD outcomes. Overall at KASS, the 
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actual extent of transition was decisive in shaping MLD’s total organisational 
contribution.  
 
In summary, the evidence is not sufficiently precise to determine the exact influence of 
the extent of structural transition on the organisational contribution of MLD for middle 
managers. However, the case studies suggest strongly that the chosen or enforced 
limits to transition have a decisive effect on the extent to which MLD interventions 
contribute to strategic change, partly by limiting the willingness of organisations to 
invest in MLD interventions for greater flexibility, and partly by limiting the opportunities 
for individual managers to achieve the expected learning outcomes. Where actual 
transition is limited, then so are the motivations related to structural change behind MLD 
and/or the outcomes associated with strategic change. It follows that, where transition is 
more limited than it is advanced, MLD contributes more to organisational stability than 
to strategic change. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Hypothesis 4 has 
tentative support from the case study evidence, but that the balance of MLD’s 
contribution to organisational stability vis-à-vis strategic change requires further 
investigation.  
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Chapter 8. Conclusion: the contingent role of management and leadership 
development 
 
It’s time to bring management and leadership back together and down to earth. 
(Mintzberg 2004a: 2) 
 
 
The basic problem with much of the MLD literature has been to disconnect managerial 
learning from its natural context and organisational reality (see the quote above, c.f. 
also Grugulis 2007: 155, Mintzberg 2009: 234). In developing, testing and refining an 
organisational contingency model of MLD options and outcomes for middle managers, 
this thesis helps to correct this tendency and represents a significant ‘Mintzberg-plus’-
type advance in the academic literature.  
 
The central hypothesis - that MLD plays an important role in organisational change but 
that greater contextualisation is required to understand its precise contribution – has 
received strong empirical support from the three case studies, which illustrated MLD’s 
contribution to divisionalisation, professionalisation and adhocratisation respectively. As 
has been shown in the previous chapter, different management roles and skill sets, and 
the intended changes to them, may be identified according to different organisational 
types and the structural transitions sought by the organisation’s strategic apex. As was 
also shown, these organisational contingencies then shape the types of MLD that 
organisations invest in, and the outcomes that result. Different types of MLD 
investments – management development, leader development and leadership 
development - were shown to produce outcomes at individual, group and organisational 
levels, but according to different and largely predictable patterns.   
 
In short, the thesis has demonstrated the contingent role of MLD in organisational 
change, as opposed to other roles for MLD that are suggested in the literature. The 
principal rival explanations for MLD’s role in organisations – as best HRM practice, as 
part of institutional mimeticism, as an instrument of political domination and control, and 
as a reproducer of managerial identities (see Mabey and Finch-Lees 2008) – have been 
largely discounted. The overall conclusion that MLD, as an instrument of HRM, plays a 
contingent role, receives support from Pichault and others (see Pichault and Nizet 
2000, Pichault and Schoenaers 2003, Pichault 2007) who cite the importance of 
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organisational and political contingencies for understanding HRM’s contribution to 
organisational change.  
 
In the first section of this final chapter the broader theoretical implications of the thesis 
are considered. In the second section of the chapter, the limitations of the thesis and 
the most fruitful directions for future research in this area are assessed. In the third and 
final section of the chapter, the implications of the thesis for practice and policy are 
discussed.  
 
 
8.1 Theoretical implications 
 
The findings of the thesis point to two main areas in which existing theory needs to be 
refined. First and foremost, the thesis has highlighted the contingent role of MLD in 
organisational change. Second, the thesis has highlighted the importance of the 
organisation’s political context in shaping MLD outcomes.  
 
8.1.1 The contingent role of MLD in organisational change 
 
MLD has conventionally been assumed to play a general role in promoting 
organisational performance and change by aligning managers’ contributions to strategic 
goals (see for example Woodall and Winstanley 1998, Mumford and Gold 2004). 
Furthermore, some leadership theories have emphasised managers’ potential to effect 
radical and transformational change (see Burns 1978, Bass 1985, Kotter 1990).  Other 
academic literature has pointed out the importance of organisational context, but 
stopped short of analysing the effects on MLD of specific organisational contingencies 
(c.f. Mole 2000, Thomson et al. 2001, Mabey 2002). This thesis has shown that, in 
order to understand MLD’s contribution more precisely, it is necessary to examine the 
relationships between different types of organisation, different types of MLD and 
different types of organisational change.  
 
In general terms, it has been shown that machine bureaucracies and divisionalised 
organisations have a greater demand for conventional, classroom-based management 
development activities, due to their requirement for the skills of managerial control. In 
contrast, professional bureaucracies and adhocracies have a greater demand for 
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individualised leader development activities, due to their requirement for the skills 
associated with mutual adjustment. Moreover, adhocracies have a specific demand for 
the collective and less prescribed activities of leadership development, due to their 
ongoing requirement to innovate and manage flux in the operating environment.  
 
In addition to this contingent pattern of investment in the three main MLD options of 
management development, leader development and leadership development, all four 
organisational types demand for their middle managers a slightly different kind of 
management development, due to their varying approaches to managerial coordination 
and control. Middle managers in the machine bureaucracy require an operationally-
oriented type of management development; middle managers in the divisionalised 
organisation require a more strategically-oriented type of management development; 
middle managers in the professional bureaucracies a more applied, professional type of 
management development; and middle managers in the adhocracy a more project 
management-oriented type of development.  
 
The contingent MLD options can be expected to lead to a pattern of multi-levelled MLD 
outcomes. At individual level, MLD outcomes consist of different types of managerial 
competence, depending on the type of managerial control required in the organisation; 
specifically leader development and leadership development can be expected to 
produce individual-level outcomes of intrapersonal competence and interpersonal 
competence respectively. At group level, MLD outcomes consist of various patterns of 
staff compliance and commitment. At organisational level, MLD outcomes consist of 
contributions to organisational stability, balanced with contributions to both planned and 
emergent strategic change. During structural transition, it has been shown how middle 
managers require not only the MLD activities that correspond to their ongoing role, but 
also those associated with a new role within a more flexible organisational structure. 
Moreover, the extent of structural transition can be expected to determine the pattern of 
contingent options and outcomes.  
 
Specifically the thesis has discovered that: i) when the machine bureaucracy 
divisionalises, as illustrated by SWT, investment in line management training makes a 
significant contribution to organisational stability, while leader development is at its most 
effective in the customer-facing divisions of the business; ii) when the safety 
bureaucracy professionalises, as illustrated by LFB, investment in competence-based 
management development and leader development can successfully promote more 
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participatory forms of management, but that political obstacles to MLD are accentuated 
in this type of organisational change; and iii) when the professional bureaucracy 
adhocratises, as illustrated by KASS, investment in the full range of MLD options makes 
a significant contribution to balancing ongoing organisational effectiveness with the 
building of adaptive capacity for the future.  
 
Contrary to a universalistic perspective, the thesis does not find that MLD, when 
implemented according to ‘best practice’ principles, is effective regardless of the 
organisational conditions. Rather, different types of MLD are appropriate according to 
different organisational types and directions of structural transition. Nor does the thesis 
find, as in a neo-institutionalist perspective, that MLD activities are primarily motivated 
by prevailing, fashionable norms in the sector or professional field. Rather, MLD options 
have been found to be driven primarily by different sets of strategic organisational 
concerns. Nor does the thesis find, according to what might be termed a critical 
perspective, that MLD is primarily a political instrument of elites to exert control over 
professionals and other occupational groups. Rather, it finds that MLD on the whole 
plays a genuinely empowering role when aligned with organisational contingencies, in 
which managers may effect changes to working methods in the operating core. Finally, 
the thesis does not find, according to what might be called a post-structuralist 
perspective, that MLD serves to produce new managerial identities. Rather it finds that 
observable efficiency-related outcomes are associated with MLD activity.  
 
The contingency model developed in this thesis may have wider applicability for 
understanding the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of other strategic HRM interventions, 
such as performance- or reward-management initiatives, that seek to effect 
organisational change. The thesis suggests that a contingency approach, that 
recognises the differences between the coordination mechanisms across organisational 
types and the dynamics of structural transition, should be fruitful. Moreover the 
approach should have relevance beyond the study of PSOs. Machine bureaucracies, 
despite their lack of salience in the recent management literature, continue to be an 
important organisational form (Mintzberg 2009: 50). This organisational type may be 
clearly observed in the transport, distribution and emergency services. They may also 
be observed in ‘office factories’ (c.f. Boxall and Purcell 2008: 13) that coordinate the 
routine clerical work of large organisations and in commercial service industries such as 
in supermarkets and call centres (c.f. Boxall et al. 2011). Professional bureaucracies 
continue to be important organisational forms in the public services (Broadbent and 
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Laughlin 2002: 95), and it is in these types of organisations, having already experienced 
a wave of managerialist changes, that the pressure to adapt to greater adhocracy are 
likely to experienced. In private professional services, such as in the legal and 
accountancy sectors, professional bureaucracies are likely to face even greater 
pressures to adopt more adhocratic forms of coordination, assuming the continued 
intensification of market competition and complexity.  
 
Beyond the machine and professional bureaucracies, however, the thesis offers few 
insights into the role of MLD in highly adhocratic and knowledge-intensive 
organisational environments, such as in consulting or research and development. (This 
limitation is discussed further in the next section). Nevertheless, the key conclusion 
remains, that organisational structural configurations and transitions are the primary 
influence over the nature and extent of MLD’s contribution and that this has implications 
for understanding the potential effectiveness of strategic HRM initiatives in general.  
 
In its adoption of a contextualised approach, the thesis has shown the value of a 
detailed analysis of work roles in the organisation, of the specific HRM instrument itself, 
and of the processes by which outcomes of intervention are reached at multiple levels. 
This type of approach is also practised and advocated by Pichault and Schoenaers’ 
(2003), whose model of HRM practices is similarly based on Mintzberg’s structural 
configurations. The authors claim that the different Mintzbergian organisational types 
are linked, if not mechanically, with specific patterns of HRM policies and practices, 
including the whole range of activities, spanning recruitment, training, performance 
management, reward, working time agreements and employment relations (see 2003: 
124).  
 
In its exclusive focus on MLD, the theoretical model in this thesis is narrower in scope 
than that of Pichault and Schoenaers. However, the model here has the advantage of 
enabling a detailed examination of a particular instrument of strategic HRM in its 
organisational context, thus revealing the diversity of approaches within the instrument 
itself, and the complexities of the processes by which its outcomes are reached. This 
necessarily trades depth for breadth, as the particular instrument is studied in isolation 
from other HR policies. It therefore has the disadvantage of failing to capture 
systematically the effects of combining HRM instruments, for example, combining an 
MLD intervention with a specific reward policy. Nonetheless, the thesis suggests that 
subjecting specific HR policies, such as reward- or performance-management, to a 
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similarly detailed contextualised analysis across varying structural types of organisation 
should be fruitful.  
 
 
8.1.2 The importance of the political context of MLD 
 
The three case studies all demonstrated the importance of the political context within 
which MLD policies are applied and their outcomes are reached. While the thesis has 
rejected the interpretation of MLD as an instrument of political control by elites, the 
theoretical model nevertheless recognised how MLD intervention involves attempts to 
reconcile different stakeholder interests.  
 
The SWT case in Chapter 4 displayed a background of political conflict, but this centred 
on the residual resistance of unionised front-line staff towards some of the centralised 
HR policies, leaving middle managers at local level largely unimpeded as they applied 
their learning. The LFB case in Chapter 5 demonstrated the most overt political conflict, 
centring on the dispute between the employers’ modernisation policies and the 
firefighters union, the FBU, and thus constraining MLD outcomes among the FBU’s 
middle management membership. Indeed, it was concluded in Chapter 5 that the 
potential for political obstacles to MLD is accentuated during professionalisation, as this 
type of organisational change involves a process of redefinition of employee roles that 
is likely to be subject to powerful vested interests. The KASS case in Chapter 6 case 
demonstrated the strongest congruence between middle managers’ interests and 
formal organisational goals, but also demonstrated how middle managers negotiated 
between their professional interests and the priorities of their employer, which 
influenced the choices they made in applying their learning.  
 
In the theoretical model of MLD in Chapter 2, political conflict was conceptualised as a 
potential obstacle to MLD, a contextual variable which could be expected to constrain 
the managerial learning process. Yet the evidence has suggested that processes of 
political negotiation should be recognised as integral to the contingent pattern of MLD 
policies and their outcomes, rather than simply an obstacle that the HRD function has to 
overcome in order to design and deliver effective MLD. This resonates with the more 
general conclusion of Truss (2001) in her case study of HRM at Hewlett Packard, that 
an appreciation of the role of informal organisation is critical to understanding how 
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strategic HRM interventions are enacted in organisations. A more systematic approach 
to integrating the political dimension, rather than treating stakeholder conflict as simply 
an obstacle to be overcome in the managerial learning process, would appear to be a 
fruitful way to refine the contingent model of MLD in future empirical research.  
 
 
8.2 Limitations and future directions 
 
There are three main limitations to the thesis. The first limitation relates to the 
narrowness of the evidence base. A stronger test of the causality of the observed MLD 
outcomes would have required a control group of three organisations that did not invest 
in MLD, each paired against the three cases of structural transition. This would have 
strengthened the validity of the conclusions drawn about MLD’s effects during different 
trajectories of organisational change. Generally, a research design that included a 
greater number of cases of MLD in each organisational change category, or a broader 
survey-based approach, might have established with greater validity the relative 
importance of organisational structural type as an explanatory variable in MLD’s 
contribution. This might also have better neutralised the possible effects of gender bias 
that were discussed in Chapters 3 and 7. In spite of this, the depth and richness of the 
case study evidence provided a strong basis on which to demonstrate with some 
confidence the importance of the different ways in which MLD options and outcomes 
are primarily shaped by organisational type and the direction of structural transition.  
 
The second limitation is also related to the limited number of cases. As noted in the 
previous section, the empirical focus on the machine/safety bureaucracy and the 
professional bureaucracy prevented more detailed insights into the role of MLD in 
adhocracies. This would have been avoided by including a case study of MLD’s 
contribution in a highly knowledge-intensive and less boundaried organisation. It might 
have been instructive, for example, to undertake a study of MLD in a research and 
development organisation in the scientific, medical or engineering sectors, which may 
be expected to have little reliance on coordination through standardisation or 
centralised control.  
 
The third limitation of the thesis concerns the research methods used in the case 
studies. The organisation of control groups of managers who did not participate in MLD, 
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and the use of more detailed instruments, such as Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe’s 
(2001) 360-degree leadership questionnaire, to measure the before-and-after effects of 
MLD, as reported by both individual managers and their colleagues, would have 
enabled greater confidence in the observed multi-levelled outcomes in the case studies. 
This should have then produced a stronger answer to the important question of ‘what if 
no MLD’? As it stands, the effects of MLD in the case studies are difficult to isolate 
precisely due to the range of other HRM interventions during the same time periods. 
For example, in the KASS case, MLD interventions represented part of a wide-ranging 
‘staff care package’, including a range of reward incentives for improving individual 
performance. The use of more precise instruments to measure changes in managers’ 
behaviour against that of a control group may have overcome this problem.  
 
This last question of the attributable effects of MLD in organisations opens up the first of 
three main directions for future research in this field. The first direction concerns the 
contribution of MLD to organisational change relative or complementary to other HRM 
interventions. The thesis has demonstrated that, in specific organisational and job 
circumstances, MLD can contribute to strategic organisational change. However, as 
suggested in the previous section, there is an empirical need to compare MLD’s 
contribution with, for example, the effects of a new performance management 
framework or reward policy. In particular, it would be interesting to investigate the 
complementarities and tensions between longer-term, developmental and resource-
based approaches to HRM, of which MLD is part, and the more ‘contractual’ 
approaches to incentivising managers through performance targets (c.f. Sisson and 
Purcell 2010).   
 
The second direction for future research concerns the political dimension to the role of 
MLD in organisational change. In particular, Pichault and Schoenaers’ (2003) 
contextualist model of HRM, further developed in Pichault (2007), which integrates a set 
of political tensions into a Mintzbergian framework of organisational differences, 
appears to provide a promising way to refine the theoretical model of contingent MLD 
outcomes. The refined model could then be tested in a new study with a selection of 
cases that not only allowed a comparison across Mintzberg’s organisational types, but 
also a comparison of, for example, unionised and non-unionised work environments in 
order to study in a more systematic way the effects on MLD of different political 
contexts.  
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The third direction for future research concerns the balance between organisational 
stability and change and the contribution of MLD and other HRM strategies that are 
aimed at altering this balance. While this thesis has demonstrated how MLD can 
contribute both to maintaining organisational continuity and facilitating strategic change, 
there is a need for greater precision in the understanding of the relationship between 
the two (c.f. Leana and Barry 2000). Although MLD is typically associated with 
organisational change, it is necessary to investigate further, through longitudinal 
studies, the circumstances under which MLD interventions contribute to stability over 
change, and vice versa.  
 
8.3 Implications for practice and policy 
 
In their 2004 review of the evidence of MLD’s contribution, Burgoyne et al noted a 
persistent lack of knowledge about ‘what works and when’ (2004: 1, 82. See also 
Section 2.1 of this thesis). The thesis sheds considerable light on this question by 
predicting the relative effectiveness of different types of MLD under varying structural 
conditions. This has significant implications for both practitioners and policymakers.  
 
For MLD practitioners, there is already much academic advice on the importance of 
sensitivity to organisational context. Particularly Mole (2000) has shown how MLD 
interventions should be designed and planned so that both individual and organisational 
development needs are met. Similarly, the Center for Creative Leadership in California 
(c.f. Van Velsor and McCauley 2004) have demonstrated both the practical importance 
of Day’s (2001) conceptual distinction between management development, leader 
development and leadership development, and the importance of individualised 
assessment, challenge and support (see also Section 2.2). However, the ‘support’ 
element of the learning process requires a finer-grained understanding. Support for 
MLD is normally understood in terms of a conducive organisational culture for learning, 
in which MLD participants are afforded the time and space for experimentation and 
reflection (c.f. Guest and King 2005: 250). While this cultural perspective has generated 
important insights for practitioners, it overlooks the structural dimension of how the 
organisational environment supports or constrains the MLD process.  
 
A greater appreciation of how organisational structure shapes MLD should help 
practitioners design more effective interventions and avoid costly investments that do 
little to further strategic organisational goals. The findings of this thesis show how MLD 
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participants require not only the time and support for experimentation and reflection, but 
also the opportunity to exercise an appropriate amount of managerial discretion. Given 
that a manager’s discretion derives chiefly from his or her role within the organisation’s 
structure (Mintzberg 1979,  2009), then MLD practitioners would be well advised to 
consider the fit between the type of MLD and the discretion afforded by the manager’s 
current or changing role.  
 
Organisations are complex and dynamic, so a perfect role-MLD fit is unlikely to be 
achieved in every circumstance. Moreover, individual learners may vary widely in their 
motivation and commitment, leading even the ‘best fit’ MLD design to fail. But the 
findings from this thesis suggest that even if individuals are appropriately selected for 
MLD (see ‘assessment’), and even if the learning activities are well managed (see 
‘challenge’), a lack of fit between the MLD design and the organisation’s dominant 
method of coordination or direction of change (see structural ‘support’) is likely to render 
much MLD investment ineffective. It is also important to add that line and staff 
managers within the same organisation may demand a different kind of fit to suit their 
differing methods of coordination.  
 
In general terms, therefore: i) standardised types of management development are 
likely to be most effective in mechanistic or professional types of organisation; ii) 
individualised leader development activities are likely to be most effective in 
professional and adhocratic organisations where much mutual adjustment is required, 
or will be required in the future; and iii) more open-ended, collective leadership 
development activities are likely to be most effective in more adhocratic organisational 
situations, or in organisations that are introducing a greater degree of ad hoc or project-
based ways of working for particular groups of managers.  
 
Such a finer-grained understanding of MLD’s role in organisations also has significant 
implications for policymakers. Since the mid-1980s there has been a raft of policy 
initiatives in the UK, aimed at developing better quality managers and leaders in both 
the private and public sectors (Guest and King 2005: 237-38). More recently, 
government concerns about the quality of public services and a lack of progress in the 
modernisation reforms have led to a wave of investment in leadership-orientated 
development initiatives for public managers (Storey 2004b: 4-6, Lawler 2008: 22). The 
last decade alone has witnessed the establishment of the NHS Leadership Centre, the 
National College for School Leadership, and the Leadership Centre for Local 
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Government. As researchers have pointed out, however, little is known about the actual 
impact of this widespread investment in MLD (Charlesworth et al. 2003, Burgoyne et al. 
2004: 70).  
 
Policymakers’ lack of knowledge about the actual contribution of these MLD initiatives is 
partly due to the inherent difficulties of attributing of organisational performance to MLD 
(see Section 3.3). But it is also due to a certain blind faith, based on a widely-held 
assumption among policy elites that MLD must be playing a generally positive, 
transformative role (c.f. Grugulis 2007: 151, 155). As this thesis shows, however, an 
understanding of MLD’s actual contribution requires an appreciation of the structural 
contingencies that shape it.  
 
There is, as already discussed, considerable organisational diversity in the public 
services (see Section 3.2). Yet, when implementing public management reforms, 
policymakers have tended to overlook the importance of the specific organisational 
mechanisms on the ground. As Mintzberg (1996: 80-81) points out, the public services 
simultaneously employ, among others, the machine model, the divisionalised 
‘performance-control’-oriented model, the professional model and the network model.  
Each has its own dominant logic of coordination, within which MLD may be expected to 
play out differently. Policymakers seeking to improve management and leadership 
would therefore be well advised to adapt their policies in ways that are sensitive to the 
different organisational models in operation.  
 
  
 309 
List of Appendices 
 
I. Interview questions for HR managers 
II. Interview questions for senior managers 
III. Interview questions for middle managers 
IV. Sample research proposal to case study organisations 
V. Sample letter of invitation to middle managers for interview 
VI. Anonymised list of interviews by case study organisation 
VII. Nvivo7 nodal structure 
  
 310 
Appendix I. Interview questions for learning and development/HR managers 
 
i. Please explain your role within the organisation and how you came to be in your 
present post.  
ii. What would you say have been the most significant changes in management 
development in the organisation in the last 5-10 years? 
iii. How is management development strategy formulated and what are the key 
drivers within the organisation?  
iv. What are the key external drivers and linkages?   
v. To what extent would you say management development is implemented 
strategically across the organisation? 
vi. Which specific management development activities in the last 5 years or so would 
you say have made the most difference to the way managers behave and work?  
vii. How is the management development strategy evaluated and what have been the 
main outcomes of evaluation? 
viii. How could the benefits of managers’ learning be increased?  
ix. Overall, what would you say are the strengths and weaknesses of management 
development at the organisation and how could it be made more effective? 
x. What are the likely future developments in management development at the 
organisation? 
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Appendix II. Interview questions for senior managers 
 
i. Please explain your role and how you came to be in your present post. 
ii. Please give me an overview of your/your team’s management development 
activities to date.  
iii. Tell me a bit about your/your team’s most significant management development 
experiences to date. How did things change for you/your team as a result of these 
particular experiences? 
iv. How important is the learning that takes place on the job (outside of formal 
development activities)? How is this learning applied? 
v. To what extent is your/your team’s management development specific to the 
organisation? To what extent does it help you/your team in your present job? 
vi. To what extent is your/your team’s management development transferable to other 
jobs within the organisation or outside of the organisation? To what extent do you 
think it will help your/their career(s)? 
vii. Overall, what would you say are the strengths and weaknesses of management 
development in the organisation? 
viii. How could management development in the organisation be improved? 
ix. Is there anything else that you want to mention that you feel might be relevant?  
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Appendix III. Interview questions for middle managers 
 
i. Please explain your role and how you came to be in your present post. 
ii. Please give me an overview of your management development activities to date.  
iii. Tell me a bit about your most significant management training and development 
experiences to date. How did things change for you as a result of these particular 
experiences? 
iv. How important is the learning that takes place on the job (outside of formal training 
and development activities)? How is this learning applied? 
v. To what extent is your management training and development specific to the 
organisation? To what extent does it help you in your present job? 
vi. To what extent is your management training and development transferable to 
other jobs within the organisation or outside of the organisation? To what extent do 
you think it will help your career? 
vii. Overall, what would you say are the strengths and weaknesses of management 
training and development in the organisation? 
viii. How could management training and development in the organisation be 
improved? 
ix. Is there anything else that you want to mention that you feel might be relevant?  
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Appendix IV: Sample research proposal to case study organisations  
 
 
Developing middle managers at Kent County Council 
– a proposed research project 
 
 
 
Patrick McGurk 
BA Hons, Dipl. Betriebswirt, PGCE, MA, Cand PhD 
 
Lecturer in Management 
University of Greenwich 
 
Postgraduate Research Student 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) 
 
 
May 2007 
 
 
Contact details:   University of Greenwich Business School 
     Maritime Greenwich Campus 
     Old Royal Naval College 
     Park Row 
     Greenwich 
     London SE10 9LS 
Tel. 020 8331 9060 (direct dial / voicemail) 
p.mcgurk@gre.ac.uk  
 
Supervisor at LSE:   
Professor David Marsden 
(d.marsden@lse.ac.uk)  
Department of Management 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following meetings between researchers at the London School of Economics and Chief 
Executive Peter Gilroy, this document outlines a proposed programme of research into 
the impact of management and leadership development (MLD) interventions at Kent 
County Council (KCC).  
 
 
2. Rationale  
 
Investment in MLD is increasing at all levels in the public services. This is an important 
aspect of the search for better quality public management to improve customer 
satisfaction and organisational outcomes. Yet little information exists in this area on 
which types of interventions work, and under which circumstances.  
 
In particular, the research proposal focuses on the development needs and learning 
activities of middle managers (MMs). It seeks to answer the following key questions.  
 
1. Which skills do MMs need to develop to successfully manage and lead in the 
organisation?  
2. How do MM learn these skills most effectively?  
3. What is MMs’ learning contributing to organisational change and performance?  
 
As part of a series of studies of MLD in public services, including the London Fire 
Brigade and South West Trains, proposed here is a case study of MM development in 
one of the UK’s highest performing and most improved local governments, KCC. The 
research will focus on one of KCC’s most innovative areas of provision, Kent Adult 
Social Services (KASS).  The research will assess the contribution to this area of KCC 
made by MLD and identify both specific and general lessons for the future.  
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3. Aim and Objectives  
 
The overall aim is to produce a consultancy report that evaluates the contribution of 
MLD for middle managers to organisational performance and change at KASS.  
 
The secondary aim is to make a comparative assessment between:  
a) the Diploma in Management programme offered centrally and certificated 
through the Chartered Management Institute (CMI); and  
b) a more recent leadership development intervention accessed by some MMs - 
‘From Good To Great’.  
 
The specific objectives of the proposed research project are to answer the following 
questions.  
 
i. What are the key features and desired outcomes of MLD, as accessed by 
MMs? 
ii. What were the critical experiences of individual MM-learners in terms of 
business outcomes?  
iii. How has the behaviour of MMs changed as a result of development 
interventions? 
iv. What is the role of informal learning amongst MMs?  
v. How could the benefits of MMs’ learning be increased? 
vi. What are the strengths and weaknesses of MLD at KASS/KCC and how does 
it contribute to organisational performance and outcomes? 
vii. What are the key lessons for likely future developments in MLD at KCC? To 
what extent will they be effective and to what extent should they be modified? 
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4. Proposed activities 
 
The key stakeholders, from whom cooperation is sought, are: 
 the relevant senior managers at KCC with responsibility for MM-development in 
KASS;  
 a member of KCC staff to provide limited administrative support; and 
 a sample of 20 MM-learners from across the 2 directorates.   
 
 
The main sources of data would be:  
 
 ‘critical incident interviews’ (held on-site, confidential and anonymised in the 
final report);  
 relevant KCC documentation 
e.g. corporate, departmental and learning & development performance data, 
including CPA/Self Assessment reports; staff satisfaction survey data.  
 
 
The key research activities would therefore be:  
 
i) exploratory interviews with selected senior managers  
ii) ‘critical incident’ interviews with 10 MMs from KASS who have recently 
completed the diploma in management qualification (or near to completion) 
iii)  ‘critical incident’ interviews with 10 MMs from KASS who have recently 
completed the ‘From Good to Great’ programme 
iv) the gathering of various relevant documentation  
 
 317 
5. Proposed Timetable 
 
Activity Date 
Negotiating the research agreement and fieldwork schedule  May 2007 
Setting up interviews with MMs via administrative support May 2007 
Undertaking the interviews on-site at KCC June – July 2007 
Requesting of documentation via administrative support July 2007 
Analysis of findings August – September 
2007 
Informal interim report September 2007 
Writing -up  October-December 
2007 
Dissemination of report and evaluation by stakeholders January 2008 
 
 
 
 
6. Proposed Outcome 
 
The overall outcome would be a consultancy report for the CEO and other stakeholders 
of KCC including:  
 
 an assessment of the investment in MLD for MMs in terms of individual, 
business and organisational outcomes; 
 an evaluation of the key features, strengths, weaknesses and future direction of 
MLD strategy for MMs at KCC; and 
 recommendations for changes in MLD strategy at KCC and general 
recommendations for policy on public management development. 
 
All those interviewed would also receive a copy of their interview and of the final report 
in return for their participation.  
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Appendix V: Sample letter of invitation to middle managers for interview  
 
 
May 2007 
 
Dear Colleague 
 
Research into Management and Leadership Development at Kent County Council 
 
May I introduce myself. I am a Lecturer in Management at the University of Greenwich 
and a postgraduate researcher at the London School of Economics. I am also working 
with the Learning and Development Team at KCC to help evaluate its leadership and 
management development programmes.  
 
As part of my PhD research, I would like to invite you to an informal interview with me 
about your experiences on the diploma in management programme and/or the ‘From 
Good to Great’ programme. The interviews are confidential and take only 45 minutes, to 
be held at Sessions House.  
 
I will summarise the interview data from all respondents anonymously and provide an 
overall report for the Leaning and Development team, of copy of which you will receive. 
 
Please confirm  to ………….. at Learning and Development, Sessions House, if you are 
willing to participate in this exercise so that we may arrange a suitable time for the 
interview during June/July.  
 
I hope that you will participate in this research of practical and academic importance, 
and that you will find the experience a useful opportunity to reflect on your own career 
development.  
 
If you have any objections or questions, please do not hesitate to contact me with your 
telephone number on my Greenwich or LSE email below and I will call you back. 
 
With kind regards,  
 
Patrick McGurk 
Lecturer in Management, University of Greenwich (p.mcgurk@gre.ac.uk)  
Postgraduate Researcher, London School of Economics (p.mcgurk@lse.ac.uk)  
 
 319 
Appendix VI: Anonymised list of interviews by case organisation 
 
South West Trains 
Human Resource Director 
Acting Head of Resourcing and Development 
3 Learning and Development Managers 
Head of Guards 
Head of Drivers 
Operations Manager 
Head of Information Technology 
Head of Pensions and Payroll 
Head of Train Service Delivery 
3 Group station managers 
4 Fleet depot managers 
2 Driver depot managers 
Guards Depot Manager 
Driver Standards Manager 
Guards Manager 
Route Revenue Protection Manager  
Operations Compliance Manager 
Technical Reliability Manager 
Contracts Manager 
Performance, Compliance and Planning Manager 
Senior Project Engineer 
ASLEF Company Council member and a branch representative 
 
London Fire Brigade 
Head of Training and Development Delivery 
2 Leadership and Management Development Managers 
Vocational Learning Manager 
9 Assistant District Officers (including 7 active station commanders) 
Administration Manager 
Recruitment Manager 
Planning Officer 
Fire Safety Inspection Officer 
Information and Planning Officer 
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Kent Adult Social Services / Kent County Council 
(KCC) 
Chief Executive Officer  
Director of Policy and Resources  
Head of Strategic Development  
Head of Corporate Performance 
Head of Corporate Communications  
Organisational Development Manager  
Acting Head of Policy Unit  
Operations Manager  
 
(KASS) 
Acting Head Learning Resources  
6 District Managers 
Head of Performance and Planning 
Area Finance Manager 
Head of Contracting and Quality Assurance  
Locality Organiser (residential care) 
Senior Practitioner (hospital & social services) 
Senior Support Time and Recovery Worker 
Team Manager (learning disabilities) 
Team Leader (adult social care district) 
Exchequer Manager 
Web Team Manager  
Project Planning Manager 
Budget manager 
Continuous Improvement Manager 
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Appendix VII: Nvivo7 nodal structure (middle manager interviews) 
 
Most important learning experience 
 Management development (MD) 
o Line management training at SWT  
o Station Commander Development Programme at LFB  
o Diploma in Management at KASS  
 Leader development (LD) 
o WOW at SWT  
o Talent Management at SWT  
o Leadership workshops at SWT  
o Leadership workshops at LFB  
o From Good to Great at KASS  
 Leadership development (LSD) 
o Inspirational Leadership at KASS  
 Learning on the job 
 Mentoring 
 Other 
 
 
Content of learning 
 Professional/technical 
 Managerial  
 Intrapersonal  
 Interpersonal  
 
Contribution of formal learning (critical incidents) 
 Continuity 
o Professional/technical competence 
o Implementation of managerial objectives  
 Change 
o Self-awareness  
o Improved 1-1 relationships 
o Improved team relationships 
o Business innovation (innovation) 
 
Contribution of informal learning 
 Continuity 
o Professional/technical competence 
o Implementation of managerial objectives  
 Change 
o Self-awareness  
o Improved 1-1 relationships 
o Improved team relationships 
o Business innovation (innovation) 
 
Organisational Conditions 
 Greater importance of informal learning 
 Equal balance between formal and informal learning 
 Conditions for successful MLD 
 Conditions for failed MLD 
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